Monthly Archives: May 2025

Chancery Court Dismisses Challenge to Removal of Tag-Along Rights in Healthcare Merger

Frank J. Favia Jr. and Jonathan A. Dhanawade are Partners at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

A recent Delaware Chancery Court decision provides important guidance for private equity sponsors, minority investors, and deal professionals regarding the enforceability of contractual waivers and the limits of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in LLC agreements. The court’s ruling underscores the primacy of contract terms in LLC governance, and the limited role of equitable doctrines where fiduciary duties have been expressly disclaimed.

Khan, et al. v. Warburg Pincus, LLC, et al. [1] involved the merger of an urgent care provider and a primary care provider. The urgent care provider, a limited liability company, was majority owned by a private equity sponsor. As explained in more detail below, after the closing, the urgent care provider’s minority unitholders challenged the elimination of their tag-along rights and the allocation of merger consideration. READ MORE »

Investor Views on AI Oversight: What Do Proxy Votes Tell Us?

Lindsey Stewart is Director of Investment Stewardship Research and River Meng is a Financial Product Specialist at Morningstar, Inc. This post is based on their Morningstar memorandum.

Key Observations

  • This research paper examines 15 recent shareholder resolutions at US companies addressing oversight and transparency over the use of artificial intelligence.
  • On average, shareholder support for resolutions on AI has exceeded support for proposals on other environmental and social themes.
  • Average adjusted support for the 15 resolutions on AI is 30%, almost double the support for the 400 E&S resolutions in the 2024 proxy year (16%). The seven significant resolutions also achieved higher average support than 107 significant E&S proposals in 2024.
  • Twelve of the 15 resolutions were filed at just five Big Tech companies: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms and Microsoft. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Netflix and Warner Bros. Discovery also featured.
  • The four most successful resolutions on AI targeted the same two issues (misinformation and disinformation, and AI-driven targeted advertising) at two companies: Meta Platforms and Alphabet.
  • As with E&S themes more generally, US and European asset managers are taking very different approaches to voting on resolutions addressing AI.
  • Average support for AI resolutions among the 20 US asset managers we reviewed was 30% – less than half the 77% observed for 15 European peers. The gap for significant resolutions is narrower.
  • In the US, BlackRock supported only one of the 15 proposals (7%), State Street and Vanguard did not support any. Fidelity, MFS, and Principal were the strongest US supporters of AI proposals (all 70%+).
  • In Europe, Allianz GI, Amundi, Candriam, and Nordea supported all 15 resolutions. The lowest level of support by a European asset manager was 43%

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: May 23-29, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 23-29, 2025

Delaware Tells Companies: ‘Let’s Stay Together’



From Code to Compensation: The HighStakes Race for AI Talent



Navigating the Post-SB 21 World of Conflict Transactions


Is ESG a Sideshow? ESG Perceptions, Investment, and Firms’ Financing Decisions


Governance of AI: A Critical Imperative for Today’s Boards


SEC Moves to Create Regulatory Framework for Cryptocurrencies)


Purpose That Matters: What Foundation Ownership Teaches Us About Sustainable Capitalism


Getting Ahead of The Looming C-Suite Succession Crisis


Shareholder Proposals in the Wake of Staff Legal Bulletin 14M


Crypto Associations


2025 Say on Pay Reports


2025 Say on Pay Reports

Austin Vanbastelaer is a Principal, and Justin Beck is a Senior Consultant at Semler Brossy LLC. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Vanbastelaer, Mr. Beck, Nathan Grantz, and Andrew Fick.

SAY ON PAY RESULTS

SAY ON PAY OBSERVATIONS

  • The current Russell 3000 average vote result of 91.5% is 80 basis points lower than this time last year (92.3%) and 60 basis points higher than the index’s 2024 year-end average
  • The current S&P 500 average vote result of 89.5% is 120 basis points lower than this time last year (90.7%) and matches the figure from the index’s 2024 year-end average
  • The Russell 3000 average vote result thus far in 2025 is 200 basis points higher than the average vote result for the S&P 500
  • These initial summary vote results continue a multiyear trend of positive early-season vote support; it is still a small sample and summary results are likely to change over the course of the year

FREQUENCY OF ISS “AGAINST” RECOMMENDATIONS

  • 6.9% of Russell 3000 companies and 7.5% of S&P 500 companies have received an ISS “Against” recommendation thus far in 2025
  • It is still early in the proxy season; the Russell 3000 ISS “Against” recommendation rate started lower (6.6%) at this time last year and increased over the course of the proxy season

AVERAGE VOTE RESULT AFTER ISS “FOR” OR “AGAINST” RECOMMENDATION

The average vote result for Russell 3000 companies that received an ISS “Against” is 26% lower than those that received an ISS “For” thus far in 2025; the spread is 30% for S&P 500 companies.


E & S PROPOSAL RESULTS

  • Shareholders have voted on 17 environmental proposals and 44 social proposals thus far in 2025 • Median vote support is 11% for both environmental proposals and social proposals, and is the lowest support has been in the past five years; note that it is early in the season and that this number may change as more voting data becomes available
  • Zero environmental proposals (0%) and two social proposal (5%) have received greater than 50% support thus far in 2024; at this time last year, two environmental proposals and five social proposals had received greater than 50% support
  • Both passing social proposals were requests for reports on political contributions

SPOTLIGHT: CBOE GLOBAL MARKETS

A shareholder submitted a proposal requesting that Cboe Global Markets publish a semi-annual report on the Company’s direct and indirect political contributions.

The proposal received 56% vote support 

  • The proponent argued that Cboe’s reputation, value, and finances can be harmed by political spending, with increased risk from contributions to groups or PACs that might then provide that money to candidates that the company might not support
  • The proponent requested that the company provide a report on its policies and procedures for making political contributions and the expenditures made under those guidelines
  • The board opposed the proposal, stating that existing oversight procedures related to contributions exist and that it did not believe that more transparency served the interests of shareholders
  • ISS noted that Cboe’s guidelines are public, and that they prohibit the use of corporate funds to support candidates or organizations for federal office
  • ISS supported this proposal, as the information available to investors is not sufficient to determine support for organizations that engage in indirect support, which still may impact reputation

DIRECTOR ELECTION RESULTS

DIRECTOR ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

  • Average vote support for Director nominees of 95.8% thus far in 2025 is 110 basis points higher than the full-year support observed in 2024
  • Over the past five years, average Director election vote support at companies that received a Say on Pay vote below 50% in the prior year is 460 basis points lower than at companies that received above 70% support
  • Average vote support for male and female Director nominees has continued the multi-year trend of converging; average support for female Director nominees is now 70 basis points higher than average support for male nominees


EQUITY PROPOSAL RESULTS

  • Average vote support for equity proposals thus far in the proxy season (90.3%) is 40 basis points above the average vote support observed at this time last year (89.9%) • No companies have received vote support below 50% in 2025
  • ISS has recommended “Against” 21.3% of equity proposals, which is far below the 2024 full-year rate
  • Average support for equity proposals that received an ISS “Against” recommendation thus far in 2025 (78%) is aligned with average vote support observed for companies that received an ISS “Against” in the past decade (76%)


Source: Data provided by   .  Analysis by Semler Brossy.

Russell 3000 sample effective as of June 2024 and S&P 500 sample effective as of January 2025.

Crypto Associations

James Park is Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. This post is based on his recent article forthcoming in the UCLA Law Review.

Standing behind every crypto asset is a crypto association. Blockchains are typically not organized as traditional legal entities such as a corporation, partnership, or LLC. Instead, they operate through a decentralized network of participants who are bound together by economic incentive to collectively run the blockchain. A Developer typically starts the blockchain, writing the computer code that creates a digital ledger and sets the rules that govern it. The Developer recruits Validators who will verify the transactions recorded on the blockchain in return for compensation in the form of crypto assets. Purchasers of the crypto asset are also necessary to initially fund the creation of the blockchain and provide a liquid secondary market that helps ensure that the Developer and Validators are compensated for their work.

Many crypto associations maintain that they operate differently from entities. They do not have a central decisionmaker such as a board of directors or partnership management committee. This position has been crystallized in litigation where crypto defendants have taken on the startling position that crypto associations owe no contractual or other legal obligation to Purchasers of crypto assets. If investor funds are diverted by Developers for their own enrichment, or crypto assets become worthless because Developers do not follow up on their promise to build a network, the Purchasers have no legal remedy against the Developer or any other party.

READ MORE »

Shareholder Proposals in the Wake of Staff Legal Bulletin 14M

Liz Walsh is a Counsel, ad Anna T. Pinedo and Jennifer Zepralka are Partners, at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum.

As we previously addressed here, on February 12, 2025, the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance published Staff Legal Bulletin 14M (“SLB 14M”). Among other things, SLB 14M rescinded previous Staff guidance on no-action requests, pursuant to which a company can attempt to exclude a shareholder proposal from consideration in its definitive proxy statement. SLB 14M also clarified the Staff’s views on the scope and application of the “economic relevance exclusion” pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(5) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) and the “ordinary business exclusion” pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(7). We previously stated our belief that the Staff’s updated guidance would make it more challenging for proponents of shareholder proposals to overcome no-action requests based on broad social policy concerns, a prediction which only somewhat seems to have come to fruition during the 2025 proxy season to date.

READ MORE »

Getting Ahead of The Looming C-Suite Succession Crisis

Miriam Capelli, Adele Farag, and Scott Smith are Consultants at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum by Ms. Capelli, Ms. Farag, Mr. Smith, Peter Pickus, Elizabeth Burn, and Sharon Tan.

In today’s exceedingly volatile business landscape, one thing remains true: no company can outperform its leadership. However, according to Russell Reynolds Associates’ Global Leadership Monitor, organizations are facing a looming crisis amongst their next generation C-suite leaders. [1]  An alarming 71% of next generation C-suite leaders are considering a career move outside their current employer, [2]  with turnover intentions increasing by 14 percentage points over the past two years. [3]

What’s driving this desire to leave? Career advancement (47%), seeking different type of leadership (36%), seeking new responsibilities (35%) and seeking a different company culture (30%) are top reasons for next generation C-suite leaders’ high turnover intent. [4]  This reasoning aligns with RRA’s Leadership Confidence Index, which found that next generation C-suite leaders’ confidence in their C-suite has been consistently declining over the last four years. [5]

To better understand this important cohort’s concerns, we interviewed 22 next generation C-suite leaders. These interviews surfaced these leaders’ strategic goals and tactical wants. One thing is clear: without addressing next generation C-suite leaders’ concerns, organizations may soon face a talent deficit at the top

READ MORE »

Purpose That Matters: What Foundation Ownership Teaches Us About Sustainable Capitalism

David Schröder is a Research Assistant at Copenhagen Business School and Steen Thomsen is a Professor of Enterprise Foundations at Copenhagen Business School. This post is based on their recent paper.

We respond to the recent contribution by Ofer Eldar and Mark Ørberg, Is It Really About Purpose? Uncovering the Economics Behind Nonprofit Ownership. In their piece, Eldar and Ørberg advance a conceptual framework that distinguishes between income-generating and socially oriented models of nonprofit control. We complement their framework with systematic evidence on how nonprofit foundation ownership performs in practice.

As concerns about capitalism’s environmental and social impacts mount, interest has grown in governance models that embed social and environmental goals (Edmans, 2020; Henderson, 2021; Mayer, 2021; British Academy, 2019). One such model gaining renewed attention is foundation ownership. In this structure, a nonprofit foundation holds a controlling stake in a for-profit business. These “enterprise foundations” are particularly common in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. They are self-owning, governed by independent boards under the oversight of private courts or government agencies. Their charter-based purposes range from charitable giving to environmental and social causes to ensuring the continuity of a business enterprise (Sanders & Thomsen, 2023).

Eldar and Ørberg (2025) distinguish between two types of nonprofit control: the income-generating model, where business profits support a foundation’s mission, and the socially oriented model, where ownership is used to embed purpose directly into business operations. This typology captures structural variation but remains theoretical. What it lacks—and what the broader literature on responsible capitalism (Edmans, 2020; Henderson, 2021; Mayer, 2021; Serafeim, 2022) has long needed—is evidence on how these models operate in practice.

READ MORE »

SEC Moves to Create Regulatory Framework for Cryptocurrencies)

Brian V. Breheny is a Partner, and Sydney E. Smith is an Associate, at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

Key Points

  • Paul Atkins has been confirmed as SEC chair, succeeding Acting Chair Mark Uyeda, who initiated significant regulatory actions.
  • The new Crypto Task Force aims to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for cryptoassets.
  • The SEC has updated guidance on shareholders’ eligibility to file Schedule 13G beneficial ownership reports.
  • Staff guidance issued during the Biden era on when companies can exclude shareholder proposals in proxy statements was reversed.
  • The agency has ended its defense of the climate disclosure rules, which required information about climate-related risks and greenhouse gas emissions.

READ MORE »

Governance of AI: A Critical Imperative for Today’s Boards

Anna Marks is the Global Chair, Lara Abrash is the Chair, and Dr. Arno Probst is the Global Boardroom Program Leader at Deloitte LLP. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum.

Defining the Opportunity: Key Themes from the Survey

  • 31% say AI is not on the board agenda
  • 66% say their boards don’t know enough about AI
  • 33% think boards are not spending enough time on AI
  • 40% are rethinking board composition due to AI

AI not always on the agenda, but improving: Nearly one-third (31%) of respondents say AI is not on the board agenda. In the previous survey, 45 percent said the same (a change of 14 percentage points).

More boards getting up to speed on AI: Two-thirds of respondents (66%) say their boards still have “limited to no knowledge or experience” with AI. However, this is an improvement from the 79 percent who said the same in the previous survey (a change of 13 percentage points).

An increase in the time boards spend on AI: One-third (33%) of respondents are “not satisfied” or “concerned” with the amount of time their boards devote to discussing AI. However, that represents a decrease of 13 percentage points from the previous survey when nearly half said the same (46%).

AI’s influence on board makeup: Two out of five respondents say AI has caused them to think differently about their boards’ makeup—a slight increase (4 percentage points) from the previous finding. READ MORE »

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