Rethinking Long-Term Incentive Design: Are Longer-Horizon RSUs Gaining Ground?

Stephan Bosshard is a Principal, Desmond Pang is a Consultant, and Michael Marino is a Managing Director at FW Cook. This post is based on their FW Cook report.

Institutional investor and proxy advisor perspectives on the appropriate mix of time- and performance-based equity have continued to evolve, including ISS’s November 2025 policy change providing greater flexibility for the use of time-based equity with extended vesting and/or holding requirements. Longer-horizon time-based equity may offer greater simplicity and predictability, reinforce sustained stock ownership and retention, and reduce reliance on multi-year performance goals that can be challenging to establish in certain business environments. These considerations may be particularly relevant for companies with long investment horizons or exposure to factors such as regulatory change, cyclicality, and long-term forecasting challenges. Consistent with this trend, FW Cook identified several companies across industries that disclosed transitions to longer-horizon RSUs in their 2026 proxy statements.

For much of the last decade, the prevailing U.S. executive long-term incentive model has been straightforward: a combination of time-based restricted stock units (RSUs) with performance stock units (PSUs), placing at least half of the equity value in performance-based awards. That model remains common, but it is no longer the only design that compensation committees can consider in long-term incentive design.

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Understanding Communications by Private Fund Managers

Josh Lerner is the Jacob H. Schiff Professor at Harvard Business School, Fiona Paine is an Assistant Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and Antoinette Schoar is the Stewart C. Myers-Horn Family Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This post is based on their recent paper.

A large literature on delegated asset management has analyzed the role of information disclosure, especially in situation where managers have significant discretion about reporting on investment choices, performance, and risk. Managers might have incentives to disclose or withhold information strategically, either obscuring or overstating the performance of transactions. This problem is especially prevalent in private capital markets where the underlying assets typically lack continuous market prices and often are difficult for outsiders to scrutinize.

In Communicating Performance: Textual and Financial Disclosures in Private Equity, Josh Lerner, Fiona Paine, and Antoinette Schoar study how general partners (GPs) in private equity funds provide information to their limited partners (LPs) about the performance of their portfolio investments. The paper focuses on two primary channels through which managers can communicate information about the performance of portfolio firms—financial reporting on the valuation of the portfolio firms and more qualitative textual reports.

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Agentic AI and the Duty of Care: What the METR Report Means and Does Not Mean for the Boardroom

Ethan Klingsberg is a Partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on his Freshfields memorandum.

The foundation of the fulfillment of the duty of care is reasonable reliance on informed expertise. The most common source of this expertise is the corporation’s executive team and, for especially challenging decision-making, combinations of outside advisors and consultants, usually together with the executive team. Importantly, “reasonable reliance” does not mean delegation of judgment and decision-making.

Toward the end of board meetings, directors often ask me a question that goes to the heart of where “reasonable reliance” ends and “delegation” begins: The directors ask whether they will be complying with their fiduciary duties by making a contemplated decision about an important strategic matter. In the absence of any director conflicts or other loyalty issues, the answer typically derives not from whether I think the decision will be better than the alternatives for advancing the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders – who am I, a mere lawyer, to know what’s best – but from whether both (a) there is a foundation in the record to support the determination and (b) the board has received sufficient information and been sufficiently engaged to enable the directors to understand this foundation and determine in good faith that their reliance on the foundation would be reasonable.

For example, if a reputable investment bank has reported to the board of a target company that the all-cash price that a proposed buyer of the company is willing to pay is the highest purchase price available after the market check conducted by the bank, together with the bank’s opinion that the price is fair from a financial point of view, but the board was neither engaged in nor understands the scope of the market check and dynamics of the sale process, and the board has not received the financial analyses and related inputs and assumptions that serve as the bases for the opinion, then this board will be in serious danger of veering away from “reasonable reliance” and into “delegation” territory.

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Five Hundred Words or a Contentious New Landscape: The Corporate Choice on Rule 14a-8

Sanford Lewis is the Director and General Counsel of the Shareholder Rights Group. Paul Rissman is Senior Engagement Strategist at Formative Financial.

Every U.S. public company now has a decision to make, and not making it is itself a choice.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed to rescind the shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8, in its entirety. The proposal was published in the Federal Register on September 21; comments are due November 20, 2026.

Companies that treat the SEC’s shareholder proposal process as an inconvenience or annoyance may be tempted to welcome its burial. We think that reaction misjudges the importance of the process to company-shareholder relations and the can of worms that eliminating Rule 14a-8 would open.

We are shareholder advocates. We have spent years on the proponent side of this process. We are not going to argue that Rule 14a-8 is perfect. Instead, we caution that the system in place is better for companies and investors than the landscape that would replace it, and that companies have a short window in which to say so.

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The Carried Interest Tax Controversy

Malcolm S. Salter is the James J. Hill Professor Emeritus at Harvard Business School.

I. Introduction

It has been over two decades since debate erupted in prestigious law journals, tax notes, and Congressional committees about a little known but highly controversial tax rule pertaining to the “carried interest” component of compensation paid to the managing partners of private investment partnerships, more commonly known as private equity funds.

Under current tax rules, carried interest is taxed at a capital gains tax rate of 23.8% rather than at much higher ordinary income tax rate of up to 40.8%. Supporters of this rule claim that it is a just reward for the risks undertaken by the sponsors and managers of these investment funds. Opponents claim that the tax preference awarded to carried interest is basically a veiled subsidy to the managers of private equity funds, whose income should be taxed at the higher ordinary income rate.

Private equity funds constitute an important sector of the U.S. economy. They own or partner with no less than 21,000 portfolio companies, employ over 13 million workers (mostly in companies with fewer than 500 employees,) and account for 7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.[1]

The debate over the appropriate tax status of the managers of private equity funds remains unresolved in the halls of Congress in the sense that the decades-long defense of the current carried interest tax preference by the investment industry has not deterred opponents from repeatedly filing legislation that would change the rule.

With the recent submission of yet another bill in Congress to reform the carried interest tax regime (Ending the Carried Interest Loophole Act of 2026), this debate has taken on immediate import and increased public scrutiny – as it has in previous Presidential and mid-term election years.

The issues involved in the carried interest tax controversy include matters pertaining to partnership law, a tax preference for some of the nation’s wealthiest citizens, tax revenue loss for the federal government, the power and influence of great wealth in Congressional rulemaking, and whether the current carried interest tax regime is consistent with foundational values underlying our democracy.

Both supporters and critics of the current carried interest tax rule have tended to focus their arguments on the law and economics involved. Less attention has explicitly been paid to the multi-faceted principle of fairness in discussing the choices that an historically reluctant Congress will need to make in considering the recently submitted reform bill. The principle of fairness is, of course, foundational to all democracies.

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2026 Proxy Season Review: Submission of Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals

Melissa Sawyer is Global Co-Head of M&A, Marc Treviño is a Partner, and June Hu is a Special Counsel at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Ms. Sawyer, Mr. Treviño, Ms. Hu, Lawrence S. Elbaum, Patrick Gadson and H. Rodgin Cohen, all at Sullivan & Cromwell.

Summary of Key Trends[1]

A. Submission of Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals

  1. The SEC recently proposed to eliminate Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals, but the proposed rulemaking will not affect shareholders’ right to submit Rule 14a-8 proposals for the core 2027 proxy season.
  2. Total submissions fell by ▼15% in H1 2026, with environmental, social and political (“ESP”) and compensation proposals decreasing by ▼35% and ▼65%, respectively, while governance proposals increased by ▲29%.
  3. Governance proposals represented the majority of submissions for the first time since 2012, driven by a ▲227% increase in independent chair proposals and a ▲410% increase in written consent proposals.
  4. Proposals related to diversity, equity and inclusion topics decreased by ▼61%.
  5. AI-related proposals increased by ▲122% and covered a broader range of governance and ESP issues.
  6. Notwithstanding the overall drop in submissions, the number of proposals from Chevedden and “anti-ESG” proponents remained level, accounting for 42% and 19% of total submissions, respectively.

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CEO and Executive Compensation Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500: 2026

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Data Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE and compensation consulting firm FW Cook, and authored by Andrew Jones, Principal Researcher, Governance & Sustainability Center at The Conference Board and Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance at The Conference Board.

This report examines CEO and executive compensation disclosed by US public companies during the 2026 proxy season. Drawing on extensive data for the Russell 3000 and S&P 500, it covers CEO pay, compensation elements, representation of women among CEOs, named executive officers (NEOs), say-on-pay voting, incentive design, perquisites, and the regulatory outlook. The broader picture is an executive compensation landscape that is becoming more equity driven and more differentiated by company scale, with scrutiny increasingly concentrated around exceptional awards, above-target incentive outcomes, and arrangements such as executive security.

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Investors Need a Better Approach to Say on Pay Voting

Stephen F. O’Byrne is President and Co-founder of Shareholder Value Advisors Inc. 

The new U.S. Pay versus Performance (PvP) disclosures make it practical for investors to have reasonable specific quantitative guidelines for Say on Pay (SOP) voting. Specific quantitative guidelines make the investor’s vote matter: portfolio companies can predict the investor’s SOP vote and change their pay design in a way that increases the likelihood of a positive vote.

In this article, I’ll show how the PvP data can be used to measure five pay dimensions at the individual company level and how these pay dimensions can be used to create reasonable specific quantitative guidelines: companies are assured of a positive SOP vote if (a) relative TSR explains at least half of the variation in relative CEO pay, (b) CEO pay leverage is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level, (c) CEO relative pay risk is reasonable (i.e., ≤2) and (d) the CEO pay premium cost of above median pay leverage is reasonable (i.e., ≤2).

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Q3 2026 Review of Shareholder Activism

Jim Rossman is the Global Head of Shareholder Advisory, Abraham Axler is a Vice President, and Josh Jacobs is an Associate at Barclays. This post is based on a Barclays memorandum by Mr. Rossman, Mr. Axler, Mr. Jacobs, Ryan Ferguson, Olakunle Akande, and Arjun Mandhare, all at Barclays.

Observations on the Activism Environment in 2026 YTD

1. Campaign Activity in Line with Prior Years Following Slower Q3

  • 179 campaigns were launched in 2026 YTD, down 7% year over year (192), but largely in line with the four year average
    • 43 campaigns in Q3 represented a 42% drop from 74 in Q2, reflecting a more normal “seasonal slowdown” compared to what was an unusually busy Q3 2025 (62)
  • A record level of concentration in the top five sectors targeted by activists (82%), led by Industrials (30%) and Technology (20%)
  • The overall number of activists continued to track lower in 2026, down 14% year over year to 99
    • Elliott launched the most campaigns YTD with 16 across seven countries; three of its Q3 launches were among the largest in 2026

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Cybersecurity Risk Oversight in the Age of AI

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Kevin S. Schwartz, and David M. Adlerstein

As advanced AI models — and autonomous AI “agents” — grow more capable, so do the associated corporate cybersecurity risks. Atincreasingly modest cost, AIsystems can now identify and exploit latent software vulnerabilities, such as by planting malicious code or stealing data, at a speed and scale beyond the reach of human hackers or conventional automated tools. AI also creates new points of vulnerability: a corporation’s own AI agents, if compromised, can become a gateway to sensitive data and to operational or payment systems. The risk of deepfakes (AI-generated voice or video impersonations) is also growing more acute; in one recent test, 48% of video call participants believed an AI agent was a live human. In 2025 alone, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center received over 22,000 cybercrime complaints with an AI-related descriptor, with reported losses nearing $900 million. In April of this year, an advanced AI model reportedly uncovered thousands of previously undetected software security flaws, including in a widely used and well-defended open source operating system, and in July, a group of autonomous AI agents worked together to hack a company’s systems.

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