Tag: Financial Regulation


FinCEN: Know Your Customer Requirements

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Sean Joyce, Joseph Nocera, Jeff Lavine, Didier Lavion, and Armen Meyer.

In recent years, authorities in the US and abroad have increased their focus on modernizing and enforcing anti-money laundering and terrorism financing (AML) regulations. As part of these efforts, the US’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements in 2014, which we expect to be finalized this year. [1]

FinCEN’s KYC requirements were proposed as part of a broader regulation setting out the core elements of a customer due diligence program. [2] Taken together, these elements are intended to help financial institutions avoid illicit transactions by improving their view of their clients’ identities and business relationships.

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Fed Rules on CFO Attestation Requirements

Andrew R. Gladin is a partner in the Financial Services and Corporate and Finance Groups at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication authored by Mr. Gladin, Mark J. Welshimer, and Sarah C. Flowers. The complete publication, including Annexes, is available here.

On January 21, 2016, the Federal Reserve published in the Federal Register a final rule (the “Final Rule”) [1] modifying Forms FR Y-14A, FR Y-14Q and FR Y-14M (collectively, the “FR Y-14 Forms”). Most notably, the Final Rule requires the chief financial officer (“CFO”) of each bank holding company (“BHC”) that is overseen by the Federal Reserve’s Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (the “LISCC Firms”) and that reports on the FR Y-14 Forms to make attestations regarding those forms and to “agree to report material weaknesses and any material errors in the data” reported on those forms.

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U.S. Uncleared Swap Margin, Capital, and Segregation Rules

Annette Nazareth is a partner in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and a former commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on a Davis Polk visual memorandum; the complete publication, including charts, is available here.

U.S. prudential regulators (the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, FCA and FHFA) and the CFTC have finalized uncleared swap margin, capital and segregation requirements (the “PR rules,” and “CFTC rules,” respectively, and the “final rules,” collectively).* The PR rules apply to swap entities that are prudentially regulated by a U.S. prudential regulator (“PR CSEs”). The CFTC rules apply to swap entities that are regulated by the CFTC and that are not prudentially regulated (“CFTC CSEs”). In this memorandum, “covered swap entities” refers to PR CSEs and CFTC CSEs, together.

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Designated Lender Counsel in Private Equity Loans

Jason M. Halper is a partner in the Securities Litigation & Regulatory Enforcement Practice Group at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on an Orrick publication by Mr. Halper and Rob McKenna.

Recent media reports have expressed alarm at the use of “designated lender counsel” in private equity-sponsored leveraged loan transactions. [1] The phrase refers to the practice of a private equity firm instructing the investment bank arranging its syndicated loan as to which law firm the private equity firm would like the investment bank to use as the bank’s counsel. According to the press reports, the practice (also known as “sponsor designated counsel”) has become prevalent in the syndicated loan market. The question raised in the press is whether this practice creates a material conflict of interest, because the law firm representing the investment bank arguably generates fees based on the strength of its relationship with the private equity firm across the table. If it does, the next question is whether that conflict could be argued to adversely affect the lending arrangement, with potential negative consequences for investors in the loan.

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Board Governance: Higher Expectations, but Better Practices?

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Jeff Lavine, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer. The complete publication, including appendix, is available here.

The board’s role in risk governance continues to attract the attention of regulators who demand that the appropriate risk tone be set at the top of financial institutions. While the largest US banks have made significant progress toward meeting these expectations, many institutions still have a lot of work to do.

Our observations of the policies and practices of the largest US banks indicate that boards have undergone structural and functional transformation in recent years. We are finding that this transformation has been fueled not only by banks’ need to satisfy regulators, but also by their own realization of the benefits of stronger risk governance. We believe the post-crisis regulatory requirements and heightened expectations for risk governance, when fully implemented, will lead to improvements in the board’s understanding of risk taking activities and position the board to more effectively challenge management’s actions when necessary.

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2015 FINRA Enforcement Actions

Jonathan N. Eisenberg is partner in the Government Enforcement practice at K&L Gates LLP. This post is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Eisenberg.

Over the past several years, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the self-regulatory organization responsible for regulating every brokerage firm and broker doing business with the U.S. public, brought between 1,300 and 1,600 disciplinary actions each year. In 2014, the most recent year for which full-year statistics are available, it ordered $134 million in fines and $32.2 million in restitution. During the same period, it barred or suspended nearly 1,200 individuals, and expelled or suspended 23 firms. It also referred over 700 fraud cases to other federal or state agencies for potential prosecution. FINRA orders also often trigger automatic “statutory disqualifications” under Section 3(a)(39) of the Securities Exchange Act and Article III, Section 4 of FINRA’s By-Laws. Absent relief, these disqualifications prohibit persons from associating with a broker-dealer or prohibit firms from acting as broker-dealers.

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OCC’s Recovery Planning Proposal

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On December 17th, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) proposed recovery planning standards for banks with assets of $50 billion or more. [1] The proposal was released exactly one year after the FDIC released guidance for covered insured depository institutions (CIDI) that significantly raised the resolution planning bar for many of these same banks. [2]

Most institutions will find that they will be able to leverage their existing risk management, business continuity planning, capital and liquidity planning, stress testing, and resolution plans in order to build their recovery plan. Many of the proposed standards’ requirements can be met by modifying existing bodies of work.

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Recovery Planning for Large National Banks

This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell LLP publication by C. Andrew GerlachRebecca J. Simmons, Mark J. Welshimer and Connie Y. Lam. Mr. Gerlach, Ms. Simmons, and Mr. Welshimer are partners in the Financial Services Group; and Ms. Lam is a firm associate.

On December 16, 2015, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) solicited public comment, through a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the “NPR”), [1] on proposed guidelines to establish standards for recovery planning by certain large insured national banks, insured Federal savings associations and insured Federal branches of foreign banks (the “Guidelines”).
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The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Amendment and Privacy Disclosure

David  M. Geffen is a Senior Attorney at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on a Ropes & Gray Alert.

On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed into law the nearly 500-page Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, which included an amendment of the consumer privacy provisions within the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the “Amendment”). The Amendment, which went into effect immediately, significantly reduces the need for financial institutions to provide an annual privacy disclosure to consumers that describes the financial institution’s privacy policies and practices. If a financial institution satisfies certain conditions (described below), it need not provide an annual privacy disclosure.
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Oversight of the Financial Stability Oversight Council

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s recent testimony before the United States House Committee on Financial Services, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council). Below I highlight my perspective on the Council and my role on it.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) established the Council to provide comprehensive monitoring of the stability of our nation’s financial system. Specifically, the Council is responsible for:

  • Identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure—or ongoing activities—of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace;
  • Promoting market discipline by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and
  • Responding to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system. [1]

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