Yearly Archives: 2014

CEO Employment Agreements in a “Say on Pay” World

The following post comes to us from Michael S. Katzke, a founding partner of Katzke & Morgenbesser LLP, and is based on a Katzke & Morgenbesser publication by Mr. Katzke and Henry I. Morgenbesser.

Although much has been written and discussed in the past few years about the impact of “Say on Pay” and Dodd-Frank on CEO compensation practices (including the narrowing or elimination of employment agreement provisions such as excise tax and other tax gross-ups and automatic “evergreen” renewal terms which have not been viewed as shareholder friendly), there has been less discussion as to whether employment agreements remain a viable option in a Say on Pay world. In spite of the complicated relationship between a CEO hire and the company, some companies, as a policy matter, do not put the terms of such relationship in writing. Complexities that are often spelled out in a written agreement include duties and responsibilities of the CEO, compensation (including formulaic increases during the term), the duration of the term of employment, termination provisions, severance payments under certain termination scenarios, and post-employment restrictive covenants. As discussed below, in our view, written employment agreements continue to be viable and recommended, particularly in the case of CEOs hired from outside the company.

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Halliburton: The Morning After

Boris Feldman is a member of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Feldman and do not reflect those of his firm or clients. Doru Gavril also contributed to this post. The Supreme Court’s expected reconsideration of Basic is also discussed in a Harvard Law School Discussion Paper by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, discussed on the Forum here.

The blogosphere is abuzz over Halliburton. [1] Will the Supreme Court overturn Basic [2] and abolish the fraud-on-the-market presumption? Will the decision end shareholder class actions as we have known them? Presumably, by the Fourth of July, we will know.

The purpose of this post is not to predict the outcome of Halliburton. Rather, it is to begin thinking about ways in which the plaintiffs’ bar may respond if the Court does overturn Basic. Those who think that plaintiffs’ lawyers will go quiet into the night are, in my opinion, ignoring the lessons of history.

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Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2013 Review

The following post comes to us from Dr. Renzo Comolli and Svetlana Starykh, Senior Consultants at NERA Economic Consulting, and is based on portions of a NERA publication. The complete publication, including analysis of motions, trends in resolutions and settlements, and footnotes, is available here.

Legal developments have dominated the news about federal securities class actions in 2013. Last February, the Supreme Court decision in Amgen resolved certain questions about materiality but focused the debate on Basic and the presumption of reliance, which are now back to the Supreme Court after certiorari was granted for the second time in Halliburton.

Against this legal backdrop, 2013 saw a small increase in the number of complaints filed for securities class actions in general and for class actions alleging violation of Rule 10b-5 in particular. Filings in the 5th Circuit doubled, while filings in the 9th Circuit bounced back after having dipped in 2012.

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The SEC in 2014

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chair White’s remarks to the 41st Annual Securities Regulation Institute Conference; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

For nearly 80 years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been playing a vital role in the economic strength of our nation. Year after year, the agency has steadfastly sought to protect investors, make it possible for companies of all sizes to raise the funds needed to grow, and to ensure that our markets are operating fairly and efficiently.

That is our three-part mission.

But, while commitment to this mission has remained constant and strong over the years, the world in which we operate continuously changes, sometimes dramatically.

When the Commission’s formative statutes were drafted, no one was prepared for today’s market technology or the sheer speed at which trades are now executed. No one dreamed of the complex financial products that are traded today. And, not even science fiction writers would have bet that individuals would so soon communicate instantaneously in so many different ways.

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The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking

Steven L. Schwarcz is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law.

In prior articles (see, e.g., Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1781 (2013)), I have argued that shadow banking is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink certain of their basic assumptions. In a forthcoming new article, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, I argue that the governance structure of shadow banking should be redesigned to make certain investors financially responsible, by reason of their ownership interests, for their firm’s liabilities beyond the capital they have invested. This argument challenges the longstanding assumption of the optimality of limited liability.

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Introduction to the SDX Protocol

James Woolery is Deputy Chairman of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Co-Chair of its Corporate Department and head of its Business Development Group. This post is based on an excerpt from the Shareholder Director Exchange (SDX) Protocol, a framework to guide engagement between directors, which is sponsored by Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Teneo Holdings, LLC, Tapestry Networks, Inc. and the participating directors and investor representatives of the SDX™. The complete publication is available here.

The Shareholder-Director Exchange (SDX™) [1] is a working group of leading independent directors and representatives from some of the largest and most influential long-term institutional investors. [2] SDX participants came together to discuss shareholder-director engagement and to use their collective experience to develop the SDX Protocol, a set of guidelines to provide a framework for shareholder-director engagements. While the decision to engage directly with investors should be made in consultation with or at the request of management, the 10-point SDX Protocol offers guidance to US public company boards and shareholders on when such engagement is appropriate and how to make these engagements valuable and effective.

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SEC Staff Issues Further Guidance on the Proxy “Unbundling” Rule

The following post comes to us from Phillip R. Mills, partner in the Mergers and Acquisitions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about bundling includes Bundling and Entrenchment by Lucian Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar, discussed on the Forum here.

The SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance recently released three Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations concerning the SEC’s so-called unbundling rule (Exchange Act Rule 14a-4(a)(3)), which requires proxies to identify clearly and impartially each “separate matter” intended to be acted upon.

Nearly a year ago, in Greenlight Capital, L.P. v. Apple, Inc., a federal court enjoined Apple from bundling four charter amendments into a single proposal. The Apple decision highlighted the lack of clarity in the unbundling rules and the risk that the SEC or an activist shareholder could challenge a company’s presentation of proposals. The new C&DIs provide bright-line guidance for amendments to equity incentive plans but leave other situations to be considered on a facts-and-circumstances basis and, implicitly, to be discussed with the SEC Staff in cases of uncertainty.

Two new concepts will need to be addressed going forward:

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The Alcoa FCPA Settlement: Are We Entering Strict Liability Anti-Bribery Regime?

The following post comes to us from Gregory M. Williams, partner focusing on complex commercial litigation and arbitration and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at Wiley Rein LLP, and is based on a Wiley Rein article by Mr. Williams, Ralph J. Caccia, and Richard W. Smith.

“This Order contains no findings that an officer, director or employee of Alcoa knowingly engaged in the bribe scheme.”

There are several notable aspects of aluminum producer Alcoa, Inc.’s (“Alcoa”) recent FCPA settlement. The $384 million in penalties, forfeitures and disgorgement qualify as the fifth largest FCPA case to date. Further, it is remarkable that such a large monetary sanction was imposed when the criminal charges brought by the U.K. Serious Fraud Office against the consultant central to the alleged bribery scheme were dismissed on the grounds that there was no “realistic prospect of conviction.” Perhaps most striking, however, is the theory of parent corporate liability that the settlement reflects. Although there is no allegation that an Alcoa official participated in, or knew of, the improper payments made by its subsidiaries, the government held the parent corporation liable for FCPA anti-bribery violations under purported “agency” principles. Alcoa serves as an important marker in what appears to be a steady progression toward a strict liability FCPA regime.

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Distracted Directors

The following post comes to us from Antonio Falato, Economist at Federal Reserve Board; Dalida Kadyrzhanova of the Department of Finance at the University of Maryland; and Ugur Lel of the Department of Finance at Virginia Tech.

In our paper, Distracted Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?, which was recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics, we examine the impact of independent director busyness on firm value in a setting that addresses a key challenge that the board of directors is an endogenously determined institution. A large number of publicly-traded firms in the U.S. have recently limited the number of multiple directorships held by their board members. For example, a recent survey shows that 74 percent of S&P 500 firms impose restrictions on the number of corporate directorships held by their independent directors, up from 27 percent in 2006, and the Institutional Shareholder Services recommends restrictions on the number of multiple directorships. Although such shareholder initiatives are consistent with standard theoretical considerations (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1992), the empirical evidence on whether director busyness has any effect on the firm is thus far mixed. While several studies find that busy directors are associated with lower firm valuations and less effective monitoring (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) others either do not, or provide mixed evidence (e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003; Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013).

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Top 5 Delaware Case Developments in 2013 for M&A Practitioners

Kerry E. Berchem is partner and co-head of corporate practice at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. The following post is based on an Akin Gump Client Alert by Elisabeth Cappuyns, Trey Muldrow, and Carlos Bermudez. This post is part of the Delaware law series, cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

During 2013, in addition to the important changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) and the Limited Liability Company Act, described here, the Delaware courts issued a number of decisions that have a direct impact on the M&A practice. Below are our Top 5 case law picks for M&A practitioners:

1. A new look at the standard of review in going-private mergers (the Business Judgment Rule)

In its In re MFW Shareholders Litigation (May 29, 2013) decision, the Court of Chancery held that in going-private mergers with a controlling stockholder on both sides the deferential business judgment standard of review applies, instead of the entire fairness standard, if certain procedural safeguards are included from the beginning. Specifically, the controlling stockholder has to agree at the outset to proceed with the merger only if the transaction is both (1) negotiated and approved by an attentive special committee comprised of directors who are independent of the controlling stockholder and fully empowered to decline the transaction and to retain its own financial and legal advisors and (2) conditioned on the un-coerced, fully informed and non-waivable approval of a majority of the unaffiliated minority stockholders.

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