Our study, “Say on Pay Laws and Insider Trading,” published in The Accounting Review, examines whether the mandatory adoption of “say on pay” (SoP) laws—which require shareholder votes on executive compensation—leads executives to engage more in insider trading as a countermeasure to the increased compensation risk imposed by these regulations. This question is crucial because SoP laws, designed to enhance transparency and align executive compensation with performance, might inadvertently lead to increased insider trading activities, thus undermining their intended goals. Yet, the potential impact of SoP on implicit compensation, such as insider trading, has remained largely unexplored.
Over the past two decades, many countries have embraced SoP regimes. Previous studies, like those by Correa and Lel (2016), indicate that SoP boosts pay-for-performance sensitivity and slows the growth of pay rates, especially in firms with excessive pay and weak governance. Other single-country studies, including those by Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) and Ferri and Maber (2013), show that SoP improves the quality of pay disclosures and prompts changes in pay practices following adverse votes. Collectively, the evidence suggests that SoP has had a direct impact on executive compensation. By increasing the performance sensitivity of top executive pay without a commensurate increase in levels, we argue that SoP increase executive pay risk.
READ MORE »