Tag: Long-Term value


Was Milton Friedman Right about Shareholder Capitalism?

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on an American Enterprise Institute roundtable conversation between Mr. Lipton; R. Glenn Hubbard, Dean Emeritus and Russell L. Carson Professor of Economics and Finance at Columbia Business School and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; and Clifford Asness, founder and chief investment officer of AQR Capital Management. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Michael Strain: Good afternoon, I’m Michael Strain, Director of Economic Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and I want to start by thanking you all for joining this discussion of shareholder capitalism. Fifty years ago last month, economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman published his famous essay in The New York Times Magazine arguing that the social responsibility of businesses is to increase their own profits. This view has been controversial ever since. While campaigning back in July, Joe Biden said that the idea that a corporation’s sole or primary responsibility is to its shareholders is not only wrong, but “an absolute farce.”

Adding fuel to the debate, the U.S. Business Roundtable appears to have retreated from its earlier shareholder capitalism stance by issuing a statement about a year ago that embraced the idea that corporations and their managements have a responsibility to a broader group of stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, and workers. And that’s the question that we want our distinguished panel to take up in the next 45 minutes or so: Should executives manage their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders or should they simply focus on maximizing shareholder value? But before jumping into our subject, let me tell you a little about each of our three panelists:

Cliff Asness is the founder and chief investment officer of AQR Capital Management. Besides running a highly successful investment company, Cliff has long been an active researcher who’s published peer-reviewed articles on a variety of financial topics in many publications. He is also a trustee of the American Enterprise Institute.

Marty Lipton is a founding partner of the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, which specializes in advising major corporations on mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. Widely credited with having invented the poison pill as a way of protecting corporations from market shortsightedness, Marty has been a major public intellectual on the social role of corporations in serving not only their shareholders, but other corporate constituencies.

Glenn Hubbard is Dean Emeritus and Russell L. Carson Professor of Economics and Finance at Columbia Business School. Glenn was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush and is at present a visiting scholar at AEI.

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Integrating Sustainability and Long Term Planning for the Biopharma Sector

Myrto Kontaxi is Partner at the Biopharma Sustainability Roundtable (BSRT) and Brian Tomlinson is Director of Research, CEO Investor Forum at Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose (CECP). This post is based on a BSRT/CECP memorandum by Ms. Kontaxi, Mr. Tomlinson, Maggie Kohn, Thomas Scheiwiller, and Sandor Schoichet.

Executive Summary

Corporate leaders and institutional investors are looking for effective, efficient, and decision-useful information about long-term business strategy, and how it connects with the most important environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues in each sector. This need is driven by many trends in management, capital markets, regulation, and civil society, two of which stand out:

  1. Growing evidence that a focus on ESG performance is strongly accretive to long-term value creation and financial performance, and that the elements of an effective ESG strategy are specific to each sector.
  2. Growing recognition of how valuable it can be to effectively communicate long-term plans to investors, employees, and other stakeholders.

Long-term planning is especially important for the biopharma sector right now, as we look toward a global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. A sustainable, long-term response by the sector is required not only to meet the direct therapeutic and diagnostic development and production challenges, but also to create new solutions and to communicate the industry’s efforts and outcomes more effectively to all stakeholders.

In response, the Biopharma Sustainability Roundtable (BSRT) and the CEO Investor Forum at Chief Executives for Corporate Purpose (CECP) have joined forces to convene the first sector-specific Biopharma CEO Investor Forum. The Forum is planned for June 7th and 8th, 2021. This report and a companion Practitioner’s Guide were created to provide practical tools for biopharma CEOs and their teams as they prepare their Sustainable Long-Term Plan presentations for the Forum. These documents combine CECP’s Long-Term Plan Framework, honed through use at previous CEO Investor Forums, with the Biopharma Investor ESG Communications Guidance, broadly validated and supported by investors to tailor the content and perspective for the biopharma sector.

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Five Facts About Beliefs and Portfolios

Stephen Utkus is Visiting Scholar at Wharton Business School and Fellow at the Center for Financial Markets and Policy at Georgetown University. This post is based on a recent paper, forthcoming in the American Economic Review, by Mr. Utkus; Stefano Giglio, Professor of Finance at Yale School of Management; Johannes Stroebel, David S. Loeb Professor of Finance at NYU Stern School of Business; and Matteo Maggiori, Associate Professor of Finance at Stanford University Graduate School of Business.

Why do investors allocate their portfolios as they do? What causes them to change their minds and trade in their portfolios? These are critical questions in the field of macro finance. And central to answering them is understanding the role of expectations: what investors believe about future market returns and risks, how their beliefs vary with time, and how those beliefs come to influence real-world portfolio choices.

Among financial economists, there has been a growing interest in measuring investor expectations in a systematic way using surveys. However, surveys have been hindered by too qualitative a set of measures or by the lack of data showing how surveyed investors actually act on their beliefs.

In order to tackle such concerns, we have created a new research initiative on investor beliefs that combines administrative and survey data for a panel of individual investors at Vanguard. Vanguard is a well-known global asset manager; it is also large provider of investment services to U.S. retail investors. The survey, conducted every other month since February 2017, asks investors about short- and long-term expected stock market returns. It also elicits the subjective distribution of expected returns, allowing us to examine beliefs about low-probability events like a market crash. We also survey expectations on economic growth. These survey results are paired with portfolio allocation, trading, demographic and digital attention data.

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Will Loyalty Shares Do Much for Corporate Short-Termism?

Mark J. Roe is David Berg Professor of Business Law at Harvard Law School, and Federico Cenzi Venezze is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); Don’t Let the Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom by Mark Roe (discussed on the Forum here); and Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact by Mark Roe, (discussed on the Forum here).

Stock-market short-termism—stemming from rapid trading and activists looking for quick cash—is, a widespread view has it, hurting the American economy. Because stock markets will not support corporate long-term planning, the thinking goes, companies fail to invest enough, do not do enough research and development, and buy back so much of their stock that their coffers are depleted of cash for their future.

This widespread view has induced proposals for remedy. One proposal is for corporate “loyalty shares,” whereby stockholders who own their stock for longer periods would get more voting power than those who trade their stock quickly. In the proponents’ vision, executives would appeal to loyal, longer-term, stockholders for votes against activists and traders and, by investing for the long run, would obtain the loyalty share votes. The longer-run stockholders, with extra votes, would elect like-minded boards and support longer-term corporate business policies. The affected companies would profit more and the American economy would prosper.

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Executive Pay and ESG Performance

Tom Gosling is an Executive Fellow at the London Business School Centre for Corporate Governance, and Phillippa O’Connor is Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a LBS/PwC report by Mr. Gosling, Ms. O’Connor, Clare Hayes Guymer, Lawrence Harris, and Annabel Savage. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) considerations now sit at the heart of good business practice, and for some companies have become a central strategic pillar.

Society needs companies to play their role in addressing challenges ranging from social mobility to climate change. This would suggest that executives should be paid based on ESG performance. But this simple conclusion may not always be correct, and simplistically adding the wrong ESG metric into executive incentives can be unproductive, and worse, counterproductive.

A new report in partnership between The Centre for Corporate Governance at London Business School and PwC reviews what market practice and academic evidence have to say about linking executive pay to ESG. There is no single right answer, but we identify the underlying reasons why a company may (or may not) include ESG in executive pay and the consequences for measure selection. And we set out the principles and decisions required to design a good, effective and enduring ESG pay metric, if that is what a board decides to do.

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Sustainable Investing in Equilibrium

Lubos Pastor is Charles P. McQuaid Professor of Finance and Robert King Steel Faculty Fellow at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business; Robert F. Stambaugh is Miller Anderson & Sherrerd Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; and Lucian A. Taylor is Associate Professor of Finance at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Sustainable investing considers not only financial objectives but also environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria. Assets managed with an eye on sustainability have grown to tens of trillions of dollars and seem poised to grow further. Given this rapid growth, the effects of sustainable investing on asset prices and corporate behavior are important to understand.

We analyze both financial and real effects of sustainable investing through the lens of an equilibrium model. The model features many heterogeneous firms and agents, yet it is highly tractable, yielding simple and intuitive expressions for the quantities of interest. The model illuminates the key channels through which agents’ preferences for sustainability can move asset prices, tilt portfolio holdings, determine the size of the ESG investment industry, and cause real impact on society.

In the model, firms differ in the sustainability of their activities. “Green” firms generate positive externalities for society, “brown” firms impose negative externalities, and there are different shades of green and brown. Agents differ in their preferences for sustainability, or “ESG preferences,” which have multiple dimensions. First, agents derive utility from holdings of green firms and disutility from holdings of brown firms. Second, agents care about firms’ aggregate social impact. In a model extension, agents additionally care about climate risk. Naturally, agents also care about financial wealth.

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How Valuable is Financial Flexibility When Revenue Stops? Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach is Swiss Finance Institute professor at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) College of Management; Kevin Rageth is Swiss Finance Institute doctoral student at EPFL; and René M. Stulz is the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in The Review of Financial Studies.

In our forthcoming Review of Financial Studies publication (available here), we examine the value of financial flexibility for large, publicly listed companies in the US during the initial phase of the COVID-19 crisis.

The COVID-19 shock led to a dramatic temporary decrease in revenues for many firms, because production and selling activities conflicted with social distancing practices. For some firms, production halted, because production would have led to workers being highly exposed to COVID-19. For other firms, customer demand flatlined, because the firm’s goods and/or services entailed exposure to COVID-19.

Firms differ in how their financial affairs are organized. Some firms hold large amounts of cash to help them cope with unexpected events. They also keep debt capacity and limit their exposure to debt rollover risk. These firms have financial flexibility, so that they can more easily fund a cash flow shortfall, such as the one created by the COVID-19 shock. In contrast, firms with less financial flexibility might rapidly descend into financial distress and be forced to take actions that healthy firms would consider detrimental to long-term shareholder wealth.

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Integrating ESG Into Corporate Culture: Not Elsewhere, but Everywhere

David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on an article first published in the New York Law Journal. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

A prominent securities regulator recently observed that “ESG no longer needs to be explained.” ESG is firmly ensconced in the mainstream of corporate America, a frequent topic in boardrooms, C-suites, investor meetings, and regulators’ remarks. Perhaps less obvious is that ESG has yet to be mainstreamed, as it were, in internal corporate governance and operations at the individual company level. In order to be a meaningful factor in effectuating corporate purpose, ESG—or, more accurately, EESG (including Employees as well as Environmental, Social, and Governance)—must be integrated throughout corporate affairs, not just in the boardroom.

The internal mainstreaming of EESG is the next step in its remarkable journey from activist wishlists to board and regulatory agendas. The good news is that this should not be difficult for most organizations to accomplish, so long as corporate leaders recognize that engaging with EESG considerations is not something that happens “elsewhere,” but “everywhere.” When EESG is integral to the culture and values of a company, it will naturally be incorporated in the work that is done throughout governance and operations, including strategic planning, risk management, compensation, communications, and disclosure. This approach to EESG is beneficial in a number of important ways: It is conducive to long-term value creation and responsive to investor interests; it improves efficiency and transparency while demonstrating commitment to EESG goals; and it can help forestall legal liability and reputational harm.

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Tailoring Executive Pay for Long-Term Success

Matt Brady is associate director of research, Matt Leatherman is director, and Victoria Tellez is senior research associate at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on an FCLTGlobal memorandum by Mr. Brady, Mr. Leatherman, Ms. Tellez, and Ariel Babcock. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Short-term incentives motivate short-term behavior. Corporate boards can drive long-term performance by making changes to remuneration that encourage long-term behavior by executives while avoiding common pitfalls. Similarly, investors can support long-term executive remuneration plans through their votes and engagement.

Financial incentives motivate behavior—indeed, financial incentives may work too well. Executive pay is focused on a short time horizon—with recent data pegging average duration of executive compensation plans for CEOs of MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) constituents at 1.7 years. [1] This short-term focus can have far-reaching consequences, yet setting out to make remuneration longer-term is no simple task.

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Race & Ethnicity and the Role of Asset Stewardship

Cyrus Taraporevala is President and CEO of State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on his opening remarks at a recent session of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Virtual Roundtable Series.

Thank you for that very kind introduction, Lucian (Bebchuk). It’s wonderful to be with you at Harvard—even if virtually—at this remarkable and important institution.

I also want to acknowledge everyone joining today. Hopefully it won’t be long before we can see each other in person again.

Obviously, the past 12 months have been extraordinary—and certainly, there is no lack of weighty topics we at State Street Global Advisors have been engaged on as an asset manager for a long time, such as Climate and Governance.

Today [March 25, 2021], I’d like to focus on just one topic from within our broad Asset Stewardship set of topics—to discuss the important role of racial and ethnic diversity in our Asset Stewardship program—and provide some insight into our engagements with companies on this issue and why we’ve taken the approach we have, and our plans going forward.

But first I want to say a few words about this moment, how we got here, and how it fits in to the evolving role asset managers have been playing, especially in recent years.

The Changing Role of Asset Stewardship

As a long-term investor in more than 10,000 public companies across the world, we have a somewhat unique view into all the factors that drive a business’s long-term value—across sectors and geographies.

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