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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Can Extended Equity Vesting Periods Break the Dominance of Performance-Based Compensation? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Can Extended Equity Vesting Periods Break the Dominance of Performance-Based Compensation?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/28/can-extended-equity-vesting-periods-break-the-dominance-of-performance-based-compensation/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=can-extended-equity-vesting-periods-break-the-dominance-of-performance-based-compensation</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 28 Mar 2026 11:30:06 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEO Pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Performance-based]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Performance based awards have long been championed by proxy advisors and investors as the best way to align executive incentives with shareholder outcomes. Performance awards with a three-year performance period have emerged as the dominant performance horizon in the U.S. as a result. Despite this broad market consensus, some investors have begun to show support [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Subodh Mishra, ISS STOXX, on Saturday, March 28, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS-Corporate memorandum by Craig Benedict and Daniel King, Compensation &amp; Governance Advisory at ISS-Corporate.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-179976 alignnone size-medium" src="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/style-1.gif" alt="" width="1" height="1" />Performance based awards have long been championed by proxy advisors and investors as the best way to align executive incentives with shareholder outcomes. Performance awards with a three-year performance period have emerged as the dominant performance horizon in the U.S. as a result. Despite this broad market consensus, some investors have begun to show support for simpler equity structures that deemphasize performance in favor of longer time-based equity vesting periods.</p>
<p>Norges Bank, the investment arm of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, is one of the most prominent proponents of an extended equity vesting period. The bank argues that performance-based equity can be expensive and complex and result in higher overall compensation than non-performance-based plans with an extended equity vesting period.</p>
<p>In this paper, ISS-Corporate examines these two different approaches to CEO compensation across Russell 3000 companies, comparing performance, compensation levels, investor and non-investor perceptions and governance data.<img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-179977 alignnone size-medium" src="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pasted-7.gif" alt="" width="1" height="1" /> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/28/can-extended-equity-vesting-periods-break-the-dominance-of-performance-based-compensation/#more-179968" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Can Extended Equity Vesting Periods Break the Dominance of Performance-Based Compensation?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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