Compensation Clawbacks – Surveying the Disclosures to Date

Mark Borges and Hannah Orowitz are Principals and Brigid Rosati is a Senior Consultant at Compensia. This post is based on their Compensia memorandum.

As we approach the third anniversary of the date when incentive compensation “received” is subject to clawback, we have taken a closer look at the disclosures companies have made since implementation.

This Thoughtful Pay Alert summarizes our findings from reviewing publicly available disclosures of “recovery analyses” conducted between January 1, 2024 and June 30, 2026.

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FDA and SEC Open a New Information-Sharing Channel: Implications for Public Life Sciences Companies

Paul Rubin and Paul Rodel are Parterns, and Melissa Runsten is a Counsel at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on their Debevoise memorandum.

Key Takeaways:

  • The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Securities and Exchange Commission recently announced a new three-year Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) establishing a formal framework for the agencies to exchange nonpublic information concerning FDA-regulated products, activities and companies.
  • For pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical-device companies that are publicly traded or otherwise are SEC-reporting companies, the MOU could have significant implications for disclosures concerning clinical trials, FDA interactions, product approvals, manufacturing and inspection developments, and other regulatory matters that may be material to investors.
  • Although the MOU does not change the securities-law disclosure standard, it likely makes it easier for SEC staff to test a company’s account of an FDA interaction against FDA’s own contemporaneous record.

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2026 U.S. Compensation Post Season Review: Strong Investor Support Despite Resurgence of One-Time Grants

Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS STOXX by Pranav Pradeep, Compensation & Governance Advisor; Tim Sessing, Compensation & Governance Advisor; & Chris Sayo, Data Analytics, at ISS-Corporate.

Key Takeaways

  • CEO pay continued to climb to record levels in fiscal 2025, with median S&P 500 CEO compensation reaching $17.5 million, while median pay among Russell 3000 companies (excluding the S&P 500) remained relatively stable;

  • Equity compensation remained the primary driver of CEO pay growth, as companies increased long-term incentive award values and expanded both the prevalence and magnitude of one-time equity grants;

  • The prevalence of CEO security perquisites in the S&P 500 continued to increase sharply, and the Russell 3000 has followed suit;

  • Say-on-Pay (SOP) support climbed to five-year highs across both the S&P 500 and Russell 3000, while SOP failures reached multi-year lows;

  • Potential changes in SEC rulings may fundamentally alter compensation disclosure and voting in years to come.

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A Breakout Year for CVRs: 2025 and First-Half 2026 Trends in Life Sciences Public M&A

Sally Wagner Partin and Sharon R. Flanagan are Partners at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on their Sidley Austin memorandum.

Three years after our first survey documented the reemergence of contingent value rights (“CVRs”) in public life sciences M&A, 2025 marked their biggest year yet. A record 28 of 59 announced public life sciences transactions (approximately 47%) included a CVR, the highest ever annual count and share. The concentration was even greater in biopharma, where over half of announced public biopharma transactions included a CVR. CVRs also moved upmarket and carried more of the potential deal value. More than a third (approximately 37%) of the $1 billion-plus life sciences CVR deals in our full dataset (going back to 2008) were announced in 2025 and the first half of 2026. Moreover, nearly half of all life sciences CVR deals above $3 billion were announced in 2025 and the first half of 2026, with two additional CVR deals over $3 billion announced since June 30, 2026. In addition, 2025 produced more CVRs with maximum potential payouts exceeding 100% of the upfront consideration than any other year surveyed.

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The Risks of Designated Directorships—Current Guidance for Directors and Those Who Appoint Them

Brian Massengill, Craig Frame, and Andrew Noreuil are Partners at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Massengill, Mr. Frame, Mr. Noreuil, and Andrew Stanger, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Significant stockholders of Delaware corporations may negotiate for the right to designate one or more directors of their choosing to the board. While such a designation right may be extremely valuable, several recent Delaware Chancery Court opinions highlight the risks of personal liability for the designated directors and the stockholders who appoint them. This Legal Update provides guidance on how designated directors and stockholders can navigate these risks, particularly in light of the 2025 amendments to Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) §144.

Background and Key Principles

Fiduciary Duties of Designated Directors: Directors appointed by a specific stockholder or a class of stockholders are often referred to as “constituency directors,” “designated directors,” or “blockholder directors,” among other terms. The right to appoint such directors might appear in the certificate of incorporation or in a separate governance agreement. [1] A company might grant director designation rights to its venture capital, private equity, or strategic investors, as well as to stockholders as part of a shareholder activist proxy contest settlement. Often, the designated directors are principals, officers, or employees of the appointing stockholder; however, they can also be individuals independent of both the corporation and the appointing stockholder.

Holders of designation rights might hold the mistaken belief that a designated director is intended to serve as their representative, who in addition to providing information and monitoring corporate developments, should vote in their interests. In reality, Delaware courts have long held that a designated director owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and all the stockholders and not to any subset of stockholders, including the stockholders that appointed the director. Specifically, directors owe fiduciary duties to “the stockholders in the aggregate in their capacity as residual claimants, which means the undifferentiated equity as a collective, without regard to any special rights.” [2] In other words, a director’s duties run to “the entity and the entire body of stockholders generally rather than to individual stockholders or stockholder subgroups.”[3]

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Forced CEO Departures

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Data Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, Russell Reynolds Associates, and Rutgers Law School’s Center for Corporate Law and Governance, and authored by Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance and Keil Lapore, Program Manager, Corporate Governance at The Conference Board.

This report examines forced CEO departures in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 from 2024 through August 2026, focusing on differences by index, business sector, company size, and the circumstances driving board-initiated leadership changes.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • Roughly 1 in 7 CEO succession cases were forced in both 2024 and 2025. The Russell 3000 recorded 49 forced departures in 2024 and 55 in 2025, while the S&P 500 increased from seven to 10; in 2026 so far, forced departures account for a smaller share of CEO succession cases than the prior two years.
  • While there is no single industry profile for forced CEO turnover, health care accounts for the largest share so far in 2026. The sector represents 35% of all Russell 3000 forced departures year to date, after consumer discretionary recorded the highest number of forced departures in 2025.
  • Company size was not a consistent predictor of forced CEO turnover. Elevated rates appeared across the revenue spectrum, suggesting succession risk is driven more by company-specific performance and strategic circumstances than by scale alone.
  • Underperformance became a more prominent driver of forced departures in 2025. It rose from 31% of Russell 3000 forced departures in 2024 to 44% in 2025 and remains the largest reason category through August 2026.
  • Activist pressure was a notable factor among S&P 500 forced departures. It accounted for eight of 19 departures across the period, reinforcing the importance of boards independently testing strategy, capital allocation, and leadership effectiveness before external pressure forces the issue.
  • Successfully navigating potential forced departures requires proactive management. Boards can focus on establishing the criteria for when underperformance becomes a leadership issue, regular maintenance of their succession plan, and reaching out to shareholders to keep abreast of possible concerns or issues.

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on the Innovation Exemption

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Commissioner Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

The innovation exemption has arrived. Today, the Commission issued an order containing time-limited exemptions designed to permit onchain trading of stocks listed on major U.S. exchanges. Adapting the Commission’s rules to new technologies is hard work, and I commend the Division of Trading and Markets, the Crypto Task Force, and other staff for their work on these exemptions. These exemptions enable market participants to experiment to be prepared for a future in which trading tokenized stocks onchain is commonplace. Taken together with the Division of Trading and Market’s April statement on interfaces used to prepare transactions in crypto asset securities,[1] today’s action is also a major step forward in allowing individuals greater personal autonomy to own and trade their own assets without the need for unnecessary intermediaries.

In issuing this order, the Commission is rejecting the approach that the mythological Procrustes would have taken. He was not asking the guests their sleep number; he claimed to have a bed that fit every traveler. In reality, he brute-forced each traveler to fit the one bed he had by stretching short travelers and cutting the legs off tall ones. Here, by contrast, the Commission is using its exemptive authority to tailor the bed to fit the sleeper. Carefully crafted conditions on that relief should ensure that nobody else’s sleep is disturbed.

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Remarks by Chairman Atkins on 24-Hour Trading

Paul S. Atkins is the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent remarks. The views expressed in the post are those of Chairman Atkins and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for joining us today to discuss preparations for expanding 24-hour trading in the U.S. equities markets. Before sharing a few reflections, I must note that the views I express here are my own as Chairman and do not necessarily reflect those of the SEC as an institution or of my fellow Commissioners.

We are moving towards a new day—and night—for our capital markets. Only 20 years ago, when I was last here as a commissioner, there was much angst and gnashing of teeth over proposals to extend U.S. trading hours by mere minutes, not hours. Today, critical business and economic events are not confined to traditional trading hours. When the world reacts in real time to breaking news, waiting to adjust a position or rebalance a hedge until the clock strikes 9:30 on Monday morning may beget missed opportunities or additional risk, especially these days. Instead, many investors are seeking the ability to respond and adjust their positions on an ever-more-frequent basis.

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Weekly Roundup: September 11-17, 2026


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 11-17, 2026

SEC Proposes Regulation Crypto Assets: A Tailored Offering Framework for Crypto Investment Contracts


Remarks by Chairman Atkins on Artificial Intelligence and Reforming Regulation NMS


Recent Developments for Directors


DATs and Crypto-Pivot Companies: Understanding and Mitigating Shareholder Activism Risks


Board Oversight of AI Transformation


Executive Security and Protection Continues to Expand


Shareholder Activism: Ten Trends for 2027


Open Letter to Corporate America’s Executives and Investors About Shareholder Proposals


From Say-on-Pay to the Boardroom: Making Off-Season Engagement Count


The State of U.S. Executive Pay Today


The Red State AG Attack on ESG Continues to Misfire



Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Proposing Rescission of Rule 14a-8 and Proxy Solicitation Modernization

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Commissioner Uyeda and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today, the Commission proposes to rescind Rule 14a-8, which leaves determination about whether a shareholder proposal may be properly placed on a proxy statement to the states, companies, and shareholders. The Commission also proposes to amend Rule 14a-4 to expand the circumstances under which a company may exercise discretionary voting authority on certain proposals.[1] Lastly, the Commission proposes amendments that would modernize certain rules related to proxy solicitations.[2]

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