Board Practices and Composition in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500

Matteo Tonello is the Head of Data Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, KPMG, and Russell Reynolds Associates, and authored by Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance and Andrew Jones, Director, Governance & Sustainability Center at The Conference Board.

This report examines how board composition and governance practices evolved in 2026 across US public companies in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500, drawing on longitudinal data from corporate filings and disclosures. The analysis focuses on changes in board refreshment, director experience and skills, leadership structures, committee organization, and other practices that shape how boards are composed and operate.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • Board refreshment slowed further in 2026. Newly elected directors represented 8.5% of Russell 3000 directors and 8.2% of S&P 500 directors, while 52.6% and 43.8% of companies, respectively, added no new director. The Russell 3000 refreshment rate has declined materially, down from a peak of 13.3% in 2022.
  • Boards are drawing less heavily on first time public company directors. Among newly elected directors, the share of those serving for the first time fell year over year from 39.1% to 21.6% in the Russell 3000 and from 27.8% to 17.6% in the S&P 500. Combined with rising new director ages, the pattern points to a greater premium on demonstrated experience.
  • Senior executive experience remains central to board recruitment. Former CEOs accounted for 23.1% of newly elected Russell 3000 directors and 23.9% of newly elected S&P 500 directors in 2026, while active CEOs represented 16.1% and 20.3%, respectively. Both categories increased from 2025, reinforcing the broader shift toward candidates with established executive leadership and public company experience.
  • Older boards are not necessarily more entrenched boards. Average director age increased again, to 63.1 years in the Russell 3000 and 63.9 years in the S&P 500, but average sitting director tenure remained broadly stable, and the share of directors serving more than 15 years did not increase.
  • The share of women in board leadership roles rose, but overall representation was flat. Even as women continued to gain ground as committee chairs, the share of newly appointed women directors fell substantially.
  • AI expertise is becoming more visible in board disclosures but remains uncommon. Board skills matrix disclosure reached 47.8% of the Russell 3000 and 81.1% of the S&P 500, while reported AI expertise among independent directors rose to 3.3% and 5.4%, respectively.
  • Boards continue to adjust how they allocate oversight and maintain effectiveness. Risk committees and science and technology committees became more prevalent, while ESG/sustainability committees declined from their 2024 peaks. Director education, comprehensive board evaluations, and capacity related policies continued to expand.
  • Diversity disclosure and formal diversity related recruitment commitments declined further. Individual director race and ethnicity disclosure declined again in 2026, and disclosed candidate pool diversity policies fell particularly sharply in the S&P 500. These measures capture disclosure and formal policy, not underlying board composition or every practice used in director searches.

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Measuring Corporate Governance with Large Language Models

Jens Frankenreiter is the Treiman Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis. This post is based on his recent paper.

Corporate governance research today would not look the same without commercial datasets. While much information on publicly traded corporations is available on the SEC’s EDGAR platform, commercial dataset providers translate this information into a format that researchers can use in empirical analyses. Many of the most influential studies of the last decades have relied on this data. Of course, researchers can also code the information by hand, and many studies have done so. But doing so is costly and usually limits the scale of feasible investigations.

While commercial corporate governance data has enabled important work, it has also shaped and constrained the field. Commercial datasets made some companies and governance arrangements much easier to study than others. Figuratively speaking: Where those datasets cast light, researchers tended to gather. Other questions, equally worthy of attention, might have been too costly to pursue.

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Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 and Amending Rule 14a-4: A Comment from United Church Funds

Charles Buck is the President and CEO of the United Church Funds. This post is based on a comment letter by United Church Funds submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals and amendments to Rule 14a-4.

This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the SEC’s proposal on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 and Amending Rule 14a-4, by United Church Funds. Below is the text of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.

United Church Funds (UCF) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and amendments to Rule 14a-4. UCF opposes adoption of the proposal in its present form. We support targeted reform that addresses demonstrated burdens while preserving meaningful shareholder participation, informed voting and an orderly process for resolving disputes.

Since 1909, UCF has stewarded assets for churches, ministries and nonprofit organizations. As a financial ministry of the United Church of Christ, our mandate joins competitive, risk adjusted returns with investment practices that support a just and sustainable world. Care for creation and love of neighbor inform how we assess risks, exercise ownership and engage companies. Our clients entrust us not only to seek competitive returns, but also to exercise ownership responsibly, including speaking as shareholders when corporate practices raise material ethical, sustainability or governance concerns. This letter addresses the proposal’s policy choices, practical administration and rationale regarding statutory authority, followed by a process for evaluating targeted alternatives.

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Delaware Becomes First State to Respond to Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8: Corporation Law Council Releases White Paper and Discussion Draft on Stockholder Proposals

Elizabeth A. Ising, Julia Lapitskaya, and Ronald O. Mueller are Partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Ms. Ising, Ms. Lapitskaya, Mr. Mueller, Michael Svedman, and Thomas W. Franck, all at Gibson Dunn, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association released a white paper and draft legislation for discussion that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the SEC rescinds Rule 14a-8. The Council has provided for a 60 day public comment period on the Discussion Draft, which the White Paper explains as recognizing that the amendments “may have effects wider in scope than most of our other recommended legislation.”

On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section (the Council) of the Delaware State Bar Association (the DSBA) released a white paper (the White Paper) and a discussion draft of legislation (the Discussion Draft)[1] that would establish a state corporate law regime to address stockholder proposals if the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) rescinds Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 14a-8).[2] The Discussion Draft sets forth draft text for a new Section 214 (Section 214) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) that would for the first time provide stockholders of Delaware companies a carefully prescribed state law statutory right to submit precatory (nonbinding) proposals at annual meetings and have those proposals included in the company’s proxy materials. The amendments would take effect when rescission of Rule 14a-8 becomes effective.

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When AI Becomes the Activist’s Thesis

Leonard Wood is Partner and Chair of the Shareholder Activism and Takeover Defense Practice, and Evan Grosch and Austin Lee are Associates, at Goodwin Procter LLP. This post is based on their Goodwin memorandum.

Going into the 2026 proxy season, many expected artificial intelligence to continue shaping shareholder activism. It did, although the focus shifted. The debate initially centered on governance—specifically, whether boards had sufficient AI expertise and whether companies were appropriately disclosing and managing AI risk. Those topics remain important to investors, and the expectations behind them continue to rise. As the 2026 proxy season unfolded, a number of activist campaigns shifted their emphasis. Rather than treating AI as primarily a governance theme, activists have increasingly asked what AI means for a target’s competitive position, revenue durability, cost structure, capital spending, and, ultimately, valuation.

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Directors’ Disclosure and Document-Preservation Obligations

Kevin Schwartz and Adam Goodman are Partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Goodman, Theodore R. Furchtgott, and Teniola T. Odugbesan, all at Wachtell Lipton, and is part of the Delaware Law Series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Last week, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a director or officer who withholds material information from the board breaches the duty of loyalty and that her destruction of corporate documents during a board investigation may constitute an independent breach of the duty of loyalty. Sarwal v. NephroSant, Inc., C.A. No. 2023-0222-BWD (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2026). The Court further held that a director or officer found to have breached the duty of loyalty forfeits indemnification for the costs of the board’s investigation into her conduct.

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The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control

Mike Burkart is a Professor of Finance at the London School of Economics, Samuel Lee is an Associate Professor of Finance at Santa Clara University, and Paul Voss is an Associate Professor of Finance at HEC Paris. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

The market for corporate control has evolved substantially over the past decades. Professional control-oriented investors such as activist hedge funds and private equity funds, which have grown enormously since the 1990s, are now central players in this market. Hostile tender offers were the prominent feature of the market in the 1980s, but the mode of control change has since shifted from such direct takeovers to takeover activism: large shareholders do not take over firms themselves but broker a sale to outside bidders.

In our paper, The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we propose that the growth of (capital at the disposal of) control-oriented investors leads to such a shift in the mode of control change. In the extant literature, the shift is usually attributed to the proliferation of takeover defenses and legal changes that facilitate shareholder activism. We contend that these do not provide a comprehensive explanation.

The novelty of our theory is to recognize that control-oriented investors need not have ex-ante designated roles on the buy- or sell-side. They can choose to become large shareholders, who possess the option to acquire firms themselves or put firms in play, or to become outside bidders for firms that are put in play. We show that both modes of control change coexist and that the choice between them allows to overcome free-riding and asymmetric information problems. The optimal role choice depends on the number of control-oriented investors in the market, which drives the evolution of the market for corporate control.

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SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements

Shalom Huber is a Partner, and Julie Yusko and Stephanie Birndorf are Counsels at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Huber, Ms. Yusko, Ms. Birndorf, Page Griffin, Michael Wiseman, and Joseph Penko, all at Skadden.

Executive Summary

  • What’s new: On November 13, 2026, the SEC issued proposed amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K and related rules. If adopted, they would be the most significant executive compensation disclosure reform since 2006.
  • Why it matters: For public companies, the proposed rules would narrow named executive officers to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer; introduce three new tables that replace the existing core executive compensation tables; and significantly scale back pay-versus-performance, pay ratio, perquisite and severance disclosures.
  • What to do next: Companies should prepare 2027 proxy statements under the current Item 402 regime. Meanwhile, they should consider planning ahead to collect data for the new tables, revisiting perquisite and security practices, and planning for investor and proxy advisor reaction.

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Proposed SEC Rule on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Comment from the Council of Institutional Investors

Jeffrey P. Mahoney is General Counsel at the Council of Institutional Investors. This post is based on a comment letter by the Council of Institutional Investors submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals and amendments to Rule 14a-4.

This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the SEC’s proposal on Rescinding Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8, by the Council of Institutional Investors. Below is the executive summary of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.

The Council of Institutional Investors (CII)[1] appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC or Commission) proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 and amend Rule 14a-4 (Release).[2] CII opposes both proposals. Our reasons and responses to the Commission’s requests for comment follow.

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Share Owner Proposals and Rule 14a8: The Uneasy Case for Devolution

Lawrence Cunningham is the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware.

The SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 presents an opportunity to reconsider how share owner proposals should fit within corporate governance.[1] The central question is who should define the terms on which one owner may require a corporation to circulate a proposal at the expense of all its owners. There is a case for moving that responsibility toward state corporate law and company-specific arrangements, though such a shift presents substantial challenges and would require an orderly transition that preserves useful participation and makes the governing rules clear.

Two surveys conducted by the Weinberg Center inform that judgment. One examined the experience and views of 519 market participants; the other examined the normative views of 89 law professors. They reveal strong support for a governance core and company relevance, weaker confidence in SEC administration, disagreement over broader purposes, and substantial interest in company tailoring. They also record significant support for retaining a federal framework. The case for devolution must explain why it is preferable despite that preference, rather than claiming a survey mandate for repeal.

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