2026 CPA-Zicklin Index Finds Corporations Hold Firm, Trendsetters Rises to 114

David Pahlic is the Director of Programs, Dan Carroll is the Vice President for Programs and Counsel, and Bruce Freed is the President at the Center for Political Accountability. This post is based on the 2026 CPA-Zicklin Index.

Published days before the US midterm election, the 2026 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability arrives at a time of great uncertainty and upheaval for corporate America. Despite the unstable political environment, the largest publicly traded companies in the United States strengthened their policies governing political spending disclosure and oversight as the number of companies designated “Trendsetter” increased from 112 to 114.

Produced by the Center for Political Accountability in conjunction with The Wharton School’s Zicklin Center for Governance and Business Ethics, the Index is the annual benchmarking of the political disclosure and accountability of the companies making up the Russell 1000 Index. Special attention is paid to the companies that are also part of the S&P 500 Index, the companies that are the dominant source of corporate political money.

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U.S. Governance in Transition: Shifting Investor Sentiments and Implications for the Future

Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS STOXX Governance Research report.

Key Takeaways

  • The U.S. governance framework is entering a period of significant transition, with proposed SEC reforms potentially reshaping shareholder proposals, exempt solicitations, executive compensation disclosure, and say-on-pay voting. The 2026 ISS Global Benchmark Policy Survey results provide an indication of how investors may respond as that landscape evolves.
  • Some long-established shareholder mechanisms may become less available. If proposed changes to shareholder proposals and exempt solicitations move forward, the mechanisms available to investors to engage, raise concerns, and communicate with companies could change significantly, potentially leading many investors to place greater emphasis on other avenues for accountability.
  • Investor focus remains firmly on shareholder rights. The survey results suggest investors generally support weighing all factors in assessing re-incorporation decisions but place particular importance on preserving mechanisms that allow shareholders to hold boards and management accountable.
  • Investors may adapt by placing greater future voting emphasis on director elections for accountability. As shareholder proposals and advisory say-on-pay votes potentially become less available, the survey results suggest that investors may increasingly look to director elections as avenues for expressing governance concerns through voting.
  • Executive compensation disclosure and oversight could change substantially. The SEC’s proposed reforms would exempt many companies from existing compensation disclosure requirements and say-on-pay votes, a change that could affect a large portion of the U.S. market. The SEC estimates that approximately 81% of public companies would qualify for the proposed changes.
  • Many investors will continue to expect accountability for pay decisions. Even in the absence of say-on-pay votes, most investor respondents to the survey supported some form of board-level accountability, particularly through compensation committee leadership. Half favored initially focusing accountability on the compensation committee chair and escalating only if concerns persist over multiple years, while 41% supported directing concerns toward compensation committee members more broadly from the start.
  • Investors continue to value executive compensation transparency, while recognizing that commercial sensitivities on performance targets can be legitimate. Over 70 percent of investor respondents answered either that competitive harm may justify non-disclosure in certain circumstances—after considering the company’s specific explanation and facts on a case-by-case basis—or with retrospective disclosure.
  • Investors are particularly skeptical of non-disclosure for relative performance metrics. Nearly 80% of investor respondents agreed that competitive harm is a less compelling rationale for withholding relative performance goals.
  • As investors may increasingly look to directors for accountability, director independence is likely to receive greater scrutiny. Approximately 64% of investor respondents indicated that lengthy director tenure should be considered in independence assessments, even though this is not currently a standard market practice in the United States.
  • Investors favor a holistic approach to board independence and tenure. Rather than using mechanical director tenure limits, respondents generally supported evaluating tenure and independence in the context of broader factors such as board refreshment, leadership structure, and long-term board tenure overlaps.

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The Economics of Attention

Joshua T. White is the Chief Economist and Director of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent speech. The views expressed in the post are those of Dr. White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Ed (Magee), and good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here with the NACD Nashville Chapter.[1]

Before I begin, let me give our standard disclaimer. My remarks are provided in my official capacity as the Chief Economist and Director of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis but do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the staff.

It is good to be back in Middle Tennessee.

Some of the research I want to talk about today was done just up I-65 at Vanderbilt.

However, I want to start with something from NACD’s own research.

In its 2026 Governance Outlook survey, directors were asked which trends they expected to have the greatest impact on their companies over the next year. The top three were shifting economic conditions, “artificial intelligence” (also known as superintelligence or SI), and regulatory requirements.[2]

I am not going to try to cover the economy this afternoon. But I am an economist, so I thought I would talk about the economics of the other two.

Regulation and SI may seem very different. But they have something important in common. Both can change how companies use scarce resources. They can change what things cost, how people spend their time, and ultimately where capital and attention go.

And for a board, attention may be the scarcest resource of all.

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Weekly Roundup: November 13-19, 2026


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 13-19, 2026

Restoring the Bump-Up Exclusion to Its Proper Bounds


Statement by Chair Atkins on Proposed Amendments to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements


Delaware


Unequal Voting Rights: Opportunity vs. Influence


The Founder’s Primer on Multi-Class Voting Structures


Share Owner Proposals and Rule 14a8: The Uneasy Case for Devolution



SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements


The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control


Directors’ Disclosure and Document-Preservation Obligations


When AI Becomes the Activist’s Thesis




Measuring Corporate Governance with Large Language Models


Board Practices and Composition in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500


Board Practices and Composition in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Data Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, KPMG, and Russell Reynolds Associates, and authored by Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance and Andrew Jones, Director, Governance & Sustainability Center at The Conference Board.

This report examines how board composition and governance practices evolved in 2026 across US public companies in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500, drawing on longitudinal data from corporate filings and disclosures. The analysis focuses on changes in board refreshment, director experience and skills, leadership structures, committee organization, and other practices that shape how boards are composed and operate.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • Board refreshment slowed further in 2026. Newly elected directors represented 8.5% of Russell 3000 directors and 8.2% of S&P 500 directors, while 52.6% and 43.8% of companies, respectively, added no new director. The Russell 3000 refreshment rate has declined materially, down from a peak of 13.3% in 2022.
  • Boards are drawing less heavily on first time public company directors. Among newly elected directors, the share of those serving for the first time fell year over year from 39.1% to 21.6% in the Russell 3000 and from 27.8% to 17.6% in the S&P 500. Combined with rising new director ages, the pattern points to a greater premium on demonstrated experience.
  • Senior executive experience remains central to board recruitment. Former CEOs accounted for 23.1% of newly elected Russell 3000 directors and 23.9% of newly elected S&P 500 directors in 2026, while active CEOs represented 16.1% and 20.3%, respectively. Both categories increased from 2025, reinforcing the broader shift toward candidates with established executive leadership and public company experience.
  • Older boards are not necessarily more entrenched boards. Average director age increased again, to 63.1 years in the Russell 3000 and 63.9 years in the S&P 500, but average sitting director tenure remained broadly stable, and the share of directors serving more than 15 years did not increase.
  • The share of women in board leadership roles rose, but overall representation was flat. Even as women continued to gain ground as committee chairs, the share of newly appointed women directors fell substantially.
  • AI expertise is becoming more visible in board disclosures but remains uncommon. Board skills matrix disclosure reached 47.8% of the Russell 3000 and 81.1% of the S&P 500, while reported AI expertise among independent directors rose to 3.3% and 5.4%, respectively.
  • Boards continue to adjust how they allocate oversight and maintain effectiveness. Risk committees and science and technology committees became more prevalent, while ESG/sustainability committees declined from their 2024 peaks. Director education, comprehensive board evaluations, and capacity related policies continued to expand.
  • Diversity disclosure and formal diversity related recruitment commitments declined further. Individual director race and ethnicity disclosure declined again in 2026, and disclosed candidate pool diversity policies fell particularly sharply in the S&P 500. These measures capture disclosure and formal policy, not underlying board composition or every practice used in director searches.

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Measuring Corporate Governance with Large Language Models

Jens Frankenreiter is the Treiman Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis. This post is based on his recent paper.

Corporate governance research today would not look the same without commercial datasets. While much information on publicly traded corporations is available on the SEC’s EDGAR platform, commercial dataset providers translate this information into a format that researchers can use in empirical analyses. Many of the most influential studies of the last decades have relied on this data. Of course, researchers can also code the information by hand, and many studies have done so. But doing so is costly and usually limits the scale of feasible investigations.

While commercial corporate governance data has enabled important work, it has also shaped and constrained the field. Commercial datasets made some companies and governance arrangements much easier to study than others. Figuratively speaking: Where those datasets cast light, researchers tended to gather. Other questions, equally worthy of attention, might have been too costly to pursue.

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Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 and Amending Rule 14a-4: A Comment from United Church Funds

Charles Buck is the President and CEO of the United Church Funds. This post is based on a comment letter by United Church Funds submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals and amendments to Rule 14a-4.

This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the SEC’s proposal on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 and Amending Rule 14a-4, by United Church Funds. Below is the text of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.

United Church Funds (UCF) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and amendments to Rule 14a-4. UCF opposes adoption of the proposal in its present form. We support targeted reform that addresses demonstrated burdens while preserving meaningful shareholder participation, informed voting and an orderly process for resolving disputes.

Since 1909, UCF has stewarded assets for churches, ministries and nonprofit organizations. As a financial ministry of the United Church of Christ, our mandate joins competitive, risk adjusted returns with investment practices that support a just and sustainable world. Care for creation and love of neighbor inform how we assess risks, exercise ownership and engage companies. Our clients entrust us not only to seek competitive returns, but also to exercise ownership responsibly, including speaking as shareholders when corporate practices raise material ethical, sustainability or governance concerns. This letter addresses the proposal’s policy choices, practical administration and rationale regarding statutory authority, followed by a process for evaluating targeted alternatives.

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Delaware Becomes First State to Respond to Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8: Corporation Law Council Releases White Paper and Discussion Draft on Stockholder Proposals

Elizabeth A. Ising, Julia Lapitskaya, and Ronald O. Mueller are Partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Ms. Ising, Ms. Lapitskaya, Mr. Mueller, Michael Svedman, and Thomas W. Franck, all at Gibson Dunn, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association released a white paper and draft legislation for discussion that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the SEC rescinds Rule 14a-8. The Council has provided for a 60 day public comment period on the Discussion Draft, which the White Paper explains as recognizing that the amendments “may have effects wider in scope than most of our other recommended legislation.”

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section (the Council) of the Delaware State Bar Association (the DSBA) released a white paper (the White Paper) and a discussion draft of legislation (the Discussion Draft)[1] that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) rescinds Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 14a-8).[2] The Discussion Draft sets forth draft text for a new Section 214 (Section 214) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) that would for the first time provide stockholders of Delaware companies a carefully prescribed state law statutory right to submit precatory (nonbinding) proposals at annual meetings and have those proposals included in the company’s proxy materials. The amendments would take effect when rescission of Rule 14a-8 becomes effective.

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When AI Becomes the Activist’s Thesis

Leonard Wood is Partner and Chair of the Shareholder Activism and Takeover Defense Practice, and Evan Grosch and Austin Lee are Associates, at Goodwin Procter LLP. This post is based on their Goodwin memorandum.

Going into the 2026 proxy season, many expected artificial intelligence to continue shaping shareholder activism. It did, although the focus shifted. The debate initially centered on governance—specifically, whether boards had sufficient AI expertise and whether companies were appropriately disclosing and managing AI risk. Those topics remain important to investors, and the expectations behind them continue to rise. As the 2026 proxy season unfolded, a number of activist campaigns shifted their emphasis. Rather than treating AI as primarily a governance theme, activists have increasingly asked what AI means for a target’s competitive position, revenue durability, cost structure, capital spending, and, ultimately, valuation.

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Directors’ Disclosure and Document-Preservation Obligations

Kevin Schwartz and Adam Goodman are Partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Goodman, Theodore R. Furchtgott, and Teniola T. Odugbesan, all at Wachtell Lipton, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Last week, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a director or officer who withholds material information from the board breaches the duty of loyalty and that her destruction of corporate documents during a board investigation may constitute an independent breach of the duty of loyalty. Sarwal v. NephroSant, Inc., C.A. No. 2023-0222-BWD (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2026). The Court further held that a director or officer found to have breached the duty of loyalty forfeits indemnification for the costs of the board’s investigation into her conduct.

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