Monthly Archives: November 2025

Activision II’s New Lessons and Important Reminders for Boards When Selling the Company

Gail Weinstein is a Senior Counsel, Philip Richter is a Partner, and Steven Epstein is the Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Steven J. SteinmanRoy Tannenbaum, and Randi Lally, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Sjunde AP-Fonden v. Activision Blizzard (Oct. 2, 2025) (“Activision II”), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage, declined to dismiss claims that the directors of Activision Blizzard, Inc. breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the $69 billion sale of the company to Microsoft Corporation.

This is the court’s second major decision issued in this litigation—which, notably, is still at the pleading stage although it has been pending for three years. In the first decision, “Activision I” (2024), Chancellor Kathaleen St.  J. McCormick held that Activision’s board may have violated certain provisions of the DGCL relating to approval of merger agreements. That decision led the board to have its stockholders ratify the merger agreement; and, famously, led the Delaware legislature to enact amendments to the DGCL to clarify certain of the technical requirements for approval of merger agreements.

In Activision II, the court has addressed the plaintiff’s claims that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in the sale process. The Chancellor found it reasonably conceivable (the standard at the pleading stage) that the board permitted Activision’s CEO to tilt the process to favor a quick deal with Microsoft, which was in his personal interest but not value-maximizing for the stockholders. Notably, although the court assumed that all of the directors were independent and disinterested, the court found it reasonably conceivable that all of them breached their fiduciary duties and acted in bad faith by simply supporting the conflicted-CEO’s decisions. The court also held that the fiduciary breaches could not be cleansed under Corwin nor exculpated under Cornerstone—leaving the directors potentially personally liable.

READ MORE »

Preparing for an Evolving Shareholder Proposal Landscape

Randi Lesnick is a Co-Chair of the Corporate Practice, and Ferrell Keel and Joel May are Partners at Jones Day. This post is based on a Jones Day memorandum by Ms. Lesnick, Ms. Keel, Mr. May, Marjorie Duffy, Braden McCurrach, and Kim Pustulka.

Preparing for an Evolving Shareholder Proposal Landscape

This White Paper examines how recent commentary from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Paul Atkins signals a greater role for state law in defining shareholders’ ability to place proposals on company proxy statements. Chairman Atkins has articulated his views about how state law and Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act intersect Rule 14a-8(i)(1), which permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal if it is not a “proper subject” for shareholder action under state law.

We outline the potential implications for companies and boards, including a possible heightened use of advance notice bylaws and how private ordering might ultimately result in companies adopting objective procedural guardrails such as ownership thresholds. READ MORE »

SEC Changes Course on Mandatory Arbitration Provisions

Tejal Shah, Brian French, and Peter Adams are Partners at Cooley. This post in based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Shah, Mr. French, Mr. Adams, Koji Fukumura and Samantha Kirby.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently changed its longstanding position disfavoring the inclusion of certain mandatory arbitration provisions in corporate certificates of incorporation or bylaws. As Chair Paul Atkins explained, the SEC’s September 17, 2025, policy statement “provides the Commission’s views on whether mandatory arbitration provisions are inconsistent with the federal securities laws – and concludes that they are not.” The upshot? The SEC’s decisions concerning “whether to accelerate the effectiveness of a registration statement will not be affected by the presence of a provision requiring arbitration of investor claims arising under the federal securities laws.”

To be clear, the policy statement does not express a view on whether mandatory arbitration provisions are “appropriate or optimal for issuers or investors.” And Atkins explained that the SEC will not weigh in on the second-order question of whether a company should adopt mandatory arbitration provisions, noting that he expects “robust public debate on this issue among various interested parties.” Indeed, since the SEC issued its policy statement, stakeholders have already begun debating the costs and benefits of mandating arbitration in this context – an issue we anticipate will be litigated on multiple fronts.

SEC neutral on mandatory arbitration provisions

The SEC’s policy statement emphasized two main takeaways. First, the SEC is taking a neutral stance on mandatory arbitration provisions – specifically, “the presence of an issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provision will not impact decisions whether to accelerate the effectiveness of a registration statement under the Securities Act.” Second, disclosure remains paramount. The SEC made clear that it will “focus on the adequacy of the registration statement’s disclosures, including disclosure regarding issuer-investor mandatory arbitration provisions.”

The SEC concluded that mandatory arbitration provisions are not inconsistent with the federal securities laws. But the SEC left open key questions related to state law preemption – an area that will be closely watched going forward. READ MORE »

Incentive Compensation and Cybersecurity: What’s the Connection?

Phil Yores is a Senior Director at Willis Towers Watson. This post is based on a WTW memorandum by Mr. Yores, Zach Georgeson, and Becky Huddleston.

When the ebb and flow of cybersecurity goes wrong, even a well-prepared company can be surprised by a new form of exploit. Strong systems and practices are table stakes, as the risks of getting it wrong are significant and the potential costs are material and lasting. Expecting and responding to disruption has become the normal course of business.

So, should companies — and, more specifically, boards of directors — pay employees for non-events or penalize for the inevitable?

Two key questions bring this subject to life in corporate boardrooms:

  1. Should incentive plans directly include a cybersecurity metric for top company officers, or is the impact on “earnings” sufficient to reflect the occurrence?
  2. How should boards and board committees consider the impact of cyber attacks on incentive plan outcomes?

READ MORE »

2025 Corporate Governance & Incentive Design Survey

Tyler Papineau and Mark Riley are Consultants at Meridian Compensation Partners. This post is based on their Meridian report.

Executive Summary

In reviewing executive compensation program designs and related corporate governance policies, companies should consider current market practices and recent trends to inform boardroom discussions.

Meridian’s 2025 Corporate Governance & Incentive Design Survey provides key insights into executive compensation and corporate governance.

The Survey summarizes market practices at 200 large publicly traded companies across all industries (referred to herein as the “Meridian 200”). These companies have median revenues and market capitalizations of $25.4B and $46.5B, respectively, making them a representative sample of the S&P 500.

All information was gathered from annual proxy statements. Meridian has conducted a similar analysis annually since 2011, with minimal changes to the list of reviewed companies (97% of the 2025 Meridian 200 constituents were reviewed in 2024). This year-over-year consistency allows for the identification of emerging trends. For more details, please refer to the Profile of Survey Companies section.

Governance Practices and Company Policies

Prevalence of Board Diversity Disclosures Decreases: 74% of companies disclose ethnic diversity statistics for current board membership, down significantly from 97% in 2024. This trend appears to coincide with changes in federal policy under the Trump administration as well as updated guidance from some institutional investors and proxy advisory firms regarding DEI-related expectations.

Mandatory Retirement Age Policies Remain Common: Similar to last year, 79% of Meridian 200 companies disclosed a mandatory retirement age policy for board members. Most of these companies set the retirement age between 72 and 75, with a recent trend towards the older end of this range continuing.

Independent Board Chair Used by Half of all Companies: 53% of Meridian 200 companies maintain a separation between the Board Chair and CEO roles. Among the companies that separate the roles, the majority (74%) appoint an independent director as Board Chair.

Companies Cap Outside Board Seats: 92% of companies disclose director overboarding policies. These policies limit the number of public company board seats an incumbent director may hold.

Most Companies Maintain Clawback Provisions Beyond the Dodd-Frank Requirements: In late 2023, NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed companies were required to adopt and implement a Dodd-Frank compliant mandatory clawback policy. 83% of companies choose to maintain policies or provisions that exceed the requirements of the mandatory policy. Companies’ expanded policies feature additional triggers (i.e., beyond financial restatement), cover a broader employee group and/or apply to more elements of compensation.

Proxy Disclosures

Compensation-Related Shareholder Proposals Decline; Support Remains Low: In 2025, 14% of companies received at least one compensation-related shareholder proposal. Most compensation-related shareholder proposals continue to receive limited shareholder support.

Nearly All Companies Engage in Shareholder Outreach: 96% of the Meridian 200 disclose shareholder outreach efforts. 50% of the Meridian 200 provide specific details on feedback received and/or actions taken as a result of the feedback.

SEC “Pay Versus Performance” Disclosures Remain Consistent: Consistent with last year, most companies (80%) choose to compare TSR against an industry specific index and a strong majority of companies (92%) use graphical disclosure to depict the relationship between “compensation actually paid” and performance.

Annual Incentive Plan Design Practices

Earnings Metrics Drive Annual Incentives: 88% of companies include an earnings metric in the annual incentive plan. On average, earnings metrics account for 50% of the overall plan weighting.

Financial Metric Prevalence Remains Consistent: Consistent with previous years, the most prevalent financial performance metrics are operating income, revenue, cash flow and earnings per share (EPS).

Non-Financial Measures Are Also Common; Types of Measures Vary Widely: Most companies (80%) also include non-financial measures in the annual incentive plan. 57% of companies include corporate operational/ strategic goals, while 43% of companies measure individual performance, either as a weighted metric (21% prevalence) or as a modifier (22% prevalence).

Long-Term Incentive Plan Design Practices

Performance Awards Are the Primary LTI Vehicle: Performance-based awards continue to be used by nearly all Meridian 200 companies (99%) in the long-term incentive plan. On average, performance awards represent 62% of CEOs’ annual target LTI value.

Standard Performance Period – 3 Years: It is most common (96%) for Meridian 200 companies to assess performance over a three-year measurement period. Typically, goals are set over the three-year cumulative period, rather than set as individual annual goals.

Relative TSR Remains the Predominant Metric: 80% of companies include a relative TSR measure in performance awards. On average, relative TSR accounts for 54% of the overall plan weighting and most companies (92%) pair TSR with at least one other performance measure. It is more common for companies to incorporate relative TSR as a weighted metric (60% prevalence), rather than a modifier.

See the full report here.

Nasdaq Proposes Stricter Initial and Continued Listing Standards

Neel Maitra and Anna Tomczyk are Partners, and Nicholas Chionchio is an Associate at Dechert LLP. This post is based on their Dechert memorandum.

Key Takeaways

  • Nasdaq proposed changes to its initial and continued listing standards, including a US$15 million minimum market value of public float for new listings under the net income standard and an accelerated delisting process for securities with a listing deficiency and a market value of listed securities below US$5 million.
  • Nasdaq proposed a US$25 million minimum public offering proceeds requirement specifically for new listings of companies principally operating in China.

Nasdaq Proposes Changes to Initial and Continued Listing Standards

The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“Nasdaq”) recently proposed modifications to its initial and continued listing standards (“Proposed Listing Standards”). The Proposed Listing Standards were submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on September 3, 2025, for review.[1] If approved by the SEC, the Proposed Listing Standards would introduce both increased requirements for minimum company public float and capital raised during initial public offerings and stricter suspension and delisting procedures for companies failing to meet Nasdaq’s continued listings standards.

Note that if approved, Nasdaq plans to implement the changes to the initial listing requirements promptly, offering a 30-day window for companies already in the listing process to complete the process under the prior standards. Thereafter all new listings will have to meet the new requirements. As discussed further below, a key aspect of the Proposed Listing Standards is the reintroduction of a minimum public offering proceeds requirement specifically for companies principally operating in China. If approved, this could significantly raise the entry barrier for these companies into U.S. capital markets.

US$15 Million Minimum Market Value of Unrestricted Publicly Held Shares for New Listings

Nasdaq is proposing to raise the minimum Market Value of Unrestricted Publicly Held Shares (“MVUPHS”) requirement for companies listing under the net income standard on the Nasdaq Global Market and the Nasdaq Capital Market. Unrestricted Publicly Held Shares are shares that are not held by an officer, director or 10% shareholder and that are free of resale restrictions.

Currently, a company must have a minimum MVUPHS of US$8 million under the income standard for initial listing on the Nasdaq Global Market[1] or a minimum MVUPHS of US$5 million under the net income standard for initial listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market.[1] The Proposed Listing Standards would increase the MVUPHS requirement to US$15 million for companies listing under the net income standard for both the Nasdaq Global Market and the Nasdaq Capital Market.

As Nasdaq explains in its proposal, the MVUPHS standard is one of the core liquidity requirements of the Nasdaq listing rules. Like the other liquidity requirements, it is meant to ensure there is sufficient liquidity to provide price discovery and support an efficient and orderly market for a company’s securities. However, Nasdaq continues to observe problems with the trading of smaller company listings with low liquidity, including a lack of price discovery and ongoing noncompliance with Nasdaq’s listing rules, and Nasdaq has therefore proposed the increases to the minimum MVUPHS to help address these concerns.

Accelerated Suspension and Delisting if MVLS Is Less Than US$5 Million

Nasdaq is also proposing to amend its rules to accelerate the suspension and delisting process for certain noncompliant companies. Specifically, if a company that has a Market Value of Listed Securities (“MVLS”) of less than US$5 million becomes noncompliant with a quantitative continued listing requirement (minimum bid price, MVLS or market value of publicly held shares), it will be subject to immediate suspension and delisting without a compliance period. Based on the noncompliant-companies list disclosed by Nasdaq as of October 27, 2025, 235 Nasdaq-listed companies are currently failing to meet Nasdaq’s continued listing standards.[1]

Under the current rules, a company listed on Nasdaq that falls out of compliance with quantitative continued listing requirements is typically granted a 180-day grace period to regain compliance. A request for a hearing usually stays the delisting process. The Proposed Listing Standards would eliminate the grace periods for a company whose MVLS has remained below US$5 million for 10 consecutive business days. According to the Proposed Listing Standards, Nasdaq believes it is not appropriate for such a company to continue trading on Nasdaq during the pendency of a hearing and will suspend trading in its securities immediately.

These rules would take effect 60 days after SEC approval.

Heightened Listing Standards for China-Based Companies

Nasdaq is also proposing to adopt new listing requirements for companies headquartered, incorporated or principally administered in China (including Hong Kong and Macau):

  • IPOs: Companies seeking to list on Nasdaq must raise a minimum of US$25 million in public offering proceeds.
  • De-SPAC Transactions: Following a de-SPAC transaction, the company must have a minimum MVUPHS of at least US$25 million.
  • Direct Listings: Companies will be precluded from listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market in connection with a direct listing.
  • Transfers From Other Markets: In the case of a company transferring its listing from the OTC market or from another national securities exchange, the company must have a minimum MVUPHS of at least US$25 million and have traded on the other market for at least one year before it is eligible to list on Nasdaq.

A company is considered “principally administered in China” if any of the following tests are met:

  1. the company’s books and records are located in China;
  2. at least 50% of the company’s assets are located in China;
  3. at least 50% of the company’s revenues are derived from China;
  4. at least 50% of the company’s directors are citizens of, or reside in, China;
  5. at least 50% of the company’s officers are citizens of, or reside in, China;
  6. at least 50% of the company’s employees are based in China; or
  7. the company is controlled by, or under common control with, one or more persons or entities that are citizens of, reside in or whose business is headquartered, incorporated or principally administered in China.

These rules would take effect 30 days after SEC approval.

Takeaways

Nasdaq’s proposed amendments to its initial and continued listing standards (SR-NASDAQ-2025-068 and SR-NASDAQ-2025-069) remain subject to SEC review and approval, which could take up to 90 days or longer. If adopted, smaller companies, and particularly those based in China, will face higher thresholds to list and maintain their status on Nasdaq.


Footnotes

1 See Nasdaq filings for the proposed rule changes, available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/rulebook/nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2025-068.pdf and https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/rulebook/nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2025-069.pdf(go back)

2 The company must also have US$18 million under the Equity Standard and US$20 million under either the Market Value or Total Assets/Total Revenue Standards. No changes are proposed to these standards.(go back)

3 The company must also have US$15 million under either the Equity or Market Value of Listed Securities Standards. No changes are proposed to these standards.(go back)

4 List available at https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/non-compliant-company-list(go back)

Recent Updates on Section 220 Demands: What Changed, What Hasn’t, and How to Respond

Michael Holmes is a Vice Chair, and Jeffrey Crough and Meredith Lyons are Partners at Vinson & Elkins. This post is based on a Vinson & Elkins memorandum by Mr. Holmes, Mr. Crough, Ms. Lyons, and Christina Peterman, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

One of the biggest changes in Delaware litigation over the past decade has been the increased usage of books and records demands under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) and the attendant burden of responding to these demands. This was, in part, the result of the encouragement of the Delaware courts in the apparent hope that allowing limited pre-litigation fact-finding would allow would-be plaintiff stockholders to make a determination of whether a lawsuit was really worth pursuing or not.[1] As the demands increased, however, so too did the burdens, as stockholders began making more extensive demands and some Delaware cases ordered extensive inspections that almost mimicked full-blown discovery. Responding to the proliferation of demands and the heightened burdens imposed by them, the Delaware legislature recently adopted amendments to Section 220 to unify its application and restrict its scope. While subsequent case law has reinforced Section 220 as a viable tool for stockholders, the new amendments will allow corporations that maintain thorough and consistent board documentation to take advantage of the amendment’s protections.

What Changed and What Hasn’t

1. DGCL Amendments

On March 25, 2025, the Delaware legislature amended Section 220 of the DGCL in several important respects, as outlined below:

Definition of “books and records.” The amendment limits the definition of “books and records” to enumerated categories of formal corporate documents akin to those required in a Schedule 13E-3 going-private filing, e.g., minutes, records and materials of board or committee meetings, and director and officer independence questionnaires.[2] Noticeably absent from this list is informal email correspondence, which had become the frequent subject of many demands prior to the amendment.

If a stockholder wishes to obtain records beyond these enumerated categories,[3] she has two options:

First, if the corporation lacks sufficient formal records matching the enumerated categories, the court may order production of their “functional equivalent,” but only to the extent “necessary and essential” to fulfill the stockholder’s proper purpose.[4] The “necessary and essential” standard is new, although courts might draw a parallel to the “essential and sufficient” standard that was previously applied.[5]

Second, the court may order other records produced if the stockholder demonstrates a “compelling need” for these additional records and proves by “clear and convincing evidence that such specific records are necessary and essential to further the proper purpose.”[6] The amendment provides increased protections to corporations in two concrete ways:

First, the new “compelling need” standard introduces an undoubtedly higher threshold that a stockholder must meet to obtain additional records. Pre-amendment case law allowed a stockholder to obtain information from the other document categories (like emails) so long as she “demonstrated a need.”[7] However, it remains to be seen how courts will interpret the difference.

Second, when determining the scope of production, stockholders now face a higher burden of proof in the form of “clear and convincing evidence” when they seek records beyond those listed in new Section 220(a)(1). Pre-amendment case law only required a stockholder to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the specific documents sought were “essential and sufficient” to the demand’s purpose.

To some extent, this framework codifies the approach of most Delaware cases, which allowed the production of “Formal Board Materials” such as minutes and presentations, and noted that a stockholder could then “demonstrate a need” for “Informal Board Materials” such as emails with directors or “Officer-Level Materials” that did not go to the board at all.[8] However, this codification makes a substantive difference by drawing clear lines between these categories and imposing heightened burdens of proof on stockholders.

Proper Purpose. The amendment codified the common law understanding of “proper purpose” in new Section 220(a)(2), which requires that inspection demands be for a “purpose reasonably related to a stockholder’s interest as a stockholder.” The amendment also added a new subsection, Section 220(b)(2), which provides that a stockholder may inspect a corporation’s books and records “only if all of the following apply:” (a) the stockholder’s demand is made in good faith and for a proper purpose; (b) the stockholder’s demand describes with “reasonable particularity” the stockholder’s purpose and the documents sought; and (c) the records sought are “specifically related” to that purpose.[9]

New production and use restrictions. The amendment also codifies the ability for corporations to impose reasonable confidentiality or use restrictions on the documents produced and to redact information not specifically related to the purpose of the demand, and requires that any document production be incorporated by reference into any later-filed complaint.[10] The incorporation-by-reference provision is especially noteworthy since it enables corporations to expand the evidentiary record a court can consider when evaluating a motion to dismiss and prevents a stockholder plaintiff from selectively quoting documents received in response to a Section 220 demand. Allowing a court to consider the entirety of a document and the surrounding context could prove particularly beneficial to corporations attempting to dismiss oversight (Caremark) cases where the existence of reporting or monitoring systems or the board’s monitoring of such systems is in dispute.

2. Recent Case Law

While these amendments might curtail the scope of books and records productions, two decisions from the Delaware courts show that stating a “proper purpose” for inspection remains a low bar.

In July 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a Court of Chancery decision dismissing a books and records action brought by a revocable trust representing stockholders of Amazon.[11] The trust’s demand stated that its purpose was to investigate wrongdoing by Amazon fiduciaries, alleging Amazon had engaged in anticompetitive practices.[12] In such circumstances, a stockholder must “show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the [court] can infer there is possible” wrongdoing.[13] To support its stated purpose, the trust cited ongoing litigation and investigations in which it was alleged that Amazon had engaged in anticompetitive activities.[14] In finding a sufficient basis to infer possible wrongdoing, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that the credible basis test is the “lowest possible burden of proof under Delaware law” and that investigations or lawsuits that have advanced beyond untested allegations—even if there has been no decision on the merits—can demonstrate a credible basis.[15]

Similarly, earlier this year, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster held that a stockholder had established a credible basis to suspect corporate wrongdoing where the stockholder heavily relied upon post-demand news articles that themselves cited confidential sources.[16] In reaching this conclusion, the Chancery Court rejected the company’s bright-line argument that “unreliable hearsay” in the form of news articles could not be relied upon to establish a credible basis, noting that “evidentiary determinations” are a “case-specific responsibility” and that courts “must weigh evidence and make factual findings.”[17] Here, the Chancery Court concluded that “[n]ews articles from reputable publications that rely on anonymous sources will generally be sufficiently reliable for a court to consider when assessing whether a stockholder has a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing.”[18]

How to Respond

Despite the greater predictability for those corporations poised to avail themselves of the amendments, it is likely that books and records demands will remain a central feature of Delaware litigation. In light of these significant developments, there are a number of important takeaways for corporations to keep in mind when keeping corporate records and responding to an inspection request:

Draft minutes with care and keep the record consistent. Corporations should maintain detailed, contemporaneous minutes and attach key board materials to minutes to avoid “functional equivalent” disputes and to reduce any claim of necessity for emails. Consistency with public disclosures is critical to avoid arguments of a gap or inconsistency that could support the need for a functional equivalent.

Pressure test proper purpose. The demand must describe, with reasonable particularity, the purpose of the stockholder’s demand and the books and records sought, and the books and records sought must specifically relate to the stockholder’s stated purpose.

Require a robust confidentiality agreement. After receiving a demand, corporations should take advantage of their codified right to impose reasonable restrictions on the records produced that: (i) limits the use and distribution of the documents produced, (ii) allows redaction of content “not specifically related” to the purpose, and (iii) deems the production incorporated by reference in any subsequent complaint (so you may use the full record on a motion to dismiss). However, corporations should think carefully about whether to redact information that is not specifically related to the stockholder’s purpose if there are proper use protections otherwise in place. In certain instances, too many redactions can be net harmful, especially on a motion to dismiss.

Produce formal board materials but resist emails and informal/officer-level materials. Corporations should argue that the statutory default controls and that formal board materials are sufficient, forcing stockholders to meet the “compelling need”/clear‑and‑convincing standard in order to obtain additional records.


1 State of Rhode Island Off. of Gen. Treasurer on Behalf of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Rhode Island v. Paramount Glob., 331 A.3d 179, 193 (Del. Ch. 2025). (go back)

2 8 Del. C. § 220(a)(1). Many of these categories contain three-year lookback periods.(go back)

3 Section 220(b)(1)(a) entitles stockholders to inspect a few other categories of documents, like a corporation’s stock ledger and a list of its stockholders “for any proper purpose.”(go back)

4 § 220(f).(go back)

5 See, e.g., NVIDIA Corp. v. City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 282 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. 2022), as revised (July 25, 2022) (holding officer-level emails were essential and sufficient because of “specific and concrete” allegations that officers communicated about the subject matter of the request); KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 752 (Del. 2019) (holding emails were essential and sufficient for the stockholder’s purpose where allegations showed that the company conducted corporate business over email rather than in more traditional ways).(go back)

6 § 220(g).(go back)

7 Hightower v. SharpSpring, Inc., 2022 WL 3970155, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2022).(go back)

8 Id. at *9.(go back)

9 § 220(b)(2).(go back)

10 § 220(b)(3).(go back)

11 Roberta Ann K.W. Wong Leung Revocable Tr. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2025 WL 2104036, at *11 (Del. July 28, 2025).(go back)

12 Id. at *2–3.(go back)

13 Id. at *8.(go back)

14 Id. at *2–3.(go back)

15 Id. at *8–10.(go back)

16 Paramount Glob., 331 A.3d at 183.(go back)

17 Id. at 196, 198.(go back)

18 Id. at 198–99.(go back)

2025 Annual Stewardship Report

Kristin Drake is the Head of Investment Stewardship at Dimensional Fund Advisors. This post is based on a Dimensional report.

Approach to Investment Stewardship

Dimensional supports stronger governance practices at the companies in which we invest on behalf of our clients because we believe it can improve returns for investors.[1]

Dimensional manages global equity and fixed income strategies for clients around the world. We aim in all areas to be responsible stewards of our clients’ assets, and one way we look to do so is through our stewardship activities. Stewardship activities include engaging with boards and management at portfolio companies, voting on behalf of our clients at shareholder meetings, and advocating for policies that we believe protect and enhance shareholder value.

Our Stewardship Philosophy

Dimensional believes that market prices reflect information about current corporate governance practices and that material improvements in corporate governance may be rewarded with higher market prices if such improvements enhance expected future cash flows or reduce perceived risks. Stewardship activities that promote better governance practices may therefore improve realized returns to shareholders.

Stewardship is an essential pillar of our investment process. Dimensional broadly considers portfolio-company-level governance in its investment management process through proxy voting, as well as by engaging with portfolio companies to share Dimensional’s areas of focus with regard to governance practices.[2] READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: October 31-November 6, 2025


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 31-November 6, 2025

Policy Survey Shows a Shifting Stewardship Landscape, and Diverging Investor Views Across Regions


Securities Law Update


2025 Top 250 Annual Incentive Plan Report


Director Data Requests – The Line Between Oversight and Management


Mapping the Managerial Talent Market Through Peer Networks


2025 U.S. Board Index


Ready for the Deal: Transaction Readiness in Turbulent Times


Data and Insights on Corporate Governance Developments and Important Trends in Proxy Voting



SB 21’s § 144 and Controlling Stockholders: Back to the Future?


2025 Executive Perquisites Report


Deciphering Rule 14a-8 and Chair Atkins’ Recent Remarks


Constant Campaign: Retail Engagement in Sunny Days


Constant Campaign: Retail Engagement in Sunny Days

Felipe Ucros is a Partner, and Jennifer Yank is a Senior Vice President at Gladstone Place Partners. This post is based on their Gladstone Place memorandum.

A quiet revolution is unfolding in the worlds of proxy voting, corporate governance and investor communications. So-called ‘pass-through’ voting programs, rolled out by large asset managers, are bringing millions of new participants into the proxy-voting ecosystem and creating entirely new cohorts of retail shareholders at publicly listed companies.

On October 21, Vanguard made a major announcement in this process with the addition of three funds – including its flagship S&P 500 ETF (VOO), the world’s largest ETF – to the list of participating funds in its pass-through voting program next year (which it calls Investor Choice). With this expansion, 20 million of Vanguard’s 50 million clients will be eligible to participate in its pass-through voting program in the 2026 season.

Few would have predicted such rapid growth in pass-through when the ‘Big Three’ asset managers – Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street – put the programs in place a couple of years ago. Since then, each of the programs has been refined and evolved to encompass ever-greater AUM eligibility and grown in participation. Today, Vanguard’s $3T Investor Choice is the largest pass-through program focused on individual investors. Blackrock’s pass-through program has $3.3T in eligible assets, including the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF with its more than 3 million investors. Meanwhile, more than 80% of State Street’s eligible index equity assets are available in its $1.9T program, which includes 600 institutional index funds and SPDR ETFs across the U.S., U.K. and Europe.

READ MORE »

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