Tag: Stock performance

Alternatives to Equity Shares in a Low Stock Price Environment

Steve Pakela is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance publication by Mr. Pakela, Brian Scheiring, and Mike Grasso.

Compensation Committees face the challenge of balancing the tension in motivating their executives to create shareholder value in the current Say on Pay and economic environment. The current pullback in stock prices and the uncertain financial outlook for 2016 at many companies will make this year’s compensation decisions even more challenging. Stock prices at many companies and in many sectors are down 50% or more over the past year and, in particular, since equity awards were last granted to executives. The table below illustrates the effect of a significantly low stock price on the number of shares granted. For companies whose stock price is down 50%, the number of shares required to deliver equivalent value will be double that granted last year. For those companies whose share price is down 67% or 75%, share grants will need to be three or four times greater than the shares granted last year, respectively. This can pose a number of problems ranging from creating potential windfalls when share prices recover to previous levels to exceeding maximum share grant levels contained in a shareholder approved equity incentive plan.



Martijn Cremers is Professor of Finance at the University of Notre Dame; Erasmo Giambona is Associate Professor of Finance and Real Estate at the University of Amsterdam; Simone M. Sepe is Professor of Law and Finance at the College of Law at the University of Arizona; and Ye Wang is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Finance at Bocconi University. This post responds to a post, titled The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: A Reply to Cremers, Giambona, Sepe, and Wang, by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (available on the Forum here). The post by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang and Keusch replied to the criticism of the study on The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here) that was put forward in a paper by Cremers, Giambona, Sepe and Wang discussed in this post.

In a December 10, 2015 post to the Harvard Corporate Governance Blog, Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (“BBJK”) suggest that a study the four of us have recently coauthored, Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (the “CGSW study”), “overlooks prior opposing evidence on the subject, offers a flawed empirical analysis, and makes [contradictory] claims.” For these reasons—BBJK unequivocally conclude—the CGSW study’s claims “should be given no weight in the ongoing examination of hedge fund activism.” We are thankful to BBJK for the time spent analyzing our work and the occasion they have provided us to offer a few clarifications. Hopefully, those clarifications will add clarity to our attempt at better understanding the effects of hedge fund activism, which is what, ultimately, we should all care about.

Information, Analysts, and Stock Return Comovement

Allaudeen Hameed is a Professor of Finance at National University of Singapore. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Hameed; Randall Morck, Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta; Jianfeng Shen, Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of New South Wales; and Bernard Yeung, Professor of Finance at National University of Singapore.

Stocks followed by more analysts should be priced more accurately, yet their returns are unusually prone to co-move with market and industry indexes. Stocks that co-move more are often thought to be related to herding. This is because more informed trading ought to make a firm’s stock price move with the changing fortunes of that specific firm, as well as with market and industry trends. More firm-specific price variation in less-followed stocks seems counterintuitive, yet this is what we observe.

In our paper, Information, Analysts, and Stock Return Comovement, forthcoming in The Review of Financial Studies, we resolve this seeming paradox. Stocks covered by more analysts co-move more precisely because they are priced more accurately and their price movements help investors update the prices of less-followed stocks. This “information spillover” makes most price movement in highly-followed stocks look like comovement with industry or market trends, but in fact investors are using information about highly-followed stocks to deduce how other stocks ought to move.


Pro Forma Compensation

David Larcker is Professor of Accounting at Stanford University. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Larcker; Brian Tayan, Researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at Stanford University; and Youfei Xiao of the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

In recent years, companies have begun to voluntarily disclose supplemental calculations of executive compensation beyond those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the annual proxy. Our paper, Pro Forma Compensation: Useful Insight or Window-Dressing?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, examines the motivation to disclose adjusted compensation and the prevalence of this practice.

Corporate disclosure of executive compensation is regulated by the SEC and is reported in the annual proxy Compensation Discussion & Analysis section and various summary compensation tables. These figures are widely cited by corporate observers, and in many cases used to rank (and criticize) corporations for their pay practices.


Prices and Informed Trading

Vyacheslav Fos is Assistant Professor of Finance at Boston College. This post is based on an article by Professor Fos and Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Professor of Finance at the Swiss Finance Institute. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang; and The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

In our paper, Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we study how empirical measures of stock illiquidity and of adverse selection respond to informed trading by activist shareholders.

An extensive body of theory suggests that stock illiquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread and by the price impact of trades, should be increasing in the information asymmetry between market participants. An extensive empirical literature employing these illiquidity measures thus assumes that they capture information asymmetry. But, do these empirical measures of adverse selection actually increase with information asymmetry? To test this question one would ideally separate informed from uninformed trades ex-ante and measure their relative impact on price changes. However, since we generally do not know the traders’ information sets, this is hard to do in practice.


Public Pension Funds’ Shareholder-Proposal Activism

James R. Copland is the director of the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Legal Policy. The following post is based on a report from the Proxy Monitor project; the complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

America’s largest publicly traded companies are facing more shareholder proposals in 2015, driven principally by a “proxy access” campaign led by New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer, who oversees the city’s $160 billion pension funds for public employees. Elected in 2013, Stringer has launched a Boardroom Accountability Project seeking, in part, proxy access, which grants shareholders with a certain percentage of a company’s outstanding shares the right to list a certain number of candidates for the company’s board of directors on the company’s proxy statement. As noted in an earlier finding, Comptroller Stringer’s proxy-access campaign has won substantial shareholder support at most companies where his proposal was introduced.

Although it is too soon to assess the impact of Comptroller Stringer’s push for proxy access, we can evaluate shareholder-proposal activism by state and municipal public employee pension funds in previous years. From 2006 to the present, state and municipal pension funds have sponsored 300 shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 companies. More than two-thirds of these were introduced by the pension funds for the public employees of New York City and State.


Incentive Alignment through Performance-Focused Shareholder Proposals on Management Compensation

The following post comes to us from Steve Fortin of the Accounting Area at McGill University; Chandra Subramaniam of the Department of Accounting at the University of Texas at Arlington; Xu (Frank) Wang of the Department of Accounting at Saint Louis University; and Sanjian Bill Zhang of the Department of Accountancy at California State University, Long Beach. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about CEO pay includes: The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers, and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here); Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors by Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate boards are conscious of the role that executive pay practices play in improving corporate governance and increasing shareholder wealth (Gammeltoft, 2010). Economic theory suggests that the key to aligning managerial compensation with shareholder interest is to increase the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance (Core et al., 2005; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Firms finance their operations, however, with funds from both shareholders and creditors, e.g., bondholders. Thus, agency theory also concerns shareholder-bondholder agency conflict and the difficulty of concurrently aligning the interests of shareholders, bondholders, and managers (Ahmed et al., 2002; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). In the past decade, the business press has focused on excessive CEO pay, observed during the 2001 Enron/Worldcom scandals as well as the recent 2007–2008 credit crisis, e.g., AIG. Critics contend that contracting between CEOs and boards has been shadowed by pervasive managerial influence (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Crystal, 1992). Consistent with these concerns, shareholders have begun to use the “shareholder proposal rule” (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to defend their interest and have submitted hundreds of proposals to many of the largest U.S. corporations.


The Role of Institutional Investors in Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs

The following post comes to us from Thomas Chemmanur, Professor of Finance at Boston College, and Yingzhen Li of The Brattle Group.

In recent years, the number of firms undertaking stock repurchases has increased dramatically, while the proportion of firms distributing value through cash dividends has declined. The popularity of share repurchases has not been mitigated even after the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of 2003. In our paper, The Role of Institutional Investors in Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we empirically analyze whether institutions have the ability to produce information about firms announcing open-market repurchase (OMR) programs, and how their information interacts with the private information held by firm insiders (which they may attempt to convey to the equity market through a repurchase program).


Short Selling Pressure, Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision

The following post comes to us from Yinghua Li of the School of Accountancy at Arizona State University and Liandong Zhang at City University of Hong Kong.

Corporate executives pay considerable attention to secondary market prices and they have strong incentives to maintain or increase the level of their firms’ stock prices. The accounting literature has long recognized that managers can make strategic financial reporting or disclosure choices to influence stock prices. A large body of empirical research examines whether and how corporate disclosures affect stock prices. The literature, however, provides little directional evidence on whether the behavior of stock prices has a causal effect on managerial strategic disclosure decisions. The difficulty in establishing causality stems largely from the endogenous nature of stock prices. In the paper, Short Selling Pressure, Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, which is forthcoming in Journal of Accounting Research, we use a randomized experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to examine the causal effect of stock price behavior on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices.


Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?

The following post comes to us from John Asker, Professor of Economics at UCLA; Joan Farre-Mensa of the Entrepreneurial Management Unit at Harvard Business School; and Alexander Ljungqvist, Professor of Finance at NYU.

Economists have long worried that a stock market listing can induce short-termist pressures that distort the investment decisions of public firms. Back in 1985 Narayanan wrote in the Journal of Finance that “American managers tend to make decisions that yield short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of the shareholders.” More recently, a growing number of commentators blame the sluggish performance of the U.S. economy since the 2008–2009 financial crisis on short-termism. For example, in a recent Harvard Business Review article, Barton and Wiseman, global managing director at McKinsey & Co. and CEO of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, respectively, argue that “the ongoing short-termism in the business world is undermining corporate investment, holding back economic growth.”

Yet, systematic empirical evidence of widespread short-termism has proved elusive, largely because identifying its effects is challenging. A chief challenge is the difficulty of finding a plausible counterfactual for how firms would invest absent short-termist pressures. In our paper, Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, which is forthcoming at the Review of Financial Studies, we address this difficulty by comparing the investment behavior of stock market-listed firms to that of comparable privately held firms, using a novel panel dataset of private U.S. firms covering more than 400,000 firm years over the period 2001–2011. Building on prior work, our key identification assumption is that, on average, private firms suffer from fewer agency problems and, in particular, are subject to fewer short-termist pressures than are their listed counterparts. This assumption is motivated by the fact that private firms are often owner managed and, even when not, are both illiquid and typically have highly concentrated ownership. These features encourage their owners to monitor management more closely to ensure long-term value is maximized.