Monthly Archives: September 2008

The 10b-5 Guide: A Survey of 2007 Securities Fraud Litigation

This post is from Holly Gregory of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.

My partners Robert F. Carangelo, Paul A. Ferrillo and Caitlyn M. Campbell have recently issued the 2007 edition of Weil, Gotshal & MangesThe 10b-5 Guide: A Survey of 2007 Securities Fraud Litigation. The Survey includes a detailed assessment of an extraordinarily active year in securities law in which securities fraud class action filings increased by 43%, fueled in part by the subprime mortgage crisis, and the Supreme Court handed down two significant opinions. The Survey also contains summaries of recent decisions concerning the federal securities laws, including Tellabs, Inc. v Makor Issues & rights, Ltd and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and highlights particular topic areas, such as the heightened pleading requirements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, secondary liability and loss causation.

The Survey is available here.

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

This post comes to us from Ilona Babenko of the Department of Finance at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

In my forthcoming Journal of Finance paper, Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts, I explore how share repurchases affect existing employee compensation contracts and offer a new explanation for the popularity of stock buybacks. Specifically, at the time of a share repurchase, employees are not permitted to tender their unvested shares, and the pay-performance sensitivity of their contracts increases. This increased employee ownership (measured by the dollar change in compensation per dollar change in firm value) creates stronger incentives for employees to provide effort, but also exposes them to greater risk. For example, a repurchase of 7% of common shares provides a 7.5% increase in employee incentives and can substitute for about half of a typical annual equity grant. Given the incentive effect of stock buybacks, managers (who make payout decisions) can benefit from stock repurchases by effectively forcing higher incentives on employees (who do not influence the firm’s payout policy).

Using a sample of 1,295 open market repurchase announcements and hand-collected data on employee stock option programs over the 1996 to 2002 period, I find that announcement returns are larger in firms with larger repurchase programs and many unvested stock options. The effect is most powerful when employees (not managers) have large amounts of unvested ownership and when firms intensively use human capital. In addition, I find that the method of payout chosen by the firm (stock repurchase versus dividend increase) is affected by the compensation structure at the firm. I find that repurchases are more likely to be announced when employees hold many unvested stock options, particularly when firms have a greater need for human capital, as measured by their R&D expenses and Tobin’s Q. Consistent with the diversification motive of risk-averse employees, I find that stock option exercises are positively related to the fraction of repurchased equity. A one-standard deviation increase in the fraction of repurchased equity is associated with a 30% increase in stock option exercises by managers and a 19% increase by employees, controlling for factors such as stock returns, market-to-strike ratios, and contemporaneous option grants, among others. The increase in stock option exercises is more pronounced for firms with highly volatile stock returns, supporting the view that employees exercise their stock options because of the increased risk exposure.

The rationale for open market share repurchases proposed in this paper is unrelated to the undervaluation and excess cash distribution motives explored elsewhere in the payout literature. While my empirical and theoretical results do not rule out undervaluation or other repurchase motives, the argument of this paper is that managers also repurchase stock to boost employee incentives.

The full paper is available for download here.

Second Circuit Rejects Collective Scienter Theory

This post is from Steven M. Haas of Hunton & Williams LLP.

In a recent decision, the Second Circuit rejected a shareholder-plaintiff’s theory of collective scienter in a securities fraud suit brought against a financial services company. At issue in Teamsters Local 445 v. Dynex Capital, Inc., was a district court’s ruling that a plaintiff adequately pled scienter with respect to the corporate defendants even though it dismissed the claims brought against the defendants’ officers. The corporate defendants appealed the decision, challenging the district court’s expansive theory of “collective scienter.”

On appeal, the Second Circuit largely agreed with the defendants. It explained that “[t]o prove liability against a corporation… a plaintiff must prove that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act with the requisite scienter, and that the act (and accompanying mental state) are attributable to the corporation.” The court stopped short of holding, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff must always plead scienter as to specific individuals in order to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to corporate defendants. But, except in highly unusual situations, the Second Circuit’s decision effectively means that securities fraud plaintiffs must plead scienter against specific corporate agents in order to recover from a corporate defendant.

Perhaps more importantly, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege any wrongful conduct by any of the defendants. Rather, the court suggested that any diminution in the value of the company’s asset-backed securities could have been caused by “the general weakness” in market conditions, particularly in the manufactured housing industry. Accordingly, the opinion is an important judicial recognition that market forces, not fraud, often cause investment losses that are the subject of securities fraud allegations. For that reason, we expect the Second Circuit’s decision to be quite significant in light of the wave of class actions that have been filed in connection with the subprime mortgage industry.

My colleagues Ed Fuhr and Terence Rasmussen represented the defendants and have prepared a case alert available here.

SEC proposes roadmap for IFRS adoption

This post comes from Ernst & Young.

Ernst & Young has released a Hot Topic discussing the recent release of the SEC’s proposed roadmap for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in the U.S. This step represents the most significant step to date by the SEC toward the adoption of a single set of high quality global accounting and financial reporting standards that everyone can use. The dominant language of financial reporting worldwide is fast becoming IFRS. Notwithstanding the strength and size of the U.S. capital market, the U.S. cannot afford to be left behind. A change to a common global accounting language will also benefit investors and market efficiency by increasing the transparency and comparability of information.

The proposed Roadmap anticipates mandatory reporting under IFRS beginning in 2014, 2015 or 2016 depending on the size of the issuer and provides for early adoption in 2009 by a small number of very large companies that meet certain criteria. It is also possible that the SEC will later decide to permit other companies to early adopt at some point prior to the mandatory date of conversion. In addition, the Roadmap is expected to include a number of milestones, including improvements in accounting standards, accountability and funding of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, improvement in the use of interactive data for IFRS, and enhancements to IFRS training and education, that the SEC will consider in making its decision in 2011 about whether to proceed with mandatory adoption of IFRS.

While there will be many challenges associated with conversion to IFRS, a U.S. shift to the global standard will provide continuous benefit. With respect to this matter, Ernst & Young believes that with the SEC’s action, the U.S. – like the rest of the world – is on the right path. You can access the entire Hot Topic here and the SEC Press Release is available here.

SEC Issues Corporate Website Guidance

The following post comes to us from Ning Chiu and Michael Kaplan of Davis Polk & Wardwell.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has issued an interpretive release on the use of corporate websites by public companies. The release provides a means of complying with Regulation FD through posting information on websites in certain circumstances, and also gives additional clarification as to the use of websites for providing other information to investors. While we do not expect the release to lead to significant changes in practice for most companies, it presents a valuable opportunity for companies to revisit their website-related practices.

Our memorandum, available here, explains the circumstances under which information posted on a company’s website will be considered “public” for purposes of Regulation FD and factors companies should consider in determining whether to alter their practices for disseminating information in view of the SEC’s new guidance. The interpretative release may be accessed here.

The SEC is soliciting comments on issues concerning corporate use of technology in providing information to investors. Comments are due on or before November 5, 2008.

CEO and CFO Career Consequences to Missing Quarterly Earnings Benchmarks

This post is from Suraj Srinivasan of Harvard Business School.

In a recent working paper co-written with Rick Mergenthaler and Shiva Rajgopal entitled CEO and CFO Career Consequences to Missing Quarterly Earnings Benchmarks, we investigate whether missing quarterly earnings benchmarks is associated with career consequences in the form of lower compensation (bonus, equity grants) and the dismissal of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

Prior research has found that a disproportionately large number of firms appear to meet or just beat quarterly earnings benchmarks relative to firms that just miss these benchmarks. Why do managers work this hard to meet or beat these quarterly earnings benchmarks? We propose that the CEO and CFO suffer negative career consequences if they repeatedly miss quarterly earnings benchmarks. We examine three earnings benchmarks – analyst consensus forecast, seasonally lagged quarterly earnings, and zero earnings. We evaluate a comprehensive set of career consequences such as the impact on compensation (bonus and equity grants) and dismissal from office for both CEOs and CFOs, conditioned on failure to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks.

Our sample includes CEOs and CFOs for the S&P 1500 firms covered in the ExecuComp database. We examine over 11,000 firm-year observations during the years 1993-2004 and investigate whether bonus changes and equity grants are associated with the failure to meet or beat quarterly earnings benchmarks after controlling for the known determinants of such compensation and for measures of firm performance such as stock returns, return on assets, and the magnitude of the earnings surprise. We use news articles to determine the circumstances surrounding each CEO and CFO’s departure to classify such turnover as forced dismissals. Our analysis seeks to predict CEO and CFO forced turnover as a function of the failure to meet earnings benchmarks. We find evidence that the failure to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks, especially the analyst consensus estimates, is associated with lower bonus and equity grants, and a higher probability of forced dismissal for both the CEO and the CFO, after controlling for several proxies for performance.

In economic terms, failing to meet two quarterly analyst consensus forecasts in a year is associated with a lower bonus equivalent to 14% (8%) of the CEOs (CFOs) salary, a lower equity grant of 24% relative to an equity grant with no misses for both the CEO and the CFO, and a 0.61% (0.62%) higher probability of being dismissed for the CEO (CFO). If the firm fails to meet all four consensus quarterly earnings forecasts in a year, the penalties jump to a lower bonus equivalent to 28% (16%) of the CEOs (CFOs) salary, a lower equity grant of 48% relative to an equity grant with no misses for both the CEO and the CFO, and a 1.51% (1.53%) higher probability of being dismissed for the CEO (CFO). Compared to the unconditional probability of forced dismissal (which is 3% for CEOs and 5% for CFOs), the dismissal penalty appears to be significant in an economic sense. We also find systematic cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the nature of these career consequences. In particular, career consequences for both the CEO and CFO are worse if they miss quarterly earnings benchmarks and their firms provide earnings guidance. Bonus cuts on missing quarterly benchmarks are greater if the firm has a history of consistently meeting or beating quarterly benchmarks in the past. In addition, career penalties to missing quarterly earnings benchmarks have increased in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act time period.

The full paper is available for download here.

Fannie and Freddie by Twilight

This post is from Peter J. Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute.

 

Having now become explicitly government-backed entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and their supporters in Congress) can no longer argue that they do not pose a risk to taxpayers. It is not politically feasible for the government to back private companies when their shareholders and managements keep the profits but the taxpayers cover the losses. Thus, even if they escape their current precarious financial straits, Fannie and Freddie are now operating in a kind of twilight before they will eventually have to be nationalized, privatized, or liquidated. In addition, the recent attention to covered bonds as a way to finance mortgages suggests that, in the future, Fannie and Freddie’s traditional business–buying and holding or securitizing mortgages–will no longer be essential to U.S. housing finance. An analysis of the available options for policymakers suggests that the best course–from the standpoint of taxpayers–is not to keep Fannie and Freddie alive through the injection of government funds but to allow them to go into receivership. A receiver can continue their operations in the secondary mortgage market and–using the Treasury line of credit recently authorized by Congress–meet their senior debt and guarantee obligations as they come due. A decision to nationalize, privatize, or liquidate them can be made at a later time and can be implemented more simply and efficiently through a receivership than if the companies are helped to survive through government recapitalization.
It took a hair-raising crisis in the housing and international capital markets, but for Fannie and Freddie, the wondrously generous world of Washington–the world they have dominated for so many years with threats, intimidation, and sheer financial and political muscle–is at last coming to an end. Both companies are hovering near insolvency. Whether they can avoid eventual receivership will depend on how much further housing values fall. But even if they are lucky enough to survive this current crisis, their halcyon days will never return. This is not because Congress has learned any kind of lesson. Without question, the preferred position in Congress, especially on the Democratic side of the aisle, will be to reconstitute Fannie and Freddie as newly recapitalized government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).

But this will not fly politically. The world was irretrievably changed by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) signed by President Bush on July 30, 2008. The act, in effect, authorized the bailout of the companies by giving the secretary of the treasury the authority to make unlimited loans to, and equity investments in, both GSEs. Thus, HERA resolved once and for all whether Fannie and Freddie were actually backed by the U.S. government; it provided the explicit backing that investors always believed would ultimately be there and that the enterprises themselves vigorously denied. But now that they are explicitly backed by the U.S. government, the GSEs can no longer claim that they represent no risk to taxpayers. As explicitly government-backed entities, they cannot deny the obvious: that their profits will go to their managements and shareholders while their losses will be picked up by taxpayers. This fact is crucial to their future.

The privatization of profit and the socialization of risk inherent in this new arrangement is politically untenable, even though it may take some time for Congress to see the substantial difference between their former status as merely government-sponsored and their new status as explicitly government-backed. Inevitably, however, the light will dawn and their form will have to be changed. The question, then, comes down to whether Fannie and Freddie will, in the future, become government agencies, private companies, or just unpleasant memories.

Moreover, there are strong indications that a far more efficient and sensible mechanism for financing home mortgages in the United States is about to be born. In mid-July, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a final policy statement on how it would treat covered bonds in the event of a bank’s failure,[1] and at the end of July, the Treasury issued a long statement on best practices for covered bonds.[2] In a covered bond transaction, mortgages remain on the books of the bank or other depository institution but serve as collateral for bonds issued to finance the acquisition of the mortgages. If the mortgages in the covered bond pool default, the bank that established the pool has an obligation to replace the assets with performing mortgages that will continue to serve as collateral for the outstanding bonds.

In other words, this structure requires lending banks to retain an interest in the quality of the mortgages they make and addresses the problem that no one in the securitization process has a continuing interest in sound underwriting after the mortgages are sold to Fannie and Freddie. Trillions of dollars in covered bonds have been issued in Europe over many years without any substantial losses. There are, of course, issues associated with the widespread use of covered bonds in the United States–mostly in balancing the interests of the FDIC and bank depositors in gaining access to the assets of a failed bank–but if these can be balanced with the need for a strong residential finance system, covered bonds could, over time, make the Fannie and Freddie business model obsolete. This is one more indication that Fannie and Freddie, both as GSEs and as essential elements of the U.S. residential finance market, are on their way out.

The Gathering Storm

It is axiomatic that Congress only acts in a crisis, and this crisis was so serious that Congress was compelled to do three important things that under ordinary circumstances it would never have done: it adopted legislation, HERA, that significantly strengthened the regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; it authorized the appointment of a receiver to take over either company if it becomes “critically undercapitalized”; and it gave the Treasury Department a blank check, limited only in time and by the U.S. debt limit, to make loans or equity investments in both companies. With its new powers, the regulator should be able to reduce the size of the GSEs and prepare them for one of the three fates: liquidation, privatization, or nationalization.

It need not have been this way. Congress was warned over two decades, by both Democratic and Republican administrations, about the dangers presented by Fannie and Freddie. But Congress, under both Democratic and Republican control, did nothing. The same process is now unfolding with respect to Social Security, Medicare, energy, securities class actions, and probably a dozen other long-term problems that Congress is seemingly unable to address. It makes you wonder why 98 percent of them are reelected.

Not that this and previous administrations are blameless. Although at their higher reaches–usually in the Treasury–they recognized the dangers, their bank regulatory arms continued to allow banks to invest in Fannie and Freddie securities without the percentage limitations normally applied to investments in privately owned business corporations. The regulators obviously believed that the government would eventually stand behind Fannie and Freddie and thus permitted U.S. banks to load up on Fannie and Freddie debt in preference to U.S. government securities. Now, thousands of banks hold more than their total Tier 1 capital in the form of Fannie and Freddie debt. A 2004 FDIC report showed that the holdings of GSE-related securities by commercial banks and savings associations aggregated more than 11 percent of the total assets of these institutions and more than 150 percent of their combined Tier 1 capital.[3] Holding Fannie and Freddie debt gave the banks some extra earnings over what they would receive from Treasuries, but it also sent signals to the capital markets that the government saw Fannie and Freddie as virtually risk-free. And when the prospect arose a few weeks ago that Fannie and Freddie debt might decline in value, Uncle Sam had to step in to prevent thousands of U.S. banks from becoming insolvent because of their GSE investments.

In any event, the Fannie and Freddie crisis has now arrived, and, in order to avert a disaster in the housing and financial markets, the United States government has been forced to put its credit behind these two ill-conceived and badly managed institutions. During the past month, as the dimensions of the problem have become clear, sensible people have actually wondered whether the credit of the United States might actually be impaired by the obligations it might be required to assume on Fannie and Freddie’s behalf. That idea, previously unthinkable, is still highly unlikely, but what is clear is that the size of the taxpayers’ losses will grow as housing prices continue to decline. There is no telling how deep into insolvency Fannie and Freddie might sink, and the further down they go, the more potential losses they will impose on the government and ultimately the taxpayers.

This, of course, is all water over the dam. The damage–allowing two privately owned companies to grow so large that they become both wards of the government and threats to the financial system–has been done. Now the only relevant question is how we get out of this mess with minimal cost to taxpayers. In the end, the options available to the Treasury Department and the new GSE regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), are both unpleasant and few. They are outlined below.

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Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization

This post is from René Stulz of Ohio State University.

I have recently completed a paper titled Securities Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial Globalization. The paper examines the following question: If capital can move freely between countries to take advantage of the best investment opportunities, are national capital markets still relevant?

With complete capital market integration across countries, there would be no national interest at stake for a country in having well-functioning capital markets. If capital can flow freely among countries, firms raise capital where it is cheapest. In a fully integrated world, we would therefore expect national capital markets to be irrelevant. If a country’s capital markets functioned poorly in such a world, firms would simply ignore these capital markets as sources of capital. The welfare consequences from having poorly functioning national capital markets would be extremely limited because firms and investors could bypass these markets freely.

As far as the trading of securities is concerned, the role of location has decreased dramatically because of the replacement of pit trading with electronic trading. With electronic trading, the location of the trader is operationally irrelevant and so is the location of the exchange.

The fact that portfolios of investors are still heavily biased towards securities issued and traded in their own country, a phenomenon described as the home bias, shows that, despite the free flow of capital, we are far from a fully integrated world in which countries are irrelevant for the issuance and trading of securities. A major reason for why countries are not irrelevant is that they have different laws and enforce them differently. The laws that apply uniquely to publicly traded securities are securities laws.

I construct a model where I show that securities laws can reduce agency costs and therefore increase share prices. I model a firm led by an entrepreneur who decides whether to take the firm public or not. I show that the entrepreneur wants to commit ex ante to a level of disclosure that is not optimal for her ex post. By committing to disclosure, the entrepreneur increases the cost of consuming private benefits and of taking decisions that are not optimal for shareholders. After the IPO, the entrepreneur would like to consume private benefits and would like to take decisions that are optimal for her but not for shareholders. It is therefore optimal for the entrepreneur to renege on disclosure commitments after the IPO. I examine private solutions to this problem and show that under some circumstances strong securities laws dominate private solutions. Strikingly, securities laws help entrepreneurs in the model rather than shareholders. Shareholders buy the shares for what they are worth, so that poor securities laws do not hurt them. Poor securities laws hurt entrepreneurs because they reduce the value of the firms that they take public.

I use the model to show that differences in securities laws across countries explain differences in share values and in the distribution of share ownership. In the model, some firms from countries with poor securities laws will choose to subject themselves to stronger securities laws. Some have argued that U.S. laws protecting shareholders have become too costly and inefficient. I model this argument by considering the case where strong securities laws have deadweight costs. I show that, to the extent that firms can choose the securities laws they are subject to, firms with poor growth opportunities choose weak securities laws with no deadweight costs while firms with strong growth opportunities choose strong securities laws even if they have some deadweight costs.

A key conclusion of my paper is that securities laws are more beneficial if they are not at risk of being watered down over time through lobbying by incumbents. However, incumbents have strong motivations to reduce the strength of securities laws since doing so increases their ability of consuming private benefits.

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