<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/06/ipo-pricing-in-business-groups/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 11:30:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>IPO Pricing in Business Groups</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/06/ipo-pricing-in-business-groups/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ipo-pricing-in-business-groups</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/06/ipo-pricing-in-business-groups/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2012 14:22:26 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking & Financial Institutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business groups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IPOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mutual funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tunneling]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=24722?d=20150105141326EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In the paper Channeling Funds into the Group: IPO Pricing in Business Groups, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we demonstrate that business groups use financial intermediaries to boost the stock prices of affiliated firms in initial public offerings (IPO). This is done when mutual funds belonging to the group strategically participate in [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, January 6, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://mohliver.com/" target="_blank">Aharon Cohen Mohliver</a> of the Department of Management at Columbia University, and <a href="http://www.isa.gov.il/Default.aspx?Site=ENGLISH&amp;ID=-3,1523" target="_blank">Gitit Gur-Gershgoren</a>, Chief Economist at the Israel Securities Authority.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper <strong><em>Channeling Funds into the Group: IPO Pricing in Business Groups</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we demonstrate that business groups use financial intermediaries to boost the stock prices of affiliated firms in initial public offerings (IPO). This is done when mutual funds belonging to the group strategically participate in the IPO’s that originate from the group during the road show, and subsequently sell their holdings quickly after the IPO.</p>
<p>In the past decade there has been increasing interest in pyramidal business groups and in the ability of group owners to transfer assets from one firm in the pyramid to another. This phenomenon, dubbed “tunneling” by Kogut and Spicer (1998) and Johnson (2000), can take many forms such as transfer pricing, transfer of goods at nonmarket prices and inflated payments for intangibles. Much of the research examined the internal capital markets in these groups yet the theoretical possibility of transferring resources from external sources into the group&#8217;s internal capital markets, an activity we refer to in this paper as “channeling&#8221; was not previously addressed.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/06/ipo-pricing-in-business-groups/#more-24722" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading IPO Pricing in Business Groups">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/06/ipo-pricing-in-business-groups/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
