Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Comment from the Council of Institutional Investors

Jeffrey P. Mahoney is General Counsel at the Council of Institutional Investors. This post is based on a comment letter by the Council of Institutional Investors submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals and amendments to Rule 14a-4.

This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the SEC’s proposal on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8, by the Council of Institutional Investors. Below is the executive summary of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.

The Council of Institutional Investors (CII)[1] appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 and amend Rule 14a-4 (Release).[2] CII opposes both proposals. Our reasons and responses to the Commission’s requests for comment follow.

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Share Owner Proposals and Rule 14a8: The Uneasy Case for Devolution

Lawrence Cunningham is the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware.

The SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 presents an opportunity to reconsider how share owner proposals should fit within corporate governance.[1] The central question is who should define the terms on which one owner may require a corporation to circulate a proposal at the expense of all its owners. There is a case for moving that responsibility toward state corporate law and company-specific arrangements, though such a shift presents substantial challenges and would require an orderly transition that preserves useful participation and makes the governing rules clear.

Two surveys conducted by the Weinberg Center inform that judgment. One examined the experience and views of 519 market participants; the other examined the normative views of 89 law professors. They reveal strong support for a governance core and company relevance, weaker confidence in SEC administration, disagreement over broader purposes, and substantial interest in company tailoring. They also record significant support for retaining a federal framework. The case for devolution must explain why it is preferable despite that preference, rather than claiming a survey mandate for repeal.

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The Founder’s Primer on Multi-Class Voting Structures

Nicholas A. Dorsey, Aaron M. Gruber, and Claudia J. Fitzpatrick (née Ricciardi) are Partners at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. This post is based on a Cravath memorandum by Mr. Dorsey, Mr. Gruber, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Virginia M. Anderson. 

Today’s founders confront that same challenge whenever they consider an initial public offering (“IPO”), and multiclass share structures have become the principal means of addressing it. By giving the shares held by founders (and, in some cases, other pre IPO investors) greater voting power than the shares sold to the public, these structures allow founders to retain voting control with a noncontrolling equity position and to pursue their long term strategy without undue exposure to short term market pressures and activist threats. Multiclass structures have historically been most prevalent among U.S. listed technology companies, but are becoming more common in other industries when the founder plays a critical role in the business. Institutional investors have also grown increasingly receptive to thoughtfully designed structures, including those that pair founder voting control with features such as an empowered board of directors and a time based or event based “sunset” provision. These considerations have particular resonance for founders building capital intensive businesses, including in artificial intelligence. This primer introduces the core concepts founders should understand, describes the principal structures in use today and outlines the design decisions founders should consider before an IPO.

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Unequal Voting Rights: Opportunity vs. Influence

Bob Mann is a Chief Executive Officer at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on his Glass Lewis memorandum.

For decades, corporate governance has rested on a seemingly straightforward principle: economic ownership and voting power should travel together.

One share, one vote is intuitively attractive. It gives shareholders a mechanism to hold boards and management accountable, supports an effective market for corporate control and limits the ability of insiders to entrench themselves while bearing only a fraction of the economic consequences of their decisions.

Yet some of today’s most innovative companies pose a difficult question for investors: how should they weigh opportunity against influence?

Should investors pass on a company, including at IPO, because its founder retains voting control? Or can accepting a limited say in governance be a reasonable tradeoff for giving an exceptional entrepreneur the freedom to execute a long-term vision?

I believe the answer lies somewhere between governance orthodoxy and founder exceptionalism.

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Delaware

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Kevin S. Schwartz, and Theo. Mirvis, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent grant of a preliminary injunction against the recapitalization of Cloudflare has led to calls from some quarters for corporations to consider anew moving from Delaware to other states. In our view, those calls are misguided.

The Cloudflare opinion addressed several important legal issues under the new Delaware statutory protections for controlling stockholder conflict transactions (DGCL § 144) enacted in 2025 as part of SB 21. Those holdings largely comported with the protective purpose of the statutory amendment, most importantly (a) by rejecting the stockholder plaintiffs’ effort to circumvent the statutory safe harbor regime by invoking the statute’s “injunctive relief” exception for transactions designed to deter, delay, or preclude a change of control; and (b) by according strong deference in the controller conflict context to the determination by a board that directors on a special committee were disinterested. Those rulings built on the earlier Chancery decisions by Vice Chancellor Will that evinced a careful regard for the protections afforded by the new statute. See our memorandum of October 19, 2026.

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Statement by Chair Atkins on Proposed Amendments to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements

Paul S. Atkins is the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chairman Atkins and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today, the Commission proposed amendments to its executive compensation disclosure requirements contained in Item 402 of Regulation S-K. These amendments reflect a comprehensive reform of Item 402 that, together with other previously proposed actions, are central tenets of my agenda and focus on transforming the SEC’s public company disclosure regime to one rooted in materiality.

During each of my prior two tours of duty at the agency, the Commission amended Item 402. First, in 1992[1] when I served as Chief of Staff to Chairman Richard C. Breeden, and then again in 2006[2] when I served as a Commissioner. These prior amendments reflected a recognition that the Commission’s rules for executive compensation disclosure require periodic updating to reflect developments in how companies compensate executives and how investors use compensation information to make investment and voting decisions.

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Restoring the Bump-Up Exclusion to Its Proper Bounds

Ian Boczko is a Partner and Sunny Jeon is an Associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

A D&O policy provision designed to prevent an insured buyer from shifting additional acquisition consideration to its insurer is increasingly being used for a very different purpose, namely denying coverage for ordinary M&A claims against target companies and their directors and officers. That expansion threatens the protection companies and boards reasonably expect D&O insurance to provide against fiduciary duty and securities claims arising from corporate transactions.

The “bump up” exclusion historically addressed a narrow moral hazard concern, namely, that an acquiror should not be able to underpay for a target and then use insurance proceeds to supply additional consideration. But policy wording is often imprecise, and insurers increasingly invoke the exclusion whenever transaction litigation results in a payment to former stockholders, including in cases involving an insured target rather than an insured buyer.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year in Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Harman International Industries, Inc. provides an important safeguard by requiring an insurer to prove that a settlement actually represents an effective increase in deal consideration, rather than inferring that conclusion from allegations alone. 360 A.3d 240 (Del. 2026). But because Harman offers a route to preserving coverage only after a highly fact specific examination of the settlement record, it does not provide the predictable rule that companies, directors, officers, and insurers need.

The better solution is clearer policy language. Where D&O policies retain a bump up clause, the clause should rest on three principles. First, it should apply only when the insured company acts as the acquiror, not as the seller or target. Second, it should reach only amounts that truly function as additional acquisition consideration, based on objective criteria addressing who receives the payment, its legal basis, and whether it would have increased the price paid at closing. Third, it should operate as an allocation provision rather than a transaction wide bar, so that only the qualifying portion should be excluded, while Side A loss, defense costs, attorneys’ fees, interest, and other covered amounts remain protected.

The bump up exclusion should answer a narrow question, namely what portion, if any, of an otherwise covered payment is truly additional acquisition consideration? Our full article examines how the provision moved beyond its original purpose, analyzes the developing case law, and offers model language designed to produce more predictable and equitable outcomes.

Weekly Roundup: November 6-12, 2026


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 6-12, 2026

Early Lessons from the New Accelerated Offering Periods for Tender Offers


SEC Sets 2027 Exam Priorities with Focus on Conflicts, Complex Products, and Technology


Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Comment from the National Association of Manufacturers


Does Company Culture Deserve a Seat at the Deal Table?


Shareholder Engagement: State of Play — Key Takeaways From Recent Panel


Treasury Proposes Outbound Investment Regulations Under the COINS Act


2026 Annual Corporate Directors Survey: Governing What’s Next


Lipp v. Mixedbread AI Addresses How a Company Can End an Advancement Obligation


Preferred Equity’s Growing Role in CFOs


Informed Short Selling Is Not Concentrated in Family Firms


Special Equity Awards: Making the Case to Shareholders


Special Equity Awards: Making the Case to Shareholders

Dan Pliskin is a Partner, Jim Barnett is an Associate Partner, and Rachael Harrison is a Director at Aon plc. This post is based on their Aon plc memorandum.

A Roadmap for Compensation Committees and Management Teams

A special equity award reflects a board’s judgment that circumstances warrant a separate opportunity to address a particular business need that the regular compensation program cannot adequately address. This exercise of judgment requires the board to demonstrate that the decision was well considered and in shareholders’ interests.

The 2026 proxy season showed why that matters. Say on pay results were strong across the market, yet one time awards were a key factor among companies that received weak or failed support. This memorandum summarizes what proxy advisors and investors expect of these awards and sets out a five step roadmap for compensation committees and management teams, from initial design through the say on pay vote.

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Informed Short Selling Is Not Concentrated in Family Firms

Ferhat Akbas is the Constantin Mihas Chair and Professor of Finance at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC), Minjie Huang is Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Louisville, and Felix Meschke is Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Kansas School of Business. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

Should unusually heavy short selling before disappointing earnings raise greater concern about an information leak at a family firm? An influential study in the Journal of Finance by Ronald Anderson, David Reeb, and Wanli Zhao answered yes. The authors found that short selling predicted returns in family firms but not in nonfamily firms. They also reported almost 17 times more abnormal short selling before negative earnings announcements in family firms than in nonfamily firms and suggested that disputes within controlling families could give short sellers access to private information.

Yet short sellers are skilled at analyzing companies and uncovering problems that other investors miss. That skill should be useful in nonfamily firms, too.

In our recent study in the Journal of Finance, we revisit those findings. Anderson and Reeb made their family-firm data available, allowing us to study the same firms and period using a more comprehensive record of short-selling activity. We find that short selling predicts returns in both family and nonfamily firms. We also find no evidence that pre-announcement short selling is more sensitive to negative earnings news in family firms.

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