Yearly Archives: 2023

Weekly Roundup: February 24 – March 2, 2023


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 24 – March 2, 2023.

The 2023 board agenda


How To Fix The C-suite Diversity Problem



The Liability Trap: Why the ALEC Anti-ESG Bills Create a Legal Quagmire for Fiduciaries Connected with Public Pensions



Equal Treatment for U.S. Investors


The Universal Proxy: An Early Look


Fiduciary Duties of Public Pension Systems and Registered Investment Advisors


An Auspicious Start for Universal Proxy


The Venture Corporation


2023 – The year of the risk-centric agenda


2023 – The year of the risk-centric agenda

Krista Parsons is a Managing Director and Audit Committee Programs Leader, Maureen Bujno is a Managing Director, and Kimia Clemente is a Senior Manager at the Center for Board Effectiveness at Deloitte & Touche LLP. This post is based on a Deloitte memorandum by Ms. Parsons, Ms. Bujno, Ms. Clemente, and Nidhi Sheth.

The audit committee’s role in risk oversight

Predicting the future is difficult, particularly in times of change and uncertainty. However, it seems safe to predict that the 2023 agendas of many audit committees will be risk-centric.

Of course, risk oversight is among the most important—if not the most important—of the audit committee’s responsibilities. While the audit committee is not responsible for overseeing all of a company’s risks, it is often responsible for oversight of the company’s risk oversight policies and processes, principally the enterprise risk program. This program, which management leads, entails identifying key risks across the organization, from financial risks to workforce risks and from risks due to raw material shortages to risks arising from natural disasters and other crises. In other words, except in cases where a company has a risk committee,[1] the audit committee oversees the process of evaluating and managing risks that could pose a threat to the company’s viability and success. According to the latest Audit Committee Practices Report published by Deloitte and the Center for Audit Quality, 43% of the total respondents surveyed said that the audit committee has primary oversight responsibility for enterprise risk management.

However, the audit committee’s responsibility for risk oversight goes beyond understanding and advising with regard to the creation and implementation of a sound enterprise risk program. The committee is charged with understanding and advising on how management continuously identifies, monitors, and assesses risks and ensuring that material risks are allocated to the full board or the appropriate committee. And the audit committee is itself responsible for overseeing key areas of risk, such as risks that impact financial reporting and disclosure, including internal controls and fraud.

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The Venture Corporation

Gad Weiss is a J.S.D. Candidate at Columbia Law School. This post is based on his recent paper.

Technological innovation is a powerful driving force for human advancement and welfare. Modern societies celebrate the numerous ways that innovative feats have contributed to the quality of life, from curing diseases to tackling global environmental challenges. Startups play an indispensable role in promoting innovation. The collaboration between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (“VCs”) has been observed to incentivize disruptive research and development in a way that cannot be replicated within established firms, in academia, or elsewhere. In some nations, startups are also significant contributors to the economy. The United States is a striking example. Firms that launched as venture-backed startups dominate US capital markets in terms of market capitalization and proportional weight of leading market indexes, and significantly contribute to US job creation. Many economies strive to create a US-like startup ecosystem and reproduce its success locally.

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An Auspicious Start for Universal Proxy

Michael R. Levin is founder and editor of The Activist Investor. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Universal Proxies (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

We discern a definitely interesting and possibly significant impact of the new universal proxy card (UPC) rules on US proxy contests, even though it’s still somewhat early. We see that impact both in how activist investors plan proxy contests, and in the small number of contests that have concluded under UPC.

We heard all manner of predictions about UPC before and since its September 1, 2022 implementation date. In one account, company advisors warn of a “disaster” for BoDs and activist advisors cautioned the inherent high cost of a successful proxy contest would weigh against the initial enthusiasm that might prompt more of them. Shareholders welcomed it.

Observers expected proxy contests to become more personal, proxy advisors to gain influence, and companies to settle contests more eagerly. We echoed some of these predictions, and added a few of our own, mostly favorable to activist investors. We expected more ESG proponents that previously relied on precatory proposals to nominate directors at companies they think moved too slowly to implement successful proposals.

Based on the initial proxy contests since implementation, a number of these predictions appear accurate, although as we noted at the outset, it’s still early. In the one contest that actually voted under UPC, it helped shareholders exactly as the SEC intended.

What have we seen so far? We can think about this question in two ways: how activist investors have planned proxy contests under UPC, and how proxy contests have worked out under UPC.

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Fiduciary Duties of Public Pension Systems and Registered Investment Advisors

Matt Cole is the Chief Investment Officer at Strive Asset Management. This post is based on his Strive memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; How Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Oliver D. Hart and Luigi Zingales; and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee (discussed on the Forum here) by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff. 

So-called Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) investment practices have come under increasing legal scrutiny.  Areas of legal concerns include potential breaches of fiduciary duty, conflicts of interest, violations of antitrust law, and violations of federal securities law.

This white paper addresses three questions:

1. Does state law prohibit public pension trustees from choosing investments, adopting investment strategies, or exercising appurtenant voting rights based on ESG considerations?

2. Does state law prohibit public pension trustees from allocating capital to funds, including index funds, owned by asset management firms that engage with portfolio companies, and/or exercise appurtenant voting rights, to promote ESG objectives?

3. Does state or federal law prohibit a registered investment advisor (“RIA”) from investing client capital, or advising a client to invest capital, in funds, including index funds, owned by asset management firms that engage with portfolio companies and/or exercise appurtenant voting rights to promote ESG objectives, without expressly informing the client of these ESG-promoting practices and obtaining the client’s express advance consent?

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The Universal Proxy: An Early Look

Keir Gumbs is a Chief Legal Officer at Broadridge. This post is based on his Broadridge piece. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Universal Proxies (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst. 

The Universal Proxy: Background

Last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s universal proxy rule took effect. Prior to the rule’s adoption, companies and dissident shareholders sent separate proxy cards listing only their own slate of nominees for board of directors. It was difficult for shareholders to mix and match management and dissident nominees unless they attended a company’s annual meeting in person. Under the universal proxy rule, companies and dissidents are now required to use a universal proxy card that lists all of the nominees from both sides. The rule is triggered when a dissident solicits 67% of a company’s shareholders and complies with nomination procedures included in a company’s bylaws. As a result of the rule, shareholders can select the nominees they favor regardless of who nominated them.

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Equal Treatment for U.S. Investors

Howell E. Jackson is the James S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and Tyler Gellasch is the President and CEO of the Healthy Markets Association. This post draws on two forthcoming papers by Professor Jackson and Jeffrey Zhang, available here and here, and on Mr. Gellasch’s SEC comment letters.

The expiration of an SEC no-action letter is typically not a topic of interest to the general public or members of Congress. But a firestorm is about to descend on Washington over the SEC’s plans to let a temporary measure adopted nearly six years ago expire this summer. Wall Street lobbyists are gearing up to push for an extension. If the SEC succumbs to their pressure, public pension plans, endowments, and millions of Americans invested in mutual funds will lose out.

The Problem of Bundled Commissions

Securities firms like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs typically offer investors potentially valuable research as well as trading services. These firms have long preferred that investors pay for both trade execution and research services with a single bundled commission. So an investment fund, like a public pension plan or a mutual fund, will often be forced to accept a bundled commission that can be thought of as having two components, a component attributable to the trading (nowadays often less than 1 cent per share), and a component attributable to research services (which can often be as high as 5 or even 10 cents per share).

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How Have the Top U.S. Asset Managers Voted in 2022?

Lindsey Stewart is Director of Investment Stewardship Research at Morningstar, Inc. This post is based on his Morningstar memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst; Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy (discussed on the forum here) and The Specter of the Giant Three (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst; and The Limits of Portfolio Primacy (discussed on the Forum here) by Roberto Tallarita.

Executive Summary

The last year has seen the debate over sustainable investing come to a head. There has never been a greater range of views on how considering environmental, social, and governance factors affects investing. Amid all this debate, everyone seems to agree on one thing: proxy-voting decisions matter.
Asset managers believe that voting at shareholder meetings is an essential element of how they exercise their fiduciary duty on behalf of their clients. Yet, outside the asset-management industry, opinions are increasingly polarized. Some stakeholders think that asset managers aren’t using the influence of their voting power to address environmental and social issues at companies. Others believe managers are overprioritizing such issues to the detriment of investor returns. But, with 2022’s record number of shareholder resolutions on environmental and social issues, it’s hard to find anyone who believes that these votes are inconsequential.

Amid this unprecedented focus on voting, it is a good opportunity to take a deep dive into how the top U.S. asset managers voted on key shareholder resolutions at U.S. companies. We define these key resolutions as those shareholder resolutions addressing environmental or social themes that were supported by 40% or more of a company’s independent shareholders. At a time when asset managers have emphasized their reluctance to support proposals that they see as “unduly prescriptive” or repetitive of existing asks of companies, analyzing these key resolutions gives a clear picture of the levels of shareholder support for proposals that asset managers with a range of approaches to sustainability are prepared to back.

This paper analyzes the trends and key topics for shareholder resolutions over not only 2022 but also 2021 and 2020. It evaluates how the top 20 U.S. asset managers have voted on 241 key resolutions and how those managers’ sustainable funds have voted relative to the wider fund range.

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The Liability Trap: Why the ALEC Anti-ESG Bills Create a Legal Quagmire for Fiduciaries Connected with Public Pensions

David H. Webber is Professor of Law at the Boston University School of Law, David Berger is Partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, and Beth Young is a lawyer and consultant on ESG issues at Corporate Governance & Sustainable Strategies. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; How Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Oliver D. Hart and Luigi Zingales, and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee (discussed on the Forum here) by Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Two proposed bills barring public pensions from considering environmental, social, and governance investment criteria create massive legal risk for any pension fiduciary or service provider. The American Legislative Exchange Council “boycott bill” and the “fiduciary duty” bill, if adopted, would impose irreconcilable legal requirements on such fiduciaries, and subject them to compliance with arbitrary and unworkable legal demands.

The main legal problems the bills create fall into four categories:

(1) the unworkable distinction between “pecuniary” and “non-pecuniary,” a distinction so blurry that the bills are self-contradictory, as we demonstrate;

(2) the clash between the bills’ definition of materiality and that established by the Supreme Court of the United States, such that state law would bar consideration of investment information that federal law requires;

(3) similarly vague and self-contradictory requirements to boycott companies that engage in ESG, and

(4) the transfer of control of proxy voting to elected officials, thereby ensuring the politicization of such voting in direct conflict with the bills’ stated goals.

The boycott bill and the fiduciary duty bill dramatically increase liability risk for plan fiduciaries and service providers without providing any corresponding or even off-setting benefits to fiduciaries or their members. They will reduce the number of service providers willing to work with such pensions, increase liability, insurance, and investment costs for taxpayers, and fund participants and beneficiaries. They should be rejected.

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Delaware Supreme Court Enforces Partnership’s Agreement Unambiguous Exculpation Provision

Jason M. Halper and Jared Stanisci are Partners and Sara Bussiere is an Associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Mr. Stanisci, Ms. Bussiere, Elizabeth Gorman and Dillon Carlin, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

Delaware Supreme Court Enforces Partnership Agreement’s Unambiguous Exculpation Provision Waiving Fiduciary Duties and Presuming Good Faith When Relying on Advice of Counsel in Reversing

$690 Million Damages Award to Minority Investors of Boardwalk Pipeline Partners LP

On December 19, 2022, Chief Justice Seitz issued an opinion for a unanimous Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en bane, reversing and remanding the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, an action brought by former minority unitholders alleging breaches of the Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP (“Boardwalk”) Partnership Agreement. [1] In its post-trial opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery had found that Boardwalk’s general partner, which “owned slightly more than 50% of” Boardwalk’s units and indisputably exercised control over it, [2] orchestrated a “sham” trigger of a call right that permitted it to take the entity private by “mani pulating” outside counsel to issue a legal opinion (one of the triggering events under the Partnership Agreement) in breach of the Partnership Agreement and awarded Plaintiffs nearly $700 million in damages. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Chancery should have enforced the plain, unambiguous terms of the Partnership Agreement and finding that the general partner was entitled to exercise the call right when it reasonably relied on an opinion of counsel-notwithstanding the Court of Chancery’s factual finding that the general partner acted “intentionally and opportunistically” in obtaining the opinion-and was exculpated from any damages under the Partnership Agreement. The Supreme Court’s opinion serves as an important reminder of the broad contractual powers that parties have under the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, including the right to impose expansive limits on the liability of controllers.

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