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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Dangers of Buybacks: Mitigating Common Pitfalls &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Dangers of Buybacks: Mitigating Common Pitfalls</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/23/the-dangers-of-buybacks-mitigating-common-pitfalls/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-dangers-of-buybacks-mitigating-common-pitfalls</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2020 13:09:57 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital allocation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dividends]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Long-Term value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Repurchases]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Returning capital to shareholders is an important and legitimate goal of many corporations. Buybacks are often an effective way to distribute capital, but care must be taken to mitigate downfalls related to personal gain and enrichment, poor timing, and excess leverage. Buybacks have experienced a meteoric rise in popularity since the turn of the twenty-first [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Sarah Keohane Williamson, Ariel Fromer Babcock, and Allen He, FCLT Global, on Friday, October 23, 2020 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Sarah Keohane Williamson is CEO, Ariel Babcock is Head of Research, and Allen He is Associate Director at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on their FCLTGlobal memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2248111">The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value</a> by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/22/the-myth-that-insulating-boards-serves-long-term-value/">here</a>); <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2895161">Short-Termism and Capital Flows</a> by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2895161">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1845620">Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay</a>, by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/04/01/share-repurchases-equity-issuances-and-the-optimal-design-of-executive-pay/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Returning capital to shareholders is an important and legitimate goal of many corporations. Buybacks are often an effective way to distribute capital, but care must be taken to mitigate downfalls related to personal gain and enrichment, poor timing, and excess leverage.</p>
<p>Buybacks have experienced a meteoric rise in popularity since the turn of the twenty-first century, overtaking dividends as the preferred means to return capital to shareholders in jurisdictions like the US. In 2019 alone, corporations spent more than USD 1.2 trillion globally on buybacks.</p>
<p>But the rise of buybacks has been riddled with controversy. Academics, practitioners, and politicians alike have maligned the use of buybacks, taking issue with their potential contribution to income inequality, underinvestment in innovation, and use for personal enrichment. Buybacks and their implications for the long-term strength of the economy are controversial but not well understood. A deeper look at the topic reveals the following:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/23/the-dangers-of-buybacks-mitigating-common-pitfalls/#more-133796" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Dangers of Buybacks: Mitigating Common Pitfalls">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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