Monthly Archives: April 2018

“Forcing the Offer”: Considerations for Deal Certainty and Support Agreements in Delaware Two-Step Mergers

Piotr Korzynski is an associate at Baker & McKenzie LLP. This post is based on a publication by Mr. Korzynski and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. This post represents the views of the author and not necessarily the views of Baker McKenzie LLP.

In the four and a half years since the Delaware legislature adopted Section 251(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and offered streamlined mechanics for closing two-step mergers, Delaware practitioners have made increasing use of the provision. The provision, subject to certain conditions, permits an acquiror’s near-simultaneous closing of an exchange or tender offer for a controlling stake in a target in the first transaction step and a merger for the remaining outstanding stake in the target immediately after in a final, second step. In its initial year, Section 251(h) was utilized in over 20% of deals involving Delaware public company targets and 33 of 41 Delaware two-step mergers. [1] In 2014, following the success of that first year, the legislature liberalized the use of Section 251(h) by, among other things, striking the condition that the provision was inapplicable to transactions involving “interested stockholders” (i.e., owners of 15% or more of a target company’s outstanding voting stock at the time of target board approval of the merger agreement). Such condition had restricted Section 251(h) transactions to true third-party transactions and likely depressed its use in the first year. By its third full year, nearly 25% of deals involving Delaware public company targets and 49 of 52 Delaware two-step mergers utilized Section 251(h).

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How a CEO’s Cultural Background Impacts Firm Performance

Duc Duy Nguyen is a lecturer at the University of St Andrews School of Management; Jens Hagendorff is professor of finance at the University of Edinburgh; and Arman Eshraghi is associate professor of finance and accounting at the University of Edinburgh. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies.

Understanding if our individual cultural backgrounds shape the everyday decisions we make is a topic of great interest and resurgent public debate. The commercial success of genealogy websites such as ancestry.com and television shows such as “Who Do You Think You Are” bear testimony to importance that the public attach to knowing who their ancestors are.

In our study we ask: do the cultural values top managers inherit from their ancestors affect their decision-making today? The main challenge of studying culture is that it is easily confounded with economic and institutional factors that, much like culture, vary across countries. The key innovation of our study is that we focus on US-born CEOs who are the children or grandchildren of immigrants. For ease of reference, we call these CEOs Gen2-3 CEOs. The key point is that, while Gen2-3 CEOs are exposed to the same legal, social and institutional influences as other US-born CEOs, they possess a distinct cultural heritage. Specifically, the cultural preferences and beliefs of Gen2-3 CEOs are likely to bear the cultural mark of the countries from which their parents or grandparents have emigrated.

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Disclosing Corporate Lobbying

Timothy Smith is Director of ESG Shareowner Engagement at Walden Asset Management and John Keenan is a Corporate Governance Analyst at the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFCSME). This post is based on a recent publication authored by Mr. Smith and Mr. Keenan. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending and Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson (discussed on the Forum here and here), and Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? by John C. Coates (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate lobbying disclosure remains a top shareholder proposal topic for 2018. A coalition of at least 74 investors have filed proposals at 50 companies asking for lobbying reports that include federal and state lobbying payments, payments to trade associations used for lobbying, and payments to any tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.

Corporate lobbying to influence laws and regulations affect all aspects of the economy, on issues from climate change and drug prices to financial regulation, immigration and workers’ rights. Over $3.3 billion in total was spent on federal lobbying in 2017, with companies spending about $2.6 billion. And companies also spend more than $1 billion yearly on lobbying at the state level. State lobbying is far less visible and transparent than federal lobbying. And trade associations spend over $100 million annually lobbying indirectly on behalf of companies. For example the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has spent over $1.4 billion on lobbying since 1998.

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Do Director Networks Improve Managerial Learning from Stock Prices?

Musa Subasi is Assistant Professor of Accounting and Information Assurance at the University of Maryland, College Park. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Subasi; Ferhat Akbas, Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Illinois at Chicago; Rebecca N. Hann, Associate Professor & KPMG Faculty Fellow at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; and M. Fikret Polat, a PhD Student in Accounting & Information Assurance at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland.

Like financial markets, director networks serve as a conduit of information exchange and managers may access a wealth of information from the network through their boards’ connections. In this paper, we address several questions. Do director networks improve managerial learning from financial markets? Does corporate governance affect the extent to which managers utilize the information advantage from their boards’ connections in their investment decisions? And, what types of director connections are more instrumental in preventing managers from basing their investment decisions on faulty price signals?

We explore these questions by studying the effect of director networks on the sensitivity of investment to noise in stock prices, which has been documented to be positive in prior research. We use the number of director connections to capture board connectedness. To capture the extent of managerial (mis)learning from stock prices, we use a Q-theory of investment framework and decompose stock prices into a non-fundamental component (noise) and its orthogonal component using mutual fund redemptions as an exogenous shock to stock prices.

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