Monthly Archives: April 2018

Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence

David J. Berger is a partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; and Laurie Simon Hodrick is Visiting Professor of Law and Rock Center for Corporate Governance Fellow at Stanford Law School, Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and A. Barton Hepburn Professor Emerita of Economics in the Faculty of Business at Columbia Business School.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here) and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

Clarion calls for regulating dual-class stock have become a common occurrence. For example, the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) has called upon the NYSE and Nasdaq to adopt a rule requiring all companies going public with dual-class shares to include a so-called “sunset provision” in their charter, which would convert the company to a single class of stock after a set period of years. CII has also urged index providers to discourage the inclusion of firms with dual-class structures (and both the S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell indices have already done so). Many individual CII members, along with some of the world’s largest mutual funds and other investors, have joined together in the “Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance” to take a strong stance against dual class structures.

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Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

Linlin Ma is Assistant Professor of Finance at Northeastern University D’Amore-McKim School of Business; Yuehua Tang is Assistant Professor of Finance at University of Florida Warrington College of Business; and Juan-Pedro Gomez is Associate Professor at IE University Business School in Madrid, Spain. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

According to the Investment Company Institute, about half of all households in the United States invest in mutual funds, and the assets managed by them totaled more than $16 trillion at year-end 2016. Given the importance of mutual funds in the economy, understanding fund managers’ incentives is a key issue for academics, regulators, practitioners, and individual investors. Due to lack of data on individual fund manager incentives, the literature has focused primarily on the design of the advisory contracts between fund investors and investment advisors (i.e., asset management companies). Little is known about the compensation contracts of the actual decision makers—individual portfolio managers hired by advisors to manage the fund portfolio on a daily basis. Our article, Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, attempts to fill this gap.

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Dodd-Frank is a Pigouvian Regulation

Aaron M. Levine is an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Joshua C. Macey is a law clerk for Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III. This post is based on their recent Note, recently published in the Yale Law Journal.

In this Note, recently published in the Yale Law Journal, we show that Dodd Frank’s compliance costs have furthered the Act’s goal of reducing systemic risk. Specifically, our article analyzes the all of the spinoffs and divestitures that have occurred at eleven systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) since Dodd-Frank went into effect in 2010 and documents the extent to which the Act’s compliance costs have led SIFIs to shed business lines of their own accord in order to reduce the costs of complying with Dodd Frank. The evidence reveals that regulators can adjust Dodd-Frank’s costs in response to the perceived riskiness of specific business units, and that SIFIs can respond to these adjustments by divesting the business lines that caused their compliance costs to increase—that is, SIFIs’ riskiest lines of business. In this way, Dodd-Frank has had an effect analogous to that of a Pigouvian tax. We call this a “Pigouvian regulation.” Our analysis thus challenges scholars who bemoan the Act’s “costly and burdensome regulations” for “failing to address key factors widely acknowledged to have contributed to the financial crisis.”

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2018 Proposed Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law

John Mark Zeberkiewicz is a Director and Stephanie Norman is an Associate at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. This post is based on a Richards, Layton & Finger publication, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Legislation proposing to amend the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “General Corporation Law”) has been released by the Corporate Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association and, if approved by the Corporation Law Section, is expected to be introduced to the Delaware General Assembly. If enacted, the amendments would, among other things, (i) amend Section 262 to apply the “market out” exception to the availability of statutory appraisal rights in connection with an exchange offer followed by a back-end merger consummated without a vote of stockholders pursuant to Section 251(h), (ii) clarify and confirm the circumstances in which corporations may use Section 204 to ratify defective corporate acts, (iii) allow nonstock corporations to take advantage of Sections 204 and 205, including for the ratification or validation of defective corporate acts, (iv) revise Section 102(a)(1) to provide that a corporation’s name must be distinguishable from the name of (or name reserved for) a registered series of a limited liability company, and (v) make other technical changes.

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Weekly Roundup: April 6–12, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of April 6–12, 2018.

Activist Arbitrage in M&A Acquirers


In the Spirit of Full Cybersecurity Disclosure


Unequal Voting and the Business Judgment Rule


Agency Conflicts Around the World


Discounted Deal Price in Appraisal Litigation




Real Talk on Executive Compensation


The Cost of Political Connections



10 Tips for Upcoming Annual Shareholder Meetings


The Information Value of Corporate Social Responsibility




How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value

How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value

Ronald J. Gilson is Stern Professor of Law and Business at Columbia Law School and Meyers Professor of Law and Business Emeritus at Stanford Law School; Paul Brest is Professor Emeritus at Stanford Law School; and Mark A. Wolfson is Adjunct Professor in Accounting and Finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst.; and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Most investors have a single goal: to earn the highest financial return. These socially-neutral investors maximize their risk-adjusted returns and would not accept a lower financial return from an investment that also produced social benefits. An increasing number of socially-motivated investors have goals beyond maximizing profits. Some seek to align their investments with their social values (value alignment), for example by only owning stock in companies whose activities are consistent with the investor’s values. Others may also want their investment to make portfolio companies create more social value (social value creation).

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Does Tax Deductibility Affect CEO Pay? The Case of the Health Insurance Industry

Jessica Schieder is a Research Assistant at the Economic Policy Institute and Dean Baker is Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. This post is based on a publication from the Economic Policy Institute and Center for Economic and Policy Research authored by Ms. Schieder and Mr. Baker.

The ratio of CEO pay to that of ordinary workers has exploded over the last four decades, going from less than 30-to-1 in the 1970s to more than 200-to-1 by 2000 and in most subsequent years (Mishel and Schieder 2017). There is an ongoing debate about the causes of this increase in CEO compensation. Many economists have argued that this increase in CEO pay is justified by the returns to shareholders produced by successful CEOs (Mankiw 2013; Kaplan 2012a; Kaplan 2012b; Hubbard and Palia 1995). On the other side, critics of increased CEO pay see it as a breakdown in the corporate governance structure that allows CEOs and other top executives to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders (Bivens and Mishel 2013; Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). These critics point to compensation packages that allow CEOs to profit from events beyond their control, such as a general rise in the stock market or an increase in world oil prices driving up profits and stock prices for oil companies.

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The Purpose of the Corporation

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton.

Whether the purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders or to operate in the interests of all of its stakeholders has been actively debated since 1932, when it was the subject of dueling law review articles by Columbia law professor Adolf Berle (shareholders) and Harvard law professor Merrick Dodd (stakeholders).

Following “Chicago School” economics professor Milton Friedman’s famous (some might say infamous) 1970 New York Times article announcing ex cathedra that the social responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, shareholder primacy was widely viewed as the purpose and basis for the governance of a corporation. My 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, arguing that the board of directors of a corporation that was the target of a takeover bid had the right, if not the duty, to consider the interests of all stakeholders in deciding whether to accept or reject the bid, was widely derided and rejected by the Chicago School economists and law professors who embraced Chicago School economics. Despite the 1985 decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware citing my article in holding that a board of directors could take into account stakeholder interests, and over 30 states enacting constituency (stakeholder) statutes, shareholder primacy continued to dominate academic, economic, financial and legal thinking—often disguised as “shareholder democracy.”

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The Information Value of Corporate Social Responsibility

Kose John is the Charles William Gerstenberg Professor of Banking and Finance at NYU Stern School of Business; Jongsub Lee is University Term Assistant Professor of Finance at University of Florida Warrington College of Business; and Ji Yeol Jimmy Oh is Assistant Professor of Finance at the Hanyang University Business School. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

A significant portion of the U.S. corporate expense budget is allocated to corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending. Given its importance, there has been a long-standing debate on its desirability from shareholders’ perspective. Several studies posit that CSR creates shareholder value through maximizing stakeholder value, a result known as “doing well by doing good” (Edmans, 2011; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016). In contrast to this performance view of CSR, the agency view of CSR claims it is merely a manifestation of managerial and shareholder interest misalignment (e.g., Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2016). The empirical evidence on these two opposing views is mixed, leaving the important question—what is the fundamental motive of CSR activities?—largely unresolved.

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10 Tips for Upcoming Annual Shareholder Meetings

Laura D. Richman is counsel and Michael L. Hermsen is a partner at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown publication by Ms. Richman, Mr. Hermsen, David S. BakstRobert F. Gray, Jr., and Anna T. Pinedo.

With spring beginning, many public companies are getting ready for their annual shareholder meetings. Here are some tips to consider as part of the planning process.

Meeting Logistics. Check and double-check meeting logistics. While this may sound basic, it is important to confirm and reconfirm the venue, in addition to all meeting participants and service providers, as the meeting date approaches. Be sure the meeting room will be set up in the manner the company prefers with the equipment the company needs. If the company will be incorporating electronics into its meeting (i.e., conducting a fully virtual meeting, holding a hybrid meeting to allow shareholders to attend in person or via computer, webcasting the proceedings or otherwise), test the technology in advance and have a workaround ready in case of an outage. Advance planning for various contingencies contributes to the smooth running of the annual shareholder meeting.

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