Monthly Archives: March 2025

2025 Proxy Season Preview

Matteo Tonello is Head of Benchmarking and Analytics at The Conference Board, Inc. This post is based on a Conference Board memorandum by Ariane Marchis-Mouren, Senior Researcher, Corporate Governance at The Conference Board.

Shareholder proposals reached record levels in 2024, signaling continued shareholder engagement pressures for 2025. Companies should continue proactively engaging with shareholders, monitor policy updates, and ensure compliance with regulatory requirements to navigate this dynamic landscape effectively.

Key Insights 

  • The 2025 proxy season is expected to see sustained shareholder activism, evolving priorities in environmental and social (E&S) proposals, and a renewed focus on corporate governance.
  • Companies continue to face competing pressures from shareholder proposals both for and against environmental, social & governance (ESG) topics, with anti-ESG filings increasing in prominence.
  • As some investors deprioritize E&S issues amid political shifts, core governance topics such as executive compensation are expected to face heightened scrutiny this proxy season.
  • Average support for shareholder proposals peaked in 2021 and steadily declined through 2024; an exception is governance proposals, which are back to 2021 levels.
  • With “proposal fatigue” growing among institutional investors, companies can strengthen investor support by providing detailed cost-benefit analyses of shareholder proposals.

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ESG Misrepresentations and Bond Investors

James Park is Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper.

When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) describes its mission as protecting investors, it mainly has stock investors in mind. The stock market crash of 1929 prompted Congress to pass the federal securities laws. It believed that ordinary investors needed protection from Wall Street insiders who exploited the speculative fervor in stock prices that preceded the crash to enrich themselves. In contrast, investors in corporate bond markets were viewed as needing less protection. The private placement exemption was meant in part to relieve issuers from the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 when selling bonds to sophisticated investors such as insurance companies.

In the modern era, the SEC’s enforcement cases against public companies for misleading investors have most often emphasized stock investor losses. The agency’s accounting fraud cases routinely argue that a company issued materially misleading information to boost its stock price. The losses from the wave of securities fraud in the late 1990s and early 2000s prompted Congress to give the SEC the power to create funds to compensate investors for their losses. The SEC generally distributes fund recoveries to stock investors.

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Impacts for US Companies of the Proposed EU Omnibus Package

Beth Sasfai is a Partner, Emma Bichet is a Special Counsel, and Jack Eastwood is an Associate at Cooley LLP. This post is based on their Cooley memorandum.

On February 26, 2025, the European Commission (Commission) published a proposed ‘Omnibus package’ to streamline some of the recently adopted European Union (EU) sustainability laws. The laws in scope of the proposed Omnibus package are the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), the EU Taxonomy Regulation, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

The Omnibus package is a legislative proposal and could still change before being adopted. It will now pass to the European Parliament and member states in the European Council for negotiation. Both the Parliament and the Council have the power to amend any of the provisions in the proposal. This is worth tracking closely for US companies that are in scope of these laws since it could have a significant impact on their EU legal compliance obligations.

Below are some key takeaways from the Commission’s proposed Omnibus package and its potential impacts for US companies preparing for compliance with key EU sustainability laws.

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Remarks by Commissioner Peirce Before the Investor Advisory Committee

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks. The views expressed in this post are those of Commissioner Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Brian [Schorr], and good morning to you all at this first Investor Advisory Committee meeting of 2025. Thank you to all the panelists joining us today. Although the Commission’s make-up has changed and we are seeing Commission priorities shift, our shared desire to ensure vibrant capital markets and informed investors will continue to unite and guide us.

Today’s first panel is set to discuss how public companies disclose the risks and opportunities associated with artificial intelligence. I hope that one theme in the conversation will be the value of principles-based disclosure and the value of affording companies the discretion to make disclosures based on what is material to their particular circumstances. Principles-based disclosure rules do not prescribe corporate disclosure, but instead provide the framework within which companies make material disclosures to investors. Attempts to fill disclosure rulebooks with requirements specific to climate, artificial intelligence, or any other hot topic disserve investors in several ways. First, companies that do not have material things to say about these topics can be forced to spend company resources saying them. Second, even mere disclosure requirements can end up being an indirect way for a securities regulator to micromanage substantive company operations. Third, these disclosure requirements can distract corporate boards and managers from doing more important things. Fourth, corporate disclosures filled with answers to prescriptive disclosure frameworks drown out material information. Clear and comprehensive disclosure should be our goal, not homogenization for its own sake. I anticipate that the panel of experts Alvin has gathered will provide us with much to think about.

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Statement by Acting Chair Uyeda on Climate-Related Disclosure Rules

Mark T. Uyeda is the Acting Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today, I am taking action on The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors rule that was adopted by the Commission on March 6, 2024 (the “Rule”). [1] The Rule is currently being challenged in litigation consolidated in the Eighth Circuit [2] and the Commission previously stayed effectiveness of the Rule pending completion of that litigation. [3] The Rule is deeply flawed and could inflict significant harm on the capital markets and our economy.

Both Commissioner Peirce and I voted against the Rule’s adoption. [4] Commissioner Peirce said that then-existing disclosure rules were sufficient and that the “[R]ule’s anticipated benefits do not outweigh the costs.” [5] She argued that “only a mandate from Congress should put us in the business of facilitating the disclosure of information not clearly related to financial returns.” [6] I stated that the Commission was “without statutory authority or expertise” to address climate change issues and that “this [R]ule is climate regulation promulgated under the Commission’s seal.” [7]

During the comment period, many submissions likewise urged that the Rule not be adopted. Among the reasons were that the Rule would require a large volume of financially immaterial information, financially material climate-related risks were already subject to disclosure under existing rules, and the proposed rules overstepped the SEC’s regulatory authority. [8]

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Texas is Disrupting Delaware’s Dominance through Innovation

Jonathan Macey is Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law at Yale Law School and Professor in the Yale School of Management, and Roberta Romano is Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Co-Director of the Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Disruptive innovation has come to the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters.

For decades, the biggest obstacle facing states seeking to challenge Delaware’s dominance in the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters was their inability to replace Delaware’s massive inventory of highly developed case law precedent. This body of law, coupled with the promise that an elite cadre of sophisticated judges would interpret new legal disputes against the background of these precedents, allowed Delaware to offer what its competitor-states could not: certainty and predictability. Until now that is.

Delaware’s position seemed insurmountable because competing with Delaware required other states to match Delaware’s certainty and predictability. This certainty and predictability was possible because of Delaware’s large body of precedential case law and its specialized and exclusive trial court. While a state could alleviate an absence of controlling precedents by incorporating Delaware decisions into its case law, as Delaware did when it superseded New Jersey as the leading domicile state in the early Twentieth Century, that does not resolve the problem going forward of having judges with expertise deciding new issues as the business environment changes. Companies that wanted to do complex deals like public offerings of debt or equity, the pursuit of an active mergers and acquisitions program, the implementation of antitakeover devices and major restructurings relocated to Delaware because their advisors told them that the law in rival jurisdictions was too undeveloped and uncertain. Companies, and their officers and directors have a high demand for legal certainty when facing litigation risk and are willing to pay for it. And pay for it they did, by opting in to the high-fee, litigation world of Delaware corporate law.

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Weekly Roundup: February 28-March 6, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 28-March 6, 2025

Securities Law Alert: Year in Review


Exiting Delaware: The TripAdvisor Decision


Sponsor-Controller Cleared of Conflicts in Sale Near Fund’s Term End


Alignment Advance Notice Bylaw


Is ESG Making the Job Market More Polarized?


The Changing Tides of the SEC Under the Second Trump Administration


SEC Leadership Change Results in Key Policy Developments


Decision Ready Data: One-Time Awards & CEO Succession


Delaware: The Empire Strikes Back


Update on DEI—Federal Court Temporarily Blocks Most of the Administration’s DEI Orders, But Uncertainty Continues


What is Top of Mind for US Investors in 2025?


Delaware and the Perils of Small Minority Controllers


Board Diversity: Policy Updates and Considerations for Proxy Season


Stakeholder Theory and the Challenge of Welfare Economics


Board Oversight of Cybersecurity Incidents


Board Oversight of Cybersecurity Incidents

Aaron Wendt is Director of U.S. Governance Policy, and Joah Clements is a Senior Analyst, at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on their Glass Lewis memorandum.

Technological advancements have improved the ways that companies collect, transfer, and process data within and between organizations, creating markets that are largely reliant on internet infrastructure for their day-to-day operations. While these technological advancements have increased the speed at which business is conducted and improved efficiency and economies of scale, this convenience can often come at the cost of cybersecurity. Hackers are constantly testing the defenses protecting corporate data, as evidenced by the explosive recent growth in the number of cyberattacks.

Many boards are already adapting to promote risk oversight that includes cybersecurity threats. There has been a significant increase in disclosure of companies’ and boards’ approaches to cybersecurity following the introduction of new SEC rules in July 2023. Those rules require disclosure of material cybersecurity incidents within four days, as well as a discussion of the role of management and the board’s committees in overseeing cybersecurity matters to be included in annual reports.

We found that approximately 74% of companies in the Russell 3000 index have taken the additional step of codifying oversight of cybersecurity at the full board level or with a board committee in their governing documents or committee charters. We view management and board oversight of cybersecurity as an essential component of a company’s preparedness for cyberattacks and expect that companies will continue to improve best practices for oversight and disclosure as attention to cybersecurity issues grows more widespread.

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Stakeholder Theory and the Challenge of Welfare Economics

Robert T. Miller is the F. Arnold Daum Chair in Corporate Finance and Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Development at the University of Iowa College of Law. This post is based on his recent paper.

In a new paper posted on SSRN, I argue that stakeholder theory will not become fully intellectually respectable until it adopts the concepts and methods of welfare economics.

As everyone involved in corporate governance knows, stakeholder theory holds that directors should manage the corporation for the benefit of all its stakeholders, including not only its shareholders but also its employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers, as well as any other individuals affected by the corporation’s operations. In an age of climate change and concern about greenhouse gas emissions, the stakeholders of a corporation can reasonably be understood to include everyone now living or to be born in the future. The imperative to maximize stakeholder welfare can thus become an imperative to maximize social welfare generally.

All serious observers realize, however, that, even when the class of stakeholders is drawn narrowly, it virtually never happens that what is good for one stakeholder is good for all stakeholders. Rather, in the typical case, what is good for some stakeholders is bad for others, and what some stakeholders prefer others disprefer. It is essential to stakeholder theory, therefore, that directors balance the competing interests or aggregate the conflicting preferences of stakeholders in order to choose the course of action that is—in some sense—best for all stakeholders collectively.

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Board Diversity: Policy Updates and Considerations for Proxy Season

Beth Sasfai is a Partner, Michael Mencher is a Special Counsel, and Vince Flynn is an Associate, at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Sasfai, Mr. Mencher, Mr. Flynn, Brad Goldberg, Amanda Weiss, and Luci Altman.

Public companies find themselves rethinking disclosures relating to the diversity of their board and their director recruitment practices as they head into proxy season, given recent developments – including the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision striking down Nasdaq’s board diversity rules, the current administration’s presidential executive orders on diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, and changes to proxy advisor and institutional investor policies on board diversity.

Companies will need to make decisions about proxy statement disclosures amid ongoing uncertainty (see, e.g., this February 25, 2025, Cooley alert discussing the US District Court for the District of Maryland pausing the enforcement of certain key provisions of the DEI executive orders) and while balancing competing stakeholder priorities. Political and legal developments, including executive orders, litigation and activist pressure campaigns have been consequential, and this environment has resulted in changes to proxy advisor and some institutional investor policies. This alert aims to provide an overview of updated board diversity voting policies of proxy advisory firms and key institutional investors and offer guidance to companies as they review their board diversity disclosures and practices in the current environment.

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