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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>First Court of Chancery Decision Interpreting New DGCL Amendments Provides Greater Certainty for Boards and M&#038;A &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>First Court of Chancery Decision Interpreting New DGCL Amendments Provides Greater Certainty for Boards and M&#038;A</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:30:17 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DGCL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DGCL S.144]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Director Independence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182144?d=20260629161849EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Key Takeaways In 2025, sweeping amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) were adopted, including a new Section 144 safe harbor for conflicted transactions and a heightened presumption of director disinterestedness. The Court of Chancery recently applied this presumption of director disinterestedness to a derivative complaint outside of the Section 144 safe harbor, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Rick Horvath, Eric Siegel, and Molly Wang, Dechert LLP, on Tuesday, June 30, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/h/rick-s--horvath.html">Rick Horvath</a> and <a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/s/eric-siegel.html">Eric Siegel</a> are Partners, and <a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/w/molly-wang.html">Molly Wang</a> is an Associate at Dechert LLP. This post is based on their Dechert memorandum and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><h3>Key Takeaways</h3>
<ul>
<li>In 2025, sweeping amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) were adopted, including a new Section 144 safe harbor for conflicted transactions and a heightened presumption of director disinterestedness.</li>
<li>The Court of Chancery recently applied this presumption of director disinterestedness to a derivative complaint outside of the Section 144 safe harbor, and made clear that bare allegations of director compensation, overlapping board service, business relationships, and minority co-investments in professional sports teams will not suffice to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness.</li>
<li>While addressed in the context of a derivative complaint, the Court’s analysis provides helpful guidance and, if applied in future cases, would remove much of the uncertainty related to conflicted transactions.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma/#more-182144" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading First Court of Chancery Decision Interpreting New DGCL Amendments Provides Greater Certainty for Boards and M&#038;A">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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