Monthly Archives: June 2025

The Singular Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance

Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, and Jeff Schwartz is the Hugh B. Brown Presidential Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in the Texas Law Review.

Among institutional investors, public pension funds hold a uniquely public and potent position. With over $5 trillion in assets under management, these funds influence corporate governance, ESG initiatives, and economic development far beyond their nominal mandate of managing the retirement money of public employees. Yet, the prevailing legal and policy framework is anchored in a doctrine that we term “beneficiary primacy,” which posits that fund managers must act solely in the economic interest of pension beneficiaries. In our article, forthcoming in the Texas Law Review,  we argue that beneficiary primacy fails to capture the singular structure and role of public pension funds and subjects them unduly to litigation risk. Instead, our article proposes a fundamental reconceptualization: public pension funds should be understood not as intermediaries whose managers are fiduciary-bound to serve passive beneficiaries, but as principals imbued with public values and run in accordance with those values.

We start with an overview of the structure, investment policies, and governance initiatives of four major public pension funds. What stands out from this overview and distinguishes public pension funds, in part, from their investment fund peers, is that public pensions are publicly accountable government agencies. State laws, legislatures, and boards elected by diverse constituencies drive decision-making. We also briefly recount the history of public pension fund engagement in corporate governance. As we explain, public pension funds have played a paradigm shifting role–pioneering socially responsible investing, serving as catalysts for governance changes that have increased management accountability through greater shareholder empowerment, and spearheading the drive to make corporations more sustainable.

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A Playbook for Unplanned CEO Transitions

David A. Katz is a Partner and Laura A. McIntosh is a Consulting Attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their article first published in the New York Law Journal.

While boards of directors routinely engage in succession planning for the company’s chief executive, fewer have planned for a scenario in which the CEO dies, unexpectedly departs, or is temporarily or permanently incapacitated.  If a board takes the time in advance to think through key issues, resolve some threshold questions for how an emergency CEO transition would be managed, and request that management consider the filings and scripts that would be necessary, the company will be far better prepared to handle such a crisis should it occur.  Having a fully developed playbook, with protocols and documents ready to take off the shelf at a moment’s notice, can mean the difference between a full-blown crisis and a manageable situation.

Creating this playbook is likely to require uncomfortable conversations among board members and the chief executive.  No matter how young, healthy, and seemingly invincible a CEO may be, anything can happen at any time.  There have been high-profile examples of chief executives who have suffered accidents or medical issues that have temporarily incapacitated them, and others who have experienced professional or personal crises that have necessitated immediate resignation or replacement.  While no one will enjoy contemplating the potential misfortunes that may befall the company’s leader, an emergency scenario is likely to resolve in a manner more advantageous to the enterprise if it can be handled with the benefits of forethought and advance planning.  Involving a public relations/investor relations firm that specializes in crisis management can make it easier for the board to consider these difficult issues.
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Making Sure Newly Cautious Shareholders Get the Information They Want

Brian V. Breheny and Raquel Fox are Partners and Joshua Shainess is an Assoicate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Breheny, Ms. Fox, Mr. Shainess, and Kyle Wiley.

Key Points

  • Revised guidance from the SEC regarding ownership reporting is making institutional investors circumspect about raising issues with management.
  • Seeking to influence a company’s executive compensation, or its social, environmental or political policies, may disqualify a shareholder from filing short-form ownership reports.
  • Companies need to respond proactively, anticipating major investors’ issues and information they want but may be reluctant to ask for.

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