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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
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		<title>Post-Doctoral and Doctoral Corporate Governance Fellowships for Individuals with Legal Training</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/post-doctoral-and-doctoral-corporate-governance-fellowships-for-individuals-with-legal-training/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=post-doctoral-and-doctoral-corporate-governance-fellowships-for-individuals-with-legal-training</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/post-doctoral-and-doctoral-corporate-governance-fellowships-for-individuals-with-legal-training/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 11:32:08 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Program News & Events]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[The Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School (HLS) is pleased to announce that it is seeking applications from highly qualified candidates who are interested in working with the Program as Post-Doctoral or Doctoral Corporate Governance Fellows. Candidates should have a law degree from a law school in the United States or abroad. Candidates [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School (HLS) is pleased to announce that it is seeking applications from highly qualified candidates who are interested in working with the Program as Post-Doctoral or Doctoral Corporate Governance Fellows.</p>
<p>Candidates should have a law degree from a law school in the United States or abroad. Candidates still pursuing a doctoral degree are eligible so long as they will have completed their program’s coursework requirements by the time they begin their fellowship period.</p>
<p>During the term of their appointment, Fellows will be in residence at HLS. They will be required to devote part of their time to work on research tasks assigned by the Program, depending on their skills, interests, and Program needs, but will be able to spend significant time on projects initiated by them. The position will provide a competitive fellowship salary and Harvard University benefits.</p>
<p>Applicants should have an interest in corporate governance and in academic or policy research in this field. Former Fellows of the Program currently teach in many leading law schools in the U.S. and abroad (e.g., Scott Hirst (BU), Robert Jackson (NYU), Marcel Kahan (NYU), Kobi Kastiel (Tel-Aviv), Yaron Nili (Duke), Roberto Tallarita (Harvard) and Holger Spamann (Harvard)).</p>
<p>Interested candidates should submit a CV, a writing sample, and a cover letter to the coordinator of the Program, at <a href="mailto:programcoordinator@corpgov.law.harvard.edu" target="_blank" rel="noopener">programcoordinator@corpgov.law.harvard.edu</a>. The cover letter should describe the candidate’s experience, reasons for seeking the position, career plans, and the period during which they would like to work with the Program.</p>
<p>Applications are considered on a rolling basis, and the start date is flexible. Candidates should apply only if they seek to stay at the Program for two years. All personnel appointments at the Program are for one year, but the appointment period is generally extendable for additional one-year period/s (subject to business needs and satisfactory performance).</p>
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		<title>Audit Committee Considerations for SEC&#8217;s Proposal on Semiannual Reporting</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/audit-committee-considerations-for-secs-proposal-on-semiannual-reporting-2/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=audit-committee-considerations-for-secs-proposal-on-semiannual-reporting-2</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/audit-committee-considerations-for-secs-proposal-on-semiannual-reporting-2/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 11:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182224?d=20260630155051EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What the audit committee needs to know On May 5, the SEC issued a rule proposal that would provide an optional semiannual reporting framework as an alternative to the existing quarterly reporting framework. The optional semiannual reporting framework would be available to any registrant currently required to file a quarterly report on Form 10-Q. Form [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kathy Nieland, Tracey-Lee Brown, and Gregory Johnson, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, on Wednesday, July 1, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.pwc.com/us/en/contacts/k/kathy-nieland.html">Kathy Nieland</a> is a Partner, and <a href="https://www.pwc.com/us/en/contacts/t/tracey-lee-brown.html">Tracey-Lee Brown</a> and <a href="https://www.pwc.com/us/en/contacts/g/gregory-johnson.html">Gregory Johnson</a> are Directors at the Governance Insights Center, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on their PwC memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>What the audit committee needs to know</h2>
<p>On May 5, the SEC issued a rule <a href="https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2026-42-sec-proposes-amendments-permit-optional-semiannual-reporting-public-companies">proposal</a> that would provide an optional semiannual reporting framework as an alternative to the existing quarterly reporting framework. The optional semiannual reporting framework would be available to any registrant currently required to file a quarterly report on Form 10-Q.</p>
<h3>Form 10-S would replace Form 10-Q for semiannual filers</h3>
<p>A company that elects the semiannual reporting framework (a semiannual filer) would forgo filing quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (for the first, second, and third quarters of its fiscal year) and would instead file one interim report covering the first half of the fiscal year on new Form 10-S. Form 10-S would require the same information that is currently required by Form 10-Q, except that the financial information (and related disclosures) would cover the fiscal six-month period instead of a quarter. Unlike Form 10-Q, which requires presentation of both quarter-to-date and year-to-date periods, Form 10-S would only require presentation of the year-to-date (i.e. semiannual) period, though voluntary presentation of quarterly information would be permitted. The financial statements in Form 10-S would be required to be (1) prepared under US GAAP, (2) reviewed by the auditor, and (3) data tagged using Inline XBRL.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/audit-committee-considerations-for-secs-proposal-on-semiannual-reporting-2/#more-182224" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Audit Committee Considerations for SEC&#8217;s Proposal on Semiannual Reporting">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Court of Chancery Imposes Sanctions for Spoliation of Signal Messages</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/court-of-chancery-imposes-sanctions-for-spoliation-of-signal-messages/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=court-of-chancery-imposes-sanctions-for-spoliation-of-signal-messages</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/court-of-chancery-imposes-sanctions-for-spoliation-of-signal-messages/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 11:30:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182215?d=20260630155144EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On May 26, 2026, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery imposed sanctions for the spoliation of evidence in a fiduciary duty case arising from the merger of a wrestling entertainment company (the “Company”) with a global sports and entertainment company (the “Acquiror”). In re World Wrestling Ent., Inc. Merger Litig., [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Mallory Tosch Hoggatt, Alan Goudiss, Jeffrey Hoschander, A&O Shearman, on Wednesday, July 1, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.aoshearman.com/en/people/mallory-tosch-hoggatt">Mallory Tosch Hoggatt</a>, <a href="https://www.aoshearman.com/en/people/alan-goudiss">Alan Goudiss</a>, and <a href="https://www.aoshearman.com/en/people/jeffrey-hoschander">Jeffrey Hoschander</a> are Partners at A&amp;O Shearman. This post is based on an A&amp;O Shearman memorandum by Ms. Tosch Hoggatt, Mr. Goudiss, Mr. Hoschander, <a href="https://www.aoshearman.com/en/people/henessy-guerrero">Henessy Guerrero</a>, and <a href="https://www.aoshearman.com/en/people/jessie-donegan">Jessie Donegan</a>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On May 26, 2026, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery imposed sanctions for the spoliation of evidence in a fiduciary duty case arising from the merger of a wrestling entertainment company (the “Company”) with a global sports and entertainment company (the “Acquiror”). <em>In re World Wrestling Ent., Inc. Merger Litig.</em>, C.A. No. 2023-1166-JTL (Del. Ch. May 26, 2026). The Court found that the Company’s controlling stockholder and senior officers—at a minimum, recklessly— destroyed Signal chats and messages after receiving legal hold notices and that plaintiffs were prejudiced thereby because “context suggests” that the lost evidence was relevant. As a result, the Court ordered a shift of the burden of proof from plaintiffs to defendants by presuming the truth of a limited set of facts in favor of plaintiffs, subject to rebuttal only by clear and convincing evidence.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/01/court-of-chancery-imposes-sanctions-for-spoliation-of-signal-messages/#more-182215" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Court of Chancery Imposes Sanctions for Spoliation of Signal Messages">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>The Effective Board: A Guide to Drive Board Performance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/the-effective-board-a-guide-to-drive-board-performance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-effective-board-a-guide-to-drive-board-performance</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/the-effective-board-a-guide-to-drive-board-performance/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:32:13 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182043?d=20260629161659EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What does it take for a board to be truly effective today, what gets in the way, and how are leading boards overcoming those barriers? In brief Directors say the quality and flow of information from management is a key driver of board effectiveness, but performance is uneven across boards. Boards want more time on [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lee Henderson and Jamie Smith, EY, on Tuesday, June 30, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.ey.com/en_us/people/lee-henderson" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.ey.com/en_us/people/lee-henderson&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1758646155033000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0ya2DwcSW76Nwx0FJ6jh4T">Lee Henderson</a> is the Center for Board Matters Leader and <a href="https://www.ey.com/en_us/people/jamie-c-smith" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.ey.com/en_us/people/jamie-c-smith&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1758646155033000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1qEKLOBNzECCy44vKXItBp">Jamie Smith</a> is the Center for Board Matters Director at EY. This post is based on their EY memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>What does it take for a board to be truly effective today, what gets in the way, and how are leading boards overcoming those barriers?</p>
<h4>In brief</h4>
<ul>
<li>Directors say the quality and flow of information from management is a key driver of board effectiveness, but performance is uneven across boards.</li>
<li>Boards want more time on AI, talent and geopolitics, and leading boards improve information and meeting practices to get it instead of just adding hours.</li>
<li>Directors see board composition as an area of weakness, but many are taking steps to refresh membership to acquire new skills.</li>
</ul>
<p>Your board agenda is packed, your board book is longer than ever, and the topics that matter most are moving faster than the scheduled meeting cycle. Coupled with stakeholders’ rising expectations of board members and activists on the hunt for targets, directors cannot afford missteps. The fundamentals of board effectiveness are urgently needed to navigate a world whose challenges are becoming daily more acute.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/the-effective-board-a-guide-to-drive-board-performance/#more-182043" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Effective Board: A Guide to Drive Board Performance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>First Court of Chancery Decision Interpreting New DGCL Amendments Provides Greater Certainty for Boards and M&#038;A</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:30:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182144?d=20260629161849EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Key Takeaways In 2025, sweeping amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) were adopted, including a new Section 144 safe harbor for conflicted transactions and a heightened presumption of director disinterestedness. The Court of Chancery recently applied this presumption of director disinterestedness to a derivative complaint outside of the Section 144 safe harbor, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Rick Horvath, Eric Siegel, and Molly Wang, Dechert LLP, on Tuesday, June 30, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/h/rick-s--horvath.html">Rick Horvath</a> and <a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/s/eric-siegel.html">Eric Siegel</a> are Partners, and <a href="https://www.dechert.com/people/w/molly-wang.html">Molly Wang</a> is an Associate at Dechert LLP. This post is based on their Dechert memorandum and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><h3>Key Takeaways</h3>
<ul>
<li>In 2025, sweeping amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) were adopted, including a new Section 144 safe harbor for conflicted transactions and a heightened presumption of director disinterestedness.</li>
<li>The Court of Chancery recently applied this presumption of director disinterestedness to a derivative complaint outside of the Section 144 safe harbor, and made clear that bare allegations of director compensation, overlapping board service, business relationships, and minority co-investments in professional sports teams will not suffice to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness.</li>
<li>While addressed in the context of a derivative complaint, the Court’s analysis provides helpful guidance and, if applied in future cases, would remove much of the uncertainty related to conflicted transactions.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/30/first-court-of-chancery-decision-interpreting-new-dgcl-amendments-provides-greater-certainty-for-boards-and-ma/#more-182144" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading First Court of Chancery Decision Interpreting New DGCL Amendments Provides Greater Certainty for Boards and M&#038;A">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>U.S. Proxy Season: Say-on-Pay, One-Time Awards, and Equity Plan Trends</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/u-s-proxy-season-say-on-pay-one-time-awards-and-equity-plan-trends/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=u-s-proxy-season-say-on-pay-one-time-awards-and-equity-plan-trends</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:32:53 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy Season 2026]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[shareholder engagement]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182083?d=20260626164301EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Strength in Say-on-pay outcomes suggests that investors view most compensation programs as reasonably aligned with performance, even as certain pay practices—such as one-time equity awards—persist. The 2026 U.S. proxy season reflects continued strength in Say-on-Pay (SOP) outcomes relative to recent years. While headline voting results jump to a five-year high, shifts in both the prevalence [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Subodh Mishra, ISS STOXX, on Monday, June 29, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS-Corporate memorandum by <a href="https://www.iss-corporate.com/about/team/tim-sessing/">Tim Sessing</a>, Compensation &amp; Governance Advisory Associate, and <a href="https://www.iss-corporate.com/about/team/chris-sayo/">Chris Sayo</a>, Senior Associate for Data Analytics at ISS-Corporate.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Strength in Say-on-pay outcomes suggests that investors view most compensation programs as reasonably aligned with performance, even as certain pay practices—such as one-time equity awards—persist.</p>
<p>The 2026 U.S. proxy season reflects continued strength in Say-on-Pay (SOP) outcomes relative to recent years. While headline voting results jump to a five-year high, shifts in both the prevalence and structure of one-time equity awards suggest that companies are once again relying on targeted compensation tools to address retention, leadership transitions, and ongoing market uncertainty. Meanwhile, activity related to equity plan proposals remains elevated, reinforcing the central role of equity in pay design. These dynamics point to broad but nuanced investor support for key executive compensation proposals.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/u-s-proxy-season-say-on-pay-one-time-awards-and-equity-plan-trends/#more-182083" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading U.S. Proxy Season: Say-on-Pay, One-Time Awards, and Equity Plan Trends">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Opting Out of Court? Reputation and Informal Norms in Private Equity</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/opting-out-of-court-reputation-and-informal-norms-in-private-equity/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=opting-out-of-court-reputation-and-informal-norms-in-private-equity</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/opting-out-of-court-reputation-and-informal-norms-in-private-equity/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:31:27 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Limited Partners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private equity]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182174?d=20260629120727EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Private equity sits at the heart of global finance. This $13 trillion industry thrives on contracts that lock in billions of dollars over decades, and on relationships between investors—the limited partners (“LPs”)—and the general partners (“GPs”) who manage their money. In an arena where LPs hand over vast sums, have limited say during a fund’s [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel (Tel Aviv University) and Yaron Nili (Duke University), on Monday, June 29, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://en-law.tau.ac.il/profile/kastiel">Kobi Kastiel</a> is a Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, and <a href="https://law.duke.edu/fac/nili">Yaron Nili</a> is a Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5407006">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Vanderbilt Law Review</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Private equity sits at the heart of global finance. This $13 trillion industry thrives on contracts that lock in billions of dollars over decades, and on relationships between investors—the limited partners (“LPs”)—and the general partners (“GPs”) who manage their money. In an arena where LPs hand over vast sums, have limited say during a fund’s life, and have few exit options, one would expect courts to play a central role in policing the relationship. Yet they do not. In stark contrast to public markets, where shareholder litigation helps deter misconduct and shape corporate norms, private equity operates in a near-litigation-free zone. Lawsuits against GPs are rare, and when they happen, they are reserved for the most egregious breaches, such as outright fraud.</p>
<p>This presents a genuine puzzle. In an industry where fiduciary conflicts and misaligned incentives are not uncommon, why do LPs almost never turn to the courts to enforce their rights? And if litigation is largely off the table, how does the industry resolve disputes and discipline misconduct?</p>
<p>In a new Article, forthcoming in the <em>Vanderbilt Law Review</em>, we offer the first account of the rarity of litigation in private equity, of its underlying causes, and of the ecosystem of extralegal relations and informal norms that serves as a partial substitute for formal legal channels. Drawing on a proprietary dataset of limited partnership agreements (“LPAs”), a comprehensive search of four decades of state and federal litigation, and a unique set of interviews with senior investment officers and legal advisors to both LPs and GPs, we make three contributions to the literature on private equity.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/opting-out-of-court-reputation-and-informal-norms-in-private-equity/#more-182174" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Opting Out of Court? Reputation and Informal Norms in Private Equity">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Claims as Derivative, Unripe, and Untimely</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-claims-as-derivative-unripe-and-untimely/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-claims-as-derivative-unripe-and-untimely</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-claims-as-derivative-unripe-and-untimely/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:30:32 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Court of Chancery]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Direct vs. Derivative Claims]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Statute of limitations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stockholder Litigation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182158?d=20260629120151EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On April 13, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed all 12 claims asserted in The Gregory M. Raiff 2000 Trust v. Jenzabar, Inc., 2026 WL 992587 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2026). Some claims were exclusively derivative, some were unripe, some were time-barred, and some were deficient for a combination of these reasons. The court [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robin Wechkin and Madison Ferraro, Sidley Austin LLP, on Monday, June 29, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/w/wechkin-robin-e">Robin Wechkin</a> is a Counsel and <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/f/ferraro-madison-j">Madison Ferraro</a> is a Managing Associate at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on their Sidley memorandum and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On April 13, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed all 12 claims asserted in <em>The Gregory M. Raiff 2000 Trust v. Jenzabar, Inc., 2026</em> WL 992587 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2026). Some claims were exclusively derivative, some were unripe, some were time-barred, and some were deficient for a combination of these reasons. The court cited <em>Brookfield</em>’s holding that dilution claims without more are derivative and rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that their claims fell within two exceptions to <em>Brookfield</em>. The opinion also reinforces the well-established distinction between indemnification and advancement of fees and illustrates the perils for plaintiffs who file too early or too late.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/29/delaware-court-of-chancery-dismisses-stockholder-claims-as-derivative-unripe-and-untimely/#more-182158" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Court of Chancery Dismisses Stockholder Claims as Derivative, Unripe, and Untimely">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Delaware Court of Chancery Interprets New Section 144 and Applies Heightened Presumption of Director Independence</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/28/delaware-court-of-chancery-interprets-new-section-144-and-applies-heightened-presumption-of-director-independence/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-court-of-chancery-interprets-new-section-144-and-applies-heightened-presumption-of-director-independence</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/28/delaware-court-of-chancery-interprets-new-section-144-and-applies-heightened-presumption-of-director-independence/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2026 11:30:54 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflicted Transactions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Court of Chancery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Demand futility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[derivative litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Director Independence]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182142?d=20260629115600EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On June 15, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an Opinion interpreting Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL), the landmark statutory measure adopted last year to provide safe harbors for certain conflicted transactions and address director independence, among other reforms. The Opinion arose in a common context in Delaware stockholder [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Amy Simmerman, Brad Sorrels, and Jordan Cramer, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, on Sunday, June 28, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/amy-l-simmerman.html">Amy Simmerman</a> and <a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/brad-sorrels.html">Brad Sorrels</a> are Partners and <a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/jordan-l-cramer.html">Jordan Cramer</a> is an Associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &amp; Rosati. This post is based on a Wilson Sonsini memorandum by Ms. Simmerman, Mr. Sorrels, Ms. Cramer, <a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/daniyal-m-iqbal.html">Daniyal Iqbal</a>, and <a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/shannon-e-german.html">Shannon German</a>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On June 15, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery <a href="https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?id=396770">issued an Opinion</a> interpreting Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL), the landmark statutory measure adopted last year to provide safe harbors for certain conflicted transactions and address director independence, among other reforms.<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/28/delaware-court-of-chancery-interprets-new-section-144-and-applies-heightened-presumption-of-director-independence/#1">[1]</a> The Opinion arose in a common context in Delaware stockholder litigation: claims over director and management compensation. In the decision, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will applied, for the first time, the statute’s heightened presumption of independence for directors of public companies determined by the board to be independent under the relevant NYSE or Nasdaq listing standards to dismiss derivative claims on demand futility grounds.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/28/delaware-court-of-chancery-interprets-new-section-144-and-applies-heightened-presumption-of-director-independence/#more-182142" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Court of Chancery Interprets New Section 144 and Applies Heightened Presumption of Director Independence">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>AI in Incentive Plans: Opportunity, Risk, and the Role of the Compensation Committee</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/27/ai-in-incentive-plans-opportunity-risk-and-the-role-of-the-compensation-committee/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ai-in-incentive-plans-opportunity-risk-and-the-role-of-the-compensation-committee</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/27/ai-in-incentive-plans-opportunity-risk-and-the-role-of-the-compensation-committee/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2026 11:30:45 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compensation committees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[performance metrics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182156?d=20260626163629EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Summary: As AI reshapes business performance, compensation committees face new governance questions around measurement integrity, accountability, and whether existing incentive frameworks still reflect how value is created. AI investment is accelerating across industries, while only a limited number of companies have chosen to reflect it in their incentive frameworks. For many committees, the question is [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Pat Haggerty, Pearl Meyer & Partners, LLC, on Saturday, June 27, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://pearlmeyer.com/our-people/patrick-haggerty">Pat Haggerty</a> is a Managing Director at Pearl Meyer &amp; Partners, LLC. This post is based on his Pearl Meyer memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><em><strong>Summary</strong>: As AI reshapes business performance, compensation committees face new governance questions around measurement integrity, accountability, and whether existing incentive frameworks still reflect how value is created.</em></p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/27/ai-in-incentive-plans-opportunity-risk-and-the-role-of-the-compensation-committee/#more-182156" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading AI in Incentive Plans: Opportunity, Risk, and the Role of the Compensation Committee">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Shareholder Activism Approaching the 2026 Midpoint: Trends, Lessons, and What to Expect for the Rest of the Season</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/26/shareholder-activism-approaching-the-2026-midpoint-trends-lessons-and-what-to-expect-for-the-rest-of-the-season/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=shareholder-activism-approaching-the-2026-midpoint-trends-lessons-and-what-to-expect-for-the-rest-of-the-season</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/26/shareholder-activism-approaching-the-2026-midpoint-trends-lessons-and-what-to-expect-for-the-rest-of-the-season/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 11:32:59 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board refreshment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge Fund Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy contests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Universal Proxy Rules]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182028?d=20260626111110EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As the 2026 proxy season approaches its midpoint, the early data confirm rather than reverse the structural shifts that defined 2025. Shareholder activism remains a feature of the public markets that virtually every issuer must confront, whatever its size, maturity, reputation, or governance profile. So far in 2026, activists have launched more campaigns than they [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Sebastian Alsheimer, J.T. Ho, and Paul J. Shim, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Friday, June 26, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/sebastian-alsheimer" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/sebastian-alsheimer&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1782496962984000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0a1mbV-cScvBe_Fdd06JZj">Sebastian Alsheimer</a> is a Partner and Head of the Shareholder Engagement and Activism Defense Practice, <a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/jt-ho" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/jt-ho&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1782496962984000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3JYX6fYXJwCe0LDFKuhhg8">J.T. Ho</a> is a Partner, and <a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/paul-j-shim" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/paul-j-shim&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1782496962984000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2NWtx15uj5ZT0CRcbDwK91">Paul J. Shim</a> is a Partner and Co-Leader of the Americas M&amp;A Group at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &amp; Hamilton LLP.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>As the 2026 proxy season approaches its midpoint, the early data confirm rather than reverse the <a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/2025-shareholder-activism-trends-and-what-to-expect-in-2026">structural shifts that defined 2025</a>. Shareholder activism remains a feature of the public markets that virtually every issuer must confront, whatever its size, maturity, reputation, or governance profile. So far in 2026, activists have launched more campaigns than they did in the same period last year. They have pressed for more M&amp;A demands, concentrated their activity among a familiar set of well-capitalized hedge funds, and turned their attention toward larger companies and the technology sector. Settlements remain the main path to the boardroom, even though board seats have grown harder to win. This post offers a mid-season assessment in two parts: the key issues that have emerged so far, and the lessons and outlook for the rest of the year. Unless we note otherwise, the figures below come from Deal Point Data and cover identified activist campaigns launched between January 1 and June 1 of each year, at companies with a market capitalization of at least $300 million.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/26/shareholder-activism-approaching-the-2026-midpoint-trends-lessons-and-what-to-expect-for-the-rest-of-the-season/#more-182028" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Shareholder Activism Approaching the 2026 Midpoint: Trends, Lessons, and What to Expect for the Rest of the Season">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Weekly Roundup: June 19-25, 2026</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/26/weekly-roundup-june-19-25-2026/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=weekly-roundup-june-19-25-2026</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/26/weekly-roundup-june-19-25-2026/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2026 11:30:07 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Weekly Roundup]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182179?d=20260625161527EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Stay Grounded on Moonshot IPOs Posted by Rodney Comegys, Vanguard, on Friday, June 19, 2026 Tags: ETF, Index funds, IPO, mega IPOs, SpaceX Supreme Court: SEC May Seek Disgorgement of Profits Without Proving Investor Loss Posted by Nekia Hackworth, Sarah Levine, and David Peavler, Jones Day, on Saturday, June 20, 2026 Tags: Disgorgement, SEC, Securities [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, on Friday, June 26, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 19-25, 2026</p>
</div></hgroup><div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/19/stay-grounded-on-moonshot-ipos/">Stay Grounded on Moonshot IPOs<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Rodney Comegys, Vanguard, on <abbr title="2026-06-19T07:32:21-0400">Friday, June 19, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/etf/" rel="tag">ETF</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/index-funds/" rel="tag">Index funds</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/ipo/" rel="tag">IPO</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/mega-ipos/" rel="tag">mega IPOs</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/spacex/" rel="tag">SpaceX</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/20/supreme-court-sec-may-seek-disgorgement-of-profits-without-proving-investor-loss/">Supreme Court: SEC May Seek Disgorgement of Profits Without Proving Investor Loss<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Nekia Hackworth, Sarah Levine, and David Peavler, Jones Day, on <abbr title="2026-06-20T07:30:52-0400">Saturday, June 20, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/disgorgement/" rel="tag">Disgorgement</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/sec/" rel="tag">SEC</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/securities-litigation/" rel="tag">Securities litigation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/securities-regulation/" rel="tag">Securities regulation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/supreme-court/" rel="tag">Supreme Court</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/21/proxy-advice-esg-ratings-and-indices-in-global-capital-markets/">Proxy Advice, ESG Ratings and Indices in Global Capital Markets<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Adriana De La Cruz, Tiziana Londero, and Hitesh Tank, OECD, on <abbr title="2026-06-21T07:30:41-0400">Sunday, June 21, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/capital-market-service-providers/" rel="tag">capital market service providers</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/capital-markets/" rel="tag">Capital markets</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/esg/" rel="tag">ESG</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/esg-ratings/" rel="tag">ESG ratings</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/financial-regulation/" rel="tag">Financial regulation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/index-providers/" rel="tag">Index providers</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/institutional-investors/" rel="tag">Institutional Investors</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/proxy-advisors/" rel="tag">Proxy advisors</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/22/ai-drafting-board-minutes-hold-up-wait-a-minute-its-complicated/">AI Drafting Board Minutes? Hold Up, Wait a Minute. It’s Complicated<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Sonia K. Nijjar, Jenness E. Parker, and Yingchuan (Grace) Mo, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom LLP, on <abbr title="2026-06-22T07:30:16-0400">Monday, June 22, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/artificial-intelligence/" rel="tag">Artificial intelligence</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/attorney-client-privilege/" rel="tag">Attorney-client privilege</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/data-privacy/" rel="tag">Data Privacy</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/digital-transformation/" rel="tag">Digital Transformation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/litigation-risk/" rel="tag">Litigation Risk</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/risk-management/" rel="tag">Risk management</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/22/when-the-call-is-coming-from-inside-the-house/">When the Call is Coming From Inside the House<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Riyaz Lalani and Dan Gagnier, Gagnier Communications, on <abbr title="2026-06-22T07:32:31-0400">Monday, June 22, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/board-dynamics/" rel="tag">Board dynamics</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/institutional-investors/" rel="tag">Institutional Investors</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/investor-engagement/" rel="tag">Investor Engagement</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/mergers-acquisitions/" rel="tag">Mergers &amp; acquisitions</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-activism/" rel="tag">Shareholder activism</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/strategic-alternatives/" rel="tag">Strategic Alternatives</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/the-new-ceo-progression-blueprint-expanding-ceo-succession-optionality-during-uncertain-times/">The New CEO Progression Blueprint: Expanding CEO Succession Optionality During Uncertain Times<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Margot McShane and Hetty Pye, Russell Reynolds Associates, on <abbr title="2026-06-23T07:30:32-0400">Tuesday, June 23, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/board-leadership/" rel="tag">Board leadership</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/ceo-succession/" rel="tag">CEO succession</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/executive-assessment/" rel="tag">Executive Assessment</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/executive-talent/" rel="tag">Executive Talent</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/leadership-development/" rel="tag">Leadership Development</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/succession-planning/" rel="tag">succession planning</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/tariffs-and-incentive-pay-assessing-the-impact-on-annual-and-long-term-incentive-payouts/">Tariffs and Incentive Pay: Assessing the Impact on Annual and Long-Term Incentive Payouts<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Shaun Bisman and Margaret Engel, Compensation Advisory Partners, on <abbr title="2026-06-23T07:32:11-0400">Tuesday, June 23, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/compensation/" rel="tag">Executive Compensation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/executive-performance/" rel="tag">Executive performance</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/incentive-plan-payouts/" rel="tag">incentive plan payouts</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/incentive-plans/" rel="tag">incentive plans</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/tariffs/" rel="tag">Tariffs</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/ma-activism-and-corporate-governance-2/">M&amp;A, Activism and Corporate Governance<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Matthew L. Ploszek, Adam M. Sanchez, Cravath, Swaine &amp; Moore LLP, on <abbr title="2026-06-24T07:30:07-0400">Wednesday, June 24, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/activist-shareholders/" rel="tag">Activist Shareholders</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/antitrust-competition/" rel="tag">Antitrust &amp; Competition</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/corporate-investigations-compliance/" rel="tag">Corporate Investigations &amp; Compliance</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/delaware-corporate-law/" rel="tag">Delaware Corporate Law</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/government-investment-industrial-policy/" rel="tag">Government Investment &amp; Industrial Policy</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/securities-regulation-sec-enforcement/" rel="tag">Securities Regulation &amp; SEC Enforcement</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/">Explaining Delaware’s Dominance<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Ofer Eldar (UC Berkeley) and Lorenzo Magnolfi (OSU), on <abbr title="2026-06-24T07:31:20-0400">Wednesday, June 24, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/corporate-incorporation/" rel="tag">Corporate Incorporation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/delaware-corporate-law/" rel="tag">Delaware Corporate Law</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/institutional-ownership/" rel="tag">Institutional Ownership</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/legal-flexibility/" rel="tag">Legal Flexibility</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/mergers-acquisitions/" rel="tag">Mergers &amp; acquisitions</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/takeover-activity/" rel="tag">Takeover Activity</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/can-you-hear-me-now-the-importance-of-maintaining-an-in-person-option-for-agms/">Can You Hear Me Now? The Importance of Maintaining an In-Person Option for AGMs<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Jen Sisson, Jakub Brejdak, and Ayan Tewari, ICGN, on <abbr title="2026-06-24T07:32:04-0400">Wednesday, June 24, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/in-person-participation/" rel="tag">In-Person Participation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/investor-rights/" rel="tag">Investor Rights</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-democracy/" rel="tag">shareholder democracy</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-engagement/" rel="tag">shareholder engagement</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-meetings/" rel="tag">Shareholder meetings</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/virtual-meetings/" rel="tag">Virtual meetings</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/2026-shareholder-proposal-season-early-review-and-look-ahead-to-2027/">2026 Shareholder Proposal Season Early Review and Look Ahead to 2027<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Brad Goldberg, Beth Sasfai, and Michael Mencher, Cooley LLP , on <abbr title="2026-06-25T07:30:55-0400">Thursday, June 25, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/esg-activism/" rel="tag">ESG Activism</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/proxy-season-2026/" rel="tag">Proxy Season 2026</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/proxy-voting-engagement/" rel="tag">Proxy Voting &amp; Engagement</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/sec-rule-14a-8/" rel="tag">SEC Rule 14a-8</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-activism/" rel="tag">Shareholder activism</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-proposal/" rel="tag">Shareholder proposals</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/ceo-pay-levels-in-the-u-s-are-converging-amid-increased-benchmarking/">CEO Pay Levels in the U.S. Are Converging Amid Increased Benchmarking<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Torsten Jochem (University of Amsterdam), Gaizka Ormazaba (IESE Business School), and Anjana Rajamani (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University), on <abbr title="2026-06-25T07:31:42-0400">Thursday, June 25, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/ceo-compensation/" rel="tag">CEO compensation</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/compensation-benchmarking/" rel="tag">Compensation Benchmarking</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/executive-pay/" rel="tag">executive pay</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/proxy-advisors/" rel="tag">Proxy advisors</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/say-on-pay/" rel="tag">Say on pay</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/sec-disclosure-regulation/" rel="tag">SEC Disclosure Regulation</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
<hr class="weeklyhr" />
<div class="weeklylist">
<h2 class="weeklylist"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/what-directors-career-histories-may-reveal-about-the-capabilities-of-fortune-100-company-boards/">What Directors’ Career Histories May Reveal About the Capabilities of Fortune 100 Company Boards<br />
</a></h2>
<div class="bylinenamedate"><em>Posted by Christine Davine, Caroline Schoenecker, and Jamie McCall, Deloitte LLP, on <abbr title="2026-06-25T07:32:59-0400">Thursday, June 25, 2026</abbr></em></div>
<div class="weeklytags">
<div class="bylineweekly-tag"><small>Tags: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/board-capabilities/" rel="tag">Board Capabilities</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/board-composition/" rel="tag">Board composition</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/risk-management/" rel="tag">Risk management</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/strategy-oversight/" rel="tag">Strategy Oversight</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/talent-and-workforce/" rel="tag">Talent and Workforce</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/technology-expertise/" rel="tag">Technology Expertise</a></small></div>
</div>
</div>
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		<title>What Directors&#8217; Career Histories May Reveal About the Capabilities of Fortune 100 Company Boards</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/what-directors-career-histories-may-reveal-about-the-capabilities-of-fortune-100-company-boards/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=what-directors-career-histories-may-reveal-about-the-capabilities-of-fortune-100-company-boards</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:32:59 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board Capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board composition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategy Oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Talent and Workforce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology Expertise]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=181985?d=20260625105521EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As businesses face volatility and market shifts, many corporate boards are having to make critical decisions amid heightened uncertainty to help top management deliver growth while strengthening resilience. Against this backdrop, improving board composition could be a key strategy for enterprises seeking to build long-term strength. This potential is underscored by a recent Deloitte Global [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Christine Davine, Caroline Schoenecker, and Jamie McCall, Deloitte LLP, on Thursday, June 25, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/about/people/profiles.cdavine+84b189b9.html">Christine Davine</a> is a Managing Partner, <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/about/people/profiles.caroline-davis-schoenecker+c612bb0e.html">Caroline Schoenecker</a> is a Managing Director, and <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/about/people/profiles.jamiemccall+26c4c888.html">Jamie McCall</a> is a Research &amp; Insights Manager at Deloitte LLP. This post is based on a Deloitte memorandum by Ms. Davine, Ms. Schoenecker, Mr. McCall, <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/about/people/profiles.elizabeth-molacek+5f166cdf.html">Elizabeth Molacek</a>, and <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/about/people/profiles.timurphy+3521b93.html">Timothy Murphy</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>As businesses face volatility and market shifts, many corporate boards are having to make critical decisions amid heightened uncertainty to help top management deliver growth while strengthening resilience. Against this backdrop, improving board composition could be a key strategy for enterprises seeking to build long-term strength. This potential is underscored by a recent <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/leadership/building-organizational-resilience.html">Deloitte Global survey</a> of 739 board directors and C-suite executives, in which 38% of respondents identified it as a leading driver of long-term resilience, second only to open communication between the board and the CEO (66%).</p>
<p>Having broader functional experience in the boardroom could help enterprises adapt more effectively to shifting market conditions. To assess that potential, we examined how directors’ career backgrounds may influence the capabilities of Fortune 100 boards, drawing on the last six leadership roles held by each director (see “<a href="https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/leadership/board-composition-capabilities.html?id=us:2em:3na:4diUS188605:5awa:6di:052026:K0211309&amp;ctr=fecta&amp;sfid=0031O000032TmT1QAK#about-the-data">About the data</a>”).<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/what-directors-career-histories-may-reveal-about-the-capabilities-of-fortune-100-company-boards/#1">[1]</a> The objective is practical: to provide a baseline for board refreshment discussions and help focus director education efforts.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/what-directors-career-histories-may-reveal-about-the-capabilities-of-fortune-100-company-boards/#more-181985" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading What Directors&#8217; Career Histories May Reveal About the Capabilities of Fortune 100 Company Boards">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>CEO Pay Levels in the U.S. Are Converging Amid Increased Benchmarking</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/ceo-pay-levels-in-the-u-s-are-converging-amid-increased-benchmarking/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ceo-pay-levels-in-the-u-s-are-converging-amid-increased-benchmarking</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/ceo-pay-levels-in-the-u-s-are-converging-amid-increased-benchmarking/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:31:42 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEO compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compensation Benchmarking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[executive pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC Disclosure Regulation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182107?d=20260624155441EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The pay levels of CEOs of publicly listed firms in the U.S. have converged sharply over the last two decades, amid the increasing use of compensation benchmarking against other firms with a similar profile. In a new paper, we looked at a wide sample of publicly listed U.S. firms over the period 1996 to 2023, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Torsten Jochem (University of Amsterdam), Gaizka Ormazaba (IESE Business School), and Anjana Rajamani (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University), on Thursday, June 25, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.uva.nl/en/profile/j/o/t.jochem/t.jochem.html">Torsten Jochem</a> is an Associate Professor in Finance at the University of Amsterdam, <a href="https://www.iese.edu/faculty-research/faculty/gaizka-ormazabal/">Gaizka Ormazabal</a> is Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Accounting and Control at IESE Business School, and <a href="https://www.rsm.nl/people/anjana-rajamani/">Anjana Rajamani</a> is an Associate Professor of Finance at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70050">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The pay levels of CEOs of publicly listed firms in the U.S. have converged sharply over the last two decades, amid the increasing use of compensation benchmarking against other firms with a similar profile.</p>
<p>In a new <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70050">paper</a>, we looked at a wide sample of publicly listed U.S. firms over the period 1996 to 2023, tracking the variation in pay across chief executives. After peaking around the year 2000, we find the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined almost 40% since 2007. Pay has converged toward the median at both tails of the distribution curve, and that is the case at an economy-wide level, across different industries, within groups of similar-sized companies in the same industries, and within compensation peer groups.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/ceo-pay-levels-in-the-u-s-are-converging-amid-increased-benchmarking/#more-182107" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading CEO Pay Levels in the U.S. Are Converging Amid Increased Benchmarking">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>2026 Shareholder Proposal Season Early Review and Look Ahead to 2027</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/2026-shareholder-proposal-season-early-review-and-look-ahead-to-2027/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=2026-shareholder-proposal-season-early-review-and-look-ahead-to-2027</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/2026-shareholder-proposal-season-early-review-and-look-ahead-to-2027/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:30:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Despite the heightened drama of the 2026 shareholder proposal season – precipitated by the landmark announcement from the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC (SEC staff) that it would generally not respond to no-action requests during the 2026 proxy season – the year-over-year trends remained largely consistent with the prior year. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Brad Goldberg, Beth Sasfai, and Michael Mencher, Cooley LLP, on Thursday, June 25, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/brad-goldberg" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Brad Goldberg</a> and <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/beth-sasfai" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Beth Sasfai</a> are Partners, and <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/michael-mencher" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Michael Mencher</a> is Special Counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Mr. Goldberg, Ms. Sasfai, Mr. Mencher, <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/reid-hooper">Reid Hooper</a>, <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/justin-kisner">Justin Kisner</a>, and <a href="https://www.cooley.com/people/vince-flynn">Vince Flynn</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Despite the heightened drama of the 2026 shareholder proposal season – precipitated by the landmark announcement from the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC (SEC staff) that it would generally not respond to no-action requests during the 2026 proxy season – the year-over-year trends remained largely consistent with the prior year. Overall proposal volume continued to decline, driven primarily by fewer environmental and social (E&amp;S) proposals, while governance and anti-ESG proposal activity and support levels remained broadly consistent with last year.</p>
<p>This alert provides an overview of proposal submissions and early voting trends for the 2026 season, examines exclusion and litigation developments under the SEC staff’s new no-action policy, as well as evolving proponent tactics, and considers the implications for what may be an even more chaotic 2027 season.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/25/2026-shareholder-proposal-season-early-review-and-look-ahead-to-2027/#more-181983" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading 2026 Shareholder Proposal Season Early Review and Look Ahead to 2027">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Can You Hear Me Now? The Importance of Maintaining an In-Person Option for AGMs</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/can-you-hear-me-now-the-importance-of-maintaining-an-in-person-option-for-agms/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=can-you-hear-me-now-the-importance-of-maintaining-an-in-person-option-for-agms</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:32:04 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[In-Person Participation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[shareholder democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shareholder engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder meetings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Virtual meetings]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=181733?d=20260623171348EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Technology should make shareholder meetings more accessible. It should not make boards less accountable. Across global markets, investors broadly welcome the use of digital tools to improve participation in annual general meetings. Remote access can help shareholders attend meetings they might otherwise miss, reduce logistical barriers and broaden engagement. But access is not the same [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jen Sisson, Jakub Brejdak, and Ayan Tewari, ICGN, on Wednesday, June 24, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.icgn.org/jen-sisson">Jen Sisson</a> is the CEO, and Jakub Brejdak and Ayan Tewari are Senior Policy Executives at International Corporate Governance Network. This post is based on their ICGN memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Technology should make shareholder meetings more accessible. It should not make boards less accountable.</p>
<p>Across global markets, investors broadly welcome the use of digital tools to improve participation in annual general meetings. Remote access can help shareholders attend meetings they might otherwise miss, reduce logistical barriers and broaden engagement. But access is not the same as accountability. An AGM is not just an administrative event. It is one of the few formal moments each year when the board is publicly answerable to shareholders. It is also a valuable opportunity for companies to hear directly from their investors, understand shareholder perspectives and build the trust that supports long-term value creation.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/can-you-hear-me-now-the-importance-of-maintaining-an-in-person-option-for-agms/#more-181733" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Can You Hear Me Now? The Importance of Maintaining an In-Person Option for AGMs">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Explaining Delaware&#8217;s Dominance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explaining-delawares-dominance</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:31:20 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Corporate Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Flexibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & acquisitions]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182063?d=20260623171010EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[For most of the modern era, Delaware has been the default home of American corporate law. That dominance is familiar, but it is also puzzling. Delaware does not offer corporations a simple code of bright-line rules. It offers fiduciary standards, judicial review, and a continuing stream of case law. Other states have often promised more [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ofer Eldar (UC Berkeley) and Lorenzo Magnolfi (OSU), on Wednesday, June 24, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/ofer-eldar/#tab_profile">Ofer Eldar</a> is a Professor of Law at UC Berkeley and <a href="https://www.lorenzomagnolfi.com/">Lorenzo Magnolfi</a> is an Associate Professor of Economics at Ohio State University. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5507918">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For most of the modern era, Delaware has been the default home of American corporate law. That dominance is familiar, but it is also puzzling. Delaware does not offer corporations a simple code of bright-line rules. It offers fiduciary standards, judicial review, and a continuing stream of case law. Other states have often promised more predictable statutes that limit litigation and protect managerial discretion. Yet public companies continued to choose Delaware in large numbers.</p>
<p>The current debate over DExit makes this puzzle newly important. High-profile firms have explored or completed moves to states such as Nevada and Texas, often arguing that Delaware law has become too uncertain or too intrusive. To assess that critique, it helps to ask why firms chose Delaware in the first place.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/#more-182063" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Explaining Delaware&#8217;s Dominance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>M&#038;A, Activism and Corporate Governance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/ma-activism-and-corporate-governance-2/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ma-activism-and-corporate-governance-2</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:30:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation & SEC Enforcement]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Mergers and Acquisitions The U.S Government as a partner: what you should know about M&#38;A and the U.S. government Under the Trump administration, the U.S. government has significantly shifted its industrial policy to act as a cornerstone investor in companies operating in sectors involving strategic assets, including energy, critical infrastructure, critical minerals, supply chain resilience, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Matthew L. Ploszek, Adam M. Sanchez, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, on Wednesday, June 24, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.cravath.com/people/matthew-l-ploszek.html">Matthew L. Ploszek</a> and <a href="https://www.cravath.com/people/adam-m-sanchez.html">Adam M. Sanchez</a> are Partners at Cravath, Swaine &amp; Moore LLP. This post is based on a Cravath memorandum by Mr. Ploszek, Mr. Sanchez, <a href="https://www.cravath.com/people/kimberley-s-drexler.html">Kimberley S. Drexler</a>, <a href="https://www.cravath.com/people/evan-a-hill.html">Evan A. Hill</a>, and <a href="https://www.cravath.com/people/margaret-t-segall.html">Margaret T. Segall</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Mergers and Acquisitions</h2>
<h3>The U.S Government as a partner: what you should know about M&amp;A and the U.S. government</h3>
<p>Under the Trump administration, the U.S. government has significantly shifted its industrial policy to act as a cornerstone investor in companies operating in sectors involving strategic assets, including energy, critical infrastructure, critical minerals, supply chain resilience, advanced technology and national security. Since the beginning of 2025, the U.S. government has invested, or committed to invest, $20.9 billion in 16 transactions to acquire direct ownership stakes in companies operating in these sectors.<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/ma-activism-and-corporate-governance-2/#1">[1]</a> However, these transactions do not fit squarely within a single investment category (<em>e.g.</em>, a U.S. government partnership may include elements of a minority equity investment, project finance, grants, loans, guarantees, commercial arrangements, regulatory facilitation and strategic partnerships). The U.S. government may be “wearing many hats” in connection with making these investments, so companies should be careful not to characterize these transactions through a narrow lens at the outset and instead assess the full range of legal, regulatory and commercial considerations that may apply.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/ma-activism-and-corporate-governance-2/#more-181959" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading M&#038;A, Activism and Corporate Governance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Tariffs and Incentive Pay: Assessing the Impact on Annual and Long-Term Incentive Payouts</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/tariffs-and-incentive-pay-assessing-the-impact-on-annual-and-long-term-incentive-payouts/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=tariffs-and-incentive-pay-assessing-the-impact-on-annual-and-long-term-incentive-payouts</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 11:32:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[incentive plan payouts]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=181700?d=20260622165739EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On April 2, 2025, referred to as “Liberation Day,” the Trump Administration announced a universal 10% tariff on all imported goods. In addition, the Administration imposed country-specific “reciprocal tariffs” on 57 nations, bringing total tariff rates to as high as 50% for certain trading partners. Major manufacturing hubs that account for a significant share of U.S. imports, including China, Vietnam, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Shaun Bisman and Margaret Engel, Compensation Advisory Partners, on Tuesday, June 23, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.capartners.com/our-people/shaun-bisman/">Shaun Bisman</a> is a Partner and <a href="https://www.capartners.com/our-people/margaret-engel/">Margaret Engel</a> is a Founding Partner at Compensation Advisory Partners. This post is based on a CAP memorandum by Mr. Bisman, Ms. Engel, <a href="https://www.capartners.com/our-people/maimouna-gueye/">Maimouna Gueye</a>, and <a href="https://www.capartners.com/our-people/bhavika-podduturi/">Bhavika Podduturi</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On April 2, 2025, referred to as “Liberation Day,” the Trump Administration announced a universal 10% tariff on all imported goods. In addition, the Administration imposed country-specific “reciprocal tariffs” on 57 nations, bringing total tariff rates to as high as 50% for certain trading partners. Major manufacturing hubs that account for a significant share of U.S. imports, including China, Vietnam, and India, were among the most significantly impacted, with certain categories of goods from these countries subject to materially higher effective tariff rates depending on industry and product type.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/tariffs-and-incentive-pay-assessing-the-impact-on-annual-and-long-term-incentive-payouts/#more-181700" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Tariffs and Incentive Pay: Assessing the Impact on Annual and Long-Term Incentive Payouts">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>The New CEO Progression Blueprint: Expanding CEO Succession Optionality During Uncertain Times</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/the-new-ceo-progression-blueprint-expanding-ceo-succession-optionality-during-uncertain-times/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-new-ceo-progression-blueprint-expanding-ceo-succession-optionality-during-uncertain-times</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 11:30:32 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[CEO succession]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[succession planning]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=181952?d=20260622170130EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Why traditional CEO succession planning is falling short CEO succession and selection is arguably the most consequential decision a board will make. More than any other leadership decision, it determines who will shape the enterprise’s strategy, culture, credibility with investors, and enduring performance. Yet in many organizations, CEO succession is narrow, rushed, and ultimately holds [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Margot McShane and Hetty Pye, Russell Reynolds Associates, on Tuesday, June 23, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/people/consultant-directory/margot-mcshane">Margot McShane</a> co-leads the Board &amp; CEO Advisory practice, and <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/people/consultant-directory/hetty-pye">Hetty Pye</a> is a senior member of the Board &amp; CEO Advisory practice at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum by Ms. McShane, Ms. Pye, Alix Pollack, and Leah Christianson.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Why traditional CEO succession planning is falling short</h2>
<p>CEO succession and selection is arguably <a href="https://hbr.org/2024/07/power-influence-and-ceo-succession" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the most consequential decision</a> a board will make. More than any other leadership decision, it determines who will shape the enterprise’s strategy, culture, credibility with investors, and enduring performance. Yet in many organizations, CEO succession is narrow, rushed, and ultimately holds little connection to the future of the business. Too often, succession is treated as a discrete event rather than the sustained leadership imperative it has become, with <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/insights/reports-surveys/global-board-culture-and-director-behaviors-study/three-areas-where-boards-spend-their-time-but-dont-see-results">only 8% of boards</a> planning more than five years in advance of CEO succession.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, the context around the CEO role has changed dramatically. Markets are more volatile. <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/insights/reports-surveys/transformational-leadership-study">Transformation is the new normal</a>. Stakeholder expectations are broader, louder, and less forgiving. At the same time, the CEO role itself has expanded in scope and complexity. The demands of enterprise leadership now extend well beyond operating performance. CEOs are expected to lead through disruption, manage competing stakeholder pressures, set direction amid ambiguity, and sustain trust under intense scrutiny. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as demands on the role grow, average CEO <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/insights/reports-surveys/global-ceo-turnover-index">tenure has dropped to 7.1 years</a>, acutely short tenures of <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/insights/reports-surveys/global-ceo-turnover-index">just 30 to 36 months</a> are increasingly common (up 79% year over year), and for those not yet in seat, <a href="https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/insights/reports-surveys/the-ambition-gap-myth">interest in the CEO role is declining</a>.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/23/the-new-ceo-progression-blueprint-expanding-ceo-succession-optionality-during-uncertain-times/#more-181952" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The New CEO Progression Blueprint: Expanding CEO Succession Optionality During Uncertain Times">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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