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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Hidden Cost of Stock Market Concentration: When Funds Hit Regulatory Limits &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Hidden Cost of Stock Market Concentration: When Funds Hit Regulatory Limits</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/07/the-hidden-cost-of-stock-market-concentration-when-funds-hit-regulatory-limits/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-hidden-cost-of-stock-market-concentration-when-funds-hit-regulatory-limits</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 11:31:43 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asset management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ETFs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Market Concentration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mutual funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[portfolio]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Market Concentration and Fund Regulation The U.S. stock market has become highly concentrated. Between 2015 and 2024, the share of the ten largest stocks in total U.S. market capitalization rose from 13% to 31%. In large-cap growth, it rose from 30% to 48%. By the end of 2024, the &#8220;Magnificent 7&#8221; stocks alone represented roughly [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lubos Pastor, Taisiya Sikorskaya, and Jinrui Wang (University of Chicago Booth School of Business), on Tuesday, July 7, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/p/lubos-pastor">Lubos Pastor</a> is the Charles P. McQuaid Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, <a href="https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/s/taisiya-sikorskaya">Taisiya Sikorskaya</a> is an Assistant Professor of Finance and a Fama Faculty Fellow, and Jinrui Wang is a Research Professional, all at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5930457">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><strong>Market Concentration and Fund Regulation</strong></p>
<p>The U.S. stock market has become highly concentrated. Between 2015 and 2024, the share of the ten largest stocks in total U.S. market capitalization rose from 13% to 31%. In large-cap growth, it rose from 30% to 48%. By the end of 2024, the &#8220;Magnificent 7&#8221; stocks alone represented roughly one-third of the S&amp;P 500 and more than half of the Russell 1000 Growth Index.</p>
<p>This rise in concentration has received substantial attention, often in connection with market power and the rise of a handful of dominant firms. We examine a different implication. As a few stocks have come to dominate major benchmarks, an old diversification rule has begun to bind, forcing funds to trim the largest stocks, with consequences for fund performance and stock prices.</p>
<p>Figure 2 illustrates why this interaction matters today: stock market concentration has risen rapidly just as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have become much larger holders of U.S. equities.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/07/the-hidden-cost-of-stock-market-concentration-when-funds-hit-regulatory-limits/#more-182329" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Hidden Cost of Stock Market Concentration: When Funds Hit Regulatory Limits">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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