Vyacheslav Fos is Assistant Professor of Finance at Boston College Carroll School of Management. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Professor Fos; Kerry Back, J. Howard Creekmore Professor of Finance at Rice University Jones Graduate School of Business; Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Professor of Finance at the Swiss Finance Institute at École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Tao Li, Associate Professor of Finance at City University of Hong Kong; and Alexander Ljungqvist, Ira Rennert Professor of Finance at NYU Stern School of Business. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.
Activist shareholders play an important role in modern corporate governance. The Economist describes them as “capitalism’s unlikely heroes” and reports that, between 2010 and 2014, half the companies in the S&P 500 index had an activist shareholder and one in seven were the target of an activist campaign (The Economist, February 7th 2015).
Activism comes in many forms. Perhaps the best known involves hedge funds accumulating stakes in firms with the intention to create value by influencing management. Prominent examples include William Ackman, Carl Icahn, Daniel Loeb, and Nelson Peltz. Existing shareholders can turn from being passive to being active when they recognize an opportunity for enhancing the value of their holdings. CALPERS and the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund are well known examples of this form of activism. And activist short-sellers can take actions so as to reduce firm value to benefit their short positions. For an example, see Bloomberg Business on how “Hedge funds found a new way to attack drug companies and short their stock” (March 20th 2015), describing how some activist hedge funds challenge pharmaceutical patents in court to reduce the value of the firms owning these patents, presumably benefitting from previously established short positions. The profitability of activism for investors hinges on their ability to trade before stock prices reflect their intention to become active. Thus, there is a fundamental link between market conditions (liquidity), activism, and firm value.