Monthly Archives: May 2023

North America Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines

Benjamin Colton is Global Head of Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on his SSGA memorandum.

State Street Global Advisors’ Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines [1] for North America outline our approach to voting and engaging with companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States and Canada. These Guidelines complement and should be read in conjunction with State Street Global Advisors’ Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Principles, which outline our overall approach to voting and engaging with companies, and State Street Global Advisors’ Conflicts Mitigation Guidelines, which provide information about managing the conflicts of interests that may arise through State Street Global Advisors’ proxy voting and engagement activities.

State Street Global Advisors’ Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines for North America (United States [“US”] and Canada) address our market-specific approaches to topics including directors and boards, accounting and audit related issues, capital structure, reorganization and mergers, compensation, and other governance-related issues.

When voting and engaging with companies in global markets, we consider market-specific nuances in the manner that we believe will most likely protect and promote the long-term economic value of client investments. We expect companies to observe the relevant laws and regulations of their respective markets, as well as country specific best practice guidelines and corporate governance codes. We may hold companies in some markets to our global standards when we feel that a country’s regulatory requirements do not address some of the key philosophical principles that we believe are fundamental to our global voting principles.

In our analysis and research into corporate governance issues in North America, we expect all companies to act in a transparent manner and to provide detailed disclosure on board profiles, related-party transactions, executive compensation, and other governance issues that impact shareholders’ long-term interests. Further, as a founding member of the Investor Stewardship Group (“ISG”), we proactively monitor companies’ adherence to the Corporate Governance Principles for US listed companies (the “Principles”). Consistent with the “comply-or-explain” expectations established by the Principles, we encourage companies to proactively disclose their level of compliance with the Principles. In instances of non-compliance, and when companies cannot explain the nuances of their governance structure effectively, either publicly or through engagement, we may vote against the independent board leader.

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Superstar CEOs and Corporate Law

Assaf Hamdani is Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University; Kobi Kastiel is Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, and Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Washington University Law Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes How Twitter Pushed Stakeholders Under The Bus (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Anna Toniolo.

Larger-than-life corporate leaders, who can move fast and disrupt entrenched players, are often perceived as having the vision, superior leadership, or other exceptional qualities that make them uniquely valuable to their corporation. While the business press, management experts, and financial economists have long studied these “superstar” CEOs, the legal literature has largely overlooked this phenomenon. In our article, Superstar CEOs and Corporate Law (forthcoming in Washington University Law Review), we develop a framework to explore the challenges that superstar CEOs pose for corporate law doctrine and scholarship.

Elon Musk is often described as a visionary, leading Tesla in its disruption of the car industry to become the world’s most valuable car manufacturer.  He has also repeatedly pushed the boundaries of corporate law, being the direct target of multiple derivative lawsuits. One lawsuit attacks Tesla’s 2016 acquisition of SolarCity—a public company in which Musk and his brother were the largest shareholders.  Another challenges Musk’s unprecedented pay arrangement which, according to some estimates, could provide him with up to $56 billion.  The third lawsuit accuses Tesla’s directors of abdicating their responsibility to monitor Musk’s use of his Twitter account, which prompted the SEC to intervene.

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Delaware M&A: Spring 2023

Andre BouchardKyle Seifried, and Laura C. Turano are partners at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on their Paul Weiss memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu; and The New Look of Deal Protection (discussed on the Forum here) by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian.

Claims That SPAC Directors, Sponsors Breached Fiduciary Duties Survive Motions to Dismiss in Pair of Opinions

In two opinions by Vice Chancellor Will, Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC and Laidlaw v. GigAcquistions2, LLC., the Delaware Court of Chancery held on motions to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that the directors of the respective special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) and their sponsors breached their fiduciary duties by disloyally depriving the SPAC public stockholders of information material to their decision on whether to redeem their shares in connection with the applicable deSPAC transaction. In both opinions, the court evaluated the claims under the stringent entire fairness standard. The SPAC’s sponsor qualified as a controlling stockholder due to its control and influence over the SPAC, even though it held a minority interest, and, in both opinions, the court concluded that the SPAC directors lacked independence from the sponsor. In addition, in both opinions, entire fairness review was warranted based on the divergent interests between the sponsor and public stockholders that are inherent in the SPAC structure, including the sponsor’s unique incentive to take a “bad deal” over a liquidation of the SPAC and returning the public stockholders’ investment. The opinions provide important key takeaways for sponsors, directors and investors in Delaware SPACs. For more on the Delman opinion, see here.

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Diversity and Inclusion—an Investor’s Handbook

Diana Lee is Director of Corporate Governance and an ESG Analyst for Responsible Investment team at AllianceBernstein. This post is based on her AllianceBernstein memorandum.

Managing a workforce has always been vital for business success. In today’s increasingly diverse society, successful people management is critical for companies seeking to retain talent and cultivate positive customer relationships.

In recent years, diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies have taken on added importance in modern work environments. However, DEI is sometimes viewed as a “softer” policy topic that doesn’t factor into investor outcomes.

We think that’s a mistake.

Strong DEI policies can provide companies with a competitive edge, especially in a tight labor market where the fight for talent is fierce and a favorable corporate culture can make a difference in overcoming business hurdles.

Based on our engagement with investment management companies and former DEI executives across many sectors, we’ve mapped out key criteria that investors should look for when evaluating a company’s DEI program. The research presented here is US-centric and should be viewed with an awareness of regional nuance.

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Statement by Chair Gensler on Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

May 3, 2023

Today, the Commission considers adopting a final rule to enhance the disclosures related to share buybacks. I support this final rule because it will increase the transparency and integrity of this significant means by which issuers transact in their own securities.

Share buybacks have become an important method through which issuers return capital to shareholders. In 2021, these buybacks amounted to nearly $950 billion and reportedly reached more than $1.25 trillion in 2022. [1]

Today’s final rule will enhance the transparency and integrity of the buyback process in two ways.

First, the rule will require issuers to disclose periodically the prior period’s daily buyback activity. This will include such information as the date of the purchase, the amount of shares repurchased, and the average purchase price for the date. Under the rule, such information will be reported quarterly by domestic public companies and foreign private issuers as well as semi-annually by certain close-end funds.

Second, the rule will require issuers to provide disclosure about their buyback programs. Such disclosure will include details about the objectives or rationales for the buyback as well as the process or criteria used to determine the buyback amount. Further, under the rule, issuers will detail whether the buyback was intended to make use of the affirmative defense or safe harbor available under Rules 10b5-1 and 10b-18. As relates to directors or executives, the rule requires disclosure of any policies and procedures relating to their trading activity during a buyback as well as whether, during the four-day period just before or after a buyback was announced, any of them traded in the shares subject to such buybacks. Finally, the amendments will add new quarterly disclosure related to an issuer’s adoption and termination of certain trading arrangements.

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Commissioner Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

May 3, 2023

Thank you, Chair Gensler. As you have heard, the final rule scraps the proposed requirement to disclose share repurchases within one business day. Despite this commendable and much needed change, I cannot support a rule that mandates immaterial disclosures without sensible exemptions. Accordingly, I dissent.

The release fails to demonstrate a problem in need of a solution. The release hints at discomfort with issuer share repurchases and suggests that granular disclosure might unearth nefarious practices related to buybacks. The release points out that share repurchases could be “conducted to increase management compensation or to affect various accounting metrics,” rather than to increase firm value. [1] Some people would argue that issuers should use excess cash to increase employee wages or fund research and development. In some cases, these buyback critics may be correct, but share repurchases are not inherently problematic. To the contrary, they enable companies to return excess cash to shareholders with greater tax-efficiency than dividends. [2] Shareholders who choose to sell their shares back to the company then can reinvest the proceeds into companies that need cash. The net result is that capital flows to where it can best be used. Issuers also sometimes repurchase shares for other legitimate purposes, including to “offset dilution from equity compensation plans, or [as] an appropriate investment when shares are viewed as undervalued.” [3]

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Weekly Roundup: April 28-May 4, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 28 – May 4, 2023.

Four Facts About ESG Beliefs and Investor Portfolios


Remarks by Commissioner Peirce before Eurofi


Trust Survey: key findings and lessons for business executives


Accounting for Bank Failure



The New Unocal


The Activism Vulnerability Report – Q4 2022


Seven Gaping Holes in Our Knowledge of Corporate Governance


Takeover Law and Practice: Current Developments


Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Form PF


Statement by Chair Gensler on Form PF


Statement by Chair Gensler on Form PF

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

May 3, 2023

Today, the Commission considers adopting a final rule amending Form PF, an important tool that the Commission uses to oversee private fund advisers. I am pleased to support the amendments because they will improve visibility into private funds, helping protect investors and promote financial stability.

History is replete with times when tremors in one corner of the financial system or at one financial institution spill out into the broader economy. When this happens, the American public—bystanders to the highway of finance—inevitably gets hurt.

Lest we forget, eight million Americans lost their jobs, millions of Americans lost their homes, and small businesses across the country folded as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Systemic risk from the banking and non-bank sectors alike spilled out into the broader economy.

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Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Form PF

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

May 3, 2023

Thank you, Chair Gensler. Today, we are voting on the recommendation to finalize the first of two outstanding proposals to amend Form PF. When Form PF was first adopted in 2011, then-Commissioner Paredes stated that “[t]he final rule fulfills Dodd-Frank’s statutory directive to the Commission to collect information on behalf of [the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”)], and does so in a way that reduces the compliance burden on advisers in important respects as compared to the rule the Commission initially proposed.” [1] Today’s amendments are the first step to reversing those initial, fruitful efforts at effective regulation. The amendments significantly expand the scope of the Form’s reporting requirements and increase the frequency of filings for large hedge fund advisers and private equity fund advisers. Yet the Commission fails to identify any particular need for the additional information or provide a clear picture of how the information might further the Commission’s investor protection mission.

To collect information on Form PF, the Commission relies on amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) made by Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. [2] Title IV authorizes the Commission to require private fund advisers to file reports if “necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors, or for the assessment of systemic risk by [FSOC].” [3] Today’s amendments invoke the need to “enhance [FSOC’s] ability to monitor systemic risk as well as bolster the SEC’s regulatory oversight of private fund advisers and investor protection efforts.” [4] However, the Commission’s low threshold for imposing additional reporting requirements on private fund advisers is merely that particular events “could have systemic risk implications or negatively impact investors.” [5]

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Takeover Law and Practice: Current Developments

Igor Kirman, Victor Goldfeld, and Elina Tetelbaum are partners at Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu; and The New Look of Deal Protection (discussed on the Forum here) by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian.

Current Developments

A. Overview

The techniques of M&A, including acquisitions, dispositions, mergers and spin-off or other separation transactions, are among the most important tools available to companies to anticipate and respond to the constantly changing economic, regulatory, competitive and technological environments in which they operate. This multidimensional and turbulent landscape not only presents threats and opportunities which companies must navigate, but also adds complexity to dealmaking itself, which often is more art than science.

Adding to this complexity recently have been changes and volatility in stock market valuations, macroeconomic developments such as inflation and interest rate hikes, wars and other geopolitical disruptions, the financial crisis, recent bank failures and associated policy responses, the COVID-19 pandemic, tax reform and changes in the domestic and foreign regulatory and political environments. The substantial growth in hedge funds and private equity, developments in governance and ESG concerns, the growing receptiveness of institutional investors to activism and the role of proxy advisory firms have also had a significant impact.

The constantly evolving legal and market landscapes highlight the need for directors to be fully informed of their fiduciary obligations and for a company to be proactive and prepared to capitalize on business-combination opportunities, respond to unsolicited takeover offers and shareholder activism and evaluate the impact of the current corporate governance debates. In recent years, there have been significant court decisions relating to fiduciary issues and takeover defenses. Although these decisions largely reinforce well-established principles of Delaware case law regarding directors’ responsibilities in the context of a sale of a company, in some cases they have raised questions about deal techniques or offered opportunities to structure transactions in a way that increase deal certainty.

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