Monthly Archives: August 2024

DOJ Launches Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

Maria Cruz Melendez and Andrew M. Good are Partners and Bora P. Rawcliffe is a Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

On August 1, 2024, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division launched the Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the Program), following up on its announcement in March 2024 of a plan to offer whistleblower awards.

Under the Program, whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the Criminal Division with original and truthful information about corporate misconduct that results in a criminal or civil forfeiture greater than $1 million are now eligible for a financial award. The award may be up to 30% of the first $100 million in net proceeds forfeited and up to 5% of any net proceeds forfeited between $100 million and $500 million.

Any award is subject to specific eligibility criteria, discussed below, and requires, among other things, a whistleblower’s cooperation. The Program complements another pilot program launched early this year that offers nonprosecution agreements to qualifying individuals who voluntarily disclose information about the same kinds of offenses.

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The short-termism trap: Catering to informed investors with limited horizons

James Dow is a Professor of Finance at London Business School, Jungsuk Han is an Associate Professor of Finance at Seoul National University, and Francesco Sangiorgi is an Associate Professor of Finance at Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. This post is based on their recent article published in the Journal of Financial Economics.

Introduction

Publicly traded firms face pressure from equity market investors with short investment horizons. This forces companies to make decisions that favor immediate gains over long-term value creation. But existing economic models of short termism cannot explain how this could be seriously damaging to the economy.  In our recent study, “The Short-Termism Trap: Catering to Informed Investors with Limited Horizons,” published in the Journal of Financial Economics, we present a model that illustrates how the short-term focus of informed investors can lead firms and the stock market into a destructive cycle of short-termism.

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Special Committee Midyear Report

Gregory V. Gooding, William Regner, and Andrew Bab are Partners at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Mr. Gooding, Mr. Regner, Mr. Bab, Caitlin Gibson, and Matthew Ryan, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

This issue of the Debevoise & Plimpton Special Committee Report surveys corporate transactions announced during the first half of 2024 that used special committees to manage conflicts, and key Delaware judicial decisions rendered during this period that relate to issues relevant to the use of special committees.

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Imputing Proxy Advisor Recommendations

Jonathon Zytnick is an Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. This post is based on his recent working paper.

The recommendations of proxy advisors are the subject of extensive academic research. Yet in recent years, proxy advisor recommendations have become largely unavailable for use in academic research. In a recent paper, I use shareholder votes to impute the recommendations of the two major proxy advisors with a high degree of accuracy. I place the imputed recommendations on my website for use by academics.

Two proxy advisors combine for a 97% market share: Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, with ISS the far larger of the two. There is no widespread access to the recommendations of either. Until recently, academics studying corporate governance have universally relied on ISS’s Voting Analytics database for ISS recommendations, but sometime between 2020 and 2022, ISS removed its recommendations from that dataset, both retroactively and on an ongoing basis. Academics have traditionally had limited or no access to Glass Lewis recommendations. The lack of access to proxy advisor recommendations creates a need for a practical, accurate substitute.

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Under Pressure—Rethinking Board Practices

Randi Lesnick and Andy Levine are Co-Chairs of Corporate Practice and Joel May is a Partner at Jones Day. This post is based on a Jones Day memorandum by Ms. Lesnick, Mr. Levine, Mr. May, and Jennifer Lewis.

Today’s corporate boards are facing unprecedented challenges, an evolving and expanding risk profile—and a significantly heavier workload. Demands of board service have risen as director responsibilities must take into account increased regulation, expanding concepts of risk oversight, a highly complex business environment, geopolitical factors, and social dynamics. Even those who adhere to notions of shareholder primacy recognize that topics like DEI and sustainability now fit squarely within the board’s purview. Moreover, the 24/7 news cycle and instantaneous social media put corporate leaders in the spotlight full-time, requiring them to respond effectively, and in real time, to developments.

From our seat as legal advisors to boards, we see a higher level of legal risk than ever before. Recent Delaware case law in areas including bylaw provisions, executive pay, the use of special committees, stockholder agreements, and even de-SPAC transactions invite concern and create uncertainty. Further, stockholder plaintiffs have continued to challenge director decision-making through derivative lawsuits, with some alarming and distinctive recent successes.

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Significant Amendments to the DGCL Are Set to Become Effective

Amy Simmerman is a Partner and Jason Schoenberg is an Associate at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on their Wilson Sonsini memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On August 1, 2024, an extensive and important set of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) will become effective. The amendments, which will apply both prospectively and retrospectively, were largely intended to address several recent Delaware Court of Chancery decisions that many practitioners considered inconsistent with prevailing market practice. Our previous client alert detailing the proposal of these DGCL amendments is available here. The most pertinent information about the new amendments is described below.

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A Proposal For Improving Trust In The Special Litigation Committee Process

Mark Richardson is a Partner at Labaton Keller Sucharow LLP and Joel Fleming is a Partner at Equity Litigation Group LLP. This post is based on their recent working paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

For many years, the special litigation committee (“SLC”) was a nearly forgotten device in derivative litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Chastened by a string of decisions rejecting SLCs’ motions to terminate,[1] boards facing derivative litigation in Delaware almost always chose to litigate on the merits. During that same period, the Delaware plaintiffs’ bar became a serious threat to wayward fiduciaries, extracting billions of dollars in settlements in high-value derivative actions.

Recently, however, the SLC has experienced a dramatic revival. After an eighteen-year drought—from 2003 to 2021—in which there was not a single written opinion granting an SLC’s motion to dismiss, SLCs are now routinely being formed in strong derivative cases, they are routinely moving to dismiss, and their motions are often granted.[2]

The SLC’s newfound popularity has bred deep cynicism and skepticism amongst shareholder advocates. As attorneys who typically represent public stockholders, we are far from alone in observing an increasingly common phenomenon: seemingly results-driven SLC investigations that appear designed to terminate meritorious claims. These “investigations” generally downplay contemporaneous evidence in favor of unsworn, after-the-fact witnesses’ explanations that are neither recorded nor transcribed.  They then culminate in a report in support of a motion to terminate that reads more like standard defense-side advocacy than an objective assessment of all relevant evidence.

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Weekly Roundup: August 2-8, 2024


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 2-8, 2024

Chancery Finds 26.7% Stockholder Was Not a Controller


Court Dismisses Most of SEC’s Claims Against SolarWinds


The Delaware Court of Chancery Undertakes Exacting Calculations of Equitable Damages


2024 Proxy Roundup: ESG Metrics in Incentive Compensation Plans


Lessons from the Biggest Business Tax Cut in US History


Summary of Shareholder Voting on Rule 14a-8 Proposals


One Year Later: The Implications of SFFA for Corporate America


Corporate Governance in an Era of Geoeconomics


Embracing disruption: The board’s role in championing innovation


ESG in 2024: A Midyear Review


Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading


Navigating ESG Collaborations Under Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny


Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2024 Proxy Season


The Credit Markets Go Dark


Does Compensation Actually Paid Align with Total Shareholder Return?


Does Compensation Actually Paid Align with Total Shareholder Return?

Ira Kay is a Managing Partner, Ed Sim is a Consultant, and Mike Kesner is a Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Key Takeaways

  • There is a strong correlation (.56) between relative TSR and CAP but not between TSR and SCT Compensation (.08)
  • A relative rank analysis against a company’s peer group or industry- and size-specific index provides the most useful evaluation of the relationship between CAP and company TSR
  • A disconnect between relative CAP and TSR may be traceable to competitive deficits/ surpluses in executive compensation strategy and policies, which may need to be addressed

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The Credit Markets Go Dark

Jared A. Ellias is the Scott C. Collins Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and Elisabeth de Fontenay is Karl W. Leo Distinguished Professor of Law at Duke University. This post is based on their recent article forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal.

Investment funds deploying “private credit” investment strategies—primarily in the form of senior secured lending to companies—managed only $400 million in 2000, yet reached $1.5 trillion in 2023.

In The Credit Markets Go Dark, we describe how private credit funds are reshaping corporate governance and corporate finance and offer new data capturing its meteoric rise.

The ownership, governance and financing of corporate America look radically different today than they did only a few decades ago, due to conflicting trends in the ownership of corporate equity on the one hand and corporate debt on the other.

On the equity side, two key features define the landscape, namely: (1) companies are increasingly choosing to remain private; and (2) the equity of both public and private companies is increasingly concentrated in the hands of powerful investment funds. Accordingly, one could describe the major trends in corporate equity ownership as privatization—the large-scale exit of companies from the public regulatory scheme and from information-rich markets—and concentration of ownership.

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