Monthly Archives: January 2013

Mandatory Financial Reporting Environment and Voluntary Disclosure

The following post comes to us from Karthik Balakrishnan and Holly Yang, both of the Department of Accounting at the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School, and Xi Li of the Fox School of Business at Temple University. A revised version of the paper by Holly Yang and Xi Li can be found here.

In the paper, Mandatory Financial Reporting Environment and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Mandatory IFRS Adoption, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate the interaction between mandatory financial reporting environment and voluntary disclosure by employing the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 as an exogenous increase to mandatory reporting to examine changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure practices. To measure voluntary disclosure, we focus on a discretionary action, namely the extent to which managers provide earnings forecasts, the most prominent performance measure that a firm supplies to investors. Ex-ante, it is unclear how the increase in reporting quality following the mandatory adoption of IFRS could influence management forecasts. On the one hand, mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure can be complements, wherein the former produces verifiable information that improves the credibility of the latter and therefore encourages managers to issue more forecasts, i.e. the confirmatory role of mandatory reporting.

Prior studies document improved reporting quality following IFRS adoption, evidenced by earnings with lower manipulation and higher value relevance, timeliness, and information content. Therefore, given the evidence that IFRS improves the verifiability of earnings, the complementary view suggests that the mandatory adoption of IFRS should increase management forecasts. On the other hand, mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure could also be substitutes, as private information that was previously conveyed through voluntary disclosure is now directly reflected in mandatory financial reports. Since IFRS produces more timely and value-relevant earnings numbers, the substitution effect predicts that the increased quality of financial reporting may reduce the demand for supplementary information from investors to predict future earnings. Therefore, IFRS adoption may also lead to fewer management forecasts.

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Why Are Some Sectors (Ahem, Finance) So Scandal-Plagued?

Editor’s Note: Ben W. Heineman, Jr. is a former GE senior vice president for law and public affairs and a senior fellow at Harvard University’s schools of law and government. This post is based on an article that appeared in the Harvard Business Review online.

In the past 25 years, the size of settlements, fines and penalties for individual corporations found guilty of wrongdoing has escalated from millions of dollars, to tens of millions, to hundreds of millions, to billions. Think Siemens and widespread bribery — about $2 billion. Or, bigger yet, think BP and the gulf disaster — almost $20 billion to date, with another $20 billion-plus likely in the future.

But during this period, there has been another change: highly expensive scandals across business sectors, not just in single companies, and this is reflected in the January 7th agreement by major banks to pay $8.5 billion due to derelict mortgage and foreclosure processes.

These sectoral scandals raise profound issues for business leaders: in a highly competitive global economy, in which some sectors are flooded with money, how do you assess sector-wide integrity risks and achieve a culture of corporate accountability before, not after, bad behavior occurs?

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Corporate Tax Reform

Editor’s Note: Robert Pozen is a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This post is based on a Tax Notes article written by Mr. Pozen and Lucas W. Goodman, titled “Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense,” available here.

Amid the current debate over tax policy in Washington, there is a bipartisan consensus on one issue: the corporate tax rate, which is currently 35 percent, should be reduced to roughly 25 percent. At the same time, budgetary pressures preclude any significant increase in the deficit to accomplish corporate tax reform.

In light of these competing demands, most corporate tax reformers advocate broadening the corporate tax base to pay for any rate reduction. Unfortunately, few politicians have put forth base-broadening measures that would generate revenue sufficient to significantly lower the corporate tax rate on a revenue-neutral basis.

In fact, revenue-neutral corporate income tax reform is likely to be very difficult, because corporate tax expenditures represent a relatively small portion of total corporate tax revenues. A preliminary analysis by the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested that the elimination of all corporate tax expenditures—except for the deferral of tax on foreign source profits, a provision whose repeal would be politically and economically infeasible—would allow for the corporate tax rate to be reduced to only 28 percent.

Therefore, if policymakers want to reduce the corporate tax rate on a revenue-neutral basis, they will likely have to adopt other types of reforms to broaden the corporate tax base. Ideally, those reforms should offer the potential for significant revenue gains and reduce economic distortions.

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2012 Distressed Investing M&A Report

The following post comes to us from David Rosewater, partner focusing on mergers & acquisitions at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on a Schulte Roth & Zabel report; the full publication, including charts and figures, is available here.

Schulte Roth & Zabel is pleased to present Distressed Investing M&A, published in association with mergermarket and Debtwire. Based on a series of interviews with investment bankers, private equity practitioners and hedge fund investors in the US, this report examines the market for distressed assets at home and abroad.

Economic uncertainty brought on by the looming US “fiscal cliff” have placed companies in difficult situations where many are forced to sell assets and restructure operations and debt in order to avoid a court mandated sale further down the line. The value gained and time saved by selling assets prior to in-court restructuring and liquidation is signaled by the respondents’ shift toward dealmaking early and out-of-court.

Outside of the US, the eurozone crisis and macroeconomic concerns in the emerging markets are having a similar effect. While some are waiting for a solution to the sovereign debt crisis, distressed investors are geared to take advantage of attractively-priced assets within the region. Hyperinflation remains a concern for the markets in Latin America and India, while economic growth has slowed in Brazil and China. Both are likely to create distressed opportunities over the next 12 months.

Respondents cite the energy sector as likely to be the most active for distressed M&A in the next year. Low natural gas prices in the US are hitting the bottom line and companies are feeling the strain. Additionally, inflation concerns in Asia may expose manufacturing companies, who respondents describe as “losing the battle” against prices.

In addition to the above findings, this report provides insight into pricing, litigation, club deals, and various other issues concerning the distressed M&A community. We hope you find this study informative and useful, and as always we welcome your feedback.

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SEC to Propose Rules on Corporate Political Spending by April 2013

Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow at Columbia Law School. Bebchuk and Jackson served as co-chairs of the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, which filed a rulemaking petition concerning political spending, discussed on the Forum here and here. Posts discussing their articles on corporate political spending, Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, and Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, are available here.

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently updated its entry in the Office of Management and Budget’s Unified Agenda to indicate that, by April, it plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics. Although the Director and Deputy Director of the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance signaled that the SEC was considering this issue in November, this update provides a firm timetable for SEC action on disclosure of corporate political spending. Moreover, this update makes clear that the SEC’s consideration of this issue will result in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

As co-chairs of the Committee of academics that petitioned the SEC to develop rules requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics, we are pleased that the SEC has indicated that it plans to move forward on these rules, and we are optimistic that rules will soon be in place to give investors the information they need to assess how corporate funds are spent on politics. As we argued in our petition—signed by a broad group of academics with widely varying views on corporate and securities law—the case for requiring public companies to disclose their spending on politics is strong.

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FDIC and Bank of England Release White Paper

Dwight C. Smith is a partner at Morrison & Foerster LLP focusing on bank regulatory matters. This post is based on a Morrison & Foerster client alert by Mr. Smith and Jeremy Jennings-Mares.

On December 10, 2012, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Bank of England released a white paper, Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions, [1] describing how each would resolve a materially distressed or failing financial institution that is globally active and systemically important (“G-SIFI”) in order to maintain the G-SIFI’s ongoing and viable operations, and contain any threats to financial stability. The paper reflects the work of U.S. and UK authorities [2] in developing resolution strategies for the failure of G-SIFIs in accordance with standards developed by the Financial Stability Board, [3] but does not go into detail on the strategic options that may be available.

The white paper warrants the close attention of G-SIFIs and their stakeholders, particularly their unsecured debtholders. The paper memorializes the consensus view of the FDIC and the Bank of England that a top-down or single-point-of-entry approach is the preferred (although not the sole) method of resolving a G-SIFI. [4] This approach could transform certain unsecured debt into equity or convertible debt and should cause G-SIFIs to review their organizational structure. Also of interest are the FDIC’s and Bank of England’s perspectives on the critical powers and preconditions for a successful resolution and what legislative or regulatory changes may be necessary.

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Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups

Jesse Fried is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware dominates the corporate chartering market in the U.S—it is the only state that attracts a significant number of out-of-state incorporations. As a result, incorporation decisions are “bimodal,” with public and private firms typically choosing between home-state and Delaware incorporation.

Much ink has been spilled in the debate over whether Delaware’s dominance arose because it offers high-quality or low-quality corporate law. Under the “race-to-the-top” view, Delaware has prevailed because its law maximizes firm value. Under the “race-to-the-bottom” view, Delaware has won by offering corporate law that favors insiders at other parties’ expense.

But a firm today may choose Delaware law not solely because of its inherent features but rather because, after decades of Delaware’s dominance, business parties—including investors and their lawyers—are now simply more familiar with Delaware law than the laws of other states. Indeed, the bimodal pattern of domiciling is itself strong evidence that business parties are familiar only with their home states’ corporate law and Delaware’s.

In our paper, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups, recently made public on SSRN, Brian Broughman, Darian Ibrahim, and I show, for the first time, that familiarity does in fact affect firms’ decisions to domicile in Delaware rather in their home states.

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Israel’s Executive Compensation Reform

Avi Licht is Deputy attorney general, and Ronnie Talmore and Haim Sachs are attorneys at the Ministry of Justice, Israel. The writers of this post advised the committee established by the Justice Minister in the formulation of Israel’s Executive Compensation Reform.

Foreword

The issue of executive compensation has been on the forefront of corporate governance discussion around the world in the past few years. Israel is no different. In previous years there was a significant rise of executive compensation in public companies that cannot be explained or linked to the companies’ performance.

Like many capital markets in continental Europe and other countries around the world, [1] most of the companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange have a controlling shareholder. A significant portion of these companies are controlled by a limited number of business groups, the majority of which are characterized by pyramid control structures.

Concentrated ownership and dominance of company groups raise a key agency problem: the relationship between controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders. The issue of protection of minority shareholder rights and the prevention of abuse of the controlling power is therefore a subject of main consideration in Israel.

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The Merger Agreement Myth

The following post comes to us from Jeffrey Manns, Associate Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School, and Robert Anderson IV, Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law.

Practitioners and academics have long assumed that markets value the deal-specific legal terms of merger agreements yet have failed to subject this premise to empirical scrutiny. Mergers are high-stakes events, so it is unsurprising that the conventional wisdom posits that value is at stake in drafting acquisition agreements and negotiating conditions, “fiduciary out” clauses, and deal protection provisions. The question is whether financial markets price the highly negotiated legal terms of acquisition agreements or only value the financial terms forged by management and bankers. The challenge in answering this question is the difficulty in separating the market impact of the merger announcement (and disclosure of financial terms) from the disclosure of the legal terms, since these events occur in close proximity.

We conduct an empirical study that shows that markets do not respond in an economically significant way to the deal-specific legal terms of M&A agreements. We collected a data set of public company cash mergers spanning the decade from 2002 to 2011 and applied a modified event study to test statistically whether the market reacted to the disclosure of merger agreements. We analyze market reactions by exploiting the (small) temporal gap between the announcement of pending mergers (which lays out their financial terms) and the disclosure of acquisition agreements (which delineate the legal terms) typically one to four trading days later. We find that markets react almost exclusively to the initial merger announcement, and there is no economically consequential market reaction to the disclosure of the acquisition agreement. This finding implies that the extensive negotiations over deal-specific legal terms are not priced into financial market valuation.

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Achieving Pay for Performance

Matteo Tonello is managing director of corporate leadership at the Conference Board. This post is based on an issue of the Conference Board’s Director Notes series by Stephen O’Byrne, president and co-founder of Shareholder Value Advisors.

Current views regarding the proper pay plan design to achieve pay for performance vary. This post discusses the three dimensions of pay for performance, demonstrates how to measure them using historical pay data, and presents a simple pay plan that achieves perfect pay for performance (PP4P) using annual grants of performance shares. It also highlights pay practices that weaken pay for performance and offers recommendations for directors to deepen their understanding of pay-for-performance issues.

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