Le Club des Juristes Commission Shareholder Activism Report

Michel Prada is former Chairman of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) and Benjamin Kanovitch is a partner at Bredin Prat. This post is based on a le Club des Juristes Commission report. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here), and Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies by Kobi Kastiel.

2018 was a record year for shareholder activism, and the rise of activists, in Europe and France specifically, has become an industry issue.

The Commission’s aim is not to take sides in the economic, political and sometimes philosophical debate between supporters and opponents of shareholder activism, or to take a position on any particular activist campaign, present or past. Instead, the aim is to identify behaviors that may damage transparency, fairness and the proper functioning of the market, and to examine, in legal terms, rules and best practices that could be applied to activist campaigns.

The work done by the Club des Juristes Commission consisted of arranging interviews with some thirty stakeholders in the area of shareholder activism, representatives of issuers and investors, and market intermediaries and qualified professionals, in order to benefit from their experience and obtain their opinions about possible future legal arrangements. To supplement the analysis, a survey was carried out among approximately 200 CFOs and heads of investor relations working for listed companies.

This post, after reviewing the current state of shareholder activism and identifying the areas that require improvement, proposes a series of recommendations regarding :

  • transparency rules governing activist campaigns;
  • the strengthening of dialogue between issuers and investors; and
  • the role of the AMF and ESMA.

Section 1—Current Situation

The task of reviewing the current situation regarding shareholder activism is particularly tricky because activists are a highly diverse group (I). The Club des Juristes’ Commission therefore sought to identify the potentially debatable behaviors that have been observed (II).

I. Defining activism given the diverse nature of activists

Shareholder activism is so diverse that it is very hard to say where it begins and ends. However, it is necessary to seek a rigorous and reliable definition with a view to appropriate regulation and the formulation of best practices specific to activism.

1. Absence of a legal definition of shareholder activism

The definitions of activism put forward in legal doctrine are not sufficient for the concept to be regulated by law. The challenge of any definition is to establish the internal and external limits of a concept. The definition must be fit for purpose, and this is especially important since it determines the scope of application of the legal rule. Several criteria have been proposed to define “activism”.

Involvement in the company

The activist is generally a company managing an investment fund that, above all, wants to make active use of its shareholder rights. As a result, certain definitions are based on this behavior. Activism is thus defined as “the influence of minority shareholders over the governance, strategy, financial policy or management of a company”, [1] or “the effective and strategic exercise of prerogatives by one or more shareholders who decide to assert their rights either regarding the running of the company, whether it is solvent or in difficulty, or as part of a capital market transaction” [2].

Other authors focus on the amount of energy expended: activism is “a doctrine or a practice that puts the emphasis on direct and vigorous action, more specifically in order to express support for or opposition to a controversial issue”. [3]

Criticism of management

If activism attracts as much reaction as interest, that is probably because it involves challenging the choices made by managers, and indeed destabilizing the managers themselves: the activist is therefore “a shareholder who challenges a company’s existing management” [4] and does not hesitate to put pressure on management. [5]

The simultaneous purchase of shares and criticism of management

The use of shareholder rights and the criticism of management are not the sole preserve of activists. Accordingly, an activist is not an investor whose comments consist solely of criticism. By analyzing the chronology of or motivation behind investors’ actions, activism can therefore be identified when investors “acquire shares with the purpose of encouraging the company to take measures capable of significantly increasing its stock market value”. [6]

Body of evidence

Other definitions use several of the aforementioned criteria. The most comprehensive definition is as follows: “an investor acquiring an equity stake in a listed company in order to use its shareholder rights and power of influence to make, with respect to the company’s management, demands or criticisms of varying levels of hostility, motivated by financial or extra-financial objectives”. [7] These criteria can therefore be seen as cumulative conditions or as components of a body of evidence that characterize activism.

Similarly, reference can be made to a “process of challenging, initiated by one or more minority shareholders”, and to “the exercise and application by minority shareholders of the rights attached to the shares of a company that they hold, in order to influence the company’s governance”. [8] This is also the approach of AFEP’s working group. After emphasizing the difficulty of defining activism, AFEP proposes using the “body of evidence” approach.

All these definitions are good descriptions of activism, but none of them allows an activist to be identified in legal terms. They include other investors who may qualify as active but not as activists, unless their simple right to criticize is confused with a genuine activist campaign.

2. The essentially varying nature of shareholder activism

The difficulty in defining activism also results from the wide variety of objectives and methods adopted by activists.

Varying focus on activism among investment funds

Some companies managing investment funds specialize in shareholder activism to such an extent that it is their main selling point. For others, activism is just one management method among others. These fund managers may occasionally take a “passive” position, without triggering an activist campaign. As a result, activism is not an inherent feature of certain funds.

Other investors are occasional activists, who only act in “special situations”.

Varying positions

Some activists hold more than 5% or 10% of the target company’s capital, while some only have a small stake and others limit themselves to short selling.

It is also possible to classify activists in two categories. Some are short-term in that they only use derivatives and in particular short selling. Others are long-term because they actually invest in the company through the acquisition of shares.

Varying and contradictory concerns

Activists’ grounds for criticism are varied and can even be contradictory: activist’s criticism can focus on matters such as the company’s strategy, its financial statements, its management and/or ESG (environmental, social and governance) criteria. We have seen fund managers vote for the renewal of managers’ terms of office, and against a company’s governance organization.

Short term vs. long term

Some funds are “short-termist”, while others seek to approximate private equity strategies by seeking involvement in the company’s governance and influence over the company’s management in order to get it to adjust its medium-term strategy.

The meaning of “long-term” is the subject of great controversy between stakeholders. Long-only investors stress their focus on the long term and their alignment with corporate interest. They even present themselves as the most effective defenders of corporate interest, combatting any abuse by management. Their stance is supported by the fact that they hold their shares for a much longer period than the average investor. The activists we interviewed are proud of their reputation and the credibility of their analysis, and say that, as a result, they would not risk damaging those attributes by carrying out short-termist transactions.

In the heat of the moment, it is often hard to say whether an activist’s strategy is short-termist or not. This can only be established after the fact.

Uncertain relationship with major investors

The boundary between the activist and other shareholders is sometimes porous. Although institutional investors and “passive” funds are traditionally seen as supportive of management, they are now more active and are happy to vote against resolutions presented by management, and even sometimes to make their position public. Some may prefer to remain discreet: without being activists themselves, they support activist funds or encourage them to act. Other investors, meanwhile, refuse to express support for activists in public or in private or only support some activists and not others.

Activism characterized by behavior

It is impossible to define activists as a legal category of shareholder. Activism, however, can be defined as a type of behavior over a given period.

The Commission therefore took a particular interest in the behavior of activists who, after studying a company for a long time and acquiring a minority shareholding, short or long, but possibly significant, seek to change the company’s governance or strategy, generally via a “robust” dialogue with its directors and then, as the case may be, launching a public campaign intended to gain the support of other shareholders.

The argument between issuers and investors has intensified in recent years over behaviors that consist in taking advantage of the asymmetries between the rules applicable to issuers and the rules applicable to investors. Issuers accuse activists of abusing regulatory asymmetry in their favor, while activists criticize the asymmetry of power and information in favor of the issuers that hinders their campaigns.

In practical terms, communication rules place few constraints on activists whereas, for a company, each communication with shareholders is subject to strict rules as regards its content, accuracy, frequency and scope of distribution. However, some dispute the true nature of this asymmetry and point out the informational superiority of the issuer.

The company can also reach its shareholders easily, in particular those with significant shareholdings, of which it has more detailed knowledge than the market, through ownership thresholds provided for in issuers’ articles of association or the procedure for identifiable bearer shares, whereas the activist has no organized access to other shareholders, apart from in an AGM, where it can make official statements and meet other shareholders. [9] In addition, directors can use the company’s resources, including financial resources, to defend themselves even where they are the ones who are being personally criticized, while the activist claims to represent corporate interest more effectively.

The debatable behaviors seen on both sides turn precisely on this asymmetry considered by both the issuers and the activists to their disadvantage.

II. Behaviors that are sometimes debatable

Past activist campaigns have involved certain behaviors that are open to criticism. Views differ greatly between issuers and activists. The behaviors in question can be seen at all stages of a campaign.

1. Position-building

The first part of activist campaigns consists of position-building, and this has given rise to concern. Issuers criticize the use of aggressive financial techniques, including the use of derivatives, for the purpose of concealment and circumventing rules relating to ownership thresholds provided for in issuers’ articles of association or laid down by statute. This concealment is all the easier as MiFID [10] has led to liquidity fragmentation. The activists we interviewed said that they do not build positions in an opaque way, making only marginal use of derivatives, which are now covered to a large extent by regulations on threshold crossing disclosures, and dispute the basis of this criticism.

All agree that there must be a correlation between activism and economic exposure, following on from analysis already carried out in relation to empty voting. To the extent that an activist seeks to influence the running of a company, its position is only legitimate if it assumes the consequences of that aim by being exposed to the company’s risks through the outright ownership of shares. The activists we interviewed said that they seek to be above reproach: because they adopt a critical position with respect to the company, they must themselves be above any criticism, otherwise their message may be discredited.

Opaque methods of position-building go back to recurring concerns relating to shareholder identification. Despite improvements resulting from the Shareholder Rights Directive II, [11] there are still many criticisms because it is not possible to take a dynamic snapshot of the ownership structure. The procedure involving identifiable bearer shares is costly, unreliable and always lags behind market movements. Threshold crossing disclosures and declarations of intent take place on a one-off basis, and do not allow regular monitoring of changes in shareholding. The content of these disclosures is not sufficient to allow a proper understanding of a shareholder’s position. Activists claim that they are above reproach in this area as well, because they comply with regulations. They also highlight the frequent use by issuers of the provision relating to reportable thresholds in the articles of association, which can start at 0.5% of the share capital and therefore allow issuers alone to be aware of the positions of their significant shareholders.

2. Dialogue with shareholders

Once an investor owns shares in a company, it is reasonable to expect a constructive and private dialogue between the activist and the issuer when the activist makes its initial observations. The evidence shows that this approach is taken in almost every case.

Quality of dialogue with the activist

In the best-case scenario, an attempt to establish dialogue results in a truce, which does not appear to be unusual and is not necessarily publicized. In many cases, however (although they are in the minority compared with the overall functioning of the market), the dialogue attempted fails because of mutual misunderstanding.

Activist investors are suspected by their targets of being agitators solely concerned with the short term, which they strongly deny. They insist that they are seeking to protect corporate interest and create long-term value, which is vital to gain the support of other shareholders and maintain their credibility.

Activists have sometimes had their request for dialogue rejected, or have been denied access to the board. Even if dialogue is formally established, some issuers apparently fail to engage properly with the demands of activist shareholders. However, the activists we interviewed place a lot of importance on meeting with the company’s management and directors because the directors are the ones best placed to explain how their industry works. Most companies are prepared to engage in dialogue at the highest level. That dialogue is particularly important for activists that intend to become major shareholders in a widely-held company and so want to avoid any conflict.

On the other hand, some activists choose speed or surprise effect, thus preventing any dialogue prior to the launch of the public campaign. The issuer is then reduced to either accepting or refusing the activist’s demands. More generally, we see that an activist shareholder escalates matters much more quickly than other investors. If the activist’s efforts are blocked, it adopts a public strategy aimed at gaining support for its action from other shareholders.

The survey showed that target companies that sought to explain their position had ended up with a constructive, calm dialogue with activists.

Frequency of dialogue with other shareholders

Dialogue with shareholders is of strategic importance for issuers, not just in its relationship with activists but also with other shareholders. The traditional advice given to issuers is to establish a regular, high-quality dialogue with their main shareholders. That dialogue plays a preventative role, especially since activists’ criticisms are often based on those of other shareholders who have given up the fight or do not wish to expose themselves directly. Dialogue also plays a remedial role if the issuer can secure the support of a solid shareholder group during its campaign.

Limits on inside information

Although this difficulty has already been mentioned, [12] the risk of inside information being exchanged as part of a private dialogue is often a source of concern. However, several of the interviews we held show that this risk is hugely overstated. Managers who take part in investor road shows know how to answer investor questions while complying with inside information rules, especially since discussions with activists often do not concern a shortage of information but rather, on the basis of existing public information, a discrepancy in the company’s analysis. To avoid any risk, some activists publish all of their discussions on their websites. However, that precaution makes it impossible to have a purely private dialogue and therefore leads to a public campaign.

3. Public campaigns

If private dialogue fails, a public campaign is launched. When the activist campaign becomes public, issuers criticize the aggressive approach taken by activists, whereas the activists we interviewed say they take a constructive approach because they are involved in the company’s strategy in a practical way.

Quality of information

Issuers cast doubt on the accuracy of activists’ analysis. Above all, communication by activists is regarded as imbalanced and ambiguous, overly focused on subjective matters.

Meanwhile, activists emphasize the extent of their preparatory work and state that the success of a campaign is determined by the strength of their analysis, not their reputation. They claim that they carry out extensive research, representing three to six months of work. Meetings are organized with the company at different levels, and with the company’s main rivals, customers, suppliers, former directors, and employees.

The timing of disclosure

Issuers are very concerned about the time when activists choose to launch their campaigns and reveal their documentation. If an activist publishes its analysis during a quiet period, its voice is amplified, the effect of which is increased if it sets up a website dedicated to the campaign, since the company cannot respond. The activists we interviewed denied that this poses any problem given the very short duration of the quiet period and the fact that activists’ period of influence is often limited to the period preceding the AGM, whereas issuers communicate on their results all year round except during the quiet period.

The intended recipients of information

Communication with other shareholders is the main area of concern because it determines the success of a campaign. Activists stress that it is hard for them to interact with other shareholders, whose identity they do not know.

From the issuer’s point of view, road shows held by an activist in private can be frustrating. They are a way for an activist to adapt its speech to its interlocutor, sometimes resulting in the delivery of contradictory messages to other shareholders. As a result, not all shareholders are informed to the same degree. The issuer has no access to these interactions and therefore cannot respond to them.

4. Voting in AGMs

Transparency of the AGM

As regards voting in an AGM, each party doubts the other’s sincerity and fears that it is manipulating the vote. Shareholders that have borrowed shares and vote in an AGM are a key concern for issuers, who demand that votes coincide with economic exposure and criticize “empty voting”. However, the activists we interviewed stated that they do not practice empty voting. Article L. 225-126 of the French Commercial Code requiring a declaration by the borrower does not seem to be applied.

Activists criticize the lack of transparency in AGMs, since they have great difficulties checking that votes are conducted properly. The Shareholder Rights Directive II [13] allows all shareholders to obtain a voting confirmation, but it is hard to be sure that all votes have been properly taken into account.

The role of other shareholders

Activists who submit resolutions during shareholders’ meeting need the support of other shareholders. Institutional investors and investment funds can back an activist’s initiative. They are especially motivated to do so since they have a fiduciary duty to their clients. Although large investment funds are not capable of carrying out an in-depth study on each company because of the large number of positions they hold in their portfolios, [14] they can support the initiative of an activist that has produced a study by focusing on a small number of companies and thus give it extra resonance.

The investors we interviewed verified that an activist’s investment argument often creates long-term value for all stakeholders. Where the activist puts forward candidates for the board of directors, the quality of each candidate and the need for change in the issuer’s governance determine which way the vote goes.

The role of proxy advisors

Proxy advisors recommended voting in favor of the resolutions put forward by the activist in half of cases, and have seen a sharp improvement in the relevance of resolutions in recent years.

There are two limitations when analyzing an activist’s argument. Firstly, proxy advisors only express a view if the activist campaign gets to the AGM. They therefore only have a very limited time, a few weeks, to study these resolutions and meet with the company and the activist. Secondly, the proxy advisors interviewed said that they base their recommendations solely on public information. This method works against activists who would limit themselves to private discussions with other shareholders. It should not only encourage them to increase their public communication but also to avoid using different speeches depending on the interlocutor.

Before supporting the resolutions put forward by an activist, proxy advisors ensure that a change is necessary and that the solution proposed by the activist is the best one, compared with the status quo or other proposals.

Proxy advisors’ clients tend to carry out their own analysis in relation to resolutions put forward by activists, but they can still consult voting recommendations when making that analysis.

In conclusion, the Commission noted that, despite the great tension between issuers and activist shareholders, the people we interviewed are very cautious regarding new regulations. They all recognize that shareholder engagement is required to ensure the proper functioning of the market and its depth. They are all aware of the risks that the Paris financial center would be taking if it adopted overly specific rules that differed from those in other centers (even if French regulations could move away significantly from European standards). Finally, they are all aware that the market represents a delicate balance, and that effort must be made to ensure that regulations do not have unintended or adverse consequences.

However, the current situation cannot be regarded as satisfactory, because asymmetries exist that are probably unjustified in certain cases [15] and because it would be desirable to correct certain excessive behaviors. Although views differ, the conclusion is unanimous: we need to restore balance between issuers and investors.

Section 2—Summary of Recommendations

1. Requirement of greater transparency in activist campaigns

  • Recommendation 1: The Commission believes that rebalancing the relationship between issuers and activists requires, as a priority, stronger transparency measures applicable to investors taking public positions, directly or indirectly, aimed at influencing an issuer’s strategy, financial position or governance. An activist taking a public position should disclose, inter alia, the number of shares and voting rights and the type of securities held in the issuer, along with any hedging position. This information should be updated as the campaign progresses. The AMF could also ask the investor to confirm or deny the rumors that an activist campaign is being prepared.
  • Recommendation 2: The Commission recommends that information made public by activists as part of a campaign should be subject to rules inspired by those applying to investment recommendations, in order to ensure the objective nature of information included in the white papers published by activists and the appropriate treatment of conflicts of interest. In this respect, it would be appropriate to specify whether the current regulations (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/958 of 9 March 2016) already apply in such context. Otherwise, the Commission recommends that activists apply similar rules in the context of their campaign. It is also proposed that, during a public campaign, the activist (i) explains to what extent its approach considers “the company’s social interest and takes into consideration the social and environmental issues related to the company’s activity” and (ii) publishes all documents that it sends privately to other shareholders. Finally, the legal framework applicable to activist campaigns could be partly inspired by the rules on active solicitation of proxies to ensure transparency regarding the rationale for their vote.
  • Recommendation 3: In order to ensure fair dialogue between issuers and activists, the latter should refrain from making any communications or publications during the “quiet periods” to which issuers are subject. Cumulatively, the conditions governing the way issuers can respond in these circumstances could be clarified.
  • Recommendation 4: Current regulations regarding the transparency of short positions could be supplemented by (i) the disclosure of all positions held by the shareholder that are close to short positions (puts, etc.), (ii) a declaration of intent in the event that certain ownership thresholds are crossed, (iii) aggregate disclosures in certain situations (in particular in the event that investors are acting in concert within the meaning of threshold crossing declarations) and (iv) the disclosure of the identity of the investors lending their shares to the activist. The regulations on threshold crossing could be strengthened if necessary (deadlines, content).
  • Recommendation 5: Further consideration could be given to depriving the borrower of the voting rights attached to the shares lent, as an effective way of combating “empty voting”. To avoid the need for legal recourse, the practice adopted by certain institutional investors of setting out that prohibition directly in their securities lending agreements could be encouraged.

2. Increased dialogue between issuers and investors

  • Recommendation 6: Collective investor engagement might also be promoted by setting up a shareholder dialogue platform enabling investors to pool their demands and engage in dialogue, where appropriate, with the issuer.
  • Recommendation 7: The Commission noted the unanimous view among the people it interviewed that shareholder dialogue is the best way to prevent activist campaigns. Following on from the Club des Juristes’ work on dialogue between directors and shareholders, the Commission recommends having a systematic dialogue process prior to the launching of a public activist campaign. For example, before activists disseminate a white paper, issuers must have sufficient time to respond to the arguments raised and correct any errors before public release, similarly to what has been imposed on proxy advisors and rating agencies.
  • In order to improve the quality of the dialogue, involved parties could agree on common principles and issuers, investors, regulators and other market participants could jointly develop a guide to shareholder dialogue.
  • Recommendation 8: The method for preparing the corporate governance code could also be re-examined, to ensure that it is accepted as widely as possible by investors. Investors could thus meet in a single committee to speak to issuers with one voice.

3. Consideration of the AMF and ESMA’s role

  • Recommendation 9: The Commission recommends that consideration be given to strengthening the AMF’s resources and role. To ensure a fair framework for activist campaigns, the AMF’s powers under Article L. 621-18 of the French Monetary and Financial Code could be extended to require investors, not just issuers, to correct or supplement their public statements.
  • Recommendation 10: The Commission recommends clarifying behaviors likely to be characterized as acting in concert in the context of an activist campaign, along the lines of the white list drawn up by ESMA for the Takeover Directive (ESMA, 12 November 2013, Information on shareholder cooperation and acting in concert under the Takeover Bids Directive, ESMA/2013/1642).

4. Necessary standards

  • For the most part, the recommendations considered by the Commission do not require legislative intervention but rather intervention by the regulatory authorities (AMF and ESMA).
  • For the AMF, this would require the adoption of a recommendation on the transparency and fairness of activist campaigns (Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5) and shareholder dialogue (Recommendations 6 and 7).
  • On the part of ESMA, this would require clarification of the legal framework applicable to investment recommendations (Recommendation 2) and the notion of acting in concert (Recommendation 10).
  • On the part of the legislator, this would require action on short positions and threshold crossing (Recommendation 4), the increase of the AMF’s financial resources (Recommendation 9) and the extension of the scope of Article L. 621-18 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (Recommendation 9).
  • In the context of the ongoing revision of MAR, efforts should be made to ensure greater legal certainty regarding market abuse.
  • The Commission is obviously ready to participate in regular monitoring of the drafting of texts and the implementation of the recommendations of this report

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Endnotes

1A. GRUMBERG, “Pour un activisme actionnarial constructif” (“In favor of constructive shareholder activism”), Les Échos, 19 October 2015.(go back)

2M. GOLDBERG-DARMON, C RUELLAN, “L’émergence d’un nouvel activisme actionnarial” (“The emergence of a new form of shareholder activism”), Actes pratiques & ingénierie sociétaire November-December 2016, p. 1.(go back)

3R. CRETE, S. ROUSSEAU, “De la passivité à l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels au sein des corporations : le reflet de la diversité des facteurs d’influence” (“From a passive to an activist approach among institutional investors within corporations: diverse influencing factors”), McGill Law Journal 1997, Vol. 42, 864-959.(go back)

4O. DE VILMORIN, A. BERDOU, “Vade-mecum de l’actionnaire activiste” (“The activist shareholder’s handbook”), BJB 2016, no. 1, p. 16.(go back)

5E. DUBOIS in C. NEUVILLE, A. GUENAOUI, A. D’ANDLAU, E. DUBOIS, L. BOISSEAU, M. GOLDBERG-DARMON, P. LEROY, H. DE VAUPLANE, “Fonds activistes : opportunité ou menace pour l’économie ?” (“Activist funds: an opportunity or threat for the economy?”), JCP E 2018, no. 1439.(go back)

6S. SCHILLER, “L’environnement réglementaire des fonds activistes” (“The regulatory environment of activist funds”), JCP E 2018, no. 1437.(go back)

7N. BOMBRUN, J. AMSELLEM-VIGANO, “Développement de l’activisme actionnarial : Comment anticiper une campagne activiste ?” (“Development of shareholder activism: how to anticipate an activist campaign”), RTDF 2019.3.(go back)

8V. DE BEAUFORT, “L’activisme actionnarial” (“Shareholder activism”), presentation online at http://europe.vivianedebeaufort.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Activisme-actionnarial-MS-DAIM-ESSEC.pdf, consulted on 23 September 2019.(go back)

9Proposing that the issuer keep a “register of so-called one-to-one contacts with its shareholders having, for example, a shareholding or voting rights greater than 0.5% of the share capital”: F. PELTIER, presentation at the Law & Trade Conference “Corporate Governance & Shareholder Engagement: the new normal”, 18 October 2019.(go back)

10Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments(go back)

11Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.(go back)

12CLUB DES JURISTES’ AD HOC COMMISSION on Director-Shareholder Dialogue, December 2017, p. 33.(go back)

13Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.(go back)

14A. DE LA CRUZ, A. MEDINA, Y. TANG, Owners of the World’s Listed Companies, OECD Capital Market Series, 2019, p. 5, p. 6 et p. 22.(go back)

15Asymmetry is one of the main subjects of the recommendations made by the Assemblée Nationale’s fact-finding mission: E. WOERTH, B. DIRX, Rapport d’information no 2287 sur l’activisme actionnarial (“Report no. 2287 on shareholder activism”), 2019.(go back)

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