Sponsor-Controller Cleared of Conflicts in Sale Near Fund’s Term End

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Steven J. Steinman is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is Managing Partner, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Steinman, Mr. Epstein, Philip Richter, Randi Lally, and Mark H. Lucas, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Manti v. Authentix, minority stockholders of Authentix Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) challenged the $87.5 million sale of the Company by private equity firm The Carlyle Group to private equity firm Blue Water Energy, LLC (the “Merger”). In an earlier decision in the case—issued seven years ago at the pleading stage of litigation—the court had found that the Merger potentially was a conflicted-controller transaction in which Carlyle had received a non-ratable benefit based on the liquidity needs of its soon-to-expire fund (the “Fund”) that had invested in the Company. The court had, therefore, at the pleading stage, declined to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims; and held that the entire fairness standard of review presumptively applied and Carlyle and its representatives on the Company’s board may have breached their fiduciary duties by causing a quick sale to coincide with expiration of the Fund’s term. Now, seven years later, the court, in a post-trial decision issued January 7, 2025, concluded instead that the Merger was not a conflicted-controller transaction. Therefore, business judgment review applied and the case was dismissed.

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Exiting Delaware: The TripAdvisor Decision

Anna T. Pinedo is a Partner at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on her Mayer Brown memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On February 4, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court (the “Court”) overturned a prior ruling by the Delaware Court of Chancery, which subjected TripAdvisor Inc.’s (“TripAdvisor”) and Liberty TripAdvisor Holdings Inc.’s (“Liberty”) corporate conversions to Nevada to an entire fairness review. Instead, the Court determined that the business judgment rule was the appropriate standard of review, as no board member—alleged controller included—received a material non-ratable benefit from the conversions.

A key aspect of the decision was the Court’s rejection of the Chancery Court’s view on the significance of “temporality” in assessing whether an alleged non-ratable benefit, such as reduced litigation exposure, was material.  After an extensive analysis of Delaware precedent, the Court emphasized that temporality plays a critical role in determining materiality.  Since no existing or imminent litigation claims were identified as being impacted by the conversions, the Court concluded that the alleged benefit was too speculative to be deemed material.  The Court also highlighted that the board made its decision to reincorporate on a “clear day,” without the shadow of pending legal threats.

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Securities Law Alert: Year in Review

Stephen BlakeCraig Waldman, and Jonathan Youngwood are Partners at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Blake, Mr. Waldman, Mr. Youngwood, Meredith Karp, Michael Garvey, and Pete Kazanoff.

Supreme Court Decisions and Developments

Supreme Court: Overturns Chevron Deference

Overturning nearly 40 years of precedent, on June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court held by a 6-3 vote: “Chevron is overruled.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (Roberts, C.J.)[1] Under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), federal courts were required to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation in cases involving statutory questions of agency authority as long as the agency’s interpretation was not unreasonable. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Chevron could not be reconciled with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which governs federal administrative agencies, because the APA requires a reviewing court to exercise its independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, but Chevron requires the court “to ignore, not follow,” the reading the court would have reached had it exercised this independent judgment.

The Court further criticized Chevron’s presumption–that Congress understood that a statutory ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows–stating that it “is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities.” Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]he very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction–the tools courts use every day–is to resolve statutory ambiguities.” He noted that this is particularly true when the ambiguity concerns the scope of the agency’s own power, which he described as “perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.”

Although the Court found that past judicial decisions have shown Chevron to be “unworkable” and unreliable as a result of inconsistent application by the lower courts, it did “not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework.” Rather, the Court concluded that “[t]he holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.”

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Weekly Roundup: February 21-27, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 21-27, 2025

Delaware Corporate Law Myth-Busting: The “Expanding Definition” of Controlling Stockholder


Delaware


White Squires, Black Knights, Spin-offs, and Succession: The Four Horsemen of Hedge Fund Activism in 2025


SEC Staff Reinstates Traditional Approach to Interpreting the Shareholder Proposal Rule


Takeaways from the Pause on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement


Rethinking Shareholder Contracting: The Design of Corporate Altering Rules


Demonstrating Alignment of CEO Pay and Performance


Delaware Corporate Law: Recent Trends and Developments


Sustainability and the Corporate Reporting System


What Directors Should Know About the 2025 Proxy Season


Delaware Supreme Court Reaffirms High Bar for Proving Control by a Minority Stockholder


AI-Powered (Finance) Scholarship


Pay Ratios: CEO and C-Suite Compensation in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500


Delaware Supreme Court Overturns Tripadvisor Decision, Providing a Clearer Path for Reincorporation


Explicit and Implicit Bundling in Shareholder Voting on Cleansing Acts


The DEI Dilemma


The DEI Dilemma

David A. Katz and Elina Tetelbaum are Partners at Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

We wrote recently about regulatory and policy developments that are ushering in a retreat from ESG at public companies, proxy advisors, and investors. As companies head into proxy season, the appropriate manner and scope of that retreat has been particularly fraught for Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI)-related issues.  Companies are grappling with key judgment calls on how to adapt DEI policies to make them legally compliant and consistent with business imperatives, as well as how prominently to feature disclosure on those topics, if at all.  For years, in response to investor feedback and proxy advisors’ corresponding focus, proxy statements and companies’ websites have highlighted the results of efforts companies have made in diversifying boards of directors, management teams, and employee bases on gender, racial, ethnic and other grounds.  Following the January 21, 2025 Executive Order, Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity, and the issuance of the Justice Department’s report “encourag[ing] the private sector to end illegal discrimination and preferences, including policies relating to DEI,” many companies and boards have evaluated the extent to which such practices and disclosures continue to be advisable.

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Explicit and Implicit Bundling in Shareholder Voting on Cleansing Acts

Marcel Kahan is the George T. Lowy Professor of Law and Edward B. Rock is the Martin Lipton Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The 2015 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Corwin expanded the cleansing effect of a shareholder vote, thereby endowing shareholder votes with greater normative weight than at any time in the modern period. Outside the context of a conflicted transaction involving a controlling shareholder, a fully informed uncoerced disinterested shareholder vote on a transaction is treated as a full defense against any claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  With the benefit of a distance of ten years, was Corwin’s interpretation of the cleansing effect of a shareholder vote on a merger justified?

We argue that this weight is misplaced from an internal corporate law perspective and represents a departure from the traditional treatment of shareholder ratification. A vote by a majority of target shareholders in favor of a transaction can be seen at most as evidence that shareholders believe that the value of their shares will be higher if the transaction takes place than if it does not take place as of the time of the vote—but such a vote does not indicate fairness and should not substitute for a fairness analysis.

As a more rational regime, we suggest holding separate votes on the transaction and cleansing.  This explicit private ordering bundling has several advantages over the present approach, which implicitly bundles the consummation of the transaction with the cleansing of fiduciary duty breaches by judicial fiat.

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Delaware Supreme Court Overturns Tripadvisor Decision, Providing a Clearer Path for Reincorporation

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Philip Richter is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is Managing Partner, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Steven Steinman, Roy Tannenbaum, and Michael P. Sternheim, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In a much-anticipated decision, Maffei v. Palkon (“Tripadvisor”) (Feb.  4, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Tripadvisor, Inc. board’s decision to reincorporate the company from Delaware to Nevada is subject to the deferential business judgment rule standard of review—and not the significantly more onerous entire fairness standard.

The decision reverses the Court of Chancery’s holding that Tripadvisor’s reincorporation was subject to entire fairness review because the company’s directors and controller may have received a material, non-ratable benefit from the transaction—namely, reduced exposure to litigation liability, as Nevada law may provide lower standards for fiduciaries as compared to Delaware law. The Court of Chancery also had suggested that, for the reincorporation to have been entirely fair, it may be that some form of consideration had to be paid to the minority stockholders to compensate them for the reduction in their “litigation rights” under Nevada law. Under business judgment review, however, the claims against the directors and the controller for breaches of fiduciary duty in approving the reincorporation almost certainly will be dismissed.

Key Points

  • A Delaware corporation’s reincorporation to another state generally will be subject to judicial deference under the business judgment rule. However, it may be subject to entire fairness review instead if the decision was not made on a “clear day”—that is, was made at a time that there was pending or threatened litigation against the directors or a controller or a specific transaction was contemplated.
  • The decision may stimulate further interest in considering reincorporation from Delaware. While the Supreme Court’s TripAdvisor decision facilitates reincorporation from Delaware, we continue to believe that the number of reincorporations will remain small and will continue to involve, primarily, controlled companies.

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Pay Ratios: CEO and C-Suite Compensation in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500

Paul Hodgson is a Senior Advisor at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on his Conference Board memorandum.

The CEO is consistently the highest-paid executive in the C-Suite, but how does CEO compensation compare to that of other executives? This report examines the ratio of CEO total compensation to that of chief financial officers (CFOs), chief legal officers (CLOs), chief operating officers (COOs), chief human resource officers (CHROs), chief marketing officers (CMOs), and named executive officers (NEOs) as a whole, across the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000.

Key Insights

  • Between 2020 and 2024, the gap between total CEO compensation and non-CEO executives narrowed in the S&P but widened in the Russell 3000.
  • There are substantial role variations by industry in the pay ratios of other executives to the CEO; for instance, for all NEOs in the Russell 3000, the differences are widest in materials, industrials, and utilities.
  • In the Russell 3000, median total compensation for all NEOs does not exceed 50% of CEO median total compensation in any industry—although a small number of individual C-Suite positions in certain sectors do surpass this threshold.
  • Gender pay gaps were smaller in the Russell 3000 but more pronounced in the S&P 500, with woman CMOs, in particular, earning significantly more than their men counterparts.

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AI-Powered (Finance) Scholarship

Robert Novy-Marx is the Lori and Alan S. Zekelman Distinguished Professor of Business Administration at Simon Business School, University of Rochester, and Mihail Z. Velikov is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Smeal College of Business at Penn State University. This post is based on their recent paper.

The Scale and Scope of AI-Generated Research

Our study begins by mining over 30,000 potential stock return predictor signals from accounting data. These signals are constructed using various combinations of financial statement items from the COMPUSTAT database, representing a comprehensive universe of accounting-based return predictors. We identify 96 signals that demonstrate robust predictive power for stock returns using the Novy-Marx and Velikov (2023) “Assaying Anomalies” protocol. This validation process involves multiple stages of increasingly stringent criteria, including tests for statistical significance, robustness to different portfolio construction methodologies, and controls for 200+ other known stock return predictors.

For each of these validated signals, we use state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) and “template reports” generated by the “Assaying Anomalies” protocol to programmatically generate three distinct versions of complete academic papers. Each version contains different theoretical justifications while maintaining consistency with the empirical findings. This approach allows us to explore how AI can generate multiple plausible explanations for the same empirical phenomena, mimicking a common practice in academic finance where researchers often develop hypothesis after discovering empirical patterns, a practice known as HARKing (Hypothesizing After Results are Known).

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Delaware Supreme Court Reaffirms High Bar for Proving Control by a Minority Stockholder

Rick Horvath, Stephen Leitzell, and Eric Siegel are Partners at Dechert LLP. This post is based on a Dechert memorandum by Mr. Horvath, Mr. Leitzell, Mr. Siegel, Sarah Kupferman, and Stephen Pratt, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Key Takeaways

  • Delaware Supreme Court reaffirms that “the test for actual control by a minority stockholder is not an easy one to satisfy.”
  • Supreme Court makes clear that control by a minority stockholder is “not presumed.”
  • Supreme Court’s decision indicates that a special committee of independent directors, and not the full suite of MFW-procedures, may suffice to restore the business judgment rule to an interested transaction with a minority stockholder who is a potential controller.
  • If Oracle is expanded to allow for a special committee to restore the business judgment rule when a minority stockholder is alleged to have control, such a result would reduce litigation risk and provide for greater deal certainty.

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