Pay Leverage, Not Percent of Pay in Equity, Is the Key Measure of Corporate Director Pay

Stephen F. O’Byrne is President and Co-founder of Shareholder Value Advisors Inc. This post is based on his Shareholder Value Advisors memorandum.

The objectives of corporate director pay are much the same as the objectives of corporate executive pay, which are to provide strong incentives to increase shareholder value, retain key talent, and limit shareholder cost.

The conventional wisdom in executive pay is that the three basic objectives can be achieved by combining median target pay with a high percent of pay at risk. The conventional theory is that a high percent of pay at risk provides a strong incentive, not letting target pay fall below the peer median retains key talent and not letting target pay rise above the peer median limits shareholder cost. These principles have become widely embraced in corporate director pay over the last thirty years.

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Explaining Delaware’s Blunder

Itai Fiegenbaum is an Associate Professor at St. Thomas University. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in the American Business Law Journal, and is part of the Controlling Shareholder Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware’s judiciary is widely regarded as the most sophisticated corporate law judiciary in the United States. Its judges are not only experts in corporate law, but also keenly aware of the political forces that shape Delaware’s position as the jurisdiction of choice for publicly traded corporations. That institutional sophistication has historically allowed Delaware’s courts to navigate threats to the state’s corporate law franchise without inviting unnecessary confrontation. How, then, did Delaware’s judiciary provoke a political backlash that culminated in the hurried enactment of the 2025 amendments to Delaware’s corporate code, which displaced decades of judge made fiduciary duty doctrine and curtailed shareholder inspection rights?

To appreciate the puzzle, consider the judiciary’s handling of the litigation surrounding the federal government’s rescue of Bear Stearns during the 2008 financial crisis. The Federal Reserve orchestrated a merger between Bear Stearns and JP Morgan to prevent the investment bank’s collapse. The transaction involved aggressive deal protections designed to ensure shareholder approval, raising serious questions under Delaware corporate law. Yet when shareholders challenged the transaction, the Delaware Court of Chancery stayed the proceedings in favor of a parallel litigation in New York. Rather than strictly apply Delaware precedent and potentially thwart federal efforts to rescue Bear Stearns, the court effectively stepped aside.

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Tokenized Securities — What Corporations Should Know

Kevin S. Schwartz is a Partner and David M. Adlerstein is an Of Counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell memorandum.

The U.S. system for issuing, trading, clearing, and holding securities rests on a book entry framework developed more than half a century ago. Familiar, time tested, and generally reliable, that framework also entails settlement delays, limited trading hours, layers of intermediaries and records, and substantial reconciliation work. Some market participants are now testing whether a different recordkeeping technology can reduce those frictions and modernize this infrastructure through tokenization, which is the representation of securities on a blockchain.

Proponents contend that tokenization could enable near instant settlement; 24/7 trading; fewer intermediaries; a potential fix for the tangled recordkeeping that complicates shareholder voting; and greater transparency on public blockchains, where activity is visible to anyone, though participants are pseudonymous. Securities in a programmable environment could also enable further efficiencies. These prospects have attracted institutions at the center of traditional securities trading, including the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), which launched a tokenization service for financial institutions last week; NYSE and Nasdaq, which are developing tokenization platforms; and BlackRock, which offers an institutional on chain money market fund.

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Stewardship at an Inflection Point – From Activity to Effectiveness

Dr. Catherine Marchewitz is a Managing Director at Governance & Values and David Mondl is the Head of Active Ownership at Inrate.

Stewardship is becoming more sophisticated. But is it becoming more effective?

Investors have never had more tools, more data or more expectations around stewardship. Engagement programs have become more structured. Voting is increasingly integrated with broader ownership strategies. Sustainability data and analytics have become more sophisticated. Regulation and stewardship codes have raised expectations around transparency and accountability.

But there is a question we think deserves more attention. Are we becoming better at stewardship or simply doing more of it?

We think this is an important distinction. More engagement meetings do not necessarily mean more influence. More votes do not necessarily mean better outcomes. And a growing number of reported milestones does not necessarily tell us how much an investor contributed to the change.

Of course, activity matters. It tells us whether investors are using their stewardship capabilities and provides an important degree of transparency. But we believe the next step is to look beyond activity and ask what happens between an investor’s intention and the outcome. This is where we see the next step in the evolution of stewardship, which is moving from measuring stewardship activity to understanding stewardship effectiveness.

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SEC Staff Streamlines Form S-8, Rule 701, and Section 16 Guidance

Michael Albano is a Partner, Julia Rozenblit is a Practice Development Lawyer, and Ariel Adler is an Associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Albano, Ms. Rozenblit, Mr. Adler, and Bobby Bee.

On October 15, 2026, the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Division of Corporation Finance (the Staff) released a series of new and revised Corporation Finance Interpretations (CFIs, formerly known as Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, or C&DIs) addressing Rule 701 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act), Form S-8 and the related registration fee rules, as well as a Form 4 filing timing question under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).[1] Most of the guidance is new, although the Staff also revised two longstanding Form S-8 interpretations, including one that reverses the Staff’s prior position on assumed awards held by former employees of an acquired company.

Taken together, the new CFIs largely resolve in companies’ favor several questions that practitioners have long treated as unclear, and in a number of respects place restricted stock and restricted stock units (RSUs) on the same footing that stock options have historically enjoyed. Below, we summarize the new guidance and highlight related existing guidance that continues to apply.

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Rule 14a-8: Perhaps Slow-Walking Recission is Best

Stefan Padfield is a Principal and Allen Mendenhall is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation.

In a recent post on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, titled “Rule 14a-8: Perhaps There’s Another Way,” Sarah Wilson, Founder and CEO of Minerva Analytics, tackles the hot topic of Rule 14a-8 rescission. At bottom, she argues for implementing a version of the UK Takeover Panel to regulate procedural requirements for proposal submission while leaving decisions about content scope to shareholders. Along the way, she argues that The Heritage Foundation, including by way of its American Investor Initiative, “is having second thoughts” about prior positions Heritage has taken on the issue, and that Heritage “seems distinctly unhappy with the SEC’s direction of travel” and is thus left in “the strange position of defending the very mechanism it spent years arguing had made shareholder meetings too political.” These characterizations of Heritage warrant some clarification.

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Investor Perspectives on SEC Disclosure Reform

Linda Pappas, Mike Kesner, and Lane Ringlee are Partners at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Broad opposition to disclosure reductions. Across our survey of institutional investors, 81% opposed the reductions in disclosures proposed or contemplated.
  • No size threshold for more limited disclosures. While the SEC proposal reduces disclosure for companies with public float below $2 billion, 79% of investors indicated that reduced disclosure is not appropriate for a company of any size.
  • Strong support for tabular disclosure. Investors strongly oppose the elimination of quantitative tables from disclosure requirements.
  • Narrative disclosure remains relevant. Over two-thirds of investors surveyed support retention of the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A).
  • Current disclosure length and complexity are not viewed as a significant concern by many investors. Investors have learned to extract the information they need and oppose changes that would eliminate information important to their voting decisions.

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2026 Global Voting Spotlight

John Roe and Amra Balic are Global Co-Heads of Investment Stewardship (BIS) at BlackRock. This post is based on a BlackRock publication.

Executive Summary

Voting at a company’s shareholder meeting is a basic right of share ownership and a core principle of corporate governance. As a fiduciary, BlackRock is legally required to make proxy voting determinations in a manner that is consistent with the investment objectives of clients who have delegated voting authority to us.

BIS’ Benchmark Policies, and the vote decisions made consistent with those policies, take a financial materiality based approach and reflect our reasonable and independent judgment of what is in the long term financial interests of clients. We do not act collectively with other shareholders or organizations in voting shares or follow any proxy research firm’s voting recommendations.

This report provides a comprehensive overview of BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s (BIS) approach to voting on corporate governance matters and other material risks and opportunities under our Benchmark Policies in the 2025/26 proxy year.[1]

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Weekly Roundup: October 23-29, 2026


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 23-29, 2026

SEC’s Shareholder Activism Role After The ’26 Proxy Season


Bank CEO Pay on the S&P 500: How One-Time Awards Impact Compensation and Benchmarking


Global Proxy Season 2026: High Support, Sharper Scrutiny and the Rise of Targeted Stewardship


Chancery Awards Buyer Damages for Founder’s Overly Aggressive Efforts to Achieve Earnout


The New Board Imperative: Governing What’s Next


Advance Notice, Fair Warning: Delaware Court Says Bylaw Provisions Aren’t Moving Targets


How Investors Vote



Cloudflare: Important Lessons for Conflict Transactions


A Tale of Two Jurisdictions: Red-Chip Companies Going Private


Remarks by Chair Atkins on IPO Modernization and Regulation Crowdfunding


Continuation Vehicles Grow as GPs and LPs Tackle Conflicts and Alignment



The Post-Recapitalization Compensation Dilemma for Private Companies: Rebuilding Long-Term Incentives After a Restructuring

Hannah Reich is a Consultant and Erin Bass-Goldberg and Michael Marino is a Managing Director at FW Cook. This post is based on their FW Cook report.

A recapitalization can give a private equity portfolio company the financial foundation for its next phase of growth. It can also create a compensation problem when the restructuring materially changes the equity available to management. When pre-recap awards are cancelled or replaced, management may emerge with materially lower incentive value and retentive equity just as the company is asking the team to rebuild enterprise value and deliver the sponsor’s investment thesis.

We call this the post-recap compensation dilemma. Sponsors understandably want to manage dilution following a restructuring, but changes to the post-recap equity structure can materially reduce the number or value of shares available to management. The result can be a meaningful gap between the value of original equity awards and replacement awards, with an even larger gap in potential realizable value at exit.

This gap matters. A management team that has navigated a restructuring is often being asked to execute an ambitious operating plan, restore growth, and ultimately deliver a successful liquidity event. Replacement awards with materially lower value can reduce the motivational power of the program at a time when alignment and retention become especially important.

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