Monthly Archives: March 2013

Supreme Court Rules on Proof of Materiality for Class Certification

The following post comes to us from Jay B. Kasner, head of the Securities Litigation Practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Kasner, Peter B. Morrison, Matthew J. Matule, and Edward B. Micheletti.

On February 27, 2013, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds that a securities fraud plaintiff alleging fraud on the market need not establish the materiality of an alleged fraudulent statement in order to obtain class certification. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy dissented.

The particular questions presented by the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari were whether, in a misrepresentation case under SEC Rule 10b-5, a securities fraud plaintiff alleging fraud on the market must establish materiality of the misstatements in order to obtain class certification and whether, in such a case, the district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a plaintiff class based on that theory.


What Motivates Minority Acquisitions?

The following post comes to us from Paige Parker Ouimet of the Finance Division at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

What motivates minority acquisitions? We study the trade-off between minority acquisitions, involving less than 50% of the target, and majority acquisitions in the forthcoming Review of Financial Studies paper, “What Motivates Minority Acquisitions? The Trade-Offs between a Partial Equity Stake and Complete Integration.” Minority acquisitions have been shown to facilitate cooperation between two independent firms. For example, Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) show that a minority acquisition can align the incentives of the acquirer with those of the target. However, similar benefits can also be achieved with a majority acquisition, suggesting that minority stakes are also motivated as a means to avoid certain costs associated with majority control.

Using a sample of 2,166 deals, we identify several key predictors in the choice between a minority or majority acquisition. The key insight provided in this paper is the importance of costs associated with the dilution to target managerial incentives following a majority acquisition in selecting the mode of acquisition. Evidence that firms are willing to forgo benefits to control to preserve target incentives speaks to the value of these incentives.


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