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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Governance Lessons from the Dimon Dust-Up &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Governance Lessons from the Dimon Dust-Up</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/13/governance-lessons-from-the-dimon-dust-up/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=governance-lessons-from-the-dimon-dust-up</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/06/13/governance-lessons-from-the-dimon-dust-up/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jun 2013 13:13:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[The recent shareholder “campaign” by a coalition of large institutional investors – AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, Hermes Fund Managers, the New York City Pension Funds, and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds – sought on its face to pressure the JPMorgan Chase &#38; Co. board of directors to amend the bylaws to require that [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ira M. Millstein, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, on Thursday, June 13, 2013 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.weil.com/iramillstein/" target="_blank">Ira Millstein</a> is a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal &amp; Manges LLP and co-chair of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The recent shareholder “campaign” by a coalition of large institutional investors – AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, Hermes Fund Managers, the New York City Pension Funds, and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds – sought on its face to pressure the JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co. board of directors to amend the bylaws to require that the role of chair be held by an independent director. It became a referendum on two additional issues: Mr. Dimon’s competence as a manager, and the competence of the board’s oversight of risk management. Unfortunately for “good governance,” the three issues become conflated and lead to harangues, heat, and polar positions by all sides, leading to little that’s instructive. It’s worth separating the issues to seek guidelines for the future.</p>
<p>Thoughtful advocates recognize that the board should have flexibility to determine leadership based on the company’s circumstances and rather than seeking to mandate the practice of independent chairmanship, view it as the appropriate default standard – or presumptive model. Even so, very few advocates of the independent chair model favor stripping an extant CEO/chair of the chair title; rather, they urge boards to consider separation upon CEO succession, unless there is an urgent need.</p>
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