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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Shareholder Proposals as an Early Warning System for Corporate Risk, and the Cost of Ignoring Them &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Shareholder Proposals as an Early Warning System for Corporate Risk, and the Cost of Ignoring Them</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/08/shareholder-proposals-as-an-early-warning-system-for-corporate-risk-and-the-cost-of-ignoring-them/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=shareholder-proposals-as-an-early-warning-system-for-corporate-risk-and-the-cost-of-ignoring-them</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 11:32:01 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Much has been written about the significance of the $5 billion historic penalty and privacy reforms imposed by the FTC on Meta, but press surrounding the incident rarely references the fact that this risk was something shareholders had already warned management about through shareholder filings. In 2018, shareholders filed a proposal at Meta asking the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Timothy Smith and Sehr Khaliq, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, on Thursday, October 8, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Timothy Smith is the Senior Policy Advisor and Sehr Khaliq is the Director of Program Evaluation at the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). This post is based on their ICCR memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Much has been written about the significance of the <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions-facebook?os=___&amp;utm_source=chatgpt.com">$5 billion historic penalty and privacy reforms imposed by the FTC on Meta</a>, but press surrounding the incident rarely references the fact that this risk was something shareholders had already warned management about through shareholder filings.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680118000022/facebook2018definitiveprox.htm">2018,</a> shareholders filed a proposal at Meta asking the company to issue a report discussing the merits of establishing a Risk Oversight Board Committee to address privacy/data risks that could threaten shareholder value. The Board opposed the proposal, arguing that the Board’s audit committee offered sufficient oversight. Since Meta is a dual class share company with CEO Mark Zuckerberg owning 99.7% of the outstanding Class B shares that represent only 13% of the economic ownership but grant him <a href="https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001326801/000132680124000034/meta-20240418.htm">61% of the voting power,</a> the proposal got only <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680118000049/form8-k2018annualmeeting.htm">11.55%</a> of the vote, which represented <a href="https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/December%205%202018%20Letter%20to%20Senate%20Banking.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com">45%</a> support among non-insider shares.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/08/shareholder-proposals-as-an-early-warning-system-for-corporate-risk-and-the-cost-of-ignoring-them/#more-184125" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Shareholder Proposals as an Early Warning System for Corporate Risk, and the Cost of Ignoring Them">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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