Yearly Archives: 2023

The Angel’s in the Details: The Importance of Well-Drafted Board Minutes

Sonia K. Nijjar and Jenness E. Parker are Partners, and Lauren N. Rosenello is an Associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

Takeaways

  • Boards should see minutes as a way to tell how they worked to fulfill their duties to stockholders, capturing a board’s deliberations and the reasoning behind its decisions.
  • Properly documenting the board’s deliberative process takes on heightened significance for “mission-critical matters” such as major deals, oversight of monoline businesses or significant revenue flows, or catastrophic events, where board actions may be the subject of stockholder litigation.
  • Well-drafted board minutes can help contain the scope of stockholders’ books and records requests and make it easier to win early dismissal of lawsuits.
  • To protect against claims that a company’s disclosures were misleading, a company’s public statements and filings should be consistent with the board minutes.

Board minutes are an essential part of a company’s internal record keeping. But they are more than a routine, formal exercise. They also play a pivotal role in stockholder litigation. As a contemporaneous record, plaintiff stockholders will scrutinize minutes when evaluating and pursuing claims against directors and officers, and judges will consider minutes at the pleadings stage. Boards should see minutes as a way to tell how they worked in fulfilling their duties to stockholders.

Minutes of important board meetings, and proxy statements describing them, have become increasingly important in recent years as a result of developments in Delaware law. Courts have sometimes granted stockholders early access to documents beyond formal board materials, such as directors’ emails and text messages, where they found that minutes offered too sparse an account of a board’s consideration of a particular issue. In addition, if a formal board record is lacking, stockholders may argue that a board breached its duty to oversee and address risk.

By contrast, a sufficiently clear record in the minutes of directors’ deliberations and the process by which they reached decisions can position the company to head off intrusive probes of internal records at the outset, help prevent complaints from being filed, and potentially aid in winning early dismissal of suits.

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Federal Reserve Proposes Climate Risk Guidance for Large Financial Institutions

Nicola Higgs, Betty M. Huber, and Arthur S. Long are Partners at Latham & Watkins LLP. This post is based on a Latham memorandum by Ms. Higgs, Ms. Huber, Mr. Long, Pia Naib, Anne Mainwaring, and Deric Behar.

On December 2, 2022, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) published proposed Principles for Climate-Related Financial Risk Management for Large Financial Institutions (the Proposal). The Proposal urges large financial institutions [1] to consider how best to identify, measure, monitor, and control the various risks associated with climate change over a variety of time horizons. It also specifies that large financial institutions should monitor microprudential risks, including credit, market, liquidity, operational, and legal and compliance risks, as well as other financial and nonfinancial risks that could arise from climate change.

The Proposal aims to support financial institution boards of directors and management in incorporating mitigation of climate-related financial risks into their broader risk management frameworks, consistent with safe and sound practices and the Federal Reserve’s rules and guidance on sound governance.

Large financial institutions are defined as those with over $100 billion in assets that are subject to Federal Reserve supervision, including the US operations of non-US banking organizations. The Federal Reserve’s guidance is founded on the premise that climate change poses an emerging risk to the safety and soundness of financial institutions and the financial stability of the United States.

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Investment Stewardship Global Principles 2023

Sandy Boss is Global Head of Investment Stewardship, John McKinley and Michelle Edkins are Managing Directors at BlackRock, Inc. This post is based on their BlackRock memorandum.

Introduction to BlackRock

BlackRock’s purpose is to help more and more people experience financial well-being. We manage assets on behalf of institutional and individual clients, across a full spectrum of investment strategies, asset classes, and regions. Our client base includes pension plans, endowments, foundations, charities, official institutions, insurers, and other financial institutions, as well as individuals around the world. As part of our fiduciary duty to our clients, we consider it one of our responsibilities to promote sound corporate governance, as an informed, engaged shareholder on their behalf. At BlackRock, this is the responsibility of the Investment Stewardship team.

Philosophy on investment stewardship

Companies are responsible for ensuring they have appropriate governance structures to serve the interests of shareholders and other key stakeholders. We believe that there are certain fundamental rights attached to shareholding. Companies and their boards should be accountable to shareholders and structured with appropriate checks and balances to ensure that they operate in shareholders’ best interests to create sustainable value. Shareholders should have the right to vote to elect, remove, and nominate directors, approve the appointment of the auditor, and amend the corporate charter or by-laws. Shareholders should be able to vote on key board decisions that are material to the protection of their investment, including but not limited to, changes to the purpose of the business, dilution levels and preemptive rights, and the distribution of income and capital structure. In order to make informed decisions, shareholders need sufficient and timely information. In addition, shareholder voting rights should be proportionate to their economic ownership—the principle of “one share, one vote” helps achieve this balance.

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Weekly Roundup: January 6-12, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 6-12, 2023

2023 Annual Letter to Boards


D&O Insurers as ESG Monitors


Cross-Border M&A – 2023 Checklist for Successful Acquisitions in the U.S.


Top 5 SEC Enforcement Developments


US M&A Levels Remain Healthy


How Important Is Corporate Governance? Evidence from Machine Learning


Sustainable finance: The road so far and a look ahead


Do Companies Redact Material Information From Confidential SEC Filings? Evidence From the FAST Act


ISS Publishes Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates for 2023




Prioritizing Human Capital — Modern Challenges and the Board’s Role


Prioritizing Human Capital — Modern Challenges and the Board’s Role

Carey Oven is National Managing Partner at the Center for Board Effectiveness and Chief Talent Officer, Michael Stephan is US Human Capital national managing partner and Reem Janho is Senior Manager at Deloitte LLP. This post is based on a Deloitte memorandum by Ms. Oven, Mr. Stephan, Ms. Janho, Art Mazor, Michael Griffiths, and Maureen Bujno. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver to All Stakeholders? (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.; and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of Covid (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.

Introduction

Many corporate boards are devoting increasing amounts of time to one of their most important assets, their workers. Profound, disruptive shifts in the marketplace and worker expectations coupled with growing demands for transparency and action on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, are elevating a variety of human capital risks and opportunities to boardroom discussions.

For example, many of the topics under ESG are workforce-related matters that have become front and center for many boards. Issues such as culture, purpose, hybrid work, the future of work, well-being, skills gaps, automation, and shifting societal expectations, as well as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), are increasingly appearing on board agendas.

The global pandemic helped accelerate many of the issues driving these discussions, but it wasn’t the sole impetus. Even before the pandemic, shifting demographics, changing expectations, digital transformation, intensifying competition for talent, and succession planning were already becoming part of routine boardroom dialogue, according to a Deloitte report  [1]

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SEC Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals: No-Action Requests, Determinants, and the Role of SEC Staff

Gregory Burke is a fifth-year accounting Ph.D. candidate at Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business. This post is based on his article forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.

Background

Since 1947, no-action letters under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-8 have allowed SEC staff members to regulate shareholder voice upon management’s request, acting as intermediaries between shareholders and management on matters related to shareholder proposals. Specifically, no-action relief under 14a-8 allows management to exclude shareholder proposals from the annual proxy with SEC staff approval. The literature notes that management seeks SEC staff support to exclude nearly 40% of all shareholder proposals and that the staff concurs 73% of the time, suggesting nearly 30% of all proposals are excluded through this process.

Scholars and practitioners have debated the merits of the SEC staff’s role as the arbiter of shareholder proposals. Supporters of the no-action process argue the SEC staff identify and exclude value destroying proposals. Opponents contend managers often seek to exclude proposals widely supported by shareholders, constraining shareholder power and thereby limiting shareholder value. Moreover, even the SEC has debated whether its involvement in this process adds value. The former director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Bill Hinman, suggested engagement between shareholders and management might improve if the SEC could “get out of the way.”

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Homophily versus monitoring: Do all female board directors drive the gender assignment of audit partners?

Mehdi Nekhili is a Professor of financial and accounting Management at Le Mans University. This post is based on an article forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy by Mr. Nekhili, Fahim Javed, Haithem Nagati, and Riadh Manita. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (discussed on the Forum here) by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss; Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried; and Duty and Diversity (discussed on the Forum here) by Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Introduction

In many countries, women are poorly represented in the upper echelons of the accounting profession, where the greatest responsibility and power lies (i.e., partnership position). Nevertheless, female audit partners are found to be associated with ethical audit decision-making and reduced opportunistic accounting practices. One potential argument in favour of engaging female audit partners could then be that they have a core set of principles and values shared with female board directors. The personal attributes of audit partners are likely to be a factor in the preferences of board (audit committee) members and may give rise to situations in which homophily plays an important role in the audit partner assignment process. The term homophily refers to people’s implicit tendency to prefer interacting with others who are similar to themselves. Our study goes beyond the homophily argument by distinguishing female directors according to their position on the corporate board. Because female independent directors and female audit committee members tend to be more vigilant monitors and are more concerned about oversight of financial reporting processes, they are likely to be more sensitive than female inside directors to the selection of audit partners for monitoring purposes. To enhance our understanding as to which of the homophily and monitoring arguments may prevail in the auditor selection process, we raise the question of whether all female directors uniformly drive the gender assignment of audit engagement partners regardless of their position on the corporate board.

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ISS Publishes Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates for 2023

Shaun Bisman is a Partner and Jared Sorhaindo is an Associate at Compensation Advisory Partners. This post is based on their CAP memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

ISS recently published 2023 policy changes, which will go into effect for annual meetings held on or after February 1, 2023. This article discusses the changes and policy clarifications made to ISS’ compensation and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) voting policies.

Executive Compensation-Related Updates

Problematic Pay Practices

ISS has explicitly indicated that severance received by an executive when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary will be considered a problematic pay practice, which may result in an adverse vote recommendation. ISS has also clarified that the types of pay practices that may result in an adverse vote recommendation are not limited to the examples provided in the policy document. The full list of problematic pay practices can be found here.

As noted by ISS, this is not a policy application change, but rather codifies ISS’ current approach to evaluating severance payments received by an executive when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary.

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate

ISS announced in its update last year that it would change its burn rate calculation effective as of February 1, 2023. The burn rate will be referred to as the “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” (VABR) and will be calculated as follows:

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Do Companies Redact Material Information From Confidential SEC Filings? Evidence From the FAST Act

Anne Thompson is an Associate Professor of Accountancy and Oktay Urcan is a Professor of Accountancy at the University of Illinois Gies College of Business. Hayoung Yoon is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in The Accounting Review.

Recent research suggests that differences between the economic and legal definitions of materiality can impose adverse consequences on equity investors. We explore this issue in the context of redacted Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. The SEC requires issuer firms to disclose entry into material contracts within four days of contract signing in an 8-K filing and file the agreement in EDGAR either as an exhibit in an 8-K or in the next periodic filing. Because some material contracts contain proprietary information, firms can redact specific information from material contracts so long as the redacted information 1) would cause competitive harm if disclosed and 2) is immaterial to investors. These joint criteria are inherently contradictory because commercially sensitive information that would cause competitive harm, if disclosed, is likely to be important to an investor’s decision making. However, the SEC rarely rejects companies’ redactions which suggests that most companies meet this joint requirement. Together, these statements imply that the SEC’s threshold when assessing legal materiality may be different from the threshold investors apply when assessing economic materiality.

Using a sample of SEC filings with material contract exhibits between January 2007 and April 2019, we conduct two sets of tests that are designed to assess the implications of non-disclosed information (in this case, redacted information) to the market. First, we compare the speed of the stock market price discovery process over the 253 trading-days following SEC filings with at least one redacted material contract to SEC filings with non-redacted material contracts. If redacted information is economically material to investors, we expect slower price discovery because the redacted information should hamper the informational efficiency of stock prices. We find that price discovery is significantly slower following SEC filings that contain redacted contracts as compared to SEC filings with only non-redacted contracts. To address the concern that redacting firms might be significantly different than non-redacting firms due to unobservable factors, we restrict the sample to firms that redact and focus on variation between filings with redacted versus non-redacted contracts. We find qualitatively similar results in these tests. We then examine the subsample of redacted contracts where SEC required the company to disclose some previously redacted information because the SEC staff judged the information to be material and/or ineligible for redaction (i.e., un-redactions). During the period when the un-redacted contracts are under SEC review, we find that stock market price discovery is significantly slower than non-redacted contracts and is not significantly different than other redacted contracts. After these contracts are un-redacted, stock price discovery increases and is not significantly different than non-redacted contracts. Because un-redactions provide a reliable ex-post indicator that managers redacted material information, this test validates our conclusions that material redactions contribute to slower price discovery.

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Sustainable finance: The road so far and a look ahead

Charles McConnell is a Partner and Xuan Jin is a Local Partner at White & Case LLP. This post is based on their White & Case memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver to All Stakeholders? (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.; and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of Covid (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.

ESG, sustainability, climate change adaptation and mitigation, social impact investing and related themes have become ubiquitous concepts that seem to be top of mind for every board director, financier and investor. While there is no universal consensus on the precise meaning of these terms (and there may never be, nor does there necessarily need to be), within business and finance circles they are largely understood to represent a set of environmental, social and corporate governance considerations that can impact a business’s strategy and its ability to create value over the long term.[1]

During the past decade (and particularly in the past two to three years), this understanding has brought about a seismic shift in business practices, reflecting a growing appreciation across sectors and geographies that integrating ESG considerations into corporate decision-making is not only “good for business” or a “nice to have,” but rather, it is a strategic imperative.

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