Monthly Archives: July 2025

Proxy Season Highlights: Shareholder and Management Proposals

Brad Goldberg is a Partner, Michael Mencher is a Special Counsel, and Vince Flynn is an Associate at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Mencher, Mr. Flynn, Alessandra Murata, Michael Bergmann, and Reid Hooper.

The 2025 proxy season (July 1, 2024 – June 20, 2025, meetings) concluded with a significant drop in the volume of shareholder proposals from the 2024 proxy season’s record high, as environmental and social (E&S) proposals faced headwinds amid shifting political dynamics and evolving stakeholder priorities.

On the management side, shareholder support remained strong across core proposal categories in the 2025 proxy season, with director elections, say-on-pay proposals and equity compensation plan proposals all receiving high levels of approval. The 2025 proxy season underscored the critical importance of proactive stakeholder engagement, intentional disclosure strategies, and careful consideration of the evolving regulatory and political landscape affecting corporate governance priorities.

This alert highlights key trends in both shareholder and management proposals from the 2025 proxy season, including sector-specific trends for tech and life sciences companies. [1]

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Season-end Summary of Shareholder Voting on 14a-8 Proposals

Neil McCarthy is Co-Founder and Chief Product Officer, G. Michael Weiksner is Co-Founder and Chief Technology Officer, and James Palmiter is CEO and Co-Founder at DragonGC. This post is based on a DragonGC memorandum by Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Weiksner, Mr. Palmiter, Markus Hartmann, Jennifer Carberry, and Nicholas Sasso.

This summary is focused on 14a-8 proposals that were voted on by shareholders during the 2024-2025 season.1 We have a separate package of materials that covers 14a-8 challenges to inclusion brought by companies using no-action letter requests which can be obtained here.

We refer to the accompanying chart which has the supporting detail for what follows. As you’ll see, we divide proposals into five categories consistent with our practice in prior years.

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Supreme Court to Weigh Limits on Fund Litigation Under ICA

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Robert A. Skinner, and Amy Roy are Partners at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on a Ropes & Gray memorandum by Mr. Hallward-Driemeier, Mr. Skinner, Ms. Roy, and Devon Applegate Caton.

On June 30, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that will determine whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) creates a private right of action for shareholders of registered investment companies to bring lawsuits for alleged violations of the statute. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized such a right of action since 2019, opening a back door to litigation claims by private plaintiffs for alleged ICA violations, despite Congress having granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sole regulatory authority to enforce the ICA. Other circuit courts of appeal have rejected a Section 47(b) private right of action. This week, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. to resolve the circuit split. The outcome of the appeal, to be heard in the Court’s October 2025 term, will have broad implications for registered funds governed by the ICA (including mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and closed-end funds), as the litigation door opened by the Second Circuit risks upending the long-established regulatory structure that is the fund industry’s bedrock.

In the ICA, Congress granted fund shareholders a single express private right of action to bring lawsuits – namely, a claim for allegedly excessive advisory fees under Section 36(b), which was added to the statute by amendment in 1970. Applying key Supreme Court precedent from 2001, lower courts have uniformly declined to read into the statutory language implied private rights of action to enforce other ICA provisions. The sole outlier was the Second Circuit’s 2019 decision in Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, recognizing an implied private right of action under Section 47(b). This provision states that a contract “whose performance involves … a violation of” the ICA cannot be enforced by any party to the contract. The Second Circuit panel concluded in Oxford University Bank that this language implied Congress’ intent to provide a private right of action to sue for “rescission” of a contract involving an alleged violation of another provision of the ICA.

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A Survey of How Public Companies Are Providing Guidance in Light of Tariffs

Alexander May is a Partner at Jenner & Block LLP. This post is based on his Jenner & Block memorandum.

In recent days, the Trump administration has proposed additional tariffs, causing further uncertainty for many public companies. As companies approach their current quarterly guidance, we took a data-driven approach to see how large public companies provided guidance in light of tariffs and to see if any patterns emerged.

For this survey, we reviewed earnings releases of 100 S&P 500 companies who issued their releases primarily during April and May 2025. After reviewing, several patterns emerged about how companies took tariffs into account.

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Key Takeaways for Asset Managers: SEC Speaks 2025

Dabney O’Riordan, Michael L. Sherman, and Ilan T. Graff are Partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on their Fried Frank memorandum.

In late May 2025, the SEC Commissioners and senior staff across the agency spent two days at “SEC Speaks” discussing the SEC’s priorities under newly installed Chairman Paul Atkins, providing the first significant window into the new SEC. It is clear that this SEC plans to make substantial shifts, including granting retail investors greater access to private funds that could be a robust benefit to both investors and private fund advisers. Equally clear, however, is that while there has been some movement in SEC priorities away from compliance-only charges, the Divisions of Examinations and Enforcement will remain active, including continuing to pursue historical fee and expenses cases.

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Shapeshifting DEI Whistleblowers: What to Know and Expect in 2025

Elizabeth Bieber, Austin Evers, and Jennifer Loeb are Partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Ms. Bieber, Mr. Evers, Ms. Loeb, Young Park, and Ginger Hervey.

The landscape for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) in the United States has shifted dramatically in 2025. What was once viewed as a cornerstone of corporate social responsibility is now a flashpoint for legal scrutiny, political backlash, and reputational risk. At the center of this transformation is an increasingly empowered and incentivized figure: the whistleblower.

A New Enforcement Era

Countering DEI has become a top priority for the current administration in Washington. Executive orders issued in January 2025 explicitly target what the administration calls “illegal DEI,” though the term remains legally undefined. These orders direct federal agencies to investigate and dismantle DEI programs across sectors, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) leading the charge.

In a memo, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche announced the launch of a “Civil Rights Fraud Initiative,” signaling DOJ’s intent to use the False Claims Act (FCA) to pursue federal contractors who “knowingly violate civil rights laws” through DEI programs. The FCA is a potent tool: it allows whistleblowers to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the government and receive a share of any recovery, which can be triple the amount of the alleged fraudulent claims.

This memo was a call to action. Federal agencies are not equipped to root out “illegal DEI” or “egregious practitioners” alone. Efforts to have agencies send certifications to companies were uncoordinated and non-standardized, and ultimately unlikely to root out the kinds of specific practices at companies that had sophisticated counsel. Federal agency budgets have been slashed and the brain drain in the federal government is real. Starting a new initiative takes resources: time, attention, and money to deploy a large-scale fishing campaign.

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Weekly Roundup: July 11-17, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 11-17, 2025

The Art and Science of Earn-Outs in M&A


Oversight in the AI Era: Understanding the Audit Committee’s Role


Texas Enacts New Law to Regulate Proxy Advisory Firms



What It Takes to Lead in the Boardroom: Insights for Prospective Directors


The One Big Beautiful Bill Act & M&A



How to Control Controller Conflicts


Board Leadership in Navigating Volatility


Fortune 1000 Say-on-Pay: An Analysis of Shareholder Engagement in Response to Adverse Votes


The 2025 Proxy Season in 7 Charts


Prepared Remarks for the SEC Roundtable on Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements


Prepared Remarks for the SEC Roundtable on Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements

Ola Peter Gjessing is a Lead Investment Stewardship Manager at Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). This post is based on his remarks for the SEC Roundtable on Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements.

A big thanks to the SEC. Thanks to everyone participating, either here or on the stream.

Thanks for inviting me and my institution, the Norwegian Fund [1], which reaps the benefits of investing in America. The majority of our global portfolio we invest here in America.

As a shareholder and investor, we are increasingly getting involved in discussions on executive compensation. Here are five points I would like to make.

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The 2025 Proxy Season in 7 Charts

Lindsey Stewart is Director of Investment Stewardship Research at Morningstar, Inc. This post is based on his Morningstar memorandum.

The end of June marks the end of another proxy year, and the past year certainly looks very different from previous ones, particularly when it comes to sustainability.

Overall, the number of ESG shareholder resolutions has fallen by around a third in 2025, but support levels have stabilized at just above 20%. Yet, once again, there’s a big difference in shareholder support for “G” resolutions on corporate governance compared with “E&S” resolutions on environmental and social themes.

Stabilizing Support for Far Fewer Shareholder Resolutions

The charts below illustrate the 2025 proxy year in the context of the last 10 years. They show a cut of Morningstar’s proxy-voting data as of mid-June, which is not the full proxy year, but it covers more than enough of the year to be able to draw out the key trends on the volume and shareholder support for ESG resolutions these past 12 months.

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Fortune 1000 Say-on-Pay: An Analysis of Shareholder Engagement in Response to Adverse Votes

Neil McCarthy is Co-Founder and Chief Product Officer, G. Michael Weiksner is Co-Founder and Chief Technology Officer, and James Palmiter is CEO and Co-Founder at DragonGC. This post is based on a DragonGC memorandum by Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Weiksner, Mr. Palmiter, Markus Hartmann, Jennifer Carberry, and Nicholas Sasso.

Background

SEC rules require that public companies hold a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of executives. This covers compensation disclosed per S-K Item 402 including CD6A, the compensation tables, and other narrative executive compensation disclosures.

Most years for most companies this vote passes with greater than 80% support from those shareholders who vote on the matter. But sometimes for some companies the approval rate is less than 80%. Sometimes the resolution receives less than a majority and fails to pass at all.

These adverse outcomes are typically driven by an adverse voting recommendation from one or more of ISS, Glass Lewis and large institutional investors for violating their voting policies for executive compensation. While SEC rules only require a non-binding advisory vote, in practice these entities provide an enforcement mechanism.

Companies that have received an adverse say-on-pay vote nearly always respond with a shareholder engagement program during the following season.

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