Monthly Archives: February 2025

Implications of Tornetta v. Musk II for Executive Compensation and for Stockholder Ratification

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Philip Richter is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is Managing Partner, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Steven SteinmanMaxwell Yim, and Rati Ranga, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Tornetta v. Musk (Jan. 30, 2024, “Tornetta I”), the Delaware Court of Chancery ordered rescission of the 10-year equity compensation plan for Elon Musk (Tesla, Inc.’s chief executive) that had been approved by Tesla’s board and the stockholders unaffiliated with Musk. Under the plan, Musk was awarded several tranches of performance-vesting stock options, with an estimated value of approximately $56 billion (now worth about $100 billion based on Tesla’s current stock price). All of the stock options had vested, as Tesla met all of the growth objectives specified in the plan, but Musk had not exercised any of the options. The court’s decision eliminated all of the compensation provided for under the plan.

Following Tornetta I, Tesla provided to the stockholders additional disclosure about the compensation plan and the court’s decision, and the stockholders unaffiliated with Musk again approved the same plan, for the stated purpose of ratifying it. Tesla then requested that, in light of the stockholders’ ratification, the court revise its decision to rescind the plan. In the most recent decision in the case (Dec. 2, 2024, “Tornetta II”), the court rejected the request to revise its decision rescinding the plan.

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The Evolving Anti-DEI and Anti-ESG Landscape: Implications for the Public Sector

Allison Wyderka is the Head of Product and Research for Proxy Services, and Wickham Egan is the Director of Business Development and Operations, at Egan-Jones Ratings Company. This post is based on their Egan-Jones memorandum.

Boards will seek to minimize their legal and regulatory risks, particularly considering that DEI and ESG programs face increased hostility.

On January 21, 2025, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14173. [1] The main thrust of this Executive Order (“EO”) was to eliminate “illegal” Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) programs across all federal agencies. Additionally, the EO called for the Attorney General and heads of all agencies to “advance in the private sector the policy of individual initiative, excellence, and hard work.”

The President called for a report within 120 days of the EO that requests all agencies outline their plan to target the “most egregious and discriminatory DEI practitioners” that are part of their jurisdictions, including targeting via civil compliance investigations, litigation, regulatory action, sub-regulatory guidance, and any other strategies possible. Each agency is required to identify up to nine civil compliance investigations of publicly traded corporations, institutions of higher education (with endowments over $1B) and foundations with assets over $500 million that will also be under scrutiny.

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Weekly Roundup: February 7-13, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 7-13, 2025

Delaware’s Rocky Year–What Lies Ahead?


A New Regulatory Environment for Climate and Other ESG Reporting Rules


Delaware Court Upholds Private Equity-Led Company Sale Under Business Judgment Rule


President Trump Acts to Roll Back DEI Initiatives


Strategic Insider Trading and Its Consequences for Outsiders: Evidence From the Eighteenth Century


A Review of Director Commitments Policies, 2023 to 2024


Glass Lewis and ISS Publish 2025 Updates


Economic Surveillance using Corporate Text


Shareholder Democracy and the Challenge of Dual Class Share Structures


A Significant Shift Away From ESG and Toward Crypto Is Expected at the SEC


Corporate Climate Commitments: Empty Promises or Profit-Driven Strategy?


Voting on ESG: A Gap Becomes a Gulf


Recent Developments for Directors


Caremark’s Fractured State


The Transformation of the CEO: Global CEO Turnover Index Annual Report


The Transformation of the CEO: Global CEO Turnover Index Annual Report

Rusty O’Kelley is a Managing Director and Laura Sanderson Co-leads the Board and CEO Advisory Partners in Europe at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum by Mr. O’Kelley, Ms. Sanderson, Stephen Langton, and Sean Roberts.

Chapter One: A record year for elections and CEO turnover

With almost half the world’s population involved in national elections, 2024 was a year characterized by change, so it is perhaps no surprise to see the recent trend of high CEO turnover reach a new peak with record departures reported.

The latest figure of 202 departures significantly surpasses the six-year average of 186 and represents a 9% increase from the 2023 number. The S&P 500 is a powerful indicator of the trend, with 58 CEOs departing in 2024, a 21% increase compared to 2023—this marks the second-highest number on record and exceeds the six-year average of 52. The ASX 200 and SMI 20 also experienced record-breaking turnover, with 70% of all global indices tracked showing higher than average turnover.

However, a number of key markets are bucking this trend. For example, the FTSE 100 saw just 12 CEOs depart in 2024, a decrease of 14% compared to 2023. Similarly, the DAX 40 turnover was also low with just five CEOs departing in the last two calendar years, while the NIFTY 50 in India saw just three departures in 2024 (compared to seven in 2023).

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Caremark’s Fractured State

Itai Fiegenbaum is an Assistant Professor of Law at St. Thomas University College of Law. This post is based on his recent article forthcoming in The Business Lawyer, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware’s hegemony in U.S. corporate law is indisputable. Law students are taught Delaware corporate law, and corporate law practitioners are expected to be well-versed in Delaware’s doctrinal nuances. Regardless of one’s opinion about the benefits provided by Delaware incorporation, Delaware’s preeminence has created a shared corporate law language that bridges jurisdictional boundaries.

The Caremark doctrine exemplifies this state of affairs. Chancellor Allen’s novel declaration of a proactive board-level monitoring obligation, even in the absence of suspected wrongdoing, propelled it to the pantheon of influential corporate law decisions. Caremark’s framework for assessing board liability invigorated the board’s oversight role and jumpstarted the compliance industry. Nearly three decades after it was handed down, Caremark remains a common staple in corporate law casebooks, and an accepted shorthand for the board’s oversight obligation.

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Recent Developments for Directors

Julia ThompsonKeith Halverstam, and Jenna Cooper are Partners at Latham & Watkins LLP. This post is based on a Latham memorandum by Ms. Thompson, Mr. Halverstam, Ms. Cooper, Charles RuckRyan Maierson, and Joel Trotter.

New SEC Chair Expected to Take Agency Back to Basics

President Trump’s nominee for SEC Chair, Paul Atkins, advocates a business-friendly, light-touch regulatory philosophy and is expected to lead the agency to retether its rulemaking to the SEC’s three-part statutory mission — facilitating capital formation; protecting investors; and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets. Atkins previously served on the SEC Staff from 1990 to 1994 and as an SEC Commissioner from 2002 to 2008. In recent years, the SEC has faced legal challenges to sweeping and ambitious rulemaking efforts — covering subjects from climate change to daily share repurchase activity to board diversity mandates — that courts have paused or invalidated in response to claims that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority. In the coming years, companies can expect the SEC to concentrate its efforts on more traditional areas of disclosure regulation, limited by what is material to investors, in contrast to the agency’s more expansive regulatory approach in recent years.

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Voting on ESG: A Gap Becomes a Gulf

Lindsey Stewart is Director of Investment Stewardship Research at Morningstar, Inc. This post is based on a Morningstar memorandum by Mr. Stewart, River Meng, and Quinn Rennell.

Key Observations

U.S. support for E&S proposals fell further in 2024. 

  • U.S. managers further reduced their backing for environmental and social (E&S) proposals in the 2024 proxy year. Average support by 20 large U.S. firms for significant E&S shareholder resolutions funds fell to 31% in 2024 from a 2021 peak of 54%.
  • For the first time in the last five proxy years, U.S. firms’ support for environmental resolutions fell below that for social resolutions, against the backdrop of growing political scrutiny of asset managers’ net zero aspirations.

Stable support by European and U.S. sustainable funds.

  • In contrast to the U.S., votes by 15 European firms for the same resolutions was consistently very high, averaging 96% over the last five proxy years.
  • Support for these resolutions by 308 U.S. sustainable funds was substantially higher than the 20 U.S. firms’ average. The funds averaged 68% support over five years, peaking at 77% in 2021.
  • Unlike the U.S. firms’ average, which fell, average support by sustainable funds was stable in 2024 compared with 2023, at just over 60%.

More U.S. firms decided to cut support in 2024.

  • For the second year in a row, most of the 20 U.S. firms we assessed showed a declining trend in support in the 2024 proxy year.
  • Columbia Threadneedle, Invesco and State Street substantially cut their support for significant E&S resolutions for the first time in 2024.
  • Several other U.S. firms – including BlackRock, J.P. Morgan and Vanguard – cut their support further in 2024 having reduced their support already in 2023.

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Corporate Climate Commitments: Empty Promises or Profit-Driven Strategy?

Viral V. Acharya is the C.V. Starr Professor of Economics in the Department of Finance at NYU Stern School of Business, Robert F. Engle is the Professor Emeritus of Finance at NYU Stern School of Business, and Olivier Wang is an Assistant Professor of Finance at NYU Stern School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper

The surge of corporate climate pledges worldwide raises a fundamental question: Are these commitments the latest incarnation of cheap talk and greenwashing, or could they meaningfully accelerate decarbonization, even if firms are purely profit-driven? The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a turning point in climate negotiations, with nearly 200 nations committing to achieve “Net Zero” greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Effective climate policy requires addressing a dual externality: not only should carbon emissions be taxed to mitigate climate damages directly, but green innovation should also be subsidized to take advantage of technological spillovers between firms and minimize the economic costs of decarbonization. Indeed, recent empirical work sheds some light on the appropriate policy mix: innovation subsidies could be efficient for innovation incentives, but green innovation alone, without carbon pricing, fails to reduce emissions. These findings reinforce the theoretical argument for policy complementarity. Yet government pledges to date lack specific enforcement mechanisms, and governments have struggled to implement credible long-run climate policies, in part due to extreme political uncertainty. The need for an efficient policy mix makes the lack of government credibility especially concerning.

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A Significant Shift Away from ESG and Toward Crypto Is Expected at the SEC

Brian V. Breheny and Raquel Fox are Partners, and Sydney E. Smith is an Associate, at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

Key Points

  • The SEC is set to undergo sweeping changes under the second Trump administration, with a Republican-controlled Commission setting a new agenda.
  • The agency is expected to focus on easing regulatory burdens and creating a crypto-friendly regulatory framework, as well as on capital formation and an enforcement program that focuses on investor harms.

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Shareholder Democracy and the Challenge of Dual Class Share Structures

Ignacio Garcia Giner is a Senior Analyst, Matteo Felleca is an Analyst, and Jackie Cook is a Director at Morningstar, Inc. This post is based on their Morningstar memorandum.

One share, one vote is a basic principle of shareholder democracy. It protects minority shareholder voices in markets with dispersed ownership. Multi-class share structures violate this principle. They give subsets of a company’s equity owners superior voting rights, so that their influence outweighs their economic interest.

Our 2024 post-proxy season analysis shows that, for companies with differential share voting rights, reported vote results often deviate significantly from estimated broad market shareholder sentiment on resolutions that shape important aspects of corporate governance. Multi-class structures can distort key governance signals, limiting the influence of minority shareholders on issues ranging from executive compensation to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) resolutions. Systemic risks may also arise as a growing number of companies, particularly in the tech sector, adopt this share structure at their initial public offering. [1]

As a minimum safeguard, companies should be required to disclose their vote outcomes by share class, to better represent the market signal conveyed via proxy voting, and to ward off weaker market-wide governance practices. [2]

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