Yearly Archives: 2010

Diversity in the Boardroom is Important and, Unfortunately, Still Rare

Posted by Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on
Thursday, September 23, 2010
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Editor’s Note: Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Aguilar’s remarks at a recent forum titled “Closing the Gender Gap: Global Perspectives on Women in the Boardroom;” his complete remarks are available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

The persistent lack of diversity in our corporate boardrooms is an issue that requires continuing focus. A focus that needs to be maintained until our corporate boardrooms reflect the America we live in. Many nations have been focused on Board diversity for years. [1] Others are just now beginning to do so.

Today’s forum is also timely because 2010 has been a year in which we have seen countries around the world take steps to correct the persistent lack of diversity in corporate boardrooms. For example, in Australia, companies are now required to disclose the company’s progress related to board-established gender objectives as well as disclose the number of female employees in the entire organization, in senior management, and on the board. [2] In the United Kingdom, companies are now required to “pay due regard to the benefits of diversity on the board, including gender” when searching for and appointing directors. [3]

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Access to the Mutual Fund Proxy

Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
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This post comes to us from Jennifer Taub, a Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Business Law Program at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

One topic missing from the early analysis of the SEC’s proxy access rulemaking [1] has been mutual funds as issuers. Though, a few experts have recognized the importance of mutual funds as shareholders. For example, Ira Millstein and Stephen Davis welcomed proxy access and noted that it “places a colossal bet that shareholders will patrol the market. Up to now many, including major mutual funds, have simply voted shares on autopilot.” [2]

Indeed, given that they hold 24% of US corporate equity, [3] the sway of mutual funds as shareholders is significant. This voting power might be tapped to reach the threshold to nominate corporate directors. And, this voting power will be used to support or block shareholder director nominees and shareholder proposals related to director nominations and elections. Notwithstanding this capacity, activists should not expect much from the largest mainstream fund families who historically favor management when casting proxy votes on shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals. [4]

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The Most Influential People in Corporate Governance

Posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, on
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
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A review of the most recent Directorship 100 list – a list of the most influential people in corporate governance put together each year by Directorship magazine – indicates that individuals affiliated with Harvard Law School and its Program on Corporate Governance play a central role in the corporate governance landscape.

This year’s Directorship 100 list includes twenty-eight individuals who are Harvard Law School faculty or fellows, guest Contributors to the Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, and/or Harvard Law School alumni. The “Harvard Twenty-Eight” (with graduation year in parenthesis for those who are HLS alumni) are as follows:

The full Directorship 100 list is available here.

The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Monday, September 20, 2010
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The following post comes to us from David Larcker, Professor of Accounting at Stanford University; Gaizka Ormazabal of the Accounting Department at Stanford University; and Daniel Taylor, Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania.

In the paper, The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions (e.g., staggered boards and CEO-chairman duality) are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying.

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Moving Forward with Corporate Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosure in Canada

Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Sunday, September 19, 2010
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Aaron A. Dhir is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. This post first appeared (in modified form) in The Lawyers Weekly, published by LexisNexis Canada Inc.

Whether the issue is climate change, biodiversity, labour and supply chains, or human rights, corporate sustainability disclosure is of increasing relevance to shareholders.  In a recent report submitted to Ontario, Canada’s minister of finance, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) made various recommendations regarding corporate reporting that may be controversial to some, but are a step in the right direction.

The report follows the Ontario Legislature’s unanimous approval of a private member’s resolution calling on the province to review existing reporting requirements and issuers’ compliance.

The resolution asked the OSC to undertake a broad consultation in order to “establish best practice corporate social responsibility…and environmental, social and governance…reporting standards”. In response, the OSC – supported by the Hennick Centre for Business and Law at York University – convened a multi-stakeholder roundtable and held various consultations with interested parties.

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Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation

Posted by Morgan Ricks, Harvard Law School, on
Saturday, September 18, 2010
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Morgan Ricks is a visiting assistant professor at Harvard Law School. Through June 2010, he was a Senior Policy Advisor and Financial Restructuring Expert at the U.S. Treasury Department. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Treasury or the U.S. Government. This post is based on his paper “Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation,” available here.

Without a safety net, banking is unstable. This proposition finds support in economic theory. In an influential analysis, Douglas Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig showed that banks without deposit insurance exhibit multiple equilibria—one of which is a bank run. [1] And financial history confirms this hypothesis. Banking panics were common in the U.S. before the enactment of deposit insurance, but nonexistent thereafter.

The apparent instability of banking has given rise to a standard policy response in the form of a social contract (a phrase borrowed from a marvelous speech by Paul Tucker of the Bank of England). [2] That contract entails certain privileges that are unavailable to other firms: most notably, access to central bank liquidity and federal deposit insurance. These privileges amount to a safety net, and they stabilize banking. The social contract also imposes obligations—activity restrictions, prudential supervision, capital requirements, and deposit insurance fees. These obligations are designed to counteract the moral hazard incentives implicit in the safety net and protect taxpayers from losses.

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CEO Turnover and Retention Light

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Friday, September 17, 2010
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The following post comes to us from John Evans, Professor of Accounting at the University of Pittsburgh; Nandu Nagarajan, Professor of Business Administration at the University of Pittsburgh; and Jason Schloetzer of the Accounting Department at Georgetown University.

In the paper, CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research, unlike prior CEO turnover literature which characterizes the board’s decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO, we focus instead on the CEO’s decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period. We call this Retention Light.

Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO’s decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO.

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Shareholder Proxy Access: Time To Get Ready

Posted by Adam O. Emmerich, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, on
Thursday, September 16, 2010
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Adam Emmerich is a partner in the corporate department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz focusing primarily on mergers and acquisitions and securities law matters. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Emmerich, Andrew R. Brownstein, Steven A. Rosenblum, Eric S. Robinson and Trevor S. Norwitz.

As we described in our recent memo, the SEC has adopted rules affording shareholders access to company proxy statements for the nomination of director candidates. The new regime, which includes new access Rule 14a-11 and amendments to Rule 14a-8, is expected to become effective in early November and will be applicable for the 2011 proxy season for most companies. It is now time for companies to take action to prepare for these sweeping changes. We opposed proxy access as an unnecessary and imprudent step. However it is now law and companies need to implement structures and procedures designed to make the proxy access regime work with minimum damage to the ability of boards to build long-term value for all shareholders. This memo highlights some of the major actions companies should consider:

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Managerial Miscalibration

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
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The following post comes to us from Itzhak Ben-David, Assistant Professor of Finance Department at the Ohio State University; John Graham, Professor of Finance at Duke University; and Campbell Harvey, Professor of Finance at Duke University.

In the paper, Managerial Miscalibration, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated as well as the determinants of their miscalibration. Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in psychology, economics, and law. Although it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in practice.

Over the past nine years, we collected over 11,600 S&P 500 forecasts as well as 80% confidence intervals from Chief Financial Officers. The width of the confidence interval gives us a measure of miscalibration. Importantly, the CFOs are forecasting a common market-wide measure. This allows us to exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in both optimism and miscalibration. By comparing forecasts to realizations over many periods, we also present a simple measure of miscalibration.

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Spotlight on Boards

Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
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Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Lipton.

Current focus on the performance of corporate boards prompts revisiting what is expected from the board of directors of a major public company – not just the legal rules, but also the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have almost as much influence on board and company behavior.

Boards are expected to:

  • Choose the CEO, monitor his or her performance and have a detailed succession plan in case the CEO becomes unavailable or fails to meet performance expectations.
  • Plan for and deal with crises, specially crises like HP where the tenure of the CEO is in question, BP where there has been a major disaster or J&J and Toyota where hard-earned reputation is threatened by product failure.

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