The following post comes to us from Hamid Mehran of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Alan Morrison of the Saïd Business School, University of Oxford; and Joel Shapiro of the Saïd Business School, University of Oxford. The views expressed in this post are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
How did the governance structure of banks perform during the financial crisis? In our paper, Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis? we examine this question in light of recent academic work and policy discussions.
We begin by providing a twist on the usual question of what is different about banks by asking what differences are important to governance. Two themes are key: 1) the multitude of stakeholders in banks and 2) the complexity of the business. Besides shareholders, the stakeholders in banks are both numerous (depositors, debtholders, and the government as both insurer of deposits and residual claimant on systemic externalities) and large (over 90 percent of the balance sheet of banks is debt). Yet shareholders control the firm, and evidence shows that both the boards and the compensation package for CEOs represent the shareholders’ preference for increasing risks. Meanwhile, banks have become much larger and expanded dramatically into other businesses since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.