Yearly Archives: 2008

DOJ Seeks To Avoid Legislation By Adopting Revised Policies on Corporate Prosecutions

This post is from John F. Savarese of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

Facing the prospect of Congressional legislation that would forbid federal prosecutors and civil enforcement lawyers from requesting any communications protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the Department of Justice has indicated that it will, yet again, revise its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (“Principles”). The current version of the Principles, known as the “McNulty Memo,” has been the subject of criticism since its issuance in December 2006 for not going far enough to guard against encroachments on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

On June 26, 2008, Senator Arlen Specter re-introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, which is a modified version of legislation that he had previously introduced. (See Year End Review: Current Regulatory and Enforcement Climate, January 2, 2007). Apparently in response to this legislation and the continuing criticism of the Principles, on July 9, 2008, the Deputy Attorney General, Mark Filip, wrote a letter to Senators Specter and Patrick Leahy, indicating that DOJ intended to make certain changes to the Principles in the coming weeks.

The Deputy Attorney General identified the following changes:

• Cooperation will be measured by the extent to which a corporation discloses
relevant facts and evidence, not its waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product;

• Federal prosecutors will not demand the disclosure of non-factual attorney work
product or core attorney-client communications as a condition for cooperation credit;

• Federal prosecutors will not take into consideration in evaluating cooperation whether a corporation has (i) advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees; (ii) entered into a joint defense or common-interest agreement; or (iii) retained or sanctioned employees involved in alleged wrongdoing.

There are at least two significant limitations to addressing the problem of government interference with the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine through a revision of DOJ’s Principles. First, unlike the proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act, the Principles do not apply to the SEC or other federal regulators. Second, the Principles do not have the force of law, but would require corporations to rely on self-policing by DOJ.

If implemented, the new Principles will have a significant impact on how corporations respond to federal criminal investigations. But what must not be lost in considering these proposed changes is the continuing fundamental requirement that, under the Principles, corporations must cooperate with government investigations to help avoid indictment. Corporations will still need to be forthcoming with detailed and relevant factual information to be perceived as cooperative.

Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location on Broad Based Stock Option Plans

This post comes from Simi Kedia at Rutgers Business School and Shivaram Rajgopal at the University of Washington Michael G. Foster School of Business.

Our forthcoming paper in the Journal of Financial Economics, Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location on Broad Based Stock Option Plans, provides the first evidence on the importance of geographic effects on broad based stock option plans. The question of why broad based option plans are so prevalent in the real world remains a puzzle for standard economic theory. Broad based options are a costly form of compensation relative to other alternatives, such as cash, because: (i) employees can expect to only garner trivial personal gains from their contribution to firm value or profits; and (ii) holding stock options in their employer exposes employees to stock price risk which is highly correlated with the risk in their human capital. Yet, broad based equity plans are commonly observed in corporate America. We show that the geographically segmented labor markets for rank and file talent is a hitherto unexplored explanation for why we observe broad-based option plans.

Using data on rank and file option grants from over 9,000 firm-years from Execucomp over the years 1992-2004 intersected with geographical data gathered from several sources such as the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that firms grant more options to rank and file workers when a higher fraction of firms in the local community (firms located within a 100 or a 250 km of its headquarters) grant more broad based options. This result holds regardless of whether we analyze aggregate state-level, or county-level, or individual firm-level patterns in broad-based option usage. We recognize that firms of certain industries cluster in certain geographical areas. However, the effect of the local community’s option usage on an individual firm’s holds even after controlling for industry membership and other traditional variables known to account for broad based option usage such as firm size, investment opportunity, leverage, cash constraints of the firm, its tax status and its stock return performance.

The neighborhood’s option granting practices can affect an individual firm’s option usage for two reasons: (i) influence through the labor market circumscribed by firm’s geographical neighborhood; and (ii) influence of other exemplary peer firms in the neighborhood. Our empirical results find consistent and strong support for the role of tight labor markets in an individual firm’s option granting decisions. In particular, we find that the neighborhood’s option granting affects an individual firm’s option grants when (i) the neighborhood has more rather than fewer firms, a proxy for the demand of rank and file labor; and (ii) the firm has a higher local beta. Further, the effect of a firm’s local beta on its broad based options usage is statistically significant only when the firm faces a tight labor market in its neighborhood. There is some empirical support for the peer-influence story in that the neighborhood’s option granting practices matter to an individual firm’s option granting when exemplar firms are present in its neighborhood. However, this result is not robust to the introduction of proxies for tight labor markets, suggesting, in effect, that tight labor markets, in general, and Oyer’s (2004) wage indexation explanation in the presence of tight labor markets, in particular, are the key reasons why the community’s broad based option grants explain option usage for individual firms.

The full paper is available for download here.

Delaware Decision Highlights Need for Director Protection

This post is from David A. Katz of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

My colleague Laura A. McIntosh and I have written an article entitled “Delaware Decision Highlights Need for Director Protection,” which discusses the Delaware Chancery Court case of Schoon v. Troy Corp. The decision, which is on appeal, clarifies that in Delaware, unless otherwise provided in the bylaws or agreed by contract, a director’s right to advancement of expenses does not vest until the company’s obligation is triggered. This result is significant since the advancement of expenses in corporation-related lawsuits, along with broad indemnification, is an important feature of director protection. The decision may leave former directors, in particular, vulnerable to bylaw amendments affecting their right to advancement of expenses. In the article we address some of the many options available to consider to protect a director’s right to advancement of expenses, including the company revising its bylaws, directors entering into indemnification agreements and former directors purchasing D&O liability insurance specifically for themselves in some cases.

The article is available here.

Competing with the NYSE

This post comes from Harold Mulherin of the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia, and William Brown and Marc Weidenmier of Claremont McKenna College.

For a significant part of its 213-year history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has reigned as the leading stock exchange both within the United States and across the world. Recently, ongoing changes in technology and the globalization of stock trading have given rise to a number of competitors that threaten the NYSE’s position as the preeminent stock exchange. These changes, as well as the NYSE’s proposed merger with Archipelago, raise many questions about the effects of direct stock market competition with the NYSE.

In a forthcoming article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Competing with the NYSE, we investigate whether the NYSE is susceptible to significant competition. We provide new evidence on both the viability and the nature of direct trading competition with the NYSE. We study the Consolidated Stock Exchange, a rival stock exchange that competed directly with the “Big Board” from 1885 to 1926. For almost 42 years, the Consolidated was an important competitor and garnered an average annual market share reaching as high as 60 percent of NYSE trading volume. This sustained incidence of competition with the NYSE came at a time of significant technological change in securities trading and thereby has direct relevance to the current competitive forces confronting the NYSE today.

Our analyses focuses on the effects of competition on the bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks. We employ two complementary tests to identify the effects of stock market competition. We first study the impact of competition on bid-ask spreads when the Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks in 1885. Then we analyze the effects of competition on bid-ask spreads for approximately 40 years of the stock exchange rivalry. Our results suggest that NYSE bid-ask spreads fell by more than 10 percent when the Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks while bid-ask spreads for our control group of stocks trading on the regional exchanges remain unchanged. The effect persisted across the 42-year rivalry between the two exchanges. The finding is robust to a wide variety of changes in the empirical model and estimation technique. Overall, our results suggest that the NYSE has faced significant long-run competition and may be susceptible to a similar level of competition in the future.

The full paper is available for download here.

The View from Delaware

The article below, just published in the Delaware Law Weekly, came to us from its author Elizabeth Bennett. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The First State’s unique position as the corporate capital of the United States means that cutting-edge developments in corporate governance often come in the form of opinions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery.

Of course, Delaware’s federal courts also decide giant cases in bankruptcy and intellectual property litigation, sometimes involving billions of dollars.

Given this, it’s no surprise that the number of blogs started by Delaware practitioners, or that address Delaware law, has grown since this publication first reported on the development in 2005.

Francis G.X. Pileggi, a partner in the Wilmington office of Fox Rothschild, was a pioneer. He started his ‘‘Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog’’ in April 2005, and reports that traffic is seven or eight times more than when he started.

Wilmington firm Morris James now has three blogs: the “Delaware Business Litigation Report,’’ the “Delaware Patent Litigation Report’’ and the “Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report.’’

Edward M. McNally, a partner who edits the blogs, said they are up to about 4,000 hits per month.

Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor also fields a blog called the “Delaware IP Law Blog.’’ Karen Keller, an associate with the firm, who writes some of the entries, reported that as of the end of 2007, the blog got an average of about 41 visitors per day from 69 different countries.

But the regent by far of all the blogs with a Delaware connection is the ‘‘Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog,’’ which has been hit nearly two million times in its roughly two years of existence. This is in part a testament to the importance of Delaware corporate law.

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Harvard Law School professor and director of the Program on Corporate Governance that runs the blog, said that a significant element of its entries “is following Delaware cases and presenting different normative viewpoints about them as well as thoughts about what they mean going forward.”

The blog was conceived about two years ago by Bebchuk and Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine Jr. of the Court of Chancery, who has been teaching at Harvard Law for five years or so and is a fellow of the Program on Corporate Governance.

The vice chancellor “has been helping us a great deal in making the connection between academia and practice,” Bebchuk said.

The idea for the blog came when Strine and Bebchuk were brainstorming about making the scholarship produced by the academics of the program more available to practitioners.

Strine said he was also seeking ways to bring together the commentary of practitioners involved with the program, who write on corporate governance issues and who are scattered all over the country.

“We had some electronic newsletters that sent out the research products of the program,” Bebchuk said. “Leo [Strine] thought it would be good to have something that is more dynamic and something [that] would have some kind [of] back and forth and give and take of different ideas.”

Bebchuk said traffic on the blog has been growing exponentially. It is now visited by about 200,000 people per month.

“It’s a very open community,” Strine said “It’s not dominated by any one view. There are people who represent stockholder plaintiffs and people who represent managers, and professors from all kinds of law schools.”

“I don’t think anybody would have expected as much content or as much readership interest,” Strine said, adding that the Program on Corporate Governance has invited outside academics and practitioners to participate in order to create an open forum that can serve as a resource.

“As a result there is a lot of content people find provocative,” he said. There have been some pretty interesting dust ups among the contributors.”

Local contributors to the Harvard blog include an array of experienced Delaware practitioners such as A. Gilchrist Sparks III of Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell, Mark A. Morton of Potter Anderson & Corroon, Robert S. Saunders of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, Jay Eisenhofer of Grant & Eisenhofer and Pileggi of Fox Rothschild, who also has his own blog, as noted above.

Lawrence A. Hamermesh, a professor at the Widener University School of Law and director of its Institute on Delaware Corporate and Business Law, is a frequent contributor and Andrea Unterberger has contributed as well.

Unterberger is assistant general counsel and director of CSC Media for the Corporation Service Company in Wilmington, which also sponsors the blog. She and the blog’s managing editor did a lot of hard work in the early days on the design and to build the community, Strine said.

“It sort of took off so they don’t need as much of our help as this point,” Unterberger said.

Rodman Ward Jr., of counsel in Skadden’s Wilmington office, sits on the board of CSC and is the grandson of its founder. He said Strine asked him if the company would consider sponsoring the blog. When he brought the idea to the leadership of the company, they went for it.

Ward said it is important that the blog not discriminate on the basis of ideology.

“We wanted the only criteria on which the posts would be chosen to be the academic quality,” Ward said. “They’ve been very good about it.”

While some core subjects for the blog are Delaware law and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Unterberger said, “there are opinions all over the country and all over the world that use Delaware law and that impact corporate governance and principles. There are academics now from all over the country that are posting. … It’s a must-read blog at this point.”

The range and breadth of the guest contributors has grown, Bebchuk said.

“We have the problems that come with success,” he said. “We have a lot of people who want to contribute but at the same time we don’t want to overwhelm readers.”

The goal is to try and maintain a balance to keep the site valuable for both academics and practitioners. Bebchuk said the success has been gratifying.

“We see how our materials are picked up by The Economist, The Wall Street Journal and by the mainstream media,” he said. “We feel there is a world out there that is paying attention to what we post on our blog.”

Corporate Voting vs. Market Price Setting

This post is by Yair Listokin of Yale Law School.

Corporations have two primary means of aggregating dispersed information and making decisions—voting and price setting. When shareholders vote on a merger or in a contested director election (two examples of “proxy fights”), they aggregate diffuse opinions through voting; the corporation pursues the outcome favored by the holders of a majority of shares. Corporations also receive feedback from diffuse investors through stock prices. When price-setting shareholders support a company’s actions, the price of the company will rise. Indeed, the market’s ability to aggregate diffuse information into prices forms the basis for all event studies.

My paper entitled “Corporate Voting vs. Market Price Setting” evaluates these two information aggregation mechanisms from an empirical perspective. I estimate how the price-setting shareholder perceives the decisions of the median voter in a corporate election. I do this by examining stock market responses to the announcement of the outcomes of close votes. The stock market response to close votes has two desirable attributes for measuring the price setting market participant’s view of the median voter’s opinion. First, the outcome of close votes is uncertain, providing information to price setting shareholders.

Second, close votes suggest that the median shareholder/voter is nearly indifferent between the two voting options in a proxy contest. The median voter in a proxy contest is the shareholder in the exact middle of a ranking of voters along the dimension of preference for one side in a proxy contest. If shareholders vote for management so long as they prefer management and the vote is a perfect tie, then the median voter is exactly indifferent between management and “dissidents”. If the vote is not a perfect tie but closely favors existing management, then the median voter slightly prefers the winning option, but is relatively “close” to indifference.

The market response to close votes in proxy voting contests is striking. In close elections—when the median voter should be close to indifferent regarding either outcome– the price setting shareholder is far from indifferent. Stock price responds systematically to the announcement of vote outcomes. When management wins a close election, market value declines; when a dissident wins, the value goes up.

I conclude that the price-setting shareholder places lower value upon management control of companies than the median voter. If price-setting shareholders provide a reasonably accurate gauge of value (a proposition that underlies every event study) and value maximization is the goal of corporate law (as most assume)—then the results suggest a need for corporate voting reforms.

The full paper is available for download here.

Short Selling Activity in Financial Stocks and the SEC July 15th Emergency Order

This post comes from Arturo Bris, a professor at IMD who is also affiliated with the Yale International Center for Finance

I have recently completed a report Short Selling Activity in Financial Stocks and the SEC July 15th Emergency Order that analyzes the effect of the EO that was issued to “enhance investor protection against naked short selling in the securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and primary dealers at commercial and investment banks”. The EO dealt primarily with the stocks of 19 financial institutions, which I denote as the G19. The study is conducted by comparing stock returns, firm fundamentals, measures of market quality, and pricing efficiency of the G19 to a matching sample of financial stocks from the U.S. and abroad, all listed on U.S. stock exchanges. The control sample of U.S. financial institutions includes 59 companies, and the control sample of non‐U.S. financial institutions includes 73 companies.

My preliminary findings are as follows:

  • The performance of the G19 stocks is significantly worse in the period January 2008 through July 2008 than for comparable stocks.
  • The short selling activities in the G19 stocks have not been significantly higher than for comparable stocks between 2006 and 2008.
  • While short selling has increased overall, short selling activities in the G19 stocks have not increased significantly more than in comparable US Financial Stocks.
  • After controlling for firm and market characteristics, all measures of shorting activity are indeed lower for G19 stocks than for comparable US Financial Stocks, but higher than for comparable non‐U.S. Financial Stocks.
  • I find that the issuance of convertible bonds has been relatively more frequent for G19 stocks than for the sample of comparable firms, and that this activity fosters shorting activity.
  • There is clear evidence that some firms outside the G19 group have been the subject of heavy shorting activity over the sample period.
  • Although the performance of the G19 stocks has been significantly worse than for comparable firms, the negative returns of G19 stocks cannot be attributed to short selling activities.
  • I find that the market quality of the G19 stocks is significantly worse on most measures of market quality than for comparable US financial stocks before July 15th 2008, and that this lower market quality is not caused by short‐selling activities.
  • After July 21st, the G19 stocks have suffered a significant reduction in intra‐day return volatility and an increase in spreads, which suggests a deterioration of market quality.

The full report and a video of my interview on CNBC’s Squawk Box Europe about the report can be found here.

Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity

This post is from Steven Kaplan of the University of Chicago.

Per Stromberg and I have just completed Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity. In the paper, we describe and present empirical evidence on the leveraged buyout and private equity industry, both firms and transactions.

We start the paper by describing how the private equity industry works. We describe private equity organizations such as Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR, and the components of a typical leveraged buyout transaction, such as the buyout of RJR Nabisco or SunGard Data Systems. We present evidence on how private equity fundraising, activity and transaction characteristics have varied over time. The article then considers the effects of private equity. We look at evidence concerning how private equity affects capital structure, management incentives, and corporate governance. This evidence suggests that private equity activity creates economic value on average. At the same time, there is also evidence consistent with private equity investors taking advantage of market timing (and market mispricing) between debt and equity markets particularly in the public-to-private transactions of the last fifteen years.

We also review the empirical evidence on the economics and returns to private equity at the fund level. Private equity activity appears to experience recurring boom and bust cycles that are related to past returns and to the level of interest rates relative to earnings. Given that the unprecedented boom of 2005 to 2007 has just ended, it seems likely that there will be a decline in private equity investment and fundraising in the next several years. While the recent market boom may eventually lead to some defaults and investor losses, the magnitude is likely to be less severe than after the 1980s boom because capital structures are less fragile and private equity firms are more sophisticated. Accordingly, we expect that a significant part of the growth in private equity activity and institutions is permanent.

The full paper is available for download here.

Reassessing the “Consequences” of Consequential Damage Waivers in Acquisition Agreements

This post comes from Glenn D. West and Sara G. Duran of Weil, Gotshal & Manges.

In our article, Reassessing the “Consequences” of Consequential Damage Waivers in Acquisition Agreements, which was recently published in The Business Lawyer, we provide clarity on the issue of Consequential Damages. Even though consequential damage waivers are a frequent part of merger and acquisition agreements involving private company targets, we believe that few deal professionals understand the concept of consequential damages and, as a result, the inclusion of such waivers may have an unexpected impact on both buyers and sellers.

After tracing the historical derivation of the term, and its current use, we provide a number of basic guidelines for addressing consequential damage waivers in acquisition agreements, which include the following:

  • At a minimum, buyers should avoid the “kitchen sink” approach to the consequential damage waiver.
  • If possible, buyers should try to define “consequential damages” for the purpose of any waiver provision in such a manner that the term covers only those consequential damages for which the law already denies recovery for breaches of contract.
  • Buyers should avoid including the broad term “lost profits” as a separate category of damages in the waiver provision.
  • Sellers, on the other hand, should consider expressly limiting recoverable losses under their indemnification provisions to the “normal measure” of contract damages.
  • Buyers should never include “incidental” damages in their waiver provisions under the assumption that they are a synonym for “consequential” damages. They are not.
  • Instead of waiving “consequential” damages, buyers should seek waivers of “remote” or “speculative” damages. Even the term “indirect” damages is preferable to the term “consequential” damages for a buyer.
  • Buyers should never agree to waivers of “diminution in value” or “multiples of earnings” damages.
  • Sellers should not assume that contract law’s “rule of reasonableness” necessarily applies to broadly worded indemnification provisions that purport to indemnify buyers for any and all losses that arise from a breach of a seller’s representation and warranty.
  • Buyers, on the other hand, should not assume that contract’s “rule of reasonableness” fails to apply to broadly worded indemnification provisions.

The full article can be found here.

CSX/ TCI Decision Webcast

This post is from John F. Olson of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. For earlier Blog posts on the CSX/ TCI decision, see here and here.

I am posting the audio recording of the recent webcast in which a number of my colleagues analyzed the consequences of the court’s decision in the CSX case which held that two hedge fund investors had violated the provisions of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 13d-3(b) thereunder, by using cash settled swap transactions in a way that, in the circumstances, improperly evaded disclosure obligations related to the formation of a group “beneficial owner.” The discussants include Brian Lane, former Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, Jim Moloney, former member of the SEC’s Office of Mergers and Acquisitions, Susan Grafton, former member of the Division of Trading and Markets staff and former compliance counsel at Goldman Sachs, and Adam Offenhartz, principal author of a brief filed in the case by a group of hedge funds. The panel is moderated by Gibson Dunn partner Ron Mueller. The discussion is particularly useful because it discusses the decision and its implications from a number of different perspectives, but does not “take sides” on resolution of the issues. This will be a subject of ongoing interest in the corporate governance community.

The recording is available here.

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