Yearly Archives: 2016

Foreign Private Issuers and NYSE Financial Reporting Requirements

Avrohom J. Kess is partner and head of the Public Company Advisory Practice and Yafit Cohn is an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Kess and Ms. Cohn.

On February 5, 2016, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) a proposed rule change that would require listed foreign private issuers to submit a Form 6-K to the SEC with unaudited financial information at least semi-annually. [1] On February 19, 2016, the SEC designated the proposed rule change “operative upon filing,” waiving the 30-day operative delay typically associated with proposed rule changes by self-regulatory organizations. [2]

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Deposit Calculations on Demand

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer. The complete publication, including appendix, is available here.

The FDIC has resolved hundreds of banks since the crisis, in nearly all cases making insured deposits available to the failed bank’s customers by the next business day. Although US depositors have come to rely on the efficiency and seamlessness of this process, the work that goes on behind the scenes to determine exactly which deposits are insured (and for how much) can be very complex.

To facilitate this process, the FDIC proposed a rule last month that would create new recordkeeping requirements for its 36 largest supervised banks. [1] Originally released last April as an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”), the proposal is largely consistent with the ANPR and essentially shifts the responsibility of calculating deposit insurance payouts from the FDIC to the banks, in order to help ensure a timely payout to depositors if a bank fails.

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Antitrust Enforcement of Small Acquisitions

Nathaniel L. Asker is counsel in the Antitrust and Competition practice at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank publication by Mr. Asker, Barry A. Nigro Jr., and Aleksandr B. Livshits.

Last month, the Federal Trade Commission challenged a $5 million acquisition in the pharmaceutical industry. The FTC’s challenge serves as a reminder that no deal is too small to generate scrutiny from the U.S. antitrust agencies. During the Obama administration, the FTC and Department of Justice have devoted significant resources to investigating and challenging transactions that are not subject to the reporting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, including consummated transactions. [1] The FTC’s latest challenge shows that a low purchase price or the lack of an HSR filing obligation does not exempt a transaction from antitrust scrutiny.

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Weekly Roundup: March 4-March 10


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 4, 2016 to March 10, 2016.











Facebook Settlement: Litigation Over Director Compensation

David E. Gordon is a Managing Director in the Los Angeles office of Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. This post is based on a FW Cook publication authored by Mr. Gordon and Bindu M. Culas.

Executive compensation experts were unpleasantly surprised by the settlement in late January of Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, a case challenging the reasonableness of stock awards to Facebook’s non-employee directors. [1] The facts surrounding this settlement create concern that unless a company has a shareholder-approved plan with meaningful limits on both the cash and equity compensation that can be awarded to non-employee directors in a year, it faces a risk of being sued, particularly where the actual amount of compensation gives plaintiffs’ lawyers a credible argument that pay is “above market.”

There are several reasons why Espinoza is concerning. First, the amount of the allegedly “excessive” compensation did not seem particularly large. Second, the plaintiff’s lawyers are expected to receive attorneys’ fees of $525,000 even though it appears highly likely that Facebook would have eventually prevailed because its controlling shareholder approved the transaction. Last, the settlement can be read to require a shareholder vote every time there is an increase in director pay, thus creating a precedent of a “Say-on-Director-Pay” standard. It should be noted that Frederic W. Cook & Co. has no knowledge of the facts in Espinoza outside the public filings.

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Obstructing Shareholder Coordination in Hedge Fund Activism

Nicole Boyson is Associate Professor of Finance at Northeastern University. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Boyson and Pegaret Pichler, Assistant Professor of Finance at Northeastern University. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here), The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here), and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

Many hedge funds follow a strategy of shareholder activism, acquiring a block of shares and then campaigning for changes in the target firm. Numerous studies have presented evidence that these campaigns can lead to both short- and long-run improvements in the values of target firms. In our paper, Obstructing Shareholder Coordination in Hedge Fund Activism, which has recently been made publicly available on SSRN, we examine hedge fund activism from a novel perspective. While prior literature has focused on the actions taken by the hedge fund activist in an attempt to increase firm value, it is silent on the impact of target firm defenses in response to activism. We attempt to fill this gap by examining defensive actions that target firms take in response to activism, with a particular focus on actions that impede coordination among shareholders.

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The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here). Critiques of the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study by Wachtell Lipton, and responses to these critiques by the authors, are available on the Forum here.

In my February 1, 2016 note, The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, I called attention to the growing evidence that the leading institutional investors were developing a new paradigm for corporate governance. In the new paradigm, these institutions would engage with a company and its independent directors to understand its long-term strategy and ascertain that the directors participated in the development of the strategy, were actively monitoring its progress and were overseeing its execution.

In a February 26, 2016 letter to board members, State Street Global advisors said:
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Do Compensation Disclosures Matter for Say-on-Pay Voting?

Lakshmanan Shivakumar is Professor of Accounting at London Business School. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Shivakumar and Tathagat Mukhopadhyay, Doctoral Candidate in Accounting at London Business School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

 

Concerns about executive pay packages have been raised by market participants and media for nearly the last three decades and, more recently, executive pay structures incentivizing risk-taking have been pointed out as a major cause for the 2008 financial crisis. In response to these concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a two pronged approach to both better inform investors about executive compensation decisions as well as to give shareholders a say on executives’ pay. While the former was implemented in 2006 by requiring firms to provide detailed executive compensation-related disclosures in definitive proxy materials, the latter approach was introduced through the mandatory “Say on Pay” (SoP) voting requirement introduced in 2011. Many prior studies examine the effectiveness of SoP, but so far we know very little about the usefulness of compensation-related proxy disclosures. In our paper, Do Compensation Disclosures Matter for Say-on-Pay Voting?, which was recently made public via SSRN, we directly examine the influence of such disclosures on the SoP voting decisions of stock market participants.

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Chancery Court Criteria for Determining “Control”

Jason M. Halper is a partner in the Securities Litigation & Regulatory Enforcement Practice Group at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on an Orrick publication by Mr. Halper, Peter J. Rooney, and Gregory Beaman. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On February 29, 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss fiduciary duty claims against certain current and former directors of Halt Medical and a 26% stockholder, American Capital, arising out of a transaction that was allegedly designed to “squeeze out” minority stockholders. See Calesa Associates, L.P. v. American Capital, Ltd., C.A. No. 10557-VCG. Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that American, despite owning only 26% of the company’s shares, exercised sufficient influence over the Halt Medical board such that it and certain affiliates could be deemed “controlling stockholders” owing fiduciary duties to other stockholders. Among other things, the decision in Calesa reaffirmed that majority stock ownership is not the sole criterion for determining “control.” The decision also sounded a cautionary note, however, by suggesting that, where plaintiffs remain minority stockholders in the company after the allegedly dilutive transaction at issue, they must plead demand futility even where, as here, only direct claims are asserted, or face dismissal at the pleading stage.

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Conflicted Voting by Shareholders in Hostile M&A Deals

Matteo Gatti is Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Gatti. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers by Lucian Bebchuk.

Takeovers have historically kept corporate scholars very busy. Yet, to date, a very relevant topic—conflicted voting by shareholders in connection with a hostile acquisition—has surprisingly received little attention. My paper, It’s My Stock and I’ll Vote If I Want to: Conflicted Voting by Shareholders in (Hostile) M&A Deals, represents a primer to organically analyze instances in which shareholder conflicts might lead to inefficient acquisition outcomes.

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