Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

The Elusive Quest For Global Governance Standards

Editor’s Note: This post is by Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School. The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance recently issued The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, a discussion paper I co-authored with Professor Assaf Hamdani. The paper is scheduled for publication in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Our slides from a […]

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Posted in Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Corporate Elections & Voting, Executive Compensation, HLS Research, International Corporate Governance & Regulation | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

The Debate Over Federal Insurance Regulation

In March 2008, the Paulson Treasury issued its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, in which Treasury recommended the establishment of a federal insurance regulatory structure to provide for the creation of an optional federal charter. The Financial Services Roundtable has endorsed the concept of a national insurance regulator, noting that “just as the […]

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Second Generation Advance Notice Bylaws and Poison Pills

This article is a reply to the post appearing in the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum authored by Marc Weingarten and Erin Magnor of Schulte, Roth & Zabel on March 17, 2009 and entitled “Second Generation Advance Notice Bylaws.” That post is available here. Introduction The past year has been marked by a wave […]

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Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies When Revlon Duties Apply

My colleagues William Kucera, Christian Fabian and Erik Axelson have prepared a memorandum further analyzing the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan. The memorandum highlights several key aspects of the decision that provide guidance to M&A practioners in counseling clients and structuring transactions. First, Lyondell clarifies when a board’s Revlon […]

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How to Avoid Overpaying for Troubled Assets

Editor’s Note: This post is based on an op-ed piece by Lucian Bebchuk published today in the Wall Street Journal online. Professor Bebchuk’s most recent post about the Treasury’s public-private investment plan is available here. Opponents of the administration’s current plan for buying troubled assets — including Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs and Peyton Young — […]

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Bailouts and Risk Management Incentives

In my paper, Bailouts, the Incentive to Manage Risk, and Financial Crises, which was recently conditionally accepted for publication at the Journal of Financial Economics, I develop a model where risk management rules are derived as optimal responses to the adverse risk taking incentives created by bailouts. Additionally, the incentives to undertake a bailout are […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Bankruptcy & Financial Distress, Financial Crisis, Legislative & Regulatory Developments | Tagged , , , | 1 Comment

SEC Grants No-Action Relief to Activist Shareholders

On March 30, 2009, the SEC staff issued two no-action letters[1] regarding the solicitation of proxies to vote in the election of directors in a situation where two dissident shareholders had submitted separate “short slates” of director nominees for election at the same annual meeting. The no-action letters permit a soliciting shareholder to “round out” […]

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Implications of the AIG Bonus Imbroglio

Great outrage and indignation have been expressed, from multiple perspectives, in connection with AIG’s retention bonuses and the Congressional response thereto. Now that most of the public, albeit probably not the actual participants, seem to be past the initial burst of emotion, we believe that it is well worth noting that all employers, whether or […]

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Impact of Accounting Choices on Performance Evaluation

In our forthcoming The Accounting Review paper entitled “The Voluntary Adoption of Internationally Recognized Accounting Standards and Firm Internal Performance Evaluation”, we investigate whether the voluntary adoption of international accounting standards is associated with changes a firm’s internal performance evaluation process; in particular, is it associated with increases in the sensitivities of CEO turnover and […]

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Underwater Stock Options and Stock Option Exchange Programs

With the market decline, many companies have found that their outstanding employee stock options are “underwater” or “out-of-the-money” because the exercise price is higher than the company’s current stock price. Underwater stock options do not provide their intended incentive and retention benefits. Moreover, they are an inefficient use of a company’s equity reserves as they […]

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Posted in Boards of Directors, Executive Compensation, Financial Crisis, Practitioner Publications, Securities Regulation | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment