Tag: Proxy advisors


The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here). Critiques of the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study by Wachtell Lipton, and responses to these critiques by the authors, are available on the Forum here.

Since I first identified a nascent new paradigm for corporate governance with leading major institutional investors supporting long-term investment and value creation and reducing or eliminating outsourcing to ISS and activist hedge funds, there has been a steady stream of statements by major investors outlining the new paradigm. In addition, a number of these investors are significantly expanding their governance departments so that they have in-house capability to evaluate governance and strategy and there is no need to outsource to ISS and activist hedge funds. The following is a summary consolidation of what these investors are saying in various forums.

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Alternatives to Equity Shares in a Low Stock Price Environment

Steve Pakela is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance publication by Mr. Pakela, Brian Scheiring, and Mike Grasso.

Compensation Committees face the challenge of balancing the tension in motivating their executives to create shareholder value in the current Say on Pay and economic environment. The current pullback in stock prices and the uncertain financial outlook for 2016 at many companies will make this year’s compensation decisions even more challenging. Stock prices at many companies and in many sectors are down 50% or more over the past year and, in particular, since equity awards were last granted to executives. The table below illustrates the effect of a significantly low stock price on the number of shares granted. For companies whose stock price is down 50%, the number of shares required to deliver equivalent value will be double that granted last year. For those companies whose share price is down 67% or 75%, share grants will need to be three or four times greater than the shares granted last year, respectively. This can pose a number of problems ranging from creating potential windfalls when share prices recover to previous levels to exceeding maximum share grant levels contained in a shareholder approved equity incentive plan.

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ISS Proxy Access FAQs: Problematic Proxy Access Provisions

Howard B. Dicker is a partner in the Public Company Advisory Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. This post is based on a Weil publication by Mr. Dicker, Lyuba Goltser, Joanna Jia, and Kaitlin Descovich.

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has published revised FAQs for its U.S. Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures, including two new FAQs directly related to proxy access. This post provides an update to our Alerts dated October 21, 2015 (available here) on Navigating Proxy Access and November 23, 2015 (available here, and discussed on the Forum here) on ISS and Glass Lewis Updated Voting Policies.

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Lessons Learned from a Highly Successful Proxy Contest Defense

M. Ridgway Barker is a partner focusing on corporate finance and securities law at Withers Bergman LLP. This post is based on a Withers memorandum by Mr. Barker, Clyde Tinnen, and Michael Rueda.

Recently, our client, a NYSE-listed publicly traded firm, successfully defended against a proxy contest brought by an activist fund that in the first part of this year acquired 5.5% stake in the company. Following on earlier indications that it would do so, the fund notified the company in September that it intended to nominate six individuals for election to the seven member board of directors at the 2015 annual meeting of stockholders to be held in November. At the meeting, stockholders elected all seven incumbent director nominees and flatly rejected all of the fund’s six nominees, despite ISS’s recommendation in favor of three of the fund’s nominees and Proxy Mosaic’s recommendation in favor of all six of the fund’s nominees. These results offer key lessons to companies under attack by dissidents, notwithstanding strong activist pressure with backing from ISS or other proxy advisors.

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Is 2015, Like 1985, an Inflection Year?

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here).

In an October 2015 post, I posed the question: Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace to the Thirty Years’ War? As we approach the end of 2015, I thought it would be useful to note some of the most cogent recent developments on which the need, and hope, for a new paradigm is based. These developments include, among other things, the accumulation of a critical mass of academic research that discredits the notion that short-termism, activist attacks and shareholder-centric corporate governance tend to create rather than destroy long-term value.
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2016 Proxy Advisor Policy Changes

Shirley Westcott is a Senior Vice President at Alliance Advisors, LLC. This post is based on an Alliance Advisors whitepaper. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

In preparation for the 2016 proxy season, proxy advisors Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. have issued updates to their proxy voting guidelines, which take effect for annual meetings held on or after Feb. 1, 2016 (ISS) and Jan. 1, 2016 (Glass Lewis). [1] The policy changes and their expected impact on issuers are discussed in more detail in Alliance Advisors’ November newsletter.

The key revisions deal with various situations where the proxy advisors recommend against directors. These include the following:

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ISS and Glass Lewis Updated 2016 Voting Policies

Ellen Odoner and Lyuba Goltser are partners in the Public Company Advisory Group of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. This post is based on a Weil publication by Ms. Odoner, Ms. Goltser, and Reid Powell. The complete publication, including appendices, is available here.

ISS and Glass Lewis have released updates to their proxy voting policies for the 2016 proxy season. [1] ISS has also modified its QuickScore 3.0 Technical Document and Equity Plan Scorecard. [2] In this post we provide guidance for U.S. public companies on addressing these developments.

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ISS 2016 Voting Policies

Andrew R. Brownstein is partner and co-chair of the Corporate practice group, and David A. Katz is a partner specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and activism, and crisis management at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Brownstein, Mr. Katz, David M. Silk, Trevor S. NorwitzSabastian V. Niles, and S. Iliana Ongun.

[November 20, 2015], ISS announced its final U.S. voting policies for the 2016 proxy season. ISS had previously released draft proposals on several of the topics in October. Changes to non-U.S. policies were also announced, including with respect to Brazil, Canada, France, Hong Kong & Singapore, India, Japan, the Middle East & Africa and the U.K. & Ireland. ISS also released an updated equity plan scorecard “FAQ,” which contains a new model index for large companies that are newly public or emerging from bankruptcy, as well as other minor adjustments to scorecard factors.

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Glass Lewis’ Updated Voting Policy Guidelines

Andrew R. Brownstein is partner and co-chair of the Corporate practice group, and David A. Katz is a partner specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and activism, and crisis management at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Brownstein, Mr. Katz, David M. Silk, Trevor S. NorwitzSabastian V. Niles, and S. Iliana Ongun.

Glass Lewis has released updated U.S. proxy voting guidelines for the 2016 proxy season. Key areas of focus include: (i) nominating committee performance; (ii) changing the Glass Lewis approach to exclusive forum provisions if adopted in the context of an initial public offering; (iii) director “overboarding;” (iv) evaluation of conflicting management and shareholder proposals when both are put to a vote of shareholders; and (v) withhold recommendations in the context of failures of environmental and social risk oversight.

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Proxy Access: Preparing for the 2016 Proxy Season

Thomas W. Christopher is a partner in the New York office and Ryan J. Maierson is a partner in the Houston office of Latham & Watkins LLP. This post is based on a Latham publication by Mr. Christopher, Mr. Maierson, Tiffany Fobes Campion, and Charles C. Wang. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Lucian Bebchuk’s The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot and The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise (discussed on the Forum here), and Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

As the 2016 proxy season approaches, every public company should consider its position on proxy access and should have a plan for responding to a shareholder proxy access proposal. Based on lessons learned from the 2015 season, this post summarizes:

  1. Actions a public company can take to prepare for receipt of a proxy access proposal.
  2. Whether a company should wait and react to a shareholder proxy access proposal or preemptively adopt its own proxy access regime.
  3. Alternatives available to a company following receipt of a proxy access proposal.

Proxy access is a mechanism that gives shareholders the right to nominate directors and have those nominees included in the company’s annual meeting proxy statement. Proxy access gained significant momentum in 2015, with approximately 100 proposals submitted to shareholders and approximately 58% of those proposals being approved by shareholders. [1] Very likely a number of public companies will be subject to proxy access proposals during the 2016 proxy season.

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