Forced CEO Departures

This report examines forced CEO departures in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500 from 2024 through August 2026, focusing on differences by index, business sector, company size, and the circumstances driving board-initiated leadership changes.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

• Roughly 1 in 7 CEO succession cases were forced in both 2024 and 2025. The Russell 3000 recorded 49 forced departures in 2024 and 55 in 2025, while the S&P 500 increased from seven to 10; in 2026 so far, forced departures account for a smaller share of CEO succession cases than the prior two years.
• While there is no single industry profile for forced CEO turnover, health care accounts for the largest share so far in 2026. The sector represents 35% of all Russell 3000 forced departures year to date, after consumer discretionary recorded the highest number of forced departures in 2025.
• Company size was not a consistent predictor of forced CEO turnover. Elevated rates appeared across the revenue spectrum, suggesting succession risk is driven more by company-specific performance and strategic circumstances than by scale alone.
• Underperformance became a more prominent driver of forced departures in 2025. It rose from 31% of Russell 3000 forced departures in 2024 to 44% in 2025 and remains the largest reason category through August 2026.
• Activist pressure was a notable factor among S&P 500 forced departures. It accounted for eight of 19 departures across the period, reinforcing the importance of boards independently testing strategy, capital allocation, and leadership effectiveness before external pressure forces the issue.
• Successfully navigating potential forced departures requires proactive management. Boards can focus on establishing the criteria for when underperformance becomes a leadership issue, regular maintenance of their succession plan, and reaching out to shareholders to keep abreast of possible concerns or issues.

How we identify forced CEO departures at US public companies

The Conference Board/ESGAUGE classifies a CEO departure as “forced” when company disclosures or other credible evidence indicate that the board, activist investors, an investigation, performance concerns, misconduct, or strategic disagreement materially influenced the timing or terms of the CEO’s exit. Primary sources include Form 8-K filings and official company statements.

Where a company describes a CEO as resigning, departing, transitioning, or otherwise leaving voluntarily but provides limited explanation, we review credible external reporting to better understand the circumstances surrounding the departure. A voluntary characterization-or the CEO’s eligibility for severance under an employment or separation agreement-does not, by itself, determine whether the departure is classified as forced.

Some board-influenced departures may not be identifiable as forced. A CEO may be encouraged to leave privately while the transition is publicly characterized as a retirement, resignation, or voluntary departure. The reported figures should therefore be viewed as a conservative measure of publicly identifiable forced succession rather than a complete measure of all board-driven exits.

How we assign reasons for departure

For departures classified as forced, the reason category reflects the principal circumstance supported by company disclosures and related research. Categories include underperformance, activist investor pressure, misconduct, board disagreement, strategic reset or restructuring, transaction-related change, and termination without cause, among others.

For underperformance, ESGAUGE primarily considers whether the CEO departed before age 64 and whether the company’s industry-adjusted total shareholder return ranked in the bottom quartile, with revenue, stock price, and market capitalization providing additional context. Where multiple factors are present, the classification reflects the principal reason supported by the source record. “Termination without cause” is used when specifically disclosed and no more specific reason is identified.

Some level of forced departure is, of course, natural: company context may change, current CEOs may not have the necessary skills for the present moment, and some executives are simply not prepared for the role. As the data show, forced CEO departures are a recurring part of succession, but they are not concentrated in a single type of company or sector. Sector

In the Russell 3000, forced departures increased from 49 in 2024 to 55 in 2025, while the index’s share of succession cases remained essentially unchanged at 14.7% and 14.8%, respectively. In practical terms, roughly 1 in 7 CEO succession cases were categorized as forced in both years.

Forced departures in the S&P 500 rose from seven in 2024 to 10 in 2025, with the overall rate rising from 14.3% to 15.2% of all succession cases. While this is a greater increase than the Russell 3000, the percentages are roughly the same, suggesting that forced succession was a recurring feature of CEO turnover at both large and smaller public companies.

This year, through August 2026, the Russell 3000 recorded 20 forced departures, representing 9.9% of succession cases, while the S&P 500 recorded two, representing 6.3%. So far in 2026, forced departures account for a smaller share of succession cases in both indexes, but the more durable governance takeaway is that boards need to be prepared for CEO transitions that may occur on a timetable they do not fully control.

Forced departures reinforce the need for a standing contingency plan alongside the long-term succession process. Boards should know who can provide immediate continuity, which internal candidates are genuinely ready, and when an external search is necessary so that an unexpected transition does not force decisions under avoidable time pressure.

Across the 2024-August 2026 period, consumer discretionary, health care, and information technology accounted for 59% of all forced departures.

Consumer discretionary saw the highest forced-departure rates, with 11 in 2024 and 16 in 2025, while information technology fell sharply from 11 departures in 2024 to three in 2025. So far in 2026, health care has recorded seven forced departures, representing 20% of the sector’s and 35% of all Russell 3000 forced departures year to date.

Uneven consumer demand and pressure on growth and margins can make it more difficult to separate external headwinds from company-specific execution. For boards, the critical question is whether weak results primarily reflect conditions management cannot control or whether they expose shortcomings in strategy, execution, or the company’s ability to adapt.

> > The shifting sector pattern suggests there is no single industry profile for forced CEO turnover. For boards, the more relevant question is whether performance, strategic execution, investor perception, or competitive positioning are deteriorating relative to peers-and whether the CEO mandate remains suited to the environment ahead.

Forced CEO departures occurred across the revenue spectrum in both 2024 and 2025, with no clear relationship between company size and succession risk. The $1 billion-$4.9 billion revenue group recorded the largest number of departures in both years, but elevated rates also appeared among much smaller and much larger companies.

The 2025 results reinforce that point. Companies with less than $100 million in revenue recorded a 22% forced-departure rate, while the $1 billion-$4.9 billion and $10 billion-$24.9 billion groups each stood at 19%, and companies with $50 billion and over were at 18%. The distribution suggests that leadership pressure is not concentrated at one end of the market.

Across the full period, the $1 billion-$4.9 billion group accounted for 42 of the 110 departures classified by annual revenue, or 38%. That concentration partly reflects the number of companies and succession events in the category rather than evidence of uniquely elevated midsized-company risk.

> > The company-size findings reinforce the sector results: there is no single corporate profile that consistently predicts forced CEO turnover. Boards should focus less on scale and more on the conditions that can make a leadership transition necessary-including persistent underperformance, strategic misalignment, and/or investor scrutiny.

Underperformance accounted for 37% of Russell 3000 forced departures across the period and became more prominent in 2025, rising from 31% of cases in 2024 to 44%. It also remains the largest reason category through August 2026, suggesting that concerns about execution and results are a persistent feature of board-initiated leadership change.

More broadly, underperformance, activist investor pressure, and termination without cause accounted for 70% of all forced departures. In 2025 alone, these three categories represented 78% of cases. The categories are assigned separately based on the principal reason supported by the source record. “Termination without cause” is used only when that characterization is disclosed and no more specific reason, such as underperformance, misconduct, or activist pressure, is identified. The overall pattern therefore points primarily to performance concerns, investor pressure, and board-initiated leadership change rather than misconduct or isolated corporate events.

> >  Boards should agree in advance on the conditions that would trigger a deeper reassessment of CEO effectiveness. That framework should look beyond annual financial results to include strategic milestones, competitive position, organizational capability, and the CEO’s response to setbacks-helping directors distinguish temporary underperformance from a more fundamental leadership problem.

Underperformance and activist pressure are classified separately, but the underlying governance concerns can overlap. Weak performance, strategic execution concerns, and questions about leadership effectiveness can also intensify investor scrutiny. For boards, that makes early assessment of performance and investor concerns particularly important.

In 2025, activist pressure accounted for five of the 10 S&P 500 forced departures. Across 2024 through August 2026, it accounted for eight of 19 departures, or 42% of the total. Underperformance separately accounted for five.

The number of S&P 500 cases is modest, but the concentration suggests that activism can be an important catalyst for leadership change, as activist campaigns often bring up issues already within the board’s remit: performance, strategy, capital allocation, portfolio structure, governance, and confidence in management.

> > Boards should periodically assess the company through an independent investor lens, challenging the assumptions underpinning strategy, performance, capital allocation, and leadership. The objective is not to let activists set the agenda, but to make sure that legitimate weaknesses are identified and addressed through the board’s own independent process before external pressure forces a more reactive response.

Recent cases show that forced CEO succession does not follow a single pattern

Performance shortfalls, strategic execution concerns, misconduct, and governance issues can all accelerate leadership change, underscoring the need for boards to maintain succession readiness that is flexible enough to respond to different triggers.

That range is evident across several high-profile transitions. In 2026, a tech company replaced the CEO after the board cited concerns about the pace of change and execution, while a consumer goods company CEO stepped down following a period of weaker US performance and heightened shareholder scrutiny. Two more consumer goods companies terminated their CEOs or forced resignations for cause in 2025, both following a board-supervised investigation.

For boards, the common thread is not the cause of departure, but the need for readiness. Clear decision processes, credible succession options, and a plan for maintaining continuity can help boards respond deliberately when leadership change becomes necessary.

How Boards Can Approach CEO Departures

How boards respond when performance, strategy, or investor confidence begins to deteriorate is paramount for both the company’s and the incoming CEO’s future success. Three priorities to follow: know when underperformance has become a leadership issue, maintain an accelerated succession plan, and engage shareholders before pressure escalates.

Know when underperformance becomes a leadership issue

Underperformance was the leading reason for forced CEO departures and became more prominent in 2025. For boards, the central challenge is distinguishing a temporary setback from evidence that the CEO may no longer be able to deliver the strategy. Establishing a robust and repeatable performance review framework can help accurately track progress from year to year, no matter the external circumstances.

CEO evaluation should therefore extend beyond short-term financial results to execution against strategic priorities, competitive position, organizational capability, and progress against agreed milestones. Boards should also establish in advance what developments would trigger additional support, a reassessment of strategy, or active consideration of succession.

Maintain an accelerated succession plan

Succession planning should address more than an orderly retirement. Boards need a credible plan for an unexpected or board-initiated transition, including who can provide immediate continuity, which internal candidates could become permanent successors, which compensation options retain key executives, and when an external search for a successor is necessary.

Boards should also maintain visibility into the external CEO talent market before a transition becomes necessary. An annual market scan can identify executives who could be viable “ready-now” candidates, benchmark internal successors against external alternatives, and reduce the time required to assess options.

The plan should also address interim authority, retention and compensation arrangements for key executives, relevant severance provisions, and the sequencing of employee and investor communications. Preparing these elements in advance gives the board greater control over the timing and direction of a transition.

Engage shareholders before pressure escalates

The prominence of activist pressure, particularly among S&P 500 forced departures, reinforces the importance of understanding investor concerns before they become a public challenge. When performance is under pressure, boards and management should clearly distinguish among external conditions, industry dynamics, and company-specific execution issues, explain how management is responding, and understand where a significant number of shareholders remain unconvinced.

Boards should also make sure that recurring investor concerns reach directors and, where appropriate, participate directly in shareholder engagement. The objective is not to prevent activism, but to identify legitimate concerns early and address them through the company’s own governance process before external pressure forces a more reactive response.

Looking Ahead

Forced CEO departures remain a recurring part of the succession environment, but the data do not point to a single type of company that is consistently more exposed. The more persistent signals are company specific-particularly performance, strategic execution, and investor pressure.

For boards, the implication is to identify those conditions early and preserve the ability to act. Clear performance expectations, candid assessment of leadership effectiveness, and a credible accelerated succession plan can help boards make leadership changes deliberately rather than reactively.

About This Report

The report is produced by The Conference Board with ESG data analytics firm ESGAUGE, in collaboration with Semler Brossy and Egon Zehnder.

Visit TCB Benchmarking, powered by ESGAUGE, to access a comprehensive library of corporate disclosure data from US public companies.

This article is based on corporate disclosure data from The Conference Board Benchmarking platform, powered by ESGAUGE.