Yearly Archives: 2008

Electronic Arts’ Attempt to Exclude My Precatory Shareholder Proposal

Editor’s Note: This post is from Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School.

Electronic Arts, Inc. recently submitted to the SEC a no-action request seeking concurrence of the SEC Staff that a shareholder proposal I submitted may be excluded from the company’s proxy materials for the 2008 annual meeting. In response to the company’s no-action request, I filed a complaint, through my counsel, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The complaint seeks, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Electronic Arts may not exclude my proposal from the company’s proxy materials and an injunction requiring the company to include the proposal.

My proposal is precatory and recommends that the board of directors submit to a shareholder vote an amendment to the company’s charter or by-laws. The suggested amendment, if adopted, could facilitate by-law amendments initiated by shareholders. In particular, the suggested amendment could require the company to submit to a shareholder vote shareholder-initiated proposals for changing the by-laws that meet certain procedural and substantive requirements. The suggested amendment could also require the company to include such proposals in the company’s proxy materials for the annual meeting.

I view my precatory proposal as rather moderate and believe that its passage and implementation could well benefit the company’s shareholders. Many shareholders, I believe, would vote for the proposal if given the opportunity to do so. I also believe that, for the reasons indicated in the complaint, the company’s attempt to exclude the proposal from the company’s proxy materials is entirely without merit. I hope that the company will change its position and allow shareholders to vote on my precatory proposal. The text of my proposal is available here, the company’s no-action request is available here, and my complaint is available here.

I would like to express my appreciation to the law firm of Grant & Eisenhofer for its invaluable legal advice and representation in this matter. I also wish to thank Greg Taxin and Julie Gresham of Spotlight Capital, and my Harvard Law School colleagues Victor Brudney, Allen Ferrell, Howell Jackson, Reinier Kraakman, and Mark Roe, for helpful comments and conversations on my shareholder proposal.

Director Compensation in Turbulent Times

This post is from John F. Olson of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

My colleagues, Amy Goodman, Gillian McPhee and I have recently published our thoughts on issues to be considered by boards of directors in setting their own compensation. We outline recent trends in compensation practices, particularly since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and discuss issues confronting boards of directors as they review their compensation programs; the issues include: the appropriate forms of cash compensation and equity compensation; the mix between equity and cash components of compensation; the adoption of stock ownership and retention policies; the use of perquisites; and the process for evaluating director compensation. We find that boards of public companies increasingly seek external guidance on these issues, recognizing that, when the board sets its own pay, it is in an unavoidable conflict of interest situation as are the corporate managers overseen by the board.

The memorandum is available here.

Apache Corporation v. NYCERS: Injunction Denied

This post is from Broc Romanek of TheCorporateCounsel.net.

Recently, I blogged about a case brought in the US District Court, Southern District of Texas, by Apache Corporation, who sought a declaratory judgment supporting its exclusion of a shareholder proposal submitted by the New York City Employees’ Retirement System. The case sought to enjoin a lawsuit brought by NYCERS in the Southern District of New York over the exclusion of a employment-related proposal by the Corp Fin Staff under the “ordinary business” basis of the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule (ie. 14a-8(i)(7)).

A few days ago, Judge Miller of the US District Court, Southern District of Texas ruled from the bench for Apache, granting Apache’s declaratory judgment. I have posted the Order and related Memo – even the trial transcript – from the court in the “Shareholder Proposals” Practice Area on TheCorporateCounsel.net.

Interestingly, Judge Miller’s opinion appears to stake out new territory from a judicial point of view. For the first time, a court has endorsed Corp Fin’s view that a proposal that involves some significant policy matters can nonetheless be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to the extent that the proposal also deals with core ordinary business matters; here for example, advertising, marketing, sales and charitable giving. We’ll see if the Second Circuit ultimately follows suit (I believe the Texas case isn’t binding on the SDNY one, but under a res judicata theory, it’s likely the Second Circuit would recognize the SDTX’s decision and rule in favor of Apache).

Also interestingly, the Texas court didn’t take the bait offered by Apache with respect to the appropriate standard of review for SEC Staff no-action: Apache asked the court to find that a company that excludes a shareholder proposal in reliance on a no-action letter is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that such exclusion was proper. The court declined to adopt such an approach, however, concluding that Staff no-action letters are only persuasive – but not binding – authority.

The opinion is available here.

The Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay

I, along with my co-authors Mary Ellen Carter and Stephen Hillegeist, have recently posted a new working paper entitled The Role and Effect of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay.

The paper examines how compensation consultants influence the level, form and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay for a sample of 880 firms from the S&P 1500 for fiscal year 2006. The sample was collected by looking at the Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) report in the annual proxy statement, which is required for filings on or after December 15, 2006. Our final sample of 880 firms all have December fiscal year ends. In addition, 86% of the firms in our sample disclosed that they retained a compensation consultant, suggesting that the use of consultants is widespread.

We find evidence of greater compensation in the presence of a compensation consultant, consistent with theory that these consultants facilitate rent extraction. However, we find no evidence of less pay-performance sensitivity when compensation consultants are hired. Among firms that retain consultants, we also examine whether there is greater rent extraction for clients of consultants with potentially greater conflicts of interest. Using a variety of specifications, we are unable to find widespread evidence of more lucrative CEO pay packages for clients of conflicted consultants despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Overall, we conclude from our findings that the potential conflict of interest between the firm and consultant is not a primary driver of excessive CEO pay.

The full paper is available for download here.

The Delaware General Corporation Law for the 21st Century

Editor’s Note: This post is from Lawrence A. Hamermesh of the Widener University School of Law. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

You are cordially invited to a very special symposium that marks and celebrates the 40th anniversary of the landmark 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law:

The Delaware General Corporation Law for the 21st Century

The Symposium will be held on May 5th at Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware. The event has been approved for 6 CLE credits in Pennsylvania and 6.3 CLE credits in Delaware (no ethics). Materials will be provided for self-reporting CLE for other states. We hope you will join us either in person, or remotely via a Live Video Webcast. There is no charge for participants attending remotely who do not need DE or PA CLE. (There is a $100 fee for remote attendance where DE or PA CLE is provided, and for in-person attendance).

For further information and to register, please click here. Corporation Service Company is the principal sponsor of the event.

In the current issue of The Delaware Lawyer, a variety of practitioners and academics (including Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Thompson, Michael Dooley and Charles Elson) present brief appeals for reform of Delaware’s corporate statutes. Many of these individuals, joined by Professors Jennifer Hill, Brett McDonnell, Faith Kahn, Elizabeth Nowicki, and Ann Conaway), will present more extended remarks about their proposals for reform at the Symposium. Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. will present the keynote address. Panels will address these subjects: The Delaware General Corporation Law and Takeovers; Stockholder Litigation Under the
DGCL; Stockholders in Corporate Governance; and What We Can Learn From Other Statutory Schemes.

Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc.

This post is from Steven M. Haas of Hunton & Williams LLP. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently held in Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., that a bylaw restricting business that could be conducted at annual meetings to (i) matters contained in the meeting notice and (ii) matters otherwise properly brought by the board or by stockholders (in accordance with advance notice provisions) did not preclude a dissident who failed to give advance notice from nominating directors at the company’s upcoming annual meeting. Vice Chancellor John W. Noble reasoned that the stockholder did not have to give advance notice of its director nominations because the annual meeting notice stated broadly that the business of director elections would be considered. Levitt follows last months’ decision in JANA as the second recent Delaware opinion finding holes in advance notice bylaws. Jim Morphy’s analysis of JANA is available here.

In Levitt, the court began with the threshold matter of interpreting a bylaw providing that “only such business shall be conducted as shall have been properly brought before the meeting.” The dissident argued that the term “business” did not apply to director elections. The court concluded, however, that the plain meaning of “business” included both stockholder proposals and stockholder director-nominations. As a result, the dissident’s director nominations were required to comply with the bylaw provision governing the conduct of annual meetings.

The court then turned to the key bylaw provision at issue, which stated that “[t]o be properly brought before an annual meeting, business must be (i) specified in the notice of the meeting… (ii) otherwise properly brought before the meeting by or at the direction of the Board of Directors or (iii) otherwise properly brought before the meeting by a stockholder… who complied with the notice procedures [including a 120-day advance notice requirement] set forth in this Section.” The corporation argued that the dissident stockholder failed to comply with the advance notice requirement and, therefore, the stockholder nominations would not be business “properly brought” before the meeting. The dissident responded that the nominations would be proper because, under clause (i) of the bylaw, the corporation’s notice of the annual meeting stated that one of the items of business was to “elect twelve (12) members of the Board of Directors.” The court agreed with the dissident, finding that the notice was sufficiently broad to allow for all director nominations—not just those on management’s slate. In other words, because the company “specified in the notice of the meeting” that director elections generally would be a matter of business, all stockholder nominations of directors will be “properly brought before the meeting” in accordance with the bylaws.

The court observed that the notice could have been drafted to avoid this outcome. Presumably, this means that the notice should have said, for example, that the stockholders would vote on the twelve nominees proposed by the nominating committee or specifically identified in the company’s proxy statement. The court also noted that the bylaws did not otherwise expressly address the director nomination process. Thus, a corporation whose bylaws have separate sections addressing stockholder proposals and stockholder director nominations may not need to change the generic language regarding director elections in its annual meeting notice. That corporation may want to make clear, however, that its bylaws distinguish between “director elections” and “business other than the election of directors.” This would avoid any ambiguity created by the court’s finding that “business” meant both director nominations and other proposals.

The Levittt opinion is available here and may be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court.

DOJ Establishes Guidelines For Corporate Monitors

This post is by John Savarese of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

My colleague David B. Anders and I have written a memorandum commenting on the guidance recently provided by the Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig S. Mortford concerning principles that DOJ will now consider when negotiating and finalizing monitor provisions for deferred prosecution arrangements. The DOJ guidance addresses, among other matters, possible criteria for monitor selection, the independent nature of the monitor, procedures for resolving disputes over the monitor’s suggestions, and ways to determine the appropriate terms of any monitorship.

The memorandum is available here.

Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws

Editor’s Note: This post is from Howell Jackson of Harvard Law School.

On April 14, my co-author Mark Roe and I presented our paper entitled Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence at the Law and Economics Seminar here at the Law School.

Recent academic work in finance has generally found that private enforcement for investor protection via disclosure and lawsuits among contracting parties is a relatively more important determinant of financial outcomes than public enforcement via financial, regulatory, and even criminal rules and penalties. However, much legal scholarship has long seen private enforcement of securities laws in the United States as poorly designed, with firms, and hence wronged shareholders, often bearing the cost of insiders’ errors and disclosure failure. Our paper seeks to clarify the discrepancy between these two areas of research.

In our paper, we develop an enforcement variable based on securities regulators’ real resources—their staffing levels and budgets. We then examine financial outcomes around the world, including stock market capitalization, trading volume, the number of domestic firms, and the number of IPOs, in light of these resource-based measures of public enforcement. We find that more intense public enforcement regularly correlates with strong financial outcomes. In comparisons between our measures of public enforcement and the measures of private enforcement prominent in recent finance scholarship, public enforcement is typically at least as important as private enforcement in explaining important financial market outcomes around the world.

The full paper is available for download here.

Treasury Proposes Financial Regulatory Overhaul

Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. has proposed a sweeping overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory system that, for the first time, would bring insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds and mortgage originators under direct federal supervision. The proposals, contained in a Blueprint for Financial Regulatory Reform officially released on March 31, would also reorganize the existing financial regulatory infrastructure in ways more fundamental than the United States has seen since the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Although some commentators are suggesting that the details of the Blueprint reflect an effort to limit the federal government’s role in the financial markets, the fact that these proposals have been put forward by a Republican administration in the middle of a financial crisis in the last months of its tenure may indicate that a shift of thought has occurred among federal policymakers. In addition, the Administration can expect both the Federal Reserve and Democratic members of Congress to insist that the Federal Reserve have a broader and more permanent regulatory role with respect to the activities and capital requirements of any groups that have access to the discount window.

The Blueprint acknowledges the practical hurdles to achieving its objectives. Factors such as traditional notions of federalism, the existing Congressional committee structure, the agencies’ powerful instincts for self-preservation and organized pressure from industry lobbyists, are likely to substantially delay or paralyze any attempt at a fundamental overhaul of the U.S. financial regulatory system.

A Davis Polk memorandum describing the highlights of the recommendations in the Blueprint is available here.

Federal District Court Reaffirms Board Primacy

This post is from Theodore Mirvis of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

It is not often that the Southern District of New York (aka The Mother Court) rules on a stockholder derivative case. Here is a recent ruling in which Judge Swain of the SDNY forcefully applied Delaware law in dismissing a stockholder attack on the Morgan Stanley board arising out of management changes in 2005. The opinion also treats important issues that intersect federal disclosure obligations and corporate governance responsibilities. Our memorandum is available here.

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