Yearly Archives: 2011

The Shifting Landscape of Corporate Governance

This post comes to us from John J. Madden, a member of the Mergers & Acquisitions Group at Shearman & Sterling LLP, and is based on an article that first appeared in the BNA Corporate Governance Report and appears with permission; the complete article is available here.

The widespread public criticism of boards of directors arising from the financial crisis, and the ensuing governance reform initiatives, should not have come as a surprise to those following trends in corporate governance. Instead, they should be seen as part of a series of developments in the evolving relationship between shareholders and their boards in the United States that has been underway for the past two decades. As the shareholder base has largely consolidated into the institutional investor community and those investors have become more organized and focused on exerting the influence inherent in their substantial ownership stakes, we have seen in recent years an accelerating shift in the “balance of authority” exercised by boards and shareholders in the corporate decision-making process.

There is no indication that this trend will reverse or even slow down significantly. Accordingly, directors should understand the origins and key drivers involved, and determine how they can most effectively adapt to this changing environment and secure the confidence and support of their companies’ shareholders.

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UN Guiding Principles for Business & Human Rights

John Ruggie, the Berthold Beitz Professor of International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, is currently serving as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights. This post relates to the final version of the Guiding Principles on Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights drafted by the Special Representative, which are available here.

In March, as the final product under my UN mandate as Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights, I released a set of Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. The Guiding Principles seek to provide for the first time an authoritative global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse human rights impacts linked to business activity. The UN Human Rights Council will consider formal endorsement of the text at its June 2011 session.

The Guiding Principles are the product of six years of research and extensive consultations involving governments, companies, business associations, civil society, affected individuals and groups, investors and others around the world. They outline how States and businesses should implement the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework in order to better manage business and human rights challenges. That Framework, which I proposed in 2008, was unanimously welcomed by the Human Rights Council at the time, and has since enjoyed extensive uptake by international and national governmental organizations, business, civil society and other stakeholders.

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The Market Value of Corporate Votes

The following post comes to us from Avner Kalay, Professor of Finance at the University of Utah; Oguzhan Karakas of the Finance Department at Boston College; and Shagun Pant of the Finance Department at Texas A&M University.

In our paper, The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we propose a new method to measure the market value of the right to vote. We quantify the market value of the right to vote as the difference in the prices of the stock and the corresponding synthetic stock. The synthetic (non-voting) stock is constructed using option prices, particularly facilitating the put-call parity relationship. The main insight is that the owners of common stocks have both cash flow rights and voting rights, whereas holders of synthetic stocks have the cash flow rights but not the voting rights. Hence, the difference in the price of the stock and the synthetic stock quantifies the market value of the vote during the expected life of the synthetic stock.

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The U.S. Left Behind: The Rise of IPO Activity Around the World

René Stulz is a Professor of Finance at Ohio State University.

Craig Doidge, Andrew Karolyi and I have posted on SSRN a new working paper titled The U.S. Left Behind: The Rise of IPO Activity Around the World. We show that there has been a striking evolution over time in IPO activity across countries. We build a comprehensive sample of 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries constituting almost $2.6 trillion (constant 2007 U.S. dollars) of capital raised over 1990 to 2007. Although the share of IPO activity by U.S. firms still ranks near the top worldwide, during the 2000s IPOs in the U.S. have not kept up with the economic importance of the U.S. In the 1990s, the yearly average of the number of U.S. IPOs comprised 26.7% of all IPOs in the world while the U.S. accounted for 27% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Since 2000, the U.S. share of all IPOs has fallen to 11.7% whereas its share of worldwide GDP has averaged 30%. The average size of a typical IPO in the U.S. is larger than that in the rest of the world so that IPO proceeds may be a more relevant metric. Yet, in the last five years of our sample, total U.S. IPO proceeds drop to 16.2% of world IPO proceeds despite the fact that during that period the market capitalization of the U.S. relative to the world stock market capitalization averages 41%.

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Criticism Distorts Value ISS Provides to Boards

Don Delves is founder and president of The Delves Group, an executive compensation and corporate governance consultancy serving boards of directors. This post is based on an article that appeared in Agenda; the paper discussed in the article is available here.

Last month, as the new federal requirement for say on pay took effect, the Center on Executive Compensation (CEC) issued a white paper that includes a well-reasoned critique of Institutional Shareholder Services. Titled “A Call for Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo,” the white paper criticizes ISS for a lack of transparency regarding its rating models. It also argues that ISS’s corporate consulting services pose a conflict of interest, and that the organization has become too powerful.

As shareholders and directors assess these criticisms, they should consider ISS’s long-term record. Clearly, that record is one of doing far more good than harm. The organization’s positions have benefited both shareholders and boards at many companies over the past 10 to 15 years by helping them rein in excessive executive compensation. In eradicating or tamping down some of the worst pay practices, the organization has brought more rationality — indeed, more sanity — to executive compensation.

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Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts

The following post comes to us from Hans Christensen and Valeri Nikolaev, both of the Department of Accounting at the University of Chicago.

In the paper, Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we propose a simple classification of financial covenants into two distinct groups: performance covenants and capital covenants. Performance covenants rely on measures of profitability and efficiency whereas capital covenants rely on information about sources and uses of capital, i.e., balance sheet information. We argue that capital covenants align incentives between borrowers and lenders by limiting the amount of debt in the borrower’s capital structure. In contrast, performance covenants act as tripwires that transfer control to lenders when performance deteriorates and hence incentive conflicts between shareholders and lenders become more acute.

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SEC Claws Back Again

Editor’s Note: Wayne Carlin is a partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Carlin and John F. Savarese.

The SEC recently announced a settled enforcement action in which it obtained a “clawback” of prior compensation and stock sale profits from a CEO pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304.  SEC v. McCarthy, No. 1:11-CV-667-CAP (N.D. Ga. March 3, 2011).  This case marks the second time the SEC has obtained this type of relief without alleging that the CEO in question personally engaged in any wrongdoing.  See our prior memos concerning Section 304 clawbacks dated June 16, 2010 [“Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback Developments”] and July 24, 2009 [“SEC Pursues Unprecedented Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback”].

Section 304 requires a CEO or CFO to return incentive-based compensation to an issuer when a financial restatement occurs “as a result of misconduct. . . .”  The SEC’s position is that the issuer’s “misconduct” alone is a sufficient predicate for this relief, and that it need not establish any personal misconduct by the CEO or CFO.  The SEC’s position is supported by the one federal district court decision that has been rendered on this issue.  SEC v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010).

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Materiality of Misrepresentations in U.S. Securities Litigation

Robert Giuffra is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell’s Litigation Group. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell client memorandum.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently curtailed the scope of securities fraud actions and tightened pleading requirements, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to allege securities fraud and ultimately making such claims more prone to an early dismissal. As such, in electing to review the “materiality” issue in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., et al. v. Siracusano, et al., No. 09-1156, some observers thought that the high court might tighten further the pleading requirements in securities litigation.

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Matrixx, holding that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded material misrepresentations by defendants for failing to disclose “adverse event reports” relating to Matrixx’s popular nasal spray, while declining to adopt a bright-line standard for determining the materiality of such reports in actions against pharmaceutical companies. In applying existing law to the allegations and circumstances present in the case, the Court’s decision is narrow and does not alter the class action landscape.

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The SEC Push for Enhanced Disclosure of Litigation Contingencies

Edward Herlihy is a partner and co-chairman of the Executive Committee at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Herlihy and Eric M. Roth.

Over the last several days, there has been a raft of SEC filings in which companies have disclosed “reasonably possible” litigation losses. These filings are the result of SEC pressure and an interpretative position advanced by the Staff. In recent speeches, the Chief Accountant of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has questioned whether companies are complying with the existing disclosure standards applicable to litigation contingencies. ASC 450 (formerly known as SFAS 5) requires the disclosure of a litigation contingency if there is at least a “reasonable possibility” that a loss has been incurred, and the disclosure must include an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss or a statement that such an estimate cannot be made. The Chief Accountant has stated that the Staff is “seeing a lack of disclosure with respect to ‘reasonably possible’ losses.” Moreover, in comment letters sent to various financial services companies, the Division of Corporation Finance has questioned the adequacy of litigation-related disclosures that do not either set forth estimates of possible losses or range of losses or explain why such estimates cannot be provided.

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How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?

The following post comes to us from Harry DeAngelo, Professor of Finance at the University of Southern California, and Richard Roll, Professor of Finance at the University of California, Los Angeles.

In the paper, How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures? which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine the stability of corporate capital structures. Overall, the evidence indicates that time-series variation in the leverage of individual firms is of first-order importance, with leverage instability reflecting the external funding of company expansion and with mature firms trending away from conservative financial policies. Capital structure stability is the exception rather than the rule at publicly held industrial firms, with the preponderance of firms having leverage ratios that take on a wide range of values and that differ over time in mean value. Leverage stability occurs only infrequently and, when it does, is virtually always temporary, with stability episodes largely occurring when firms have low leverage. Departures from stability are rarely followed by rebalancing to the prior stable leverage regime or by establishment of a new stable regime. Leverage instability is strongly associated with asset growth and external funding to support that growth, and also reflects a trend away from conservative leverage that played out mainly over the 1950s and 1960s and that began in the mid- to late-1940s with the need to fund expansion during the post-World War II boom.

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