Yearly Archives: 2008

Acquisition of Troubled Financial Institutions and Assisted Transactions

This post is from Edward D. Herlihy of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

My partners Craig M. Wasserman, Richard K. Kim, Lawrence S. Makow, Nicholas G. Demmo and Matthew M. Guest and I have recently issued a memorandum entitled “Acquisition of Troubled Financial Institutions and Assisted Transactions.” The memorandum discusses the credit-related losses suffered by some financial institutions, their efforts to raise capital, and the increasingly prominent role played by federal and state regulators in monitoring and shoring up the capital and liquidity situations of struggling institutions. Against this backdrop, the memorandum discusses the FDIC’s historical approach to addressing failures of insured depository institutions. In this context, the FDIC is required by law to guarantee insured deposits and dispose of the failed institution’s assets in the manner least costly to the FDIC’s deposit insured fund. We also discuss the FDIC’s formal resolution process, which may include a managed auction to dispose of failed bank franchises, and explain the options open to the FDIC after a bank has been declared insolvent. In view of distinguishing features of the current economic downturn, we expect a more receptive regulatory climate for private investments into banks and thrifts.

The memorandum is available here.

Economic Characteristics, Corporate Governance, and the Influence of Compensation Consultants on Executive Pay Levels

This post is from David F. Larcker of the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Posts by Brian Cadman and Tatiana Sandino, available here and here also analyzed the role of compensation consultants in setting pay.

In a recent working paper, Christopher Armstrong, Christopher Ittner and I investigate the relation between the use of compensation consultants and CEO pay levels. We conduct an analysis using proxy disclosures by a diverse sample of 2,116 companies. Consistent with claims that executive pay levels in clients of compensation consultants are higher than justified by economic characteristics, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that control for a wide variety of economic determinants of compensation indicate that total pay is higher for clients of most (but not all) of the consulting firms relative to companies without consultants. The OLS results also suggest that pay levels of clients of the larger, most frequently used compensation consultants are higher than those of firms using other consulting firms (most of which are smaller, boutique compensation consultants) in some model specifications. However, when more sophisticated propensity score matched pair analyses are used to relax the stringent functional form assumptions imposed by OLS models and to assess correlated omitted variables problems, most differences between the individual consulting firms disappear, though the statistically higher levels of total pay at companies using compensation consultants persist.

When we add governance variables, we continue to find higher pay in clients of most consulting firms in OLS regressions. In contrast, we find no significant differences in total pay levels between users and non-users of consultants or among the various consulting firms when propensity score matched pair analyses are used. This evidence indicates that once companies with similar economic and governance characteristics are compared and OLS’s strict functional form is relaxed, pay levels are not significantly different, suggesting that governance differences account for much of the unexplained pay differences between consultant users and non-users.

Further analysis indicates that these results are due (at least partially) to pay levels for clients of individual consulting firms varying with governance strength, with weaker governance within clients of a given consultant associated with higher total pay. These results suggest that the higher pay found in consulting clients is at least partially explained by the link between weaker governance and higher pay in companies using consultants. This is consistent with the rent extraction view of the association between compensation consultant use and CEO pay. Finally, we find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher for clients of potentially “conflicted” consultants that offer a broad range of advisory services relative to clients of specialized, “non-conflicted” compensation consulting firms.

The full paper is available for download here.

Shareholder Activism and the “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”: Response to Marty Lipton

This post is by John F. Olson and Amy L. Goodman, partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP in Washington, DC.

In a post to this blog on June 25th, Marty Lipton presented a paper entitled “Shareholder Activism and the Eclipse of the Public Corporation: Is the Current Wave of Activism Causing Another Tectonic Shift in the Public Corporation?,” in which he expressed concern about the eroding centrality of the board and its vulnerability to pressure to seize short-term value at the expense of long-term value creation. Marty is one of our most experienced and thoughtful observers of corporate governance trends, based in large part from his front row seat as an advisor to many corporate boards and managements. However, while his points of caution are well worth bearing in mind, we think that directors and those who advise them must do more than decry what to many are troublesome trends that erode the ability of the board to take decisive action on behalf of the corporate enterprise.

The new world of inexpensive and constant communication is not limited to the corporation and its constituents; it is part of everyday life in every realm. Shareholder and other interest groups are going to make themselves heard; proxy contests are going to be cheaper and more accessible to those who may have short term goals; regulation will continue to be hard pressed to adapt quickly to these changes. In response to this environment, which we argue is inescapable, we submit that it’s time to move beyond the us (corporate board/managers) versus them (shareholder) mindset and recognize the commonality of interest that exists between boards and most shareholders in creating long-term value. We are preparing a paper that will develop these ideas in more detail but wanted to encourage more dialogue surrounding these important issues now.

Given the increasingly complex and global world facing corporations today, we need to get away from focusing on the corporate governance issue du jour or per annum to assisting the Board in addressing its complex role. In recent years, there has been an annual “hot” corporate governance issue–from declassifying boards, to shareholder approval of poison pills, to majority voting for directors, to an advisory vote on pay. While companies have embraced many of these proposals, boards of directors are becoming increasingly concerned about the amount of time and attention they, management and the company’s advisors must spend on responding to the corporate governance issue du jour. It may be time to step back and consider whether other issues should take priority, especially given the state of the economy and the many challenges facing corporate America.

In our upcoming paper, we will address some of the issues that deserve focus from shareholders, directors, business executives and other interested stakeholders.

• First, and not necessarily in order of importance, we need to develop effective methods of board/shareholder communication that build on new electronic capabilities but are not burdensome and do not increase liability risks.

• Second, boards and business executives need to effectively and regularly communicate corporate strategy and the board’s oversight role to investors, the business press and analysts, once again without fear of increased liability.

• Third, companies need to make good investor relations, and “good listening” a day to day corporate priority, and shareholders need to take advantage of these opportunities to present their views to business executives and directors.

• Fourth, shareholders need to think for themselves and reduce their reliance on proxy advisory services and be more transparent in their proxy voting decision-making processes.

• Fifth, companies, boards and their advisors need to figure out a way for directors to spend more time addressing strategy and risk and less time on compliance.

• Finally, while efforts to better educate directors about corporate governance and their fiduciary responsibilities has been salutary, we now need to shift our efforts to better educating directors in understanding the businesses, including the risks, of their companies.

Delaware Supreme Court Case on Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: Today’s Oral Argument

Editor’s Note: This post from J.W. Verret of George Mason University summarizes today’s oral argument in Delaware. For previous posts on the Blog about the case, and for the parties’ briefs, see here and here. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

AFSCME Employees Pension Plan submitted a shareholder proposal for inclusion in CA’s proxy materials for their annual meeting scheduled to be held on September 9, 2008. That proposal sought to amend CA’s bylaws to require the company to reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a dissident nominating a rival slate of directors, provided that at least one nominee from the dissident slate was victorious. CA sought no-action relief from the SEC permitting it to exclude that proposal under Rule 14a-8 as illegal under Delaware law, and the SEC certified the question to the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court’s opinion stands to re-define the nature of corporate federalism and ring in a new collaborative relationship between the Delaware Courts and the SEC. Indeed, it may encourage the SEC to include more state law carve-outs in future rule-making.

I wrote an essay (available here) on this issue in March predicting that the SEC would certify the bylaw question to Delaware soon. For more on the growing trend of shareholder democracy behind this challenge, see Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie: Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined (available here). For more on bylaws, see Profs. Coates and Faris’s work (Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 Bus. Law. 1323 (2001) (with B. Faris)) and Prof. Hamermesh’s article (available here). Anticipating that the opinion in this difficult case might make use of dicta guidance, see also my article with Chief Justice Steele on the Delaware Guidance Function (available here).

This post summarizes a very lively oral argument in Dover, Delaware this morning. The Justices and the parties displayed a rigorous command of this intricate subject, working in a very short timeframe. It was fascinating to watch these masters of the Delaware General Corporation Law at the height of their craft.

Arguing on behalf of Computer Associates was Robert Guiffra of Sullivan & Cromwell. His presentation focused on two key issues: first, he argued that this bylaw does not relate to an election of directors, but merely comes into play after the election, and thus is not protected by the principles in the Blasius line of cases. As a mandated payment of expenses it relates to control of the corporate treasury, part of the business and affairs of the corporation as defined in Rule 141(a). As such, limitations on the Board’s authority may only appear in its Certificate of Incorporation, not its bylaws. Second, he argued that the Board must be permitted to make a determination of whether a reimbursement was consistent with its fiduciary duty, where this bylaw mandated payment under all circumstances.

Arguing on behalf of AFSCME was Michael Barry of Grant & Eisenhofer. His presentation focused on two key issues: first, he argued that this bylaw relates to an election, implicates the shareholder franchise and Blasius review, and is not a part of the ordinary business affairs of the corporation. As such, it does not undermine the Board’s authority under section 141. He also argued that where directors are mandated to reimburse expenses, they cannot be doing so for the purposes of entrenchment, and thus cannot logically do so in violation of their fiduciary duties. He also cited Delaware’s approval of mandatory indemnification bylaws as binding precedent on this issue.

Both Counsel admitted that, though the bylaw was unclear, reimbursement of expenses for the full contest and not just for the successful nominee was anticipated. Both parties also skillfully argued that the Court need not permanently resolve any looming contradiction between section 109 and section 141(a) to rule in their favor. Section 109 of the DGCL grants shareholders the right to adopt bylaws, and section 141(a) reads that “the business and affairs of every corporation…shall be managed by…a board of directors.” Thus, the oft referenced “recursive loop” in which a bylaw adopted under section 109 might limit a board’s authority under 141(a). The Court nevertheless asked counsel’s opinion concerning the intent of the legislature in creating two conceivably conflicting sections of the code.

Questions from the Court during oral argument make any predictions difficult. The Justices pushed counsel for CA over whether the prospect of reimbursement was inextricably linked to the success of an election, and whether the bylaw would be legal if adopted by the Board. The Justices pushed counsel for AFSCME over whether there might be any circumstances under which a bylaw could force inequitable reimbursement and whether the Board’s authority to adopt bylaws was co-extensive with that of shareholders. Interestingly, Justice Berger, when she served as a Vice Chancellor, suggested in dicta that stockholders create a bylaw limiting the board’s power to amend a stockholder adopted bylaw in American Int’l Rent a Car, an opinion from 1984, which may indicate her view on whether the right to adopt bylaws is co-extensive. The Court also questioned whether the “reasonable” qualifier in this bylaw left enough room for board discretion not to reimburse wasteful expenses.

My own prediction is a substantive victory for AFSCME is possible, but the holding would be limited. If the Court allows election bylaws that mandate board action, it may require bylaws mandating board action have a “fiduciary out” clause similar to what we see in deal lock-in measures. This could be accomplished, I think, either by ruling that the bylaw is illegal only for lack of a fiduciary-out or ruling that the bylaw is legal but that a Board could ignore it if it’s fiduciary duty required it (board action which would then be critically reviewed under subsequent challenge, and the standard of that review for such a decision could be formulated in this opinion). The one thing I am most confident about is that the Court is likely to leave open the possibility to rule that other forms of bylaws, especially poison pill related bylaws, run afoul of 141(a).

Delaware Supreme Court Case on Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: The Parties’ Briefs

This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In advance of the scheduled Delaware Supreme Court hearing tomorrow on the validity of the proposed shareholder-adopted election bylaw submitted for inclusion in the proxy materials of Delaware corporation CA, Inc, we are posting the briefs of the two sides, which were filed yesterday. As previously reported on the Blog, the case is before the Court on two questions certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission and accepted by the Court. Submitted by AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the bylaw would require the company to reimburse reasonable stockholder expenses incurred in running a short slate of director nominees for election.

The brief of CA, Inc is here, and the brief of AFSCME Employees Pension Plan and its appendix are here and here. Oral argument is scheduled for tomorrow, July 9, at 10:00 a.m.

Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines

This post is from Effi Benmelech of Harvard University.

My paper “Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines” co-written with Nittai Bergman, which is forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, documents empirically the conditions under which airlines renegotiate aircraft leases in the United States. The control rights that financial contracts provide over firms’ underlying assets play a fundamental role in the incomplete contracting literature since the threat of asset liquidation motivates debtors to avoid default. Thus, in the incomplete contracting literature, asset liquidation values play a key role in the ex-post determination of debt payments. To date, there is little empirical evidence analyzing the ability of firms to renegotiate their financial liabilities and the role asset values play in such renegotiations. This paper attempts to fill this gap.

We develop an incomplete-contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline industry in the United States. Our model has two testable implications. First, firms will be able to credibly renegotiate their financial commitments only when their financial situation is sufficiently poor. Second, when a firm’s financial position is sufficiently poor, and hence its renegotiation threat is credible, a reduction in the liquidation value of assets increases the concessions that the firm obtains in renegotiation.

Our empirical analysis examines renegotiation of leases amongst U.S. airlines. We collect data on all publicly traded, passenger-carriers and construct a dataset which includes information about contracted lease payments, actual lease payments, and fleet composition by aircraft type.

In addition, we construct four different measures of the ease of overall re-deployability of an airline’s leased aircraft. We find that publicly traded airlines often renegotiate their lease contracts. Furthermore, we show that aircraft lease renegotiations take place when liquidation values are low and airlines’ financial condition is poor. We supplement our analysis by studying lease renegotiation out of bankruptcy. We find that, even out of bankruptcy, airlines in poor financial condition can reduce their lease payments and that lower fleet re-deployability enables these airlines to extract greater concessions from their lessors.

The full paper is available for download here.

FASB Proposes Amendments to SFAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies

This post is from John F. Olson of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. We have received other memoranda on the proposed amendments to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 by Eric Roth of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and our guest contributor Holly Gregory of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. The memoranda are available here and here.

My colleagues and I have prepared a memorandum summarizing the serious concerns raised for public companies by proposed amendments to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number 5, dealing with loss contingencies. Boards of directors, particularly audit committee members, and those who advise boards should become familiar with the proposed amendments and the potential consequences, which include earlier, more detailed public disclosure and, including liability estimates, for litigation and other claims, even in cases where the company expects to prevail or does not believe there will be a material cost to settle the matter. Comments in writing are due on this proposed amendment by August 8, 2008 and FASB will thereafter host an open forum on the issue at which those who have submitted comments may testify. We welcome reactions to the concerns we have expressed.

The memorandum is available here.

Delaware Supreme Court to Rule on the Validity of Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws

This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission has certified to the Delaware Supreme Court two questions of law regarding the permissibility of a bylaw amendment submitted as a shareholder proposal to a Delaware corporation, CA, Inc. The amendment would require the company to reimburse reasonable stockholder expenses incurred in running a short slate of director nominees for election. This is the first time that the SEC has used this certification procedure.

CA asserts that the shareholder proposal may be excluded from its 2008 proxy materials under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on the grounds that the proposal is an improper subject for shareholder action under Delaware law and that the proposal, if adopted, would cause CA to violate Delaware law. The Court has agreed to an immediate determination of the questions certified and ordered briefs to be filed on or before Monday, July 7. Oral argument is to be held on Wednesday, July 9.

The Supreme Court’s order accepting the questions certified by the SEC is available here. The SEC’s certification of questions of law, with the SEC General Counsel’s covering letter, are available here and here. The competing legal opinions are available here and here.

Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the U.S. – An Update

This post is from Mark Gordon of Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz.

Together with my colleagues Adam Emmerich and Sabastian V. Niles, I have issued a memorandum entitled “Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the U.S. – Six Months Later,” which discusses the surprising slowdown in SWF Activity in the U.S. since the end of 2007 and into the opening weeks of 2008 when investment activity by these funds reached new heights. Our memorandum discusses some of the reasons for the slowdown, highlighting the possibility that the uncertain political receptivity to SWF investments and heightened regulatory activity has chilled SWF interest in the U.S. by increasing the costs and risks of investment. The memorandum concludes by calling for continued SWF activity in order to develop a track record of successful investments that will help cause political concerns to recede and by identifying the critical issues for those SWF transactions that get to the negotiation phase.

The memorandum is available here.

Accounting Information as Political Currency

This post is from Karthik Ramanna of Harvard Business School.

It is well known that firms contribute money to politicians. It is also widely held that such money, in the form of campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures, is used to buy access to and/or favors from politicians. Firms and politicians establish relationships with one another and the value to firms of such relationships likely increases over time. When a politician with a well-established relationship to a firm faces a tough election prospect, it is in the firm’s interest to secure that politician’s future. One obvious way to do so is to make further monetary contributions directly to the politician’s campaign. A priori, direct monetary contributions are not the only channel through which firms can deliver benefits to candidates during political campaigns. In a recent working paper, Sugata Roychowdhury of MIT and I investigate whether political contributions can take a non-cash form, specifically (accounting) information. In other words, we investigate whether (accounting) information can be used as political currency?

Our setting is the US congressional election of 2004, where outsourcing of US jobs was a campaign issue. Firms engaged in outsourcing activities had incentives to ensure that political candidates they were affiliated with did not suffer from negative media due to the outsourcing. These incentives were likely to be strongest when the candidates were in competitive races. We test whether outsourcing firms understated profits in the period leading up to the 2004 election, in circumstances where the firms’ affiliated candidates were in competitive races. Understating profits can help deflect attention away from the firms’ outsourcing activities, and thus spare the candidates considerable embarrassment. We find that outsourcing firms donating to congressional candidates in closely watched races managed their earnings downwards in the two quarters immediately preceding the 2004 election. We find no evidence of downward earnings management among outsourcing corporations donating to congressional candidates not in closely watched races.

Ceteris paribus, if donors’ downward earnings management is effective in deflecting attention away from outsourcing, thus sparing candidates from negative media, we expect such candidates to do better in the election (than the average candidate). In regression tests that control for likely determinants of election outcomes, we find vote shares for candidates are increasing in the extent of their corporate donors’ downward earnings management. Overall, our findings are consistent with firms managing accounting information in circumstances where this is likely to benefit allied politicians. The evidence is consistent the hypothesis that accounting information can be used as political currency.

You can read the entire paper here and an interview with me over the paper here.

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