Tag: SIFIs


OCC’s Recovery Planning Proposal

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On December 17th, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) proposed recovery planning standards for banks with assets of $50 billion or more. [1] The proposal was released exactly one year after the FDIC released guidance for covered insured depository institutions (CIDI) that significantly raised the resolution planning bar for many of these same banks. [2]

Most institutions will find that they will be able to leverage their existing risk management, business continuity planning, capital and liquidity planning, stress testing, and resolution plans in order to build their recovery plan. Many of the proposed standards’ requirements can be met by modifying existing bodies of work.

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Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially Important Non-Financial Institutions

Shlomit Azgad-Tromer is a visiting scholar at Berkeley Law School. This post is based on the article Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially Important Non-Financial Institutions.

Systemically important financial institutions are broadly considered to pose a risk to the entire economy upon failure. Thus governments act upon their failure, providing them with an implied insurance policy for ongoing liquidity. Yet governments frequently provide de facto liquidity insurance for non-financial institutions as well. For example, recently in the U.K., 35 hospital trusts were sharing £536 million in non-repayable bailouts in order to keep services running smoothly during 2013-2014. A decade earlier, a federal bankruptcy judge approved California’s multibillion-dollar bailout of Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation. In an effort to stabilize and sustain air transportation after 9/11, the U.S. Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, which provided the airline industry with financial aid valued at as much as $10 billion. In all of these cases, taxpayer money was used to rescue non-financial institutions.

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The Fed’s Finalized Liquidity Reporting Requirements

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer. The complete publication, including Appendix, is available here.

On November 13th, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) finalized liquidity reporting requirements for large US financial institutions and US operations of foreign banks (FBOs). [1] The requirements were proposed last year and are intended to improve the FRB’s monitoring of the liquidity profiles of firms that are subject to the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) [2] and their foreign peers, and to enhance the FRB’s view of liquidity across institutions.

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Regulatory Competition in Global Financial Markets

Wolf-Georg Ringe is Professor of International Commercial Law at Copenhagen Business School and at the University of Oxford. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Ringe.

The decades-long discussion on the merits of regulatory competition appears in a new light on the global financial market. There are a number of strategies that market participants use to avoid the reach of regulation, in particular by virtue of shifting trading abroad or else relocating activities or operations of financial institutions to other jurisdictions. Where this happens, such arbitrage can trigger regulatory competition between jurisdictions that may respond to the relocation of financial services (or threats to relocate) by moderating regulatory standards. Both arbitrage and regulatory competition are a reality in today’s global financial market, and the financial sector is different from their traditional fields of application: the ease of arbitrage, the fragility of banking and the risks involved are exceptional. Most importantly, regulatory arbitrage does not or only rarely occurs by actually relocating the financial institution itself abroad: rather, banking groups tend to shift trading to foreign affiliates.

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Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty

Steven L. Schwarcz is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law. This post is based on a draft article by Professor Schwarcz, available here.

Although corporate risk-taking is economically necessary and even desirable, it can also be harmful. There is widespread agreement that excessive corporate risk-taking was one of the primary causes of the systemic collapse that caused the 2008-09 financial crisis. To avoid another devastating collapse, most financial regulation since the crisis is directed at reducing excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms. Often that regulation focuses on aligning managerial and investor interests, on the assumption that investors generally would oppose excessively risky business ventures.

My article, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, argues that assumption is flawed. What constitutes “excessive” risk-taking depends on the observer; risk-taking is excessive from a given observer’s standpoint if, on balance, it is expected to harm that observer. As a result, the law inadvertently allows systemically important firms to engage in risk-taking ventures that are expected to benefit the firm and its investors but, because much of the systemic harm from the firm’s failure would be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, harm the public.

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Dodd-Frank Turns Five, What’s Next?

Daniel F.C. Crowley is a partner at K&L Gates LLP. This post is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Crowley, Bruce J. HeimanSean P. Donovan-Smith, and Giovanni Campi.

The 2008 credit crisis was the beginning of an era of unprecedented government management of the capital markets. July 21, 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of the hallmark congressional response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Dodd-Frank resulted in an extraordinary revamp of the regulatory regime that governs the U.S. financial system and, consequently, has significant implications for the U.S. economy and the international financial system.

Members of Congress recognized the fifth anniversary of Dodd-Frank in markedly different ways. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) has held two of a series of three hearings to examine whether the United States is more prosperous, free, and stable five years after enactment of the law. In contrast, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)—one of the leading proponents of the law—and other members of Congress have criticized the slow pace of implementation by the regulatory agencies. Meanwhile, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL) is advancing the “Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015,” which seeks to amend a number of provisions of Dodd-Frank.

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Fed/FDIC Comments on Wave 3 Resolution Plans

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On July 28th, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board (together, “the regulators”) announced that they have provided private feedback on the resolution plans of 119 Wave 3 banking institutions [1] and the three systemically important non-bank financial institutions. [2] Unlike the regulators’ highly critical August 2014 public commentary on the 2013 resolution plans filed by Wave 1 banking institutions, [3] this week’s comments are largely silent on the regulators’ view of the plans’ adequacy:

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Fed Supervision: DC in the Driver’s Seat

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Kevin Clarke, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On April 17th, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) issued a better-late-than-never Supervisory Letter, SR 15-7, describing its governance structure for supervising systemically important financial institutions under its so-called Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (“LISCC”). [1] Though much of the structure has been in place for years, the Fed had not publicly explained in detail its supervisory process, leading some in Congress and elsewhere to criticize its secrecy.

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Resolution Preparedness: Do You Know Where Your QFCs Are?

The following post comes to us from Dan Ryan, Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Frank Serravalli, Dan Weiss, John Simonson, and Daniel Sullivan. The complete publication, including appendix, is available here.

In January, the US Secretary of Treasury issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPR”) that would establish new recordkeeping requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts (“QFCs”). [1] US systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) and certain of their affiliates [2] will be required under the NPR to maintain specific information electronically on end-of-day QFC positions, and to be able to provide this information to regulators within 24 hours if requested. This is a significant expansion in both scope and detail from current QFC recordkeeping requirements, which now apply only to certain insured depository institutions (“IDIs”) designated by the FDIC. [3]

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Key Points From the 2015 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR)

The following post comes to us from Dan Ryan, Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, and is based on a PwC publication by Mike Alix, Steve Pearson, and Armen Meyer.

The 2015 stress test results published on March 11th as part of the Federal Reserve’s (“Fed”) CCAR follow last week’s release of Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (“DFAST”) results. [1] CCAR differs from DFAST by incorporating the 31 participating bank holding companies’ (“BHC” or “bank”) proposed capital actions and the Fed’s qualitative assessment of BHCs’ capital planning processes. The Fed objected to two foreign BHCs’ capital plans and one US BHC received a “conditional non-objection,” all due to qualitative issues.

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