Monthly Archives: June 2015

What You Need to Know on Form BE-10

Avrohom J. Kess is partner and head of the Public Company Advisory Practice at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Kess, Lee A. Meyerson, Karen Hsu Kelley, and Mark Chorazak.

U.S. companies with “foreign affiliates” during their 2014 fiscal year will need to participate in a “benchmark survey” conducted every five years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The survey is conducted through a series of forms known as the BE-10. Filings are due by May 29 or June 30, depending on the number of foreign affiliates to be reported, but the BEA is granting extension requests on a case-by-case basis. As explained in the Background section below, the BE-10 is one of many forms that may need to be filed by a U.S. company having cross-border relationships or engaging in cross-border transactions. These forms are only statistical surveys and submitted information is accorded confidential treatment.

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Remarks Before the SEC Historical Society

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s remarks at the annual meeting of the SEC Historical Society, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

I was delighted to be able to speak at your annual meeting. This yearly event of the SEC Historical Society is always the right occasion to underscore that those of us who currently have the privilege of serving at the SEC are part of a long and important tradition. The staff of this agency is beyond compare in its dedication, high-mindedness and expertise, making us all very proud to work here.

The SEC alumni are undoubtedly the biggest, most supportive and most enthusiastic group of any government agency or private entity. The SEC’s history is one of important public service and a tradition of protecting investors and bringing confidence to the financial markets. The SEC’s commitment to markets that are both safe and fair, as well as dynamic, has given millions of people the opportunity to share in the growth of the American economy, while facilitating capital formation to fuel the economy.

Those of us here today, who are or who have been part of the SEC tradition, can be rightly proud of our role in shaping a financial system that meets the needs both of visionary entrepreneurs, and those contributing as much as they can to their 401(k) or for their children’s college education.

As a reminder of your service at the SEC, I have been asked to very briefly share with you some of what we are working on—now and for the near future. I think you will recognize in that work the mission that brought you to the agency and which should continue to resonate long after you left your SEC post.

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Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance

Mark Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches bankruptcy and corporate law. Professor Roe received the European Corporate Governance Institute’s 2015 Allen & Overy Prize for best corporate governance paper. The article, Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance, appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and was discussed on the Forum here as a working paper. In the following summary, Mr. Roe updates the earlier post.

In Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance, I examined how and why financial conglomerates that have grown too large to be efficient find themselves free from the standard and internal and external corporate structural pressures push to resize the firm. The too-big-to-fail funding boost—from lower financing costs because lenders know that the government is unlikely to let the biggest financial firms fail—shields the financial firm’s management from restructuring pressures. The boost’s shielding properties operate similar to “poison pills” for industrial firms, in shielding managers and boards from restructurings. But unlike the conventional pill, the impact of the too-big-to-fail funding boost reduces the incentives of insiders to restructure the firm, not just outsiders. These weakened restructuring incentives weaken both the largest financial firms and the financial system overall, making it more susceptible to crises. The article predicts that if and when too-big-to-fail subsidies diminish, the largest financial firms will face strong pressures to restructure.

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Practice Points Arising From the El Paso Decision

John E. Sorkin is a partner in the corporate practice at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. The following post is based on a Fried Frank publication authored by Mr. Sorkin, Philip Richter, Abigail Pickering Bomba, and Gail Weinstein. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Delaware Chancery Court recently ruled, in In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litigation (Apr. 20, 2015), that the general partner of a master limited partnership (MLP) was liable to the MLP for the $171 million by which the court determined that the MLP had overpaid for liquefied natural gas (LNG) assets purchased from its parent company for $1.4 billion in a typical “dropdown” transaction. In a separate memorandum (available here and discussed on the Forum here), we have discussed the decision and our view that it will have limited applicability given the unusual factual context. We note that the court’s extremely negative view of the conduct of the conflict committee and its investment banker offers a blueprint for how not to conduct a conflict committee process. We offer the following practice points arising out of the decision.

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Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-world Challenges (with a Critique of the European Commission Proposal)

Luca Enriques is Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law at University of Oxford, Faculty of Law.

Transactions between a corporation and a “related party” (a director, the dominant shareholder, or an affiliate of theirs) are a common instrument for those in control to divert value from a corporation, especially in countries with concentrated ownership. While direct evidence of value diversion via related party transactions (RPTs) is obviously hard to obtain, widespread use of RPTs has been observed for example in China (in the form of inter-company loans) and South Korea (also as a tool to transfer wealth from one generation of controllers to the next in avoidance of inheritance taxes), has been vividly reported for post-privatization Russia and Italy (where corporate scandals, such as Parmalat and, more recently, Fondiaria-Sai, often go together with significant RPT activity). Anecdotal evidence of value extraction via RPTs also exists with regard to the US (think of the Hollinger case and those reported in Atanasov et al.’s paper on law and tunneling, available here). Their (ab)use at Russian and East-Asian companies listed in the UK has recently prompted the UK Listing Authority to stiffen its already strict provisions on RPTs (see here; for a news report on RPTs at one of these East-Asian companies—Bumi, now renamed Asia Mineral Resources—see here).

In my article Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-world Challenges (with a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), published in 16 European Business Organization Law Review 1 (2015), and available here (and here as a working paper), I provide a comparative and functional overview of how laws deal with RPTs and criticize a recent European Commission proposal for a harmonized EU regime on RPTs (see Article 9c of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2007/36/EC and 2013/34/EU, available here).

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Capital Unbound: Remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regulation

Michael S. Piwowar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Piwowar’s recent remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regulation. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Piwowar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

I am happy to be with you in New York City. When I have the opportunity to travel for meetings or to conferences such as this, I have fundamentally different conversations than when I am in Washington, D.C. In Washington, conversations frequently are scripted. Participants, who may be accompanied by trade association representatives and lawyers, use their talking points and have been coached to “stay on message.” Those discussions are undoubtedly meaningful as we at the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”) engage in rulemaking and otherwise set policy.

But outside of Washington D.C., people generally want to talk about something else. They want to share their dreams and concerns about running their businesses. They want to show how their products, services, and innovations contribute to the economy, create jobs, and improve standards of living. And more importantly, they want to demonstrate how inside-the-beltway regulations are often focused on concerns that do not represent the biggest risks of harm to investors, customers, and businesses outside the beltway. I hear how regulations distract attention from the real risks and challenges of operating a business in globally competitive markets.

Compliance with securities laws and regulations is only one component of running a company. A business must also comply with laws on consumer protection, taxes, safety, employment, zoning, and the environment, to name only a few. If you have multiple locations—such as in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut—you must deal with regulators in each jurisdiction. Soon, it may seem like you exist not to provide a good or service, but just to stay in compliance with the law.

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Anticipating Proxy Put Litigation

William Savitt is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savitt.

In recent months, a number of companies have received stockholder demands or faced stockholder litigation attacking “proxy put” provisions in credit agreements—that is, provisions that allow a lender to put outstanding debt to the corporate borrower for immediate payment upon a change in board control, creating potential financial risk for the company. These “proxy put” provisions are typically triggered when a majority of the board is displaced in a contested election. Many forms of credit agreement include a proxy put that allows an incumbent board to approve prospective directors for change-in-control purposes, even candidates sponsored by a dissident stockholder. Credit agreements of this kind can give rise to complex fiduciary duty litigation in the event a board declines to approve the members of a dissident slate in the face of a live proxy contest, but they do not appear vulnerable to facial attack under prevailing law.

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Bipartisan Group of Former SEC Commissioners Support the Rulemaking Petition for Transparency in Corporate Political Spending

Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Bebchuk and Jackson served as co-chairs of the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, which filed a rulemaking petition requesting that the SEC require all public companies to disclose their political spending. Bebchuk and Jackson are also co-authors of Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, published in the Georgetown Law Journal. A series of posts in which Bebchuk and Jackson respond to objections to an SEC rule requiring disclosure of corporate political spending is available here. All posts related to the SEC rulemaking petition on disclosure of political spending are available here.

We are pleased to report that a bipartisan group of three distinguished former SEC Commissioners—former Chairman William Donaldson, former Chairman Arthur Levitt, and former Commissioner Bevis Longstreth—last week submitted to the SEC a letter urging the Commission to move forward with the rulemaking we proposed in our petition on corporate political spending. We are delighted that this distinguished group of former Commissioners is adding its voice to the massive and unprecedented support that the petition has already received.

In July 2011, we co-chaired a committee of ten corporate and securities law experts that submitted a rulemaking petition urging the SEC to develop rules requiring public companies to disclose their political spending. The SEC has thus far received more than 1.2 million comments on the proposal—more than any rulemaking petition in the SEC’s history.

The three former SEC Commissioners who have now come out in support of our petition bring a rich and telling set of perspectives and experiences to this issue. William Donaldson, a Republican, was appointed by President George W. Bush after having previously served in the Nixon Administration and served as SEC Chairman from 2003 to 2005. Arthur Levitt, a Democrat, was appointed by President Bill Clinton and served as SEC Chairman from 1993 to 2001. And Bevis Longstreth, a Democrat, was twice appointed to the SEC by President Ronald Reagan, serving as a Commissioner from 1981 to 1984.

As we have discussed in previous posts on the Forum, the case for rules requiring disclosure of corporate political spending is compelling. Unfortunately, Chairman Mary Jo White has faced significant political pressure not to develop such rules, and the Commission has so far chosen to delay consideration of rules in this area. The delay is unfortunate and unwarranted in light of the strong arguments for disclosure put forward in the rulemaking petition and the remarkable and broad support that the petition has received. Moreover, as we showed in our article Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending an examination of the full range of objections that opponents of such rules have so far been able to raise indicates that these objections, both individually and in combination, fail to provide an adequate basis for opposing such rules.

In the letter submitted last week by the bipartisan group of three distinguished former SEC Commissioners, the authors opined that it is a “slam dunk” for the SEC to move forward with rules that would shine light on corporate spending on politics. We are delighted that these distinguished former Commissioners share our view that the case for mandating disclosure of corporate political spending is compelling. The SEC should proceed with rulemaking in this area without further delay.

Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and Sabastian V. Niles. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here) and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here).

Today, regardless of industry, no company can consider itself immune from hedge fund activism. Indeed, no company is too large, too popular or too successful, and even companies that are respected industry leaders and have outperformed the market and peers have come under fire. Among the major companies that have been targeted are Amgen, Apple, Microsoft, Sony, General Motors, Qualcomm, Hess, P&G, eBay, Transocean, ITW, DuPont, and PepsiCo. There are more than 100 hedge funds that have engaged in activism. Activist hedge funds are estimated to have over $200 billion of assets under management, and have become an “asset class” that continues to attract investment from major traditional institutional investors. The additional capital and relationships between activists and institutional investors encourages increasingly aggressive activist attacks.

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The Trend Towards Board Term Limits is Based on Faulty Logic

Robert Pozen is a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This post is based on an article by Mr. Pozen and Theresa Hamacher that originally appeared in the Financial Times.

In the business world, experience is generally considered to be positive. When it comes to corporate directors, however, tenure is increasingly viewed with suspicion. Yet the trend towards board term limits is based on faulty logic and threatens performance.

The movement towards director term limits is global. In France, directors are not considered independent if they have served on the company’s board for more than 12 years. In the UK, publicly traded companies must either comply or explain: terminate a director after nine years of service, or explain why long tenure has not compromised director independence.

In the US, the Council of Institutional Investors, which represents many public pension funds, urges its members to consider length of tenure when voting on directors at corporate elections. The council is concerned that directors become too friendly with management if they serve for extended periods.

Institutional Shareholder Services, the proxy voting advisory firm that is a powerful force in corporate governance, penalises companies with long-serving directors by reducing their “quick score” governance rating. Under the current methodology, a company loses points if a substantial proportion of its directors has served for more than nine years. Although ISS recognises that there are divergent views on this, it concluded that “directors who have sat on one board in conjunction with the same management team may reasonably be expected to support that management team’s decisions more willingly”.

But the assumption that lengthy director service means cozy relationships with management simply is not supported by the facts.

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