CEO Pay Mix Changes Following Say on Pay Failures

Ran Bi is a Research Analyst at Equilar Inc. This post is based on her Equilar memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here) and Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. legislation was passed in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act to bring some changes in the corporate environment. Say on Pay, which gives shareholders the right to vote on the remuneration of executives, addressed the issue of excessive CEO pay and was meant to give shareholders a voice and reduce CEO pay to a reasonable level.

Say on Pay has been in effect for almost eight years, but the question of how long it takes for Say on Pay votes to exert a noticeable impact on CEO pay is difficult to address. Intuitively, it seems possible that CEO pay should decrease since it is under the scrutiny of a large number of shareholders. However, the data reveals a different story. CEO pay, instead of declining, actually experienced a small degree of growth after Say on Pay was put into law.


The Division of Corporate Finance’s Response to Mandatory Arbitration Proposal

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Posner.

The issue of mandatory arbitration bylaws is a hot potato—and a partisan one at that (with Rs tending to favor and Ds tending to oppose). And in this no-action letter issued yesterday to Johnson & Johnson—granting relief to the company if it relied on Rule 14a-8(i)(2) (violation of law) to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting adoption of mandatory arbitration bylaws—Corp Fin successfully passed the potato off to the State of New Jersey. Crisis averted. However, the issue was so fraught that SEC Chair Jay Clayton felt the need to issue a statement supporting the staff’s hands-off position:

The issue of mandatory arbitration provisions in the bylaws of U.S. publicly-listed companies has garnered a great deal of attention. As I have previously stated, the ability of domestic, publicly-listed companies to require shareholders to arbitrate claims against them arising under the federal securities laws is a complex matter that requires careful consideration,

consideration that would be more appropriate at the Commissioner level than at the staff level. However, as Clayton has previously indicated, mandatory arbitration is not an issue that he is anxious to have the SEC wade into at this time. To be sure, if the parties really want a binding answer on the merits, he suggested, they might be well advised to seek a judicial determination.


A Capitalist’s Solution to the Problem of Excessive Buybacks

Nell Minow is Vice Chair of ValueEdge Advisors. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here).

We may not need a government solution to the issue of excessive corporate stock buybacks. We most certainly do not need the solution proposed by Senators Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, requiring companies to adopt minimum wage requirements for hourly workers before buying back stock. What we need is a capitalist solution, removing misaligned incentives, moral hazards, and diversion of assets to make sure the market’s buyback decision is the right one.

The conventional thinking about stock buybacks is that when corporate managers and directors believe the stock is undervalued and do not have a better use for excess capital they should return it to shareholders. No one can argue with that; it is vastly preferable to the usual alternative, overpaying for acquisitions that are not core to the company’s business. That’s a whole different discussion of misaligned incentives.


Go-Shops Revisited

Guhan Subramanian is Joseph H. Flom Professor of Law and Business at Harvard Law School and H. Douglas Weaver Professor of Business Law at Harvard Business School and Annie Zhao is a Fellow in the Program for Research on Markets and Organizations at Harvard Business School. This post is based on their recent paper.

Until approximately 2005, the traditional sale process for U.S. public companies involved a broad market canvass and a merger agreement with the winning bidder, followed by a “no shop” obligation for the seller between the signing and the closing of the merger. In the mid-2000s, however, the introduction of the “go-shop” technology turned this standard deal template on its head. In its purest form, a go-shop process involves an exclusive (or nearly exclusive) negotiation with a single buyer, followed by an extensive post-signing “go shop” process to see if a higher bidder could be found.

The first go-shop transaction appeared in Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe’s buyout of U.S. Oncology in March 2004. Go-shops proliferated quickly after that, particularly in private equity (PE) buyouts of public companies. Many commentators at the time were skeptical of go-shops. The conventional wisdom held that go-shops amounted to nothing more than a fig leaf to provide cover for management to seal the deal with its preferred bidder, while insulating the board against claims that it failed to satisfy its obligation to maximize value for the shareholders in the sale of the company.


Weekly Roundup: February 15-21, 2019

More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 15-21, 2019.

Books and Records Access for Terminated Directors

Board Diversity by U.S. Region

Practical Lessons in Boardroom Leadership

Corporate Bankruptcy and Restructuring 2018-2019

Text Messages and Personal Emails in Corporate Litigation

Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?

Bank Boards: What Has Changed Since the Financial Crisis?

Investor Engagement and Activist Shareholder Strategies

The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A Case Study

REIT M&A: Use and Overuse of Special Committees

The Creation and Evolution of Entrepreneurial Public Markets

The Creation and Evolution of Entrepreneurial Public Markets

Shai Bernstein is Assistant Professor of Finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business; Abhishek Dev is a Researcher at Harvard Business School; and Josh Lerner is Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking at Harvard Business School. This post is based on their recent paper.

One important channel through which financial development enables economic growth is through the funding of innovative and entrepreneurial projects—activities that have been long recognized as particularly hard to finance with outside capital. Well-developed public equity markets have been shown to be instrumental in filling this financing gap, allowing young and fast-growing companies to fund R&D activities. Recognizing the importance of entrepreneurial finance, a major focus of financial policymakers around the world has been on the creation of new stock exchanges for young and small-capitalization companies, often characterized by less restrictive listing requirements. Such exchanges, termed second-tier exchanges, have been heralded in many places as a way to promote the creation, financing, and retention of job-creating new ventures. Anecdotally, while there have been some highly visible successes (such as NASDAQ in New York, London’s Alternative Investment Market, and the Shenzhen-based ChiNext market), there have been many more failures (such as EASDAQ).


Social Responsibility and Enlightened Shareholder Primacy: Views from the Courtroom and Boardroom

Peter AtkinsMarc Gerber and Edward Micheletti are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here).

There is an ongoing debate about the role that publicly traded for-profit business corporations should play in addressing a broad range of problems confronting our world today. Many issues fall under the ESG label—meaning they are environmental, social and/or governance-related in nature. Investors, as well as interest groups with varying agendas, have joined in this debate.

Although the motivations of ESG proponents may vary, many ESG proponents are investors and asset managers that believe appropriate company consideration of ESG matters, and the attendant board oversight, improve the long-term performance of the companies in which they are invested and reduce the risk in those investments.


REIT M&A: Use and Overuse of Special Committees

Adam O. EmmerichRobin PanovkaWilliam Savitt, and Viktor Sapezhnikov are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

Special committees are often an indispensable tool in conflict transactions. In REIT management-buyout transactions, a well-functioning and well-advised committee can sometimes shield directors and managers from after-the-fact litigation exposure. But special committees are not one-size-fits-all, and can also be deployed to the detriment of a company and its shareholders. Forming a special committee when not required can needlessly hamper the operations of the company and its ability to transact, create rifts in the board and between the board and management, and burden the company with an inefficient decision-making structure that may be difficult to unwind. It is important, therefore, for REITs to carefully consider—when the specter of a real or potential conflict arises—whether a special committee is in fact the best approach, whether it is required at all, and whether recusal of conflicted directors or other safeguards are perhaps the better approach.


The NYC Comptroller’s New Normal?

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Posner. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Post-shutdown, the SEC is starting to catch up on no-action requests to exclude shareholder proposals, posting several new entries at the end of last week. While most of the responses reflected withdrawals of requests in light of withdrawal of the subject proposal, one of the more interesting withdrawal letters relates to a decision to include a shareholder proposal. The proposal, submitted by the New York City Employees’ Retirement System and other pension funds overseen by NYC Comptroller Scott Stringer, sought to have TransDigm Group Incorporated, a manufacturer of aerospace components, adopt a policy related to climate change. After the company sought no-action relief from the SEC staff—and notably well before the government shutdown and before the SEC had even responded to the company’s request—the proponent pension funds filed suit in the SDNY seeking to enjoin the company from soliciting proxies without including the shareholder proposal and declaratory relief that the exclusion of the proposal violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-8. Will the Comptroller use the same tactic of circumventing the traditional SEC process and commencing litigation for any proposal the pension funds submit in the future? Will going straight to court be the new normal?


Mandatory Securities Arbitration Under New Jersey Corporate Law

Jacob Hale Russell is Assistant Professor at Rutgers Law School. This post is based on a white paper authored by Professor Russell and signed by 25 law professors. The white paper and a full list of signatories are available here.

Under New Jersey corporate law, may a corporation adopt a mandatory arbitration provision in its bylaws that would require shareholders to bring federal securities law claims via separate individual arbitration? The issue is squarely raised by a recent shareholder proposal at Johnson & Johnson, a New Jersey corporation, that asks the board to adopt such a bylaw for “disputes between a stockholder and the Corporation and/or its directors, officers or controlling persons relating to claims under federal securities laws.”

This whitepaper explains why such a bylaw (hereafter called a “mandatory securities arbitration bylaw”) would violate the New Jersey Business Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 et seq. There are additional, compelling reasons why such a provision might be impermissible, including that it might violate the anti-waiver provisions of federal securities laws or be unenforceable under state contract law. Such arguments have been developed elsewhere and are outside the scope of this white paper.


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