Tag: Securities fraud


Supreme Court to Weigh in on Presumption of Reliance in Securities Class Actions: Goldman Sachs v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Jason Halper is partner, Matthew Karlan is special counsel, and Nicholas Caros is an associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on their Cadwalader memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Rethinking Basic, by Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell (discussed on the Forum here); and Price Impact, Materiality, and Halliburton II, by Allen Ferrel and Andrew H. Roper (discussed on the Forum here).

On March 29, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al., No. 20-222. The closely-watched case raises a host of important issues concerning the substantive and procedural requirements for certifying a securities fraud class action. Most notably, the Court will clarify what evidentiary burden a defendant bears in attempting to rebut the “fraud on the market” presumption of reliance that permits claims asserted under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to proceed as class (as opposed to individual) actions. While the Court has opined on this issue in past decisions, including in its seminal Basic v. Levinson decision in 1988, which established the doctrine, and more recently in Amgen and Halliburton I & II, the lower courts have struggled to apply those rulings consistently.

More broadly, the case implicates the challenges lower courts have faced in applying the Supreme Court’s instruction that class action plaintiffs, whether in the Section 10(b) context or otherwise, “must affirmatively demonstrate” compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. As the Court held in Comcast and Wal–Mart, the “Rule ‘does not set forth a mere pleading standard.’ Rather, a party must not only ‘be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact,’ typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of representation, as required by Rule 23(a). The party must also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b),” including that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Importantly, the Court made clear that “such an analysis will frequently entail ‘overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.’”

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Twenty Years Later: The Lasting Lessons of Enron

Michael Peregrine is partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP, and Charles Elson is professor of corporate governance at the University of Delaware Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics.

This spring marks the 20th anniversary of the beginning of the dramatic and cataclysmic demise of Enron Corp. A scandal of exceptional scope and impact, it was (at the time) the largest bankruptcy in American history. The alleged business practices of its executives led to numerous individual criminal convictions. It was also a principal impetus for the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the evolution of the concept of corporate responsibility. As such, it is one of the most consequential corporate governance developments in history.

Yet a new generation of corporate leaders has assumed their positions since then; for others, their recollection of the colossal scandal may have faded with the years. And a general awareness of corporate responsibility principles is no substitute for familiarity with the governance failings that reenergized, in a lasting manner, the focus on effective and responsible governance. A basic appreciation of the Enron debacle and its governance implications is essential to director engagement.

Enron was formed as a natural gas pipeline company and ultimately transformed itself, through diversification, into a trading enterprise engaged in various forms of highly complex transactions. Among these were a series of unconventional and complicated related-party transactions (remember the strangely named Raptor, Jedi and Chewco ventures) in which members of Enron’s financial leadership held lucrative financial interests. Notably, the management team was experienced, and both its board and its audit committee were composed of a diverse group of seasoned, skilled, and prominent individuals.

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Revisiting the SEC Approach to Financial Penalties

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

On Tuesday [March 9, 2021], SEC Commissioner Caroline Crenshaw spoke to the Council of Institutional Investors. Her presentation, Moving Forward Together—Enforcement for Everyone, (discussed on the Forum here) concerned “the central role enforcement plays in fulfilling our mission, how investors and markets benefit, and how a decision made 15 years ago has taken us off course.” In her view, the SEC should revisit its approach to assessing financial penalties and should not be reluctant to impose appropriately tailored penalties that effectively deter misconduct, irrespective of the impact on the wrongdoer’s shareholders. Is this a sign of things to come?

Crenshaw observes that, generally, SEC Commissioners of all stripes believe in a strong enforcement program but differ on the effect of corporate penalties in achieving the SEC’s goals. Crenshaw believes that the SEC has overemphasized “factors beyond the actual misconduct when imposing corporate penalties—including whether the corporation’s shareholders benefited from the misconduct, or whether they will be harmed by the assessment of a penalty.” Not only is this approach “fundamentally flawed,” but, more importantly, it allows companies to profit from their own fraud and handcuffs the SEC, inhibiting it from crafting “tailored penalties that more effectively deter misconduct” and that create financial incentives to follow the rules and invest in compliance. In Crenshaw’s view, “enforcement best advances our agency’s goals when it concentrates the costs of harm with the person or entity who committed the violation. For these reasons, ensuring that the violator pays the price is key to a successful enforcement regime and to promoting fair and efficient markets more broadly.”

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2020 Developments in U.S. Securities Fraud Class Actions Against Non-U.S. Issuers

David H. KistenbrokerJoni S. Jacobsen and Angela M. Liu are partners at Dechert LLP. This post is based on a Dechert memorandum by Mr. Kistenbroker, Ms. Jacobson, Ms. Liu, Christine Isaacs and Siobhan Namazi, and Austen Boer.

Notwithstanding a year of unprecedented economic and societal change amidst a global pandemic, non-U.S. issuers continued to be targets of securities class actions filed in the United States. Indeed, despite widespread court closures due to the coronavirus pandemic, 2020 continued to see an uptick in the number of securities class action lawsuits brought against non-U.S. issuers. It is therefore imperative that, regardless of the economic climate, non-U.S. issuers stay vigilant of filing trends and take proactive measures to mitigate their risks.

In 2020, plaintiffs filed a total of 88 securities class action lawsuits against non-U.S. issuers.

  • As was the case in 2019, the Second Circuit continues to be the jurisdiction of choice for plaintiffs to bring securities claims against non-U.S. issuers. More than 50% of these 88 lawsuits (49)3 were filed in courts in the Second Circuit. A clear majority (35) of these 49 lawsuits were filed in the Southern District of New York. The next most popular circuit was the Third Circuit, with 22 lawsuits initiated in courts there. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits followed with 15 and two complaints, respectively.
  • Of the 88 non-U.S. issuer lawsuits filed in 2020, 28 were filed against non-U.S. issuers with a headquarters and/ or principal place of business in China, and 12 were filed against non-U.S. issuers with a headquarters and/or principal place of business in Canada.
  • As was the case in 2018 and 2019, the Rosen Law Firm P.A. continued to be the most active plaintiff law firm in this space, leading with most first-in-court filings against non-U.S. issuers in 2020 (25). However, departing from the trend of the last several years, Pomerantz LLP was appointed lead counsel in the most cases in 2020 (14); the Rosen Law Firm closely followed with 13 appointments as lead counsel.
  • Remarkably, the majority of the suits (28) were filed in the 2nd quarter, at the height of the coronavirus pandemic for most areas throughout the United States, particularly in the Southern District of New York.
  • While the suits cover a diverse range of industries, the majority of the suits involved the biotechnology and medical equipment industry (14), followed by the software and programming industry (9), the consumer and financial services industry (7), and the communications services industry (7).
  • Of the 22 lawsuits brought against European-headquartered companies, five were filed against firms headquartered in the United Kingdom and four were filed against firms headquartered in Germany.

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Measuring Accounting Fraud and Irregularities Using Public and Private Enforcement

Christopher G. Yust is assistant professor of accounting at Texas A&M University Mays Business School. This post is based on a recent paper forthcoming in The Accounting Review authored by Mr. Yust, Dain Donelson, Antonis Kartapanis, and John McInnis.

Corporate accounting fraud has a significant negative impact on the economy and investors, so academic research on factors that make accounting fraud more or less likely to occur has substantial real-world and public policy implications. However, conducting such research is difficult because researchers cannot observe the incidence of fraud for most firms, corporate admissions of fraud are rare, and trials proving fraud are almost nonexistent. Thus, researchers are forced to rely on proxies for fraud to conduct empirical analysis. Our recent paper examines the use of both public and private accounting enforcement with appropriate screening to proxy for accounting fraud and demonstrates how this combined proxy improves research inferences.

The current dominant proxy for accounting fraud in research is public enforcement through the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In contrast, relatively few papers, particularly in the accounting literature, use private enforcement via securities class actions (SCAs). However, we argue that the use of only public or private enforcement excludes credible fraud firm observations as the SEC lacks a sufficient budget to pursue all possible fraud and private litigants lack the incentive to pursue such cases if their expected costs exceed expected recoveries. Critically, the use of either enforcement regime does not only reduce statistical power but can also bias regression estimates.

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Speech by Commissioner Crenshaw on Moving Forward Together – Enforcement for Everyone

Caroline Crenshaw is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent speech to the Council of Institutional Investors. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Crenshaw, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

I want to thank the Council of Institutional Investors for inviting me today [March 9, 2021]. You are tireless advocates for investors and staunch proponents of good corporate governance. The agenda for this year’s meeting covers a number of timely topics that are top of mind for me as well—from the impact of COVID-19 on members, to drivers behind the SPAC boom, to diversity and inclusion at U.S. companies. I’m pleased you are also talking about sustainable finance, proxy voting issues and ESG ratings. Further, I share CII’s prioritization of clawbacks and transparency as to executive pay, stock trades and share buybacks. Today I have been asked to speak about what’s next for the SEC. Before I do that, I will make the usual disclaimer that the views I express today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of staff, my fellow commissioners, or the agency.

In thinking about what I wanted to discuss today, of course I considered policy matters that I would like to see the Commission prioritize in the near term: Regulation Best Interest, the improvements needed in the proxy process, the need to finish implementing Dodd-Frank, and continuing updates to our market infrastructure. But I kept coming back to something even more foundational: our enforcement program. I want to talk about the central role enforcement plays in fulfilling our mission, how investors and markets benefit, and how a decision made 15 years ago has taken us off course. And I’ll explain how changing tack now will yield better outcomes in all these areas.

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Supreme Court Relies on “Bridgegate” Case to Vacate Second Circuit Decision

Greg Andres, Angela Burgess, and Paul Nathanson are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Mr. Andres, Ms. Burgess, Mr. Nathanson, Neil MacBride, Martine Beamon and Kenneth Wainstein.

On January 11, 2021, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s controversial decision in United States v. Blaszczak, which held that proof of a benefit to the tipper is not a required element for criminal insider trading claims brought under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Although the Supreme Court ordered reconsideration on other grounds— whether certain government information may be considered “property” for the purpose of a scheme to defraud—the impact on the insider trading decision may be the more significant consequence. 

The Second Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Blaszczak

As we discussed in a past client memorandum, in 2019 the Second Circuit in United States v. Blaszczak expanded insider trading liability by affirming the convictions of four individuals of wire fraud, securities fraud, and conversion charges under Title 18. The government charged the defendants—a government employee, a consultant, and two hedge fund analysts—with violating both Title 15 and Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The jury acquitted the defendants under Title 15, which is the traditional basis to charge insider trading, but convicted on certain Title 18 counts. [1] On appeal, one of the defendants’ arguments was that the District Court wrongly instructed the jury that an element that applied under Title 15 did not apply under Title 18: that the tipper disclosed information for a “personal benefit” that was known to the recipients of the tip.

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A New Whistleblower Environment Emerges

Robert T. Biskup is Managing Director of Deloitte Risk & Financial Advisory, Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP. This post is based on his Deloitte memorandum.

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, the whistleblower environment is changing in ways that should have the focused attention of compliance executives across industries. Three converging factors are at work here:

1) a significant increase in fraud and whistleblower activity; 2) disruptions stemming from remote work; and, 3) new Department of Justice (DOJ)/Security Exchange Commission (SEC) guidance on corporate compliance programs. This post offers insights on what’s driving the new environment and strategic actions you can take to adapt.

5 insights you should know

Economic uncertainty and COVID-19-related instability have real consequences. Rapid, unprecedented economic turmoil has created record unemployment and layoffs. Organizations are under significant cost-reduction pressure. According to a recent ACFE survey, 79 percent of member companies have observed an increase in fraud, and 90 percent expect further fraud increases in the next 12 months. [1]

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Does Media Coverage Cause Meritorious Shareholder Litigation? Evidence from the Stock Option Backdating Scandal

Dain C. Donelson is Henry B. Tippie Excellence Chair in Accounting at University of Iowa Tippie College of Business; Antonis Kartapanis is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Texas A&M University Mays Business School; and Christopher G. Yust is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Texas A&M University Mays Business School. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors by Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein, and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here).

Our recent paper uses the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the stock option backdating scandal to examine whether media coverage causes meritorious shareholder litigation. While the media has a prominent role in covering corporate scandals, it is unclear whether the media coverage itself causes any subsequent litigation because the underlying corporate misconduct and firm characteristics may cause both the litigation and attract media coverage. Thus, meritorious litigation may have eventually occurred even in the absence of media coverage. Evidence on the causal relation between media coverage and meritorious litigation is timely due to growing concerns about the precipitous decline in newspapers nationwide and whether it will result in a significant decrease in corporate accountability (Grieco 2020; Knight Foundation 2019). The findings further have a number of important implications for the media, firms, and others.

We predict that media coverage will increase the likelihood of meritorious litigation because such coverage may increase the expected payoff of such litigation to plaintiffs’ lawyers. Specifically, the expected payoff is a function of the settlement probability, expected settlement amount, and expected litigation costs, and media coverage may affect each of these components. That is, media coverage can provide new “expert witness” information or increase the credibility of existing information, increasing both the probability of settlement and expected settlement amount. Additionally, negative media coverage may contribute to an abnormal price decrease, which may increase the settlement probability by establishing loss causation and increase settlement amounts by increasing shareholder damages. Finally, media coverage may lower investigation costs. That is, plaintiffs’ lawyers may rely on experts cited by the media, and coordination costs may be lowered by making it easier to assemble a class of affected plaintiffs.

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2020 Securities Related Settlements Exceed $5.8 Billion

Jeff Lubitz is Executive Director at ISS Securities Class Action Services LLC. This post is based on his ISS memorandum.

In the midst of a global pandemic, securities class action cases continue to provide investors with critical recoveries from companies accused of various fraudulent activities. In fact, the dollar amount of settlements in 2020 totaled $5.84 billion… an increase of 61% over the $3.62 billion in settlements during 2019.

The number of worldwide settlements in 2020 where a monetary amount was agreed to totaled 133… an increase of 13% above the 118 settlements finalized during 2019.

The primary difference between 2019 and 2020 were with the mega settlements… typically considered cases settling for $100 million or greater. While the quantity of these cases were similar during the last two calendar years, the largest settlements in 2020 were incredibly higher in dollar amounts. The two largest settlements in 2019 were Cobalt International Energy at $389.6 million and Alibaba Group Holding at $250 million… while the top 2020 settlements were the following:

  • Valeant Pharmaceuticals – $1,210,000,000
  • American Realty Capital –$1,025,000,000
  • First Solar – $350,000,000
  • Signet Jewelers – $240,000,000
  • SCANA Corporation – $192,500,000

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