Monthly Archives: March 2009

Directors’ Duty of Oversight in a Meltdown

The post is based on a client memorandum by Peter Atkins, Edward Welch and Jennifer Voss of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Other posts on this Forum that also discuss In Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation are available here and here. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

This note was prompted by our review of the recent decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in In Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 3338-CC. In the context of dismissing, on the basis of a failure adequately to plead demand futility, allegations in a complaint of breaches by directors of their duty of oversight, the Court emphasizes the continuing vitality and primacy of the business judgment rule presumption as a key protector of our system of private capital investment. For corporate lawyers, the analysis and outcome of the case is not particularly surprising. However, in this meltdown environment, the outcome could easily be misunderstood as a reflection of a supposed era of state corporate law being too kind and gentle to directors.

So we’ve written this note to include some context and elaboration, rather than just reporting some specific key findings and an overall assessment — such as “It is a heartening decision for directors who oversee their companies in good faith, even though business decisions made on their watch result in ‘staggering’ losses” — which would likely only contribute to the misunderstanding.

Our objective is to illuminate both the serious and thoughtful approach to decisionmaking reflected in the Citigroup decision — an approach that is characteristic of Delaware judicial decisions generally — as well as the important underlying economic policy on which it is grounded. In addition, in a particularly difficult time, when change seems to be the order of the day, we hope that by providing some context and elaboration we may in some small way help counteract a tendency to discard or diminish certain core legal concepts which have stood the test of time and for good reason.

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That famous curse — may you live in interesting times — is upon us! For directors of business corporations nothing could be more true. For almost a year now, the global financial markets have been in turmoil, and the global economy has followed suit. In more ebullient times, risks were undertaken in businesses across many industries and around the world that, on a hindsight basis, the directors and management of numerous companies wish had never occurred. As events have unfolded, operating results have plummeted, balance sheets have deteriorated, stock market values have declined dramatically and personal wealth has imploded. All in all an ugly environment and one uniquely positioned for victims to assign blame and seek recompense.

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SEC Reverses Course on TARP-Related Shareholder Proposal

This post by Jeremy Goldstein is based on a client memo by Mr. Goldstein and his colleagues Lawrence S. Makow, Jeannemarie O’Brien, Nicholas G. Demmo, and David M. Adlerstein of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

The SEC staff has denied a no-action request by Regions Financial to exclude a shareholder proposal requesting that Regions impose numerous restrictions on executive compensation in light of the company’s participation in the TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Several unions have reportedly submitted the proposal (or a variation thereof) at nearly two dozen financial institutions. Its restrictions, if adopted, would severely hamstring a company in designing compensation to attract, retain and incentive senior management. The union proposal would micromanage executive compensation with a laundry list of rigid, inflexible restrictions, including an annual cap on incentive compensation, a requirement of performance vesting for most long-term equity compensation, a requirement that stock option strike prices be peer-indexed, a bar against executives selling more than 25% of their equity awards while they remain employed, a prohibition on accelerated (e.g., non-cause firing) vesting for all executive equity awards, a limit on severance payments to no more than annual salary and a freeze on the accrual of retirement benefits under SERPs.

Regions argued that the proposal is actually multiple proposals in violation of Rule 14a-8 and is vague and indefinite (among other reasons, for failing to say whether the restrictions would be permanent or limited to the period of TARP participation). Regions also argued that it had substantially implemented the proposal by agreeing to limit executive compensation in its CPP investment agreement with the U.S. Treasury. Last December, the SEC staff granted no-action relief to SunTrust on a substantially identical shareholder proposal. In denying Regions’ request for no-action relief, the staff provided no explanation for its about-face.

As described in our memorandum of February 13, 2009, the just-enacted stimulus bill requires Treasury to implement harsh compensation restrictions for TARP participants. Last week, Treasury announced its own distinct set of compensation requirements for prospective TARP participants. Each of these differs from the contractual compensation restrictions that CPP participants believed they were signing up for in round one of the TARP. Right now, directors and managers of financial institutions are being compelled to spend significant time grappling with responses to these developments. In this overheated environment, boards of many major financial companies will now also have to contend with the recent wave of “kitchen sink” shareholder initiatives on executive compensation. The SEC and investors alike would be well served to consider whether a continual ratcheting up of distraction and pressure on financial institutions is the best path to hastening economic recovery and restoring credit markets.

Debt Enforcement Around the World

Editor’s Note: This post is by Andrei Shleifer of the Harvard University Department of Economics.

In a recently published Journal of Political Economy paper entitled Debt Enforcement around the World (co-written with Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart and Caralee McLiesh), my co-authors and I study debt enforcement with respect to an insolvent firm in 88 countries. To do so, we present insolvency practitioners in each country with the same case study of an insolvent firm. The case was developed jointly with the Committee on Bankruptcy of the International Bar Association to be representative of insolvency of a midsize firm in many countries. The firm is a hotel with a given number of employees, capital and ownership structure, value as a going concern, and a lower value if sold piecemeal. It is otherwise identical across countries except that the economic values are all normalized by the country’s per capita income.

Our analysis is organized around the procedures that the respondents say are likely to be used in their countries to address the insolvency of the hotel, which are (1) foreclosure by the senior creditor, which may or may not involve a court; (2) liquidation; and (3) reorganization. We find that debt enforcement around the world is highly inefficient, even in the relatively simple case we consider. The inefficiency comes from high administrative costs and long delays, but also from excessive piecemeal sales of viable businesses. The inefficiency is linked to underdevelopment, which probably proxies for poor public sector capacity of a country, and to French legal origin, which probably proxies for excessive formalism of the debt enforcement process. The inefficiency is also related to such structural aspects of debt enforcement as ineffective collateral systems, poorly structured appeals, business interruptions during bankruptcy, and inefficient voting among creditors. The inefficiency correlates with underdeveloped debt markets, consistent with the view that failures of debt enforcement discourage lending.

The narrative that emerges from these findings is straightforward. Developing countries follow the rich ones and introduce elaborate bankruptcy procedures, presumably designed to save and rehabilitate insolvent firms. In the rich countries, although these procedures are time consuming and expensive, they typically succeed in preserving the firm as a going concern. In the developing countries, in contrast, these procedures nearly always fail in their basic economic goal of saving the firm; in fact, 80 percent of insolvent businesses end up being sold piecemeal. The odds of saving the firm are especially low in the French legal origin countries, which have highly formal bankruptcy procedures. Our analysis suggests that less formalistic mechanisms might improve debt enforcement in a developing country. In addition, efficiency may be improved through a number of small changes in how debt enforcement is organized, such as restricting appeals in bankruptcy proceedings, moving toward absolute priority and to floating charge debt.

The full paper is available for download here. In addition, the data used in this paper can be downloaded from here.

Financial Reporting in a Time of Crisis

The post below by James Turley is a transcript of remarks by him at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 5, 2009.

Good evening and thank you to the Commonwealth Club for inviting me to speak here today. I’m well aware of the club’s rich history, and I’m proud to have this opportunity to be with you tonight.

I’ve just returned from the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, which is better known simply as “Davos.” As you may know, this multi-day event brings together leaders in business and government, for discussions on a range of important topics. There were a number of useful discussions — some of them enlightening, one or two uplifting, many of them sobering.

As you probably know, Ernst & Young has operations in about 140 countries, and I seem to spend a great deal of my time across all of them. In conversations around the world, and certainly in Davos, I’ve heard a lot of blame directed at the United States, as the place that gave birth to the financial crisis that is impacting markets globally. The critics make a number of points. They talk about erosion in US fiscal discipline…reckless lending by mortgage lenders…and excessive leverage at financial institutions. They also point to the role of the credit-dependent American consumer…it’s not just the banks that need deleveraging, it’s the American consumer. The view is that the United States has created an illness in the financial system that has now infected everyone else. And you know what? I think a lot of these criticisms ring true.

Yet, at the same time, in the middle of this financial crisis, I also heard in Davos a sense of determination and hope. Many see that there are important opportunities right now, and are looking for leadership. Many believe that the combination of the financial crisis, an enhanced appreciation for global interconnectivity, and a new US Administration will create momentum for needed change and reform. In the early going, President Obama enjoys tremendous goodwill among political and business leaders the world over.

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Voting Integrity

This post is by Stephen Davis of the Yale School of Management.

The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the Yale School of Management has recently released a new policy briefing entitled “Voting Integrity: Practices for Investors and the Global Proxy Advisory Industry.”

Accountability of corporate boards to shareowners rests in large part on the integrity of the system by which investors vote their proxy ballots. Shareowners rely on the vote to affect the governance of a company; corporate directors see the vote as a barometer of investor confidence in board stewardship. Outcomes determine the fate of director tenure, mergers, acquisitions, capital raising, remuneration plans and other critical decisions with sometimes profound consequences for stakeholders and the marketplace.

However, this briefing finds that the proxy voting system in the US and other markets is chronically subject to criticism that it is short on integrity sufficient to ensure trust. Parties involved are institutional investors, agents such as proxy advisory services, and intermediaries charged with transmitting ballots. Threats include conflicts of interest, opacity, technical faults in the chain by which ballots are transmitted, and a shortage of resources devoted to informed decision-making.

Remedies proposed in this briefing include:

• Governance firms should endorse and comply with a first industry-wide code of professional ethics, including a general ban on a vote advisor performing consulting work for any company on which it provides voting recommendations or ratings.

• Institutional investors should endorse and follow guidance on their own governance produced by the International Corporate Governance Network.

• Institutional investors should report to clients or beneficiaries at least annually on their voting policies and voting records. Further, such institutions should regularly review voting policies to ensure they are fit for purpose; identify, manage and disclose real or potential conflicts of interest on a regular basis; and determine the level and quality of resources necessary and appropriate to deliver vote recommendations and decisions that are in line with their voting policies.

• The US Securities and Exchange Commission should empanel a high-level independent review aimed at modernizing the US proxy voting system. Regulators should work with counterpart bodies in other markets to supervise the seamless integration of national systems to enable accurate and efficient cross-border voting.

The full briefing can be found here.

Lessons from the Financial Crisis

This post comes from Mats Isaksson of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

The OECD Steering group has recently issued a report entitled “Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis.”

This Report concludes that the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements. When they were put to a test, corporate governance routines did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking in a number of financial services companies. A number of weaknesses have been apparent. The risk management systems have failed in many cases due to corporate governance procedures rather than the inadequacy of computer models alone: information about exposures in a number of cases did not reach the board and even senior levels of management, while risk management was often activity rather than enterprise-based. These are board responsibilities. In other cases, boards had approved strategy but then did not establish suitable metrics to monitor its implementation. Company disclosures about foreseeable risk factors and about the systems in place for monitoring and managing risk have also left a lot to be desired even though this is a key element of the Principles. Accounting standards and regulatory requirements have also proved insufficient in some areas leading the relevant standard setters to undertake a review. Last but not least, remuneration systems have in a number of cases not been closely related to the strategy and risk appetite of the company and its longer term interests.

The Report also suggests that the importance of qualified board oversight, and robust risk management including reference to widely accepted standards is not limited to financial institutions. It is also an essential, but often neglected, governance aspect in large, complex non-financial companies. Potential weaknesses in board composition and competence have been apparent for some time and widely debated. The remuneration of boards and senior management also remains a highly controversial issue in many OECD countries.

The current turmoil suggests a need for the OECD, through the Steering Group on Corporate Governance, to re-examine the adequacy of its corporate governance principles in these key areas in order to judge whether additional guidance and/or clarification is needed. In some cases, implementation might be lacking and documentation about the existing situation and the likely causes would be important. There might also be a need to revise some advice and examples contained in the OECD Methodology for Assessing the Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.

The full report can be found here.

Will Bank Recapitalization Succeed?

This post comes from Anil K. Kashyap of The University of Chicago.

I recently presented a new working paper co-written with Takeo Hoshi at the Law, Economics and Organizations workshop at Harvard Law School entitled Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Lessons from Japan. In the paper, we look back at Japan’s decade-long response to its financial crisis and evaluate what has and hasn’t worked, and draw on the Japanese experience to evaluate the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which focused on the idea of purchasing troubled assets to stabilize the financial system, and the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which focuses on acquiring stakes in banks in the form of preferred shares and warrants.

While it is widely known that the banking problems in both countries began after a sharp increase in land prices, the events in Japan from late 1997 to early 1999 closely track developments in the U.S. in 2008. One important similarity is the bank credit crunch that prevailed in both instances. More importantly, the Japanese banks emerged from the acute phase of its crisis with seriously undercapitalized banks. We identify four main problems with the string of Japanese asset purchase plans and capital injection programs that were pursued to combat the banking problems. First, the asset purchase plans were too narrow. The scope of assets to be purchased and the set of financial institutions included were limited, thus precluding a comprehensive plan. Second, the loan purchases that did take place, especially in the 1990s, involved little restructuring of the borrowers. This resulted in many of the companies operating with few changes while typically receiving more loans that subsequently went bad. Third, the capital purchase plans ran into trouble in getting the banks to accept funding. Fourth and most importantly, the overall amount of government money committed was too small to recapitalize the banks. Hence, the banks only really returned to being adequately capitalized in 2006 and 2007, when macroeconomic conditions improved and after supervision policy had changed.

In broad terms, the TARP and CPP programs mimic many elements of the Japanese plans. We present data comparing the largest U.S. banks, particularly in terms of the risks that they face from continued deterioration in the economy. Based on publicly available data it is hard to make confident assessments about the solvency of the banks. The lesson from Japan is that the details of the potential recapitalization program will be critical in determining whether any injections will increase the banks’ capital levels and hence their lending capacity. While the U.S. plans are still in flux, it appears that U.S. is at risk for running into some of the same problems that hobbled the Japanese policies.

The full paper is available for download here.

Jump-Starting the Market for Troubled Assets

Editor’s Note: This post is an op-ed piece by Lucian Bebchuk published today at Forbes.com. The post outlines some of the key points of the Discussion Paper by Bebchuk, How to Make TARP II Work, issued last month by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This Discussion Paper builds in part on Bebchuk’s September 2008 article, A Plan for Addressing the Financial Crisis, which first proposed the idea of using competing privately managed funds to restart the market for troubled assets. The post was written before the appearance in today’s WSJ of a story suggesting that the Treasury is considering establishing a program for financing competing private funds. We hope to get from Professor Bebchuk another post on the subject as information about the Treasury’s plan becomes available.

Four weeks ago, Treasury Secretary Geithner announced the administration’s interest in developing a plan—which the Treasury is willing to back with up to $1 trillion of public funds—to partner with private capital to buy banks’ “troubled assets.” The announcement has met with substantial skepticism about the possibility of working out an effective plan to restart the market for troubled assets for such a public-private partnership. However, in a paper issued last month, How to Make TARP II Work, I show that this can be done, and explain how the plan should be designed to contribute most to restarting the market for troubled assets at the least cost to taxpayers.

The Bush administration was forced to abandon its own plan for directly purchasing troubled assets once it became clear that its plan could not be designed to effectively address concerns about arbitrary valuation and potential overpayments. This experience contributed to the doubts about the Obama administration’s new plan. With the stock market reacting negatively, one noted columnist observed that “[t]he market was right to worry because… nobody has yet devised a way to make such a scheme work.” Another columnist suggested that the market was “glum” because the announcement was “short on details – and no more so than on the critical question of how the government will address the problem of dealing with the toxic assets that have effectively rendered large portions of the nation’s financial system insolvent.”

Despite the widespread doubts, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels. First, at the level of buying troubled assets, the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital – and not creating one, large “aggregator bank” funded with public and private capital and engaging in purchasing troubled assets. Second, at the level of allocating government capital among the competing private funds, potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers.

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Employee Indemnification

This post comes from Wallace P. Mullin of George Washington University and Christopher M. Snyder of Dartmouth College.

In Should Firms be Allowed to Indemnify Their Employees for Sanctions? which was recently published by the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, we analyze the widespread practice of employee indemnification using a three player model, where there is a principal and agent, as well as a governmental player that sets and enforces sanctions. In our model, the government authority can always deter crime with a sufficiently high combination of fines on the firm and employee. The challenge is to deter crime at minimum social cost. We show that deterrence can typically be obtained at minimum social cost by sanctioning the firm alone. This maintains deterrence without exposing the agent to risk from sanctions or inducing the exit of productive, law-abiding firms.

Sanctioning the agent is valuable in limited circumstances. If deterrence is especially difficult, it may be optimal to hit the agent with a sanction large enough to bankrupt him. Although the de jure sanctions cannot vary with actual guilt—imperfect enforcement prevents this—bankrupting the agent allows the de facto agent sanction to vary with his wealth. The agent needs to be paid a premium to induce him to commit a crime, and so the agent of the criminal firm ends up having more wealth to be seized than the agent of a law-abiding firm. Indemnification need not be explicitly banned for this strategy to work: the agent’s sanction can be set so high that the firm would not choose to indemnify the agent even if allowed by law.

Indeed, if sanctions are set appropriately, the government’s policy toward indemnification becomes moot. Either the agent should not be sanctioned at all, in which case there is nothing for the firm to indemnify, or the agent should be sanctioned so harshly that the firm chooses not to indemnify the agent even if it could. The government’s policy toward indemnification is not moot in an extension of the corporate-crime model in which the agent’s cooperation can help convict a criminal firm. The authority can offer to reduce the employee’s fine in return for his cooperation; an offer the firm can unravel by pledging to indemnify him fully.

The broad lesson to be drawn from the analysis is that authorities should be wary of sanctioning employees let alone banning their indemnification. Typically, firm sanctions deter crime more efficiently than unindemnifiable employee sanctions. Readers can find a link that provides free access to the full paper at Professor Snyder’s homepage here.

Driving a Constitutional Stake through Section 16(b)

This post is by Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog Investors.

Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has long been criticized for its “purposeless harshness,” and its “arbitrary, some might say Draconian” nature, as one court put it. Section 16(b) generally requires directors, officers and beneficial owners of more than 10% of the stock of a publicly traded corporation to disgorge to the corporation any so called “short swing profits” from purchases and sales of stock (or vice versa) made within a period of less than six months.

The stated purpose of Section 16(b) is to “[prevent] the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer.” To that end, the law authorizes any shareholder to file a derivative suit to recover such profit “if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request.” There is no requirement that the shareholder own any shares at the time of the alleged insider trading. The predictable result has been to create a cottage industry of Milberg, Weiss style legalized barratry.

For example, The Children’s Investment Fund and 3G Capital Partners LP recently settled a Section 16(b) lawsuit brought by a small shareholder of CSX Corporation to recover their alleged short swing profits in CSX stock. The shareholder made no allegation that TCI or 3G were privy to any inside information let alone that any inside information about CSX even existed at the time of the trades. Under the settlement CSX will receive $10 million from TCI and $1 million from 3G and the plaintiff’s lawyer will seek approval by the court for fees and costs of up to $550,000, payable from the proceeds.

In another recent Section 16(b) case, Huppe v. Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P., No. 06 Civ. 6097 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) the District Court ruled that a 10% shareholder of WPCS International Incorporated had to disgorge its short swing profits to the company despite the absence of any allegation of the existence of inside information. The Court acknowledged that the shareholder’s purchase of stock from WPCS in an arm’s length transaction had probably rescued the issuer from financial disaster but ruled that equitable defenses are inapplicable in a Section 16(b) case:

Although it is undisputed in this case that WPCS genuinely needed and was provided capital through PE’s and QP’s purchases of WPCS stock, nothing in the statute permits the Court to consider as a mitigating factor the issuer’s intent or any benefit inuring to the issuer, nor is there any equitable defense available based on such theories.

That is because Section 16(b) creates a conclusive presumption that a 10% shareholder who realizes a short swing profit is presumed to have had access to and abused inside information. No allegation that inside information existed, e.g., a proposed merger or dividend increase, is even required. While there have been several failed due process challenges to Section 16(b), I know of none since Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that an irrebuttable statutory presumption that a university student who recently moved to Connecticut was not a legitimate resident of the state (for university tuition purposes) is invalid because the presumption was not warranted. A court should be equally skeptical of Section 16(b)’s presumption that any short swing profits by a 10% shareholder stems from access to inside information. Unlike a director of a corporation, no shareholder has a legal right to obtain inside information and in fact, 10% shareholders of public corporation usually do not possess such information. Thus, a constitutional challenge based on Section 16(b)’s irrebuttable presumption of insider trading appears promising.

An even more obvious constitutional flaw of Section 16(b) is that it does not meet the Supreme Court’s requirement for Article III standing because it purports to authorize a “suit to recover such profit . . . by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer” even though the issuer has not been harmed. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, the Supreme Court found that one could not sue for damages unless the party alleged that (1) it suffered an actual injury as a result of the defendant’s actions and (2) that a favorable ruling would compensate the plaintiff for the injury suffered:

Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one “who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff must always have suffered “a distinct and palpable injury to himself,” ibid., that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, 426 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct., at 1924.

One might argue that Congress created “a distinct and palpable injury” to an issuer when it passed a law requiring the transfer of short swing profits from the statutory insider to the issuer. However, that is circular reasoning and contrary to the Court’s insistence that Congress cannot abrogate Article III’s requirement that the plaintiff must suffer a true injury to himself to have standing. If Congress could create an artificial injury by fiat, that would effectively eviscerate Gladstone.

Abe Lincoln reputedly popularized this riddle: “How many legs does a dog have if you call a tail a leg?” “The answer is four because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg.” Similarly, Congress does not have the power to legislate the existence of “a distinct and palpable injury” to a corporation when such an injury does not exist. The plain truth is that a corporation does not suffer any injury from short swing profits realized by a 10% shareholder and hence does not have standing to bring a Section 16(b) lawsuit against that shareholder.

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