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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Dangerous “Promise of Market Reform”: No Shareholder Proposals &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Dangerous “Promise of Market Reform”: No Shareholder Proposals</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/15/the-dangerous-promise-of-market-reform-no-shareholder-proposals/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-dangerous-promise-of-market-reform-no-shareholder-proposals</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2017 13:36:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=93712?d=20171002094036EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This has been a historic proxy season, marking three majority votes for shareholder proposals addressing climate change at Occidental Petroleum, PPL Corp. and ExxonMobil, with the latter proposal exceeding 60% support. As of this writing it is too early to tell which asset managers voted for these proposals, with the exception of BlackRock, which announced that [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Adam M. Kanzer, Domini Impact Investments LLC, on Thursday, June 15, 2017 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.domini.com/why-domini/our-team/adam-m-kanzer">Adam M. Kanzer</a> is Managing Director at Domini Impact Investments LLC. This post is based on a Domini publication by Mr. Kanzer. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513408">Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/12/08/private-ordering-and-the-proxy-access-debate/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>This has been a historic proxy season, marking three majority votes for shareholder proposals addressing climate change at <a href="https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2017/climate-risk-reporting-passes-occidental-petroleum">Occidental Petroleum</a>, <a href="https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/shareholder-vote-amps-pressure-energy-company-climate-risk-analysis-and">PPL Corp</a>. and <a href="https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/exxonmobil-investors-make-history-majority-vote-climate-risk-disclosure">ExxonMobil</a>, with the latter proposal exceeding 60% support. As of this writing it is too early to tell which asset managers voted for these proposals, with the exception of BlackRock, which <a href="https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/publication/blk-vote-bulletin-occidental-may-2017.pdf">announced</a> that it voted for the proposal at Occidental (Vanguard also <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-vanguard-mull-pressuring-exxon-to-disclose-climate-risks-1495704601">reportedly</a> supported that proposal). This year, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-fidelity-climatechange-idUSKBN18M110">Fidelity</a> announced that it may support shareholder proposals on sustainability matters and both <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-vanguard-mull-pressuring-exxon-to-disclose-climate-risks-1495704601">BlackRock and Vanguard</a> said they were strongly weighing supporting the ExxonMobil proposal.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/15/the-dangerous-promise-of-market-reform-no-shareholder-proposals/#more-93712" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Dangerous “Promise of Market Reform”: No Shareholder Proposals">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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