Tag: R&D

CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism

The following post comes to us from Xia Chen and Qiang Cheng, both of the School of Accountancy at Singapore Management University; Alvis Lo of the Department of Accounting at Boston College; and Xin Wang of the Accounting Area at the University of Hong Kong.

In our paper, CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate whether CEO contractual protection, can address managerial short-termism by reducing managers’ incentives to engage in myopic behavior. Managers generally have incentives to boost short-term performance to increase their welfare, potentially at the expense of long-term firm value. However, CEOs with contractual protection are protected from short-term performance swings and downside risk, and consequently are likely to have weaker incentives to engage in myopic behavior.


Nanotechnology and the S&P 500

The following post comes to us from Heidi Welsh, Executive Director at the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2), and is based on a Si2 report.

Corporations globally have been investing $9 billion annually in nanotechnology, yet less than one-tenth of S&P 500 companies report to shareholders and other stakeholders on their involvement in nanotechnology. Although it has the potential to revolutionize industries like healthcare, information technology and energy systems, nanotechnology’s promise is tethered to unique environmental, health and safety (EH&S) issues that are not yet fully understood. Investors eyeing rapid growth and minimal regulation are engaging companies in discussions about nano-related EHS risks and recently forced a vote on the first nano-related shareholder resolution.


Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation

The following post comes to us from Thomas Chemmanur, Professor of Finance at Boston College; Elena Loutskina of the Finance Area at the University of Virginia; and Xuan Tian of the Finance Department at Indiana University.

There is no doubt that innovation is a critical driver of a nation’s long-term economic growth and competitive advantage. The question lies, however, in identifying the optimal organizational form for nurturing innovation. While corporate research laboratories account for two-thirds of all U.S. research, it is not obvious that these innovation incubators are more efficient than independent investors such as venture capitalists. In our paper, Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we explore this question by comparing the innovation productivity of entrepreneurial firms backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) and independent venture capitalists (IVCs).


Financial Dependence and Innovation

The following post comes to us from Viral Acharya, Professor of Finance at NYU, and Zhaoxia Xu of the Department of Finance and Risk Engineering at NYU.

While innovation is crucial for businesses to gain strategic advantage over competitors, financing innovation tends to be difficult because of uncertainty and information asymmetry associated with innovative activities (Hall and Lerner (2010)). Firms with innovative opportunities often lack capital. Stock markets can provide various benefits as a source of external capital by reducing asymmetric information, lowering the cost of capital, as well as enabling innovation in firms (Rajan (2012)). Given the increasing dependence of young firms on public equity to finance their R&D (Brown et al. (2009)), understanding the relation between innovation and a firm’s financial dependence is a vital but under-explored research question. In our paper, Financial Dependence and Innovation: The Case of Public versus Private Firms, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we fill this gap in the literature by investigating how innovation depends on the access to stock market financing and the need for external capital.


Firm Boundaries Matter

The following post comes to us from Amit Seru, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago.

Do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources? This question had spawned significant research in economics since it was raised in Coase (1937). A large body of work has focused on comparing the resource allocation in conglomerates relative to stand-alone firms to shed light on this issue. Theoretically, there are competing views on this aspect. On the one hand, Alchian (1969), Wiliamson (1985), and Stein (1997), among others, have put forth the view that conglomerates, by virtue of exerting centralized control over the capital allocation process, may do a better job in directing investments than the external capital markets. On the other hand, the “dark side” view of internal capital markets argues that problems of corporate socialism are more prevalent in conglomerates making them less efficient in resource allocation (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).


Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia

The following post comes to us from Alex Edmans, Professor of Finance at the London Business School, Vivian Fang of the Department of Accounting at the University of Minnesota, and Katharina Lewellen of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.

In our paper, Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study the link between real investment decisions and the vesting horizon of a CEO’s equity incentives. We find that research and development (“R&D”) is negatively associated with the stock price sensitivity of stock and options that vest over the course of the same year. This association continues to hold when including advertising and capital expenditure in the investment measure. Moreover, CEOs with significant newly-vesting equity are more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts by a narrow margin. However, the market recognizes such CEOs’ incentives to inflate earnings—the lower announcement returns to meet or beating earnings forecasts are decreasing in the sensitivity of vesting equity. These results provide empirical support for managerial myopia theories.

Many academics and practitioners believe that managerial myopia is a first-order problem faced by the modern firm. While the 20th century firm emphasized cost efficiency, Porter (1992) argues that “the nature of competition has changed, placing a premium on investment in increasingly complex and intangible forms,” such as innovation, employee training, and organizational development. However, the myopia theories of Stein (1988, 1989) show that managers may fail to invest due to concerns with the firm’s short-term stock price. Since the benefits of intangible investment are only visible in the long run, the immediate effect of such investment is to depress earnings and thus the current stock price. Therefore, a manager aligned with the short-term stock price may turn down valuable investment opportunities.


Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions

The following post comes to us from Jan Bena and Kai Li, both of the Finance Division at the University of British Columbia.

It has long been argued that synergies are key drivers of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and that many M&As occur due to technology reasons. However, there is little direct evidence of whether and how synergies in the technology space drive individual firms’ decisions to participate in M&As, and of how they affect merger outcomes. In our paper, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we first examine the relation between characteristics of corporate innovation activities and whether a firm becomes an acquirer or a target firm. We then study whether technological overlap between firm pairs affects transaction incidence. Finally, using a sample of bids withdrawn due to reasons exogenous to innovation as a control sample, we estimate the effect of a merger on future innovation output when there is pre-merger technological overlap between merging firms. Our large and unique patent-merger data set over the period 1984 to 2006 allows us to construct targeted measures of innovation output and technological overlap, extending the analysis of Hoberg and Phillips (2010) in product markets.


Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth

The following post comes to us from Daron Acemoglu, Professor of Economics at MIT; Ufuk Akcigit of the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania; Nicholas Bloom, Professor of Economics at Stanford University; and William Kerr of the Entrepreneurial Management Unit at Harvard Business School.

In our paper, Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we build a micro-founded model of firm innovation and growth, enabling us an examination of the forces jointly driving innovation, productivity growth and reallocation. In the second part of our paper, we estimate the parameters of the model using simulated method of moments on detailed U.S. Census Bureau micro data on employment, output, R&D, and patenting during the 1987-1997 period.

Our model builds on the endogenous technological change literature. Incumbents and entrants invest in R&D in order to improve over (one of) a continuum of products. Successful innovation adds to the number of product lines in which the firm has the best-practice technology (and “creatively” destroys the lead of another firm in this product line). Incumbents also increase their productivity for non-R&D related reasons (i.e., without investing in R&D). Because operating a product line entails a fixed cost, firms may also decide to exit some of the product lines in which they have the best-practice technology if this technology has sufficiently low productivity relative to the equilibrium wage. Finally, firms have heterogeneous (high and low) types affecting their innovative capacity—their productivity in innovation. This heterogeneity introduces a selection effect as the composition of firms is endogenous, which will be both important in our estimation and central for understanding the implications of different policies. We assume that firm type changes over time and that low-type is an absorbing state (i.e., high-type firms can transition to low-type but not vice versa), which is important for accommodating the possibility of firms that have grown large over time but are no longer innovative.


R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity

Gordon Phillips is a Professor of Finance at the University of Southern California.

In the paper, R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Services, my co-author (Alexei Zhdanov of the University of Lausanne and the Swiss Finance Institute) and I examine how the incentives to innovate differ between large and small firms and whether the M&A market hinders or promotes innovative activity. Previous literature has documented that R&D and innovation decreases post-acquisition and has attributed this effect to large firms stifling innovative activity. Using recent data on pre-merger R&D activity, we show that this view is flawed. Rather than large firms stifling R&D by small firms, we show theoretically and empirically how mergers can stimulate R&D activity of small firms. Thus, ex ante R&D rises and then falls naturally after acquisition as the pre-merger stimulus effect wears off.


Multinationals and the High Cash Holdings Puzzle

The following post comes to us from Lee Pinkowitz of the Department of Finance at Georgetown University; René Stulz, Professor of Finance at Ohio State University; and Rohan Williamson, Professor of Finance at Georgetown University.

In the paper, Multinationals and the High Cash Holdings Puzzle, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate whether the cash holdings of American companies are abnormally high after the financial crisis and whether these cash holdings can be explained by the theories summarized in the previous paragraph. We show that the extent to which cash holdings are unusually high after the crisis depends critically on the measure used. We would expect larger firms to hold more cash. Since corporate assets tend to grow over time, the dollar amount of cash holdings would grow even if the ratio of cash to assets stays constant. Consequently, at the very least, cash holdings should be measured relative to a firm’s assets. Using all non-financial and non-regulated public firms with assets and market capitalization greater than $5 million per year, the average cash/assets ratio is 20.18% in 2009-2010 compared to 20.50% in the 2004-2006 pre-crisis period. However, when we consider the median ratio, it is higher by 0.87% in 2009-2010 than in 2004-2006. Similarly, the asset-weighted ratio is higher by 0.74% in the recent period. The larger increase in the asset-weighted ratio than in the equally-weighted ratio suggests that large firms increased their holdings more and we show that this is the case. However, the changes in cash holdings from 2004-2006 to 2009-2010 are dwarfed by the changes in cash holdings from 1998-2000 to 2004-2006. Over that latter period, the average cash/assets ratio increases by 3.77%, the median by 6.39%, and the asset-weighted average by 3.62%. When we distinguish between private and public firms, we show that there is no evidence of an increase in the cash/assets ratio for private firms.