Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Disclosure of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

Companies commonly supplement their reported earnings under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) with non-GAAP financial measures that they believe more accurately reflect their results of operations or financial position or that are commonly used by investors to evaluate performance. A non-GAAP financial measure is a numerical measure of a company’s historical or future financial […]

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Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban

In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. In our paper, Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we examine the ban’s effect on market quality, shorting activity, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and stock prices. […]

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SRP Mid-Proxy-Season Results: 19 Boards Declassified, 13 Precatory Declassification Proposals Passed

Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is the Director of the Shareholder Rights Project (SRP), Scott Hirst is the SRP’s Associate Director, and June Rhee is Counsel at the SRP. The SRP, a clinical program operating at Harvard Law School, works on behalf of public pension funds and charitable organizations seeking to improve corporate governance at publicly […]

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The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law

Takeovers remain the most controversial corporate governance mechanism. According to pro-takeover commentators, takeovers are generally beneficial for corporate governance. Takeovers can displace poorly performing managers and facilitate corporate restructuring. From this perspective, regulation should encourage takeovers. On the opposite side of the debate, those who oppose hostile takeovers argue that they can disrupt well-functioning companies […]

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Posted in Academic Research, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Mergers & Acquisitions | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

Exit Consents in Restructurings – Still a Viable Option?

Exit consents are often used as a restructuring tool by issuers of bonds. Issuers invite bondholders to exchange their existing bonds for new bonds (usually with a lower principal amount). In order to participate in the exchange, bondholders must agree to vote in favour of a resolution that amends the terms of the existing bonds […]

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Posted in Banking & Financial Institutions, Corporate Elections & Voting, Court Cases, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications | Tagged , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Exit Consents in Restructurings – Still a Viable Option?

Risk in the Boardroom

In a Director Note recently published, The Conference Board reviews current corporate practices on risk oversight by members of the board of directors of U.S. public companies. The study is based on findings from a survey of 359 SEC-registered business corporations conducted by The Conference Board in collaboration with NASDAQ OMX and NYSE Euronext. Data […]

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The Non-Expert Agency: Using the SEC to Regulate Partisan Politics

The regulation of political speech, including the regulation of contributions and spending, is one of the most constitutionally delicate operations in which the government can engage. As the Supreme Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo, “[Political] contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. . . . [T]he […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Securities Litigation & Enforcement, Securities Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

SEC Comment Letter: Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending

We recently submitted a comment letter in connection with a rulemaking petition, currently before the SEC, urging the development of rules to require public companies to disclose the use of corporate resources for political activities. The Petition was submitted by the Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, a group of ten corporate and securities […]

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2013 Women on Boards Survey

GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards survey includes data on 5,977 companies in 45 countries around the world. The results show that progress on most measures of female representation continues to be slow. Women now hold 11% of board seats at the world’s largest and best-known companies, up 0.5 percentage points from a year ago […]

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The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting

A large body of prior literature examines the relation between managerial equity incentives and financial misreporting but reports mixed results. This literature argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if managers are risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity […]

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