Edward Micheletti is a Partner and Ryan Lindsay is Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang; and Dancing with Activists (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch.
In late 2021 and early 2022, two decisions from the Court of Chancery addressing advance notice bylaws reiterated, consistent with long-standing Delaware law, that clear and unambiguous advance notice bylaws will be enforced. These decisions also noted that application of such bylaws remains subject to equitable review to determine if the incumbent board acted manipulatively or otherwise inequitably in rejecting stockholder board nominees.[1] However, these decisions also articulated slightly different standards of review — with the court in the first decision holding that under the court’s equitable review a stockholder could prove “compelling circumstances” justifying a finding of inequitable conduct, while the court in the second decision expressly applied enhanced scrutiny, placing the burden on the incumbent board to demonstrate it acted reasonably.[2]
The Court of Chancery’s most recent decision on this topic further reiterates that clear and unambiguous bylaws will be enforced. Furthermore, the decision clarifies that enhanced scrutiny focusing on the reasonableness of incumbent board conduct is the standard of review that applies to the application of even validly enacted advance notice bylaws. Therefore, when assessing a board’s application of an advance notice bylaw, the court will analyze whether the board has identified proper corporate objectives and has justified its actions as reasonable in relation to those objectives.