Monthly Archives: June 2011

Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance

The following post comes to us from Benjamin Hermalin, Professor of Finance and Economics at the University of California, Berkeley; and Michael Weisbach, Professor of Finance at Ohio State University.

Corporate disclosure is widely seen as an unambiguous good. In our paper, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we show that this view is, at best, incomplete. Greater disclosure tends to raise executive compensation and can create additional or exacerbate existing agency problems. Hence, even ignoring the direct costs of disclosure (e.g., meeting stricter accounting rules, maintaining better records, etc.), there could well be a limit on the optimal level of disclosure.

The model used to study disclosure reflects fairly general organizational issues. A principal desires information that will improve her decision making (e.g., whether or not to fire the agent, tender her shares, move capital from the firm, adjust the agent’s compensation scheme, etc.). In many situations, the agent prefers the status quo to change imposed by the principal (e.g., he prefers employment to possibly being dismissed). Hence, better information is view asymmetrically by the parties: It benefits the principal, but harms the agent. If the principal did not need to compensate the agent for this harm and if she could prevent the agent from capturing, through the bargaining process, any of the surplus this better information creates, the principal would desire maximal disclosure. In reality, however, she will need to compensate the agent and she will lose some of the surplus to him. These effects can be strong enough to cause the principal to optimally choose less than maximal disclosure.

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Holding Steady in an Active Market

David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. This post is based on an article by Mr. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh that first appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Favorable market conditions appear to be producing a substantial increase in shareholder activism and hostile takeover activity this year. Led by pension funds and hedge funds, activist investors have been emboldened by recent changes in corporate governance. As boards of directors and management teams address demands by regulators as well as heightened attacks from shareholder activists, directors need to be fully prepared with state-of-the-art plans ready for immediate use. When facing increased hostile takeover activity, directors should keep in mind that the fundamentals remain unchanged: the business judgment rule still applies, and takeover defenses, especially of the structural variety, are as effective as ever when used appropriately.

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New Insights into Calculating Securities Damages

Allen Ferrell is the Harvey Greenfield Professor of Securities Law at Harvard Law School.

My co-author, Atanu Saha, and I have recently posted three papers dealing with securities damage issues. The first paper, Forward-Casting 10b-5 Damages: A Comparison to Other Methods, discusses and critiques two commonly used methods for calculating securities fraud damages under Rule 10b-5: constant dollar back-casting and the allocation method. We also present the forward-casting method, our proposed alternative to these other methods. Not only is the forward-casting method well-grounded in academic literature, but has the advantage of incorporating market expectations when determining what the stock price would have been “but for” the alleged fraud. Neither the constant dollar back-casting nor the allocation method takes these market expectations into account. We also address other issues that can arise by virtue of using these various methods. These three methods can generate substantially different 10b-5 damage estimates. We use a real world example to demonstrate these differences in the three methodologies.

The methodology used to estimate Rule 10b-5 damages is extremely important when estimating potential liability exposure and the determination of settlement value. In addition, these estimates, because they speak to the extent to which securities prices were distorted by fraudulent misinformation, can also be useful in determining whether the misinformation was “material,” an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. Moreover, our analysis has implications for other causes of action, including Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and common law fraud actions.

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Corporate Law Lessons from Ancient Rome

The following post comes to us from Andreas M. Fleckner, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law.

How did the Romans finance capital-intensive endeavors such as the erection of temples, the pavement of roads, or the trading of goods from foreign countries? This question has fascinated generations of classical readers and scholars. It is, however, also of interest to the corporate lawyer of today, because Ancient Rome helps us better understand the functions of corporate law and its role within the broader economic, social, political, and legal setting.

What We Know About Ancient Rome

For more than 175 years, historians, economists, and lawyers have speculated or even claimed that, as early as the Roman Republic (6th to 1st century BC), businessmen formed large firms with publicly traded shares similar to modern stock corporations (since Orelli, 1835). Most recently, a longer Journal of Economic Literature article argues that there was evidence for such an “early form of shareholder company” (Malmendier, 2009).

In a new book, however, I conclude that such claims are unwarranted. [1] I consider all legal and literary sources, both in Latin and classical Greek, that have come down to us, such as the works of Polybius (2nd century BC), Cicero (1st century BC), Livy (around the time of Christ’s birth), Pliny the Elder (1st century AD), or Plutarch (2nd century AD), as well as great collections like the New Testament (1st/2nd century AD) or the Digest (6th century AD). None of these sources brings to light evidence for larger “capital associations” (my term for entities that helped finance projects which, on account of their scope, duration or risk, exceeded the capacity of single individuals), let alone associations with publicly traded shares.

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Does CEO Education Matter?

Matteo Tonello is Director of Corporate Governance for The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a Conference Board Director Note by Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Ajay Subramanian, and relates to a paper by these authors discussed on the Forum here.

Selecting a new CEO is among the most delicate decisions a board of directors will ever face. The selection process is exposed to so many unknowns: personality, integrity, technical skills, and experience. Such intangibles are very hard to assess, let alone compare among candidates. In this evaluation, the education of a candidate may be one of the few pieces of information that is certain: the quality and relevance of that education may be debatable, but the simple facts are known and verifiable. To provide guidance to corporate boards on the validity of that indicator, this report analyzes data on the education of 1,800 individuals who served as CEOs of Standard & Poor’s Composite 1500 companies to determine the effect of education on CEO turnover and firm performance.

What makes a CEO great? Recent history has produced many successful CEOs, with vastly different backgrounds and personalities: Warren Buffett, Jack Welch, and Steve Jobs, to name just a few. As outsiders, we characterize these CEOs as “successful” because of the results they produce. Their companies have created new products, penetrated new markets, and provided substantial returns to investors and other stakeholders. It is easy to define a CEO as a great leader after his or her company has become successful; what is much more difficult is identifying a great candidate for CEO before that success has materialized.

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Criteria for an Independent Accounting Standard Setter

Donna Street is the Mahrt Chair in Accounting at the University of Dayton.

In 2008, the Council of Institutional Investors (Council) adopted a policy regarding the independence of international accounting and auditing standard setters. The Council’s policy supports the goal of convergence to a single set of high quality accounting standards designed to produce comparable, reliable, timely, transparent and understandable financial information that will meet the needs of investors and other consumers of financial reports. Importantly, the policy also opposes replacing U.S. accounting standards and standard setters with international accounting standards and standard setters unless and until seven criteria have been achieved.

In a recent white paper commissioned by the Council of Institutional Investors, Criteria for an Independent Accounting Standard Setter How Does the IASB Rate? I explore evidence and views regarding each of the seven criteria. The paper is designed to assist Council members and other interested parties in evaluating whether the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) satisfy any or all of the criteria. This evaluation is particularly timely.

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Qualifications and Evaluations of Directors and Boards

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum.

As part of a continuing study, on April 5 the European Commission issued a consultation green paper on corporate governance. It is a very thoughtful study. It covers many of the same issues that have been the subject of the corporate governance debate in the United States. Of special interest, and relevance to us, is the discussion of the composition of the board and the qualifications of the directors:

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Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance During the Recent Financial Crisis

René Stulz is a Professor of Finance at Ohio State University.

Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Robert Prilmeier and I have made available a paper on SSRN titled This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance During the Recent Financial Crisis. In this paper, we show that banks that performed poorly during the Russian crisis of 1998 also performed poorly during the recent financial crisis.

Russia defaulted on its domestic debt on August 17, 1998. This event started a dramatic chain reaction. As Thomas Friedman from the New York Times put it, “the entire global economic system as we know it almost went into meltdown.” The Russian crisis was described as the biggest crisis since the Great Depression. The financial crisis that started in 2007 would eventually be described as the biggest financial crisis of the last 50 years, supplanting the crisis of 1998 for that designation.

The similarity between the crisis of 1998 and the recent financial crisis raises the question of how a bank’s experience in one crisis is related to its experience in another crisis. In our recent paper, we examine this question.

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The SEC’s First Deferred Prosecution Agreement

Wayne Carlin is a partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Carlin, Theodore A. Levine, John F. Savarese, David B. Anders and Joshua A. Naftalis.

The SEC recently announced its first use of a deferred prosecution agreement, one of the initiatives announced in January 2010 (and discussed in our previous memo here) to encourage greater cooperation in enforcement investigations.  See SEC Press Release.  The announcement of this agreement with Tenaris S.A. follows the agency’s first non-prosecution agreement in December 2010 with Carter’s Inc. (and discussed in our previous memo here).

Tenaris, a manufacturer of steel pipe products, is incorporated in Luxemburg and has American Depository Receipts listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  Tenaris allegedly bribed Uzbekistan government officials in bidding for government pipeline contracts, and made almost $5 million in profits from the contracts.  A world-wide internal investigation triggered by other matters and conducted by outside counsel revealed Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations in Uzbekistan.  The company self-reported to the SEC and the Department of Justice, cooperated with the government and undertook extensive remediation efforts.

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Delaware Court of Chancery Refines Rules for Mixed-Consideration Mergers

William Savitt is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savitt, Steven A. Rosenblum and James Cole, Jr. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is co-sponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Delaware Court of Chancery last week provided fresh guidance on the standards of director conduct applicable to part-cash, part-stock mergers and reaffirmed the rules of the road for board process and deal protection provisions in strategic mergers. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. 6164-VCP (May 20, 2011).

In a merger agreement announced on January 23, Smurfit-Stone, a leading containerboard manufacturer, agreed to merge with Rock-Tenn Corporation. The agreement provides that Smurfit-Stone stockholders will receive consideration valued at $35.00 per share as of the date of the merger agreement, representing a 27 percent premium over the stock’s pre-announcement trading price, with 50 percent of the consideration payable in cash and the other 50 percent payable in Rock-Tenn common stock. Shareholder plaintiffs sought to enjoin the deal, alleging that the Smurfit-Stone board had improperly failed to conduct an auction and that the deal protection provisions in the merger agreement were impermissible as a matter of Delaware law.

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