Delaware Becomes First State to Respond to Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8: Corporation Law Council Releases White Paper and Discussion Draft on Stockholder Proposals

Elizabeth A. Ising, Julia Lapitskaya, and Ronald O. Mueller are Partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Ms. Ising, Ms. Lapitskaya, Mr. Mueller, Michael Svedman, and Thomas W. Franck, all at Gibson Dunn, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association released a white paper and draft legislation for discussion that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the SEC rescinds Rule 14a-8. The Council has provided for a 60 day public comment period on the Discussion Draft, which the White Paper explains as recognizing that the amendments “may have effects wider in scope than most of our other recommended legislation.”

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section (the Council) of the Delaware State Bar Association (the DSBA) released a white paper (the White Paper) and a discussion draft of legislation (the Discussion Draft)[1] that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) rescinds Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 14a-8).[2] The Discussion Draft sets forth draft text for a new Section 214 (Section 214) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) that would for the first time provide stockholders of Delaware companies a carefully prescribed state law statutory right to submit precatory (nonbinding) proposals at annual meetings and have those proposals included in the company’s proxy materials. The amendments would take effect when rescission of Rule 14a-8 becomes effective.

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When AI Becomes the Activist’s Thesis

Leonard Wood is Partner and Chair of the Shareholder Activism and Takeover Defense Practice, and Evan Grosch and Austin Lee are Associates, at Goodwin Procter LLP. This post is based on their Goodwin memorandum.

Going into the 2026 proxy season, many expected artificial intelligence to continue shaping shareholder activism. It did, although the focus shifted. The debate initially centered on governance—specifically, whether boards had sufficient AI expertise and whether companies were appropriately disclosing and managing AI risk. Those topics remain important to investors, and the expectations behind them continue to rise. As the 2026 proxy season unfolded, a number of activist campaigns shifted their emphasis. Rather than treating AI as primarily a governance theme, activists have increasingly asked what AI means for a target’s competitive position, revenue durability, cost structure, capital spending, and, ultimately, valuation.

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Directors’ Disclosure and Document-Preservation Obligations

Kevin Schwartz and Adam Goodman are Partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Goodman, Theodore R. Furchtgott, and Teniola T. Odugbesan, all at Wachtell Lipton, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Last week, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a director or officer who withholds material information from the board breaches the duty of loyalty and that her destruction of corporate documents during a board investigation may constitute an independent breach of the duty of loyalty. Sarwal v. NephroSant, Inc., C.A. No. 2023-0222-BWD (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2026). The Court further held that a director or officer found to have breached the duty of loyalty forfeits indemnification for the costs of the board’s investigation into her conduct.

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The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control

Mike Burkart is a Professor of Finance at the London School of Economics, Samuel Lee is an Associate Professor of Finance at Santa Clara University, and Paul Voss is an Associate Professor of Finance at HEC Paris. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

The market for corporate control has evolved substantially over the past decades. Professional control-oriented investors such as activist hedge funds and private equity funds, which have grown enormously since the 1990s, are now central players in this market. Hostile tender offers were the prominent feature of the market in the 1980s, but the mode of control change has since shifted from such direct takeovers to takeover activism: large shareholders do not take over firms themselves but broker a sale to outside bidders.

In our paper, The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we propose that the growth of (capital at the disposal of) control-oriented investors leads to such a shift in the mode of control change. In the extant literature, the shift is usually attributed to the proliferation of takeover defenses and legal changes that facilitate shareholder activism. We contend that these do not provide a comprehensive explanation.

The novelty of our theory is to recognize that control-oriented investors need not have ex-ante designated roles on the buy- or sell-side. They can choose to become large shareholders, who possess the option to acquire firms themselves or put firms in play, or to become outside bidders for firms that are put in play. We show that both modes of control change coexist and that the choice between them allows to overcome free-riding and asymmetric information problems. The optimal role choice depends on the number of control-oriented investors in the market, which drives the evolution of the market for corporate control.

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SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements

Shalom Huber is a Partner, and Julie Yusko and Stephanie Birndorf are Counsels at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Huber, Ms. Yusko, Ms. Birndorf, Page Griffin, Michael Wiseman, and Joseph Penko, all at Skadden.

Executive Summary

  • What’s new: On November 13, 2026, the SEC issued proposed amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K and related rules. If adopted, they would be the most significant executive compensation disclosure reform since 2006.
  • Why it matters: For public companies, the proposed rules would narrow named executive officers to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer; introduce three new tables that replace the existing core executive compensation tables; and significantly scale back pay-versus-performance, pay ratio, perquisite and severance disclosures.
  • What to do next: Companies should prepare 2027 proxy statements under the current Item 402 regime. Meanwhile, they should consider planning ahead to collect data for the new tables, revisiting perquisite and security practices, and planning for investor and proxy advisor reaction.

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Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Comment from the Council of Institutional Investors

Jeffrey P. Mahoney is General Counsel at the Council of Institutional Investors. This post is based on a comment letter by the Council of Institutional Investors submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals and amendments to Rule 14a-4.

This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the SEC’s proposal on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8, by the Council of Institutional Investors. Below is the executive summary of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.

The Council of Institutional Investors (CII)[1] appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 and amend Rule 14a-4 (Release).[2] CII opposes both proposals. Our reasons and responses to the Commission’s requests for comment follow.

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Share Owner Proposals and Rule 14a8: The Uneasy Case for Devolution

Lawrence Cunningham is the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware.

The SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 presents an opportunity to reconsider how share owner proposals should fit within corporate governance.[1] The central question is who should define the terms on which one owner may require a corporation to circulate a proposal at the expense of all its owners. There is a case for moving that responsibility toward state corporate law and company-specific arrangements, though such a shift presents substantial challenges and would require an orderly transition that preserves useful participation and makes the governing rules clear.

Two surveys conducted by the Weinberg Center inform that judgment. One examined the experience and views of 519 market participants; the other examined the normative views of 89 law professors. They reveal strong support for a governance core and company relevance, weaker confidence in SEC administration, disagreement over broader purposes, and substantial interest in company tailoring. They also record significant support for retaining a federal framework. The case for devolution must explain why it is preferable despite that preference, rather than claiming a survey mandate for repeal.

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The Founder’s Primer on Multi-Class Voting Structures

Nicholas A. Dorsey, Aaron M. Gruber, and Claudia J. Fitzpatrick (née Ricciardi) are Partners at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. This post is based on a Cravath memorandum by Mr. Dorsey, Mr. Gruber, Ms. Fitzpatrick, and Virginia M. Anderson. 

Today’s founders confront that same challenge whenever they consider an initial public offering (“IPO”), and multiclass share structures have become the principal means of addressing it. By giving the shares held by founders (and, in some cases, other pre IPO investors) greater voting power than the shares sold to the public, these structures allow founders to retain voting control with a noncontrolling equity position and to pursue their long term strategy without undue exposure to short term market pressures and activist threats. Multiclass structures have historically been most prevalent among U.S. listed technology companies, but are becoming more common in other industries when the founder plays a critical role in the business. Institutional investors have also grown increasingly receptive to thoughtfully designed structures, including those that pair founder voting control with features such as an empowered board of directors and a time based or event based “sunset” provision. These considerations have particular resonance for founders building capital intensive businesses, including in artificial intelligence. This primer introduces the core concepts founders should understand, describes the principal structures in use today and outlines the design decisions founders should consider before an IPO.

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Unequal Voting Rights: Opportunity vs. Influence

Bob Mann is a Chief Executive Officer at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on his Glass Lewis memorandum.

For decades, corporate governance has rested on a seemingly straightforward principle: economic ownership and voting power should travel together.

One share, one vote is intuitively attractive. It gives shareholders a mechanism to hold boards and management accountable, supports an effective market for corporate control and limits the ability of insiders to entrench themselves while bearing only a fraction of the economic consequences of their decisions.

Yet some of today’s most innovative companies pose a difficult question for investors: how should they weigh opportunity against influence?

Should investors pass on a company, including at IPO, because its founder retains voting control? Or can accepting a limited say in governance be a reasonable tradeoff for giving an exceptional entrepreneur the freedom to execute a long-term vision?

I believe the answer lies somewhere between governance orthodoxy and founder exceptionalism.

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Delaware

Martin Lipton is a Founding Partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Kevin S. Schwartz, and Theo. Mirvis, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent grant of a preliminary injunction against the recapitalization of Cloudflare has led to calls from some quarters for corporations to consider anew moving from Delaware to other states. In our view, those calls are misguided.

The Cloudflare opinion addressed several important legal issues under the new Delaware statutory protections for controlling stockholder conflict transactions (DGCL § 144) enacted in 2025 as part of SB 21. Those holdings largely comported with the protective purpose of the statutory amendment, most importantly (a) by rejecting the stockholder plaintiffs’ effort to circumvent the statutory safe harbor regime by invoking the statute’s “injunctive relief” exception for transactions designed to deter, delay, or preclude a change of control; and (b) by according strong deference in the controller conflict context to the determination by a board that directors on a special committee were disinterested. Those rulings built on the earlier Chancery decisions by Vice Chancellor Will that evinced a careful regard for the protections afforded by the new statute. See our memorandum of October 19, 2026.

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